WI: Crisis of the Third Century kills Rome?

I'm not saying that it was a grand strategy, merely that in times of trouble that the Romans would pay/bribe other tribes to attack the ones on the borders.
Not as far as Danemark, and less by proxy than as auxiliaries for what mattered the Barbaricum : Roman army regularily made interventions and campaigns ast of Rhine, north of Danube and then met with some Barbarian chiefdoms or alliance against some other.
They tended to not do so, especially because they were aware that destabilizing their periphery for the evulz was going to bite them back in the culus : they needed a stable periphery, on which recruitement and trade could be done without problems (on which most of chiefdoms were happy to oblige, willy-nilly, as long the Roman state remained strong enough)

So, no, I continue to disagree : presence of Roman weapons in Barbaricum is not in any way proof of "arming barbarians in hope they would turn against each other", and Romans strategy in Barbaricum was more or less the opposite of what you describe for the most part.
 
Not as far as Danemark, and less by proxy than as auxiliaries for what mattered the Barbaricum : Roman army regularily made interventions and campaigns ast of Rhine, north of Danube and then met with some Barbarian chiefdoms or alliance against some other.
They tended to not do so, especially because they were aware that destabilizing their periphery for the evulz was going to bite them back in the culus : they needed a stable periphery, on which recruitement and trade could be done without problems (on which most of chiefdoms were happy to oblige, willy-nilly, as long the Roman state remained strong enough)

So, no, I continue to disagree : presence of Roman weapons in Barbaricum is not in any way proof of "arming barbarians in hope they would turn against each other", and Romans strategy in Barbaricum was more or less the opposite of what you describe for the most part.

Given that there are two current's of opinion on the matter, you are with one, I'm with the other, so let's just agree on disagree.
 
Given that there are two current's of opinion on the matter, you are with one, I'm with the other, so let's just agree on disagree.
To be honest, I never met your opinion before, with virtually anything I can remember (or that I checked before answering, would it be only to not make a fool of myself, among others a quick look at Heart and Pitts) about it stressing that it wasn't the case, and that Roman presence in the region was essentially stabilizing, with little to no "divide and rule", up to the point Roman collapse meant regional destabilization.

Now, maybe there's a thesis or a more recent work going in the way of your opinion. What are you basing youself on?
 
To be honest, I never met your opinion before, with virtually anything I can remember (or that I checked before answering, would it be only to not make a fool of myself, among others a quick look at Heart and Pitts) about it stressing that it wasn't the case, and that Roman presence in the region was essentially stabilizing, with little to no "divide and rule", up to the point Roman collapse meant regional destabilization.

Now, maybe there's a thesis or a more recent work going in the way of your opinion. What are you basing youself on?

Mostly from some papers I read and the fact that the large amount of weapons found outside of the Imperium couldn't be gathered by raid and selling weapons to barbarians was a crime, I doubt that the illegal commerce would be enough, so the only way for them to gather so many weapons would be for the Empire to give them to loyal chieftains.

Also Goldsworthy on his book "How Rome Fell" he states

(...) it's impressive the amount of weapons found in the hands of Scandinavian tribal armies (...). Some were captured by incursions, but most was either given to the loyal chieftains or acquired by, the mostly illegal, commerce.

I doubt that the illegal commerce would be enough to equip the numbers we get, specially like in Illerup were they found enough weapons to equip 300-350 warriors. Or like in Ejsbol were they found enough to 200.

Also:

It was much easier for the Romans to engage with a few kings or chiefs than with the many members of the individual tribes. From the begging that the leaders seen as friends of Rome were supported with subsidies and occasionally direct militar help.

(...)

The arrival of Rome could had augmented the frequency and possibly the scale of the wars on the other side of the border. What is certain is that from the 1 Century a.C. weapons begin to appear more and more frequently as funeral objects in Germanic funerals. The new economical conditions* allowed that objects that were once rare became now available in large quantities. The slave trade encouraged the incursions. But the most important fact was that the Roman subsidies allowed the chiefs to pay for bigger bands of warriors.(...) The competition for power between the leaders reached a new level of strength and intensity. Riches weren't enough to ensure success on the long run. Some of the leaders that Rome supported ended dead by rivals and other escaped to the other side of the border for a confortable live in exile.

*he specifies the trade between the two sides to Rome buying mostly amber from the Baltic, pelts and slaves.

I'm more in line with what Goldsworthy claims, that the Roman subsidies of Gold and Weapons, plus their willingness to support strong chiefs loyal to Rome was what destabilized the Border. He also goes forward and claims that it was the Roman Diplomacy that gave rise to the ascension of the tribes behind the borders and the creation of the powerful tribal leaders.
 
selling weapons to barbarians was a crime, I doubt that the illegal commerce would be enough
You had something very similar with the Carolingians and the, technical, interdiction to sell weapons outside Francia, especially to Scandinavians. It never prevented anyone to sell them swords, at the point Scandinavian swords are generally modelles on Frankish swords until the late Xth IIRC.
If I understand well enough the situation, it's possible that a good aprt of Roman swords founds in Germania may have been good local copies as well.

Giving the importance of Roman goods, including weapons, for what matter the social distinctiveness and redistribution role of Barbarian elites (Germans having, for some authors, an hypetrophied military aristocracy), you have an important incitative for trade that i'm not sure multiple interdictions (that tend to show that the interdiction wasn't that respected) would that prevent to appear.

so the only way for them to gather so many weapons would be for the Empire to give them to loyal chieftains.
Not necessarily : Barbarians as auxiliaries had as well to fought some Roman armies or Roman-equipped armies. While the gift of Roman weapons probably was reserved to particular services and loyalties, these armies also equipped themselves on the spoils of defeated armies.
On this regard, it's as well a by-product of the recruitment in Barbaricum and military situation in Romania, than trade and diplomacy.

I doubt that the illegal commerce would be enough to equip the numbers we get
Alone maybe not, but I don't see any reason why it couldn't have provided a large part of weaponry, as it happened in later times.

specially like in Illerup were they found enough weapons to equip 300-350 warriors. Or like in Ejsbol were they found enough to 200.
Which doesn't implies a diplomacy of destabilization : modern Danemark remained fairly stable (giving the circumstances) compared to what happened in the Vth, as the peninsula was run-over trough the straight. For instance, you don't see much fortifications popping up compared to this period, which hints more at a structuration, than what would appear in the case of regular and violent infighting, especially supported by the neighbouring super-power.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, it's possible that we may have part of a local production modelled on Roman features in these finds.

Also: It was much easier for the Romans to engage with a few kings or chiefs than with the many members of the individual tribes. From the begging that the leaders seen as friends of Rome were supported with subsidies and occasionally direct militar help.
Which is not the point at hand : we're not discussing if Rome did or didn't sent weapon to Germanic chiefdoms, but what was Roman policy towards these.
You argued that it had to be, partially, with the goal of destabilizing Germanic chiefdoms, trough a divide and rule objective. Which doesn't really seems obvious archeologically, giving that most of evidences of destabilization in northern Germania seems to be issued from the fall of the Roman state.

was what destabilized the Border
The problem is that raids and pushed limes is generally either a by-product of troubles proper to Barbaricum (as Marcomanic Wars causes being partially issued from inner migrations) on which Rome couldn't do much, either as a by-product of Roman crisis which allowed opportunistic raids.
If Roman involvement created destabilization as a policy, you'd have much more troubles than that in the Rhineish limes, for instance : but at the contrary of what happened in the late IInd and IIIrd century (in a time where imperial authority was significantly weakened), it was fairly quiet in the Ist or IVth century, in periods of strong imperial authority.

He also goes forward and claims that it was the Roman Diplomacy that gave rise to the ascension of the tribes behind the borders and the creation of the powerful tribal leaders.
That's a relatively bold statement to make, especially giving that Roman knowledge of Barbaricul hinterland was at best limited (Vandalic people being considered as Celtic natives for exemple). I don't remember a good litterary source on this behalf, myself, but maybe he does provides that?
 
You had something very similar with the Carolingians and the, technical, interdiction to sell weapons outside Francia, especially to Scandinavians. It never prevented anyone to sell them swords, at the point Scandinavian swords are generally modelles on Frankish swords until the late Xth IIRC.
If I understand well enough the situation, it's possible that a good aprt of Roman swords founds in Germania may have been good local copies as well.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, it's possible that we may have part of a local production modelled on Roman features in these finds.

He was only referring to weapons made in the Imperium, weapons that archaeological findings indicate to have been made by Rome.

Giving the importance of Roman goods, including weapons, for what matter the social distinctiveness and redistribution role of Barbarian elites (Germans having, for some authors, an hypetrophied military aristocracy), you have an important incitative for trade that i'm not sure multiple interdictions (that tend to show that the interdiction wasn't that respected) would that prevent to appear.

The production of weapons was controlled by the Empire, for the weapons to end in Germania the contractors, and later the fabricae, and the angariae would have to be involved in the selling of weapons. Can't see how would someone would do such a scheme without being caught, sure that the late Emperors had very little contact with how things were run, the bureaucracy made it impossible for the Emperor to know everything, but for the Emperor to not find this out would be a bit too much, unless of course if the Imperial Bureaucracy was involved in the sell.

Not necessarily : Barbarians as auxiliaries had as well to fought some Roman armies or Roman-equipped armies. While the gift of Roman weapons probably was reserved to particular services and loyalties, these armies also equipped themselves on the spoils of defeated armies.
On this regard, it's as well a by-product of the recruitment in Barbaricum and military situation in Romania, than trade and diplomacy.

Most of the weapons and armour would be damaged by battle and the findings imply that the gear was in good conditions and without remends. Also most Barbarians that acted as auxiliary would be settled inside the Imperium so those weapons would find a hard time getting into Germania.

Alone maybe not, but I don't see any reason why it couldn't have provided a large part of weaponry, as it happened in later times.

By the simple fact that the Imperium had a hard time producing enough weapons for themselves, also such illegal commerce would depend on too many factors to be in large numbers.

Which doesn't implies a diplomacy of destabilization : modern Danemark remained fairly stable (giving the circumstances) compared to what happened in the Vth, as the peninsula was run-over trough the straight. For instance, you don't see much fortifications popping up compared to this period, which hints more at a structuration, than what would appear in the case of regular and violent infighting, especially supported by the neighbouring super-power.

Denmark was but an example but if you read about the Himlingøje dynasty it indicates that Rome supported the rise of power in the Baltic, probably to force the tribes that bordered Rome to be more cautious as they now had a power in their backs. Also I never said diplomacy of destabilization, I said that they supported the raise of specific tribes that they considered loyal to help them in keeping the border tribes under control, it would only be in times of war that they would expect their "allies" in Germania to attack.

Which is not the point at hand : we're not discussing if Rome did or didn't sent weapon to Germanic chiefdoms, but what was Roman policy towards these.
You argued that it had to be, partially, with the goal of destabilizing Germanic chiefdoms, trough a divide and rule objective. Which doesn't really seems obvious archeologically, giving that most of evidences of destabilization in northern Germania seems to be issued from the fall of the Roman state.

I indicate that Rome supported the rise of selected allies, as a means to control the Germanics. Under times of peace they wouldn't ask/demand their allies to attack the border tribes but when the raids became too many or too violent they would expect powers like the Himlingøje to attack their enemies.

The problem is that raids and pushed limes is generally either a by-product of troubles proper to Barbaricum (as Marcomanic Wars causes being partially issued from inner migrations) on which Rome couldn't do much, either as a by-product of Roman crisis which allowed opportunistic raids.
If Roman involvement created destabilization as a policy, you'd have much more troubles than that in the Rhineish limes, for instance : but at the contrary of what happened in the late IInd and IIIrd century (in a time where imperial authority was significantly weakened), it was fairly quiet in the Ist or IVth century, in periods of strong imperial authority.

And you can see the Roman policy in the IIIrd century. During Caracala and Alexander they kept the border in peace so Rome had to interest in supporting inter-Germanic war, but during Maximus you see the border under much pressure, so he used his "allies" on the other side to force the border ones to ease the pressure. Another interesting example of Goldsworthy is that he says that the Roman control over their "allies" was very tenue and that they had trouble ensuring that they kept the peace when Rome wanted, and that they were forced to bribe them to stop attacking the border tribes, which is a bit ironic considering that they had bribed them in the first place to attack that said tribes but when the border ones got in line there was no way to ensure that the other ones would keep the peace.

I was at a interest convention/reunion of several former Portuguese and Spanish army officers and military historians and one of the speakers spoke of this and indicated that the Romans only considered short term gains and that their arming of the tribes behind the border was one of the things that came back to bite them in the ass.

That's a relatively bold statement to make, especially giving that Roman knowledge of Barbaricul hinterland was at best limited (Vandalic people being considered as Celtic natives for exemple). I don't remember a good litterary source on this behalf, myself, but maybe he does provides that?

On the Glossary he provides this source: W.Willems, Romans and Barbarians (1986).
 
He was only referring to weapons made in the Imperium, weapons that archaeological findings indicate to have been made by Rome.
There's a problem there. What was found at Ejsbol was around sixty swords, for roughly two hundred spears, shields and javelins.
That being deposited at different times.

Either the argument is that all or essentially of these weapons were Roman-made, either we're talking about a part of the find, which I suppose (maybe wrongly) is essentially composed by swords (in relatively limited numbers) : I tried to find a detailed file about archeological data from this cache, to no avail unfortunatly.

Can't see how would someone would do such a scheme without being caught
By the simple fact that the Imperium had a hard time producing enough weapons for themselves, also such illegal commerce would depend on too many factors to be in large numbers.

As you said, imperial control was limited, and far from being omniscient.
Even outside periods,like the IIIrd century, were imperial control was more of a private joke than a reality (that Diocletian had to reaffirm the imperial control over state manufacturies tells about the situation), stealing, corrupting, etc. and smuggle your way up to Barbarians was a fair possibility. Forbidden trade usually means a profitable trade (especially exchanged for slaves or amber).
Don't forget that army weaponry also sub-contracted a lot of its work, which make it even easier to divert weaponry or to illegally produce some.

Don't get me wrong : a lot of trafficers must have been caught and punished, but I don't think you had nearly enough scrutiny to make roman weapon production and distribution a state monopoly.

I went a bit into the Roman legislation (often repeted, which probably means it wasn't that well respected) on selling weapons (or rather, looked a bit at what Jean Andrau said about it, being specialized on roman trade) tough, and apparently it was tweaked in the way that it was forbidden to sell wheat, salt and iron (including weapons) to Rome's ennemies. It seems that it didn't as much forbidden trading weapons, than trying to speculate on Rome's war at the expense of the empire.
Giving that trade of wheat is really attested, I don't see why weapons trade wouldn't be a main explanation there as well.

Most of the weapons and armour would be damaged by battle and the findings imply that the gear was in good conditions and without remends
These cache weapons are part of a sacrificial ritual, probably directly produced for this intent

Also most Barbarians that acted as auxiliary would be settled inside the Imperium so those weapons would find a hard time getting into Germania.
I disagree : while you had a lot of auxiliaries coming from laeti communities by the IInd, Barbarian auxiliaries were as well recruited (trough treaties, for exemple) outside Romania proper. For example, Iazyges of the Pannonian Plain were bound by treaty to provide 8 000 cavalrymen, and similar treaties were passed with Germania's peoples during the Principate.

Denmark was but an example but if you read about the Himlingøje dynasty it indicates that Rome supported the rise of power in the Baltic, probably to force the tribes that bordered Rome to be more cautious as they now had a power in their backs.
There's a lot of room between the rise of a local complex chiefdom in Zealand, supported by Romans always in need of clearly identified and identifiable interlocutors; and a strategic plan to "rise" a chiefdom into a local hegemôn.
It doesn't seem, for instance, that this Danish complex chiefdom as a putative ally was hugely useful in the IIIrd when it comes to a rear alliance, when it was undergoing its apogee.

Also I never said diplomacy of destabilization, I said that they supported the raise of specific tribes that they considered loyal to help them in keeping the border tribes under control, it would only be in times of war that they would expect their "allies" in Germania to attack.
Fair enough, but you'll admit how you formulated it* was a bit misleading.

Still, I don't think that such planned policy could really account for the presence of Roman weapons (Roman-made or copies) as a coherent policy for the already mentioned reasons, as well that weapon giving covered as well "propagandist" use (Roman state and Imperial figure as source of wealth was a regular theme of imperial culture), especially giving that the weapons we mentioned so far were discovered in sacrificial caches, and then less than probably used as warfare.
Does that means that Romans were unaware they allowed barbaria kingships to recieve the means necessary to their stability (the scacerdotal of Germanic kingship being agreed upon, I think)? Maybe not.
The point being that you had a lot of other reasons, especially for "remote" peoples as in the Vistule's basin, to have access to Roman weapons without something entierly planned for centuries.

*they armed them to encourage fights between the Germanics.

And you can see the Roman policy in the IIIrd century. During Caracala and Alexander they kept the border in peace so Rome had to interest in supporting inter-Germanic war
Which is contradictory : a peaceful limes was as well based on Romania being spared inner crisis, than Barbaricum being less troubled by inner conflict (as pointed by the Marcommanic Wars).
Not that rear alliances are unthinkable, at the contrary : the conquest of Dacia points to an extensive use of Sarmatian peoples by Trajan (which created another issue, as Sarmatians raided the newly conquered regions shortly afterwards). But I'm quite under the impression it's really a thing when Rome intervenes directly in the Barbaricum.

Another interesting example of Goldsworthy is that he says that the Roman control over their "allies" was very tenue and that they had trouble ensuring that they kept the peace when Rome wanted, and that they were forced to bribe them to stop attacking the border tribes, which is a bit ironic considering that they had bribed them in the first place
In short, they had little control beyond the periphery (and even there...), and whatever they could pull off had little incidence safe structurating Barbarian chiefdoms and complex chiefdoms.
At this point, either Romans were particularily thick, or they didn't as much planned alliances than trying to find legit interlocutors (not only in the eyes of Germanic society but as well, and probably more importantly, to their own).
Does it go against the evidence of the policy of subsides of Rome? I agree it doesn't. The point, there again, is the presence of clear policy of rear alliances trough giving weapons away.

I was at a interest convention/reunion of several former Portuguese and Spanish army officers and military historians and one of the speakers spoke of this and indicated that the Romans only considered short term gains and that their arming of the tribes behind the border was one of the things that came back to bite them in the ass.
One of the main problems that Romans had, IMO, when it come to Barbaricum is that they had only a faint idea what really existed there. Tacitus' Germania remained the basic ethnographic work for what Romans could be bothered with, and it guided their "Germanic" policy a bit too long, conceptualizing Barbarians as deprived of history (something that only Romans, Greeks, and maaaaaaybe Persians and Egyptians, in a way, had) and therefore of genuine social complexity evolving trough time.
Now, how did it translated in terms of "geopolitics"...that's more or less the (interesting) discussion we have.

I'm a bit wary about the focus on short term gain : it's true in time of crisis when they had to make choices (not all good, far from it, and indeed deprived of strategical background), but the relative success on some fronts makes me think you had to have long-term goals, at least along the Rhine and in the African limes.

On the Glossary he provides this source: W.Willems, Romans and Barbarians (1986).
I don't have it, but I'll try to gave it a look.
 
@LSCatilina While I enjoy learning about what you know - i never hide that I haven't studied History - I would enjoy it even more if garnished with politeness.
I'm sorry you felt it was impolite : it's probably for the better that I edited the post before sending it.

So, again, sorry if you didn't like the harsh tone, but I'd want to stress it's much more directed at the ideas (someone intelligent can have really face-palming ideas : whatever you're studying, I've no doubt you could put me to shame) which are admittedly put as obvious affirmations. Which peeved me, but I agree I should try taking more easily, was the ideological point you did, underlining "tragedies", "catastrophe", etc. which are not only wrong, but pollute an historical discussion with pseudo-moralistic concepts (such as linkening tragic chances of the IIIrd with the caste system of MA), and for someone that studied or know the period are always a bit cringe-worthy.
 
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