WI CP victory in WWI?

Deleted member 1487

If Italy joins the CP, it is going to do so out for its own interest. In 1914-15, Italian ruling class wanted to affirm Italy's status as a true great power, and its regional hegemony in the Med or the Balkans, by cutting down one of its traditional rivals, Austria or France. It had worthwhile irredentist claims on both powers: Trento, Istria, Dalmatia on Austria, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia on France. The Austrian ones indeed were more important than the French ones, but it might easily be seen as the opposite, in the right circumstances. It very much came down to giving the right spin to nationalist propaganda.

British neutrality, regardless of whether London is pro-France or not, can quite easily make Rome deem the Entente the weaker part, and hence to prefer an opportunist CP belligerance to grab the above claims, some extra colonies if at all possible, and cut down France in Europe a notch to raise Italy in its place.

Not really considering France was Italy's #1 trading partner and had excellent relations prewar. Also the even minor threat that Britain would castigate them would be enough to deter them. It is not a matter of who is weaker, but who they can live with post war: France, a friendly, excellent trading partner, or Austria-Hungary, a belligerent competitor in the Balkans, who will have German backing. Also, remember that for the decade before WW1 Conrad, the Austrian CoS was demanding loudly and publicly that Austria declare war on Italy at every opportunity to crush her as a rival. Also Austria broke a number of treaties with Italy, including the one stipulating that any gains in power in the Balkans by one power would necessitate the other get compensation. Italy never received anything after AH annexed Bosnia. The slight was remembered.

The consequences post war for attacking France were too great to risk.

Question for you: why would Italy declare war in the 1914-15 era when Germany is turning East? Do you really think she would bear the brunt of the French reserves while the French fleet can interdict her coast at will? Remember the French fleet is concentrated in the Medditerranean, as Britain promised to defend her North Sea/Atlantic coast even if neutral. The Italian Fleet was a joke even then compared to the French fleet, so French troops could be landed in Rome with ease if needed. And the Italian government is not very stable in peace, but would be even less if the French, who most Italians thought of as an ally, were attacked. If the French land in Sicily or near Rome, Italy may well surrender or rise in revolt against the government.

Now the Brits probably would cut off coal to the Italian even if neutral to aid the French, so where would Italy get the rest from? Through Gibraltar or the Suez, both British controlled? The CPs cannot supply enough for themselves, let alone Italy.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Not really considering France was Italy's #1 trading partner and had excellent relations prewar.

Quite irrelevant. Italo-French trade relationship had not been an obstacle to Italy's CP membership and several decades when France was henceforth the designated enemy in an European war.

Also the even minor threat that Britain would castigate them would be enough to deter them.

Irrelevant as well. Short of going to war, and hence being able to impose a naval blockade, Britain cannot inflict severe enough reprisals on Italy. Rome may easily expect that France and Russia are defeated before Britain can do anything really serious.

It is not a matter of who is weaker, but who they can live with post war: France, a friendly, excellent trading partner, or Austria-Hungary, a belligerent competitor in the Balkans, who will have German backing.

Already been there for Italy, in the 1880s-1890s. They can easily live with it, and in the coming German-led Pan-European Zollverein, Italy is one of the nations that is posed to benefit the most of it. Economic ties with Germany would trump the ones with France. Even today, guess who's the most important trading partner of Italy ? Not France. In such a post-war Europe, Germany would most likely balance its support and mediate between its two main allies. Italy would have been proved as useful to check France as Austria to check Russia.

Also, remember that for the decade before WW1 Conrad, the Austrian CoS was demanding loudly and publicly that Austria declare war on Italy at every opportunity to crush her as a rival.

It was a couple outbursts, not "for a decade", and nothing came of it, apart from a nutty warmonger CoS embarassing its nation on the diplomatic stage by proposing to attack an official ally. Irrelevant.

Also Austria broke a number of treaties with Italy, including the one stipulating that any gains in power in the Balkans by one power would necessitate the other get compensation. Italy never received anything after AH annexed Bosnia. The slight was remembered.

True, but again, irrelevant in the scenario. The stuff that Italy can reap from France's hide in a victorious war can easily make up for everything.

The consequences post war for attacking France were too great to risk.

Which consequences ? The German-Italian alliance, which the war would solidify, can hold a defeated France in check for the foreseeable future.

Question for you: why would Italy declare war in the 1914-15 era when Germany is turning East? Do you really think she would bear the brunt of the French reserves while the French fleet can interdict her coast at will? Remember the French fleet is concentrated in the Medditerranean, as Britain promised to defend her North Sea/Atlantic coast even if neutral. The Italian Fleet was a joke even then compared to the French fleet, so French troops could be landed in Rome with ease if needed.

Ridicolous Francewank. In such a scenario, France is going to waste a lot of blood in futile attempts to break through the Alps front if it tries to go on the offensive against Italy, just like it did with Germany in Alsace-Lorraine. Italy would just stay on the defensive until Germany is done with Russia, and send an expeditionary corps against Serbia, and its surplus forces in Alsace-Lorraine, as standing Triple Alliance protocols dictated.

As it concerns the naval side, France would have a lot of trouble defending its own coasts and the communications with North Africa against the combined Italo-Austrian-Turkish fleets, much less go on the offensive. And your statement of the relative strength of the French and Italian WWI fleets is a rather distorted assessment. Not to mention that Britain is neutral, so Germany can send a part of its fleet to base in the Med through the North Sea-Atlantic route. Britain may unofficially help France defend its northern coasts, but it cannot interdict Germany from moving its own ships.

And the Italian government is not very stable in peace, but would be even less if the French, who most Italians thought of as an ally, were attacked. If the French land in Sicily or near Rome, Italy may well surrender or rise in revolt against the government.

Please. Italy got Caporetto and it did not fold. And very few thought of France as an ally in 1914, it was a traditional rival and had been the designated enemy for three decades. Your "ally" statement is quite anachronistic. It was 1914, not 1964.

Now the Brits probably would cut off coal to the Italian even if neutral to aid the French, so where would Italy get the rest from? Through Gibraltar or the Suez, both British controlled? The CPs cannot supply enough for themselves, let alone Italy.

As long as Britain is neutral, it may refuse selling its coal to Italy, but it cannot put a CP Italy under blockade. Italy may easily get its coal from Germany, Belgium, and America. And the CP as a whole had a food deficit (Italy is not going to have a serious problem about it), not a coal deficit.
 
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Quite irrelevant. Italo-French trade relationship had not been an obstacle to Italy's CP membership and several decades when France was henceforth the designated enemy in an European war.

Bismarck's system was supposed to avoid war. The 'designated enemy' was social change, which war invariably speeds up. The alliance with Italy was something of a ruse in any case. It was certainly not signed in the expectation (on either side) that there was soon going to be a war with France.

Irrelevant as well. Short of going to war, and hence being able to impose a naval blockade, Britain cannot inflict severe enough reprisals on Italy. Rome may easily expect that France and Russia are defeated before Britain can do anything really serious.

Why? As Wiking points out, the French and Russians have fight in them in this scenario.

Economic ties with Germany would trump the ones with France.

That's not how it works. I'm an Italian businessman making money off French trade. Do I want war with France? No! I use my political influence to stear the nation away from it. The Franco-Italian link was the extant one.

Business interests had big roles in foreign policy in the days of bourgeois democracy. In France, the rivalry of the Russophile big-resource men and the more German-friendly bankers was played out in the foreign ministry. In Italy, shipping interests keen to eliminated the competition at Trieste whipped up war-fever.

Germany would most likely balance its support and mediate between its two main allies.

This is requiring Italy to bet on the unseeable future being to their liking (ignoring pan-Germanism as usual). Better to consider the present. What exactly does Italy lose in the event of Entente victory, whether Italy is involved on the Entente side or neutral?

It was a couple outbursts, not "for a decade", and nothing came of it, apart from a nutty warmonger CoS embarassing its nation on the diplomatic stage by proposing to attack an official ally. Irrelevant.

That Vienna let him get away with it speaks volumes.

True, but again, irrelevant in the scenario. The stuff that Italy can reap from France's hide in a victorious war can easily make up for everything.

War is seldom a profitable pursuit for statesmen and it certainly wasn't for Italy in those circumstances (the population of the territories they gained in Europe was, IIRC, about equal to their war casualties - and it was mostly Germans or Slavs rather than Italian lads in their prime). The war was, for Italy more than anybody, about symbols.

Which consequences ? The German-Italian alliance, which the war would solidify, can hold a defeated France in check for the foreseeable future.

The immediate military consequences, which should always be foremost in anyone's mind in entering an ongoing and undecided war.

Ridicolous Francewank. In such a scenario, France is going to waste a lot of blood in futile attempts to break through the Alps front if it tries to go on the offensive against Italy, just like it did with Germany in Alsace-Lorraine.

Why? The sea is right there, you know. Why must the French necessarily do the worst possible thing when they have a perfectly viable alternative.

Italy would just stay on the defensive until Germany is done with Russia,

That today or tomorrow?

Russia, it turns out, is just miles and miles of bloody Russia. Inhabited by millions of bloody Russians.

As it concerns the naval side, France would have a lot of trouble defending its own coasts and the communications with North Africa against the combined Italo-Austrian-Turkish fleets, much less go on the offensive. And your statement of the relative strength of the French and Italian WWI fleets is a rather distorted assessment.

Are you planning to provide evidence to the contrary?

Not to mention that Britain is neutral, so Germany can send a part of its fleet to base in the Med through the North Sea-Atlantic route. Britain may unofficially help France defend its northern coasts, but it cannot interdict Germany from moving its own ships.

We can shadow them ominously, like what happened to Rozhestvensky. We absolutely don't want the Germans to win, so why not use our clout to limit their options within the bounds of neutrality?

Please. Italy got Caporetto and it did not fold.

The difference between Caporetto and a seizure of Rome ought to be obvious.
 

Deleted member 1487

The only thing I have to add to I Blame Communism's excellent retort is that the Italians won't be able to import enough coal from Germany or AH. The Alpine passes won't allow through enough, so everything with Italy needs to be shipped in. AH ports don't have enough capacity to ship it in from Germany, which already needs all the coal it can get and cannot afford the cost of diverting its limited locomotives to Austro-Hungarian ports to ship its limited coal across the Adriatic.

And the Italian Navy needs either coal or oil to run, which it will not be able to do with its needs not met by its allies. Also, it won't be able to raise capital to pay for US coal or oil and US shipping, because the US was insisting on a cash-and-carry policy until 1917. The British won't be giving out loans, which is how the Italians paid for things OTL. So how is Italy going to raise the money to buy things, especially when France can interdict the Mediterranean shipping routes with its larger navy?

Logistically Italy cannot fight against France, let alone Britain, which doesn't even take into consideration the internal political ramifications of fighting on the side of their hereditary enemy, who won't give up unredeemed Italian lands (there is no way AH COULD even give up the Italian speaking areas without causing massive political troubles among every 'unredeemed' ethnic group in the empire).
 

archaeogeek

Banned
Logistically Italy cannot fight against France, let alone Britain, which doesn't even take into consideration the internal political ramifications of fighting on the side of their hereditary enemy, who won't give up unredeemed Italian lands (there is no way AH COULD even give up the Italian speaking areas without causing massive political troubles among every 'unredeemed' ethnic group in the empire).

Well that and the "unredeemed" italian areas didn't really match up with the actual spread of the Italian minority, which was basically Trentino and a minority of the population of Istria living in the cities...
 
It had worthwhile irredentist claims on both powers: Trento, Istria, Dalmatia on Austria, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia on France.

I love your description of the irredentist claim on Savoy as "worthwhile". The claim on Savoy was delusional for the only reason that the population living in Savoy was NOT Italian at all and that Italian was not and had never ever been spoken in the area.
On the basis of language and "ethnicity" France had a much more legitimate claim to the Aoste Valley, Bardonneche, Suse, Tende and Sestrieres. One which we sadly did not press upon in 1945.
 
Well that and the "unredeemed" italian areas didn't really match up with the actual spread of the Italian minority, which was basically Trentino and a minority of the population of Istria living in the cities...

Indeed, the claim on Bozen was delusional full stop!
 
I love your description of the irredentist claim on Savoy as "worthwhile". The claim on Savoy was delusional for the only reason that the population living in Savoy was NOT Italian at all and that Italian was not and had never ever been spoken in the area.
On the basis of language and "ethnicity" France had a much more legitimate claim to the Aoste Valley, Bardonneche, Suse, Tende and Sestrieres. One which we sadly did not press upon in 1945.

Pardon me for cherrypicking, but isnt Tende in France?
 

Eurofed

Banned
The alliance with Italy was something of a ruse in any case. It was certainly not signed in the expectation (on either side) that there was soon going to be a war with France.

Nobody in the late 19th century expected a war with other European powers 'soon' (apart from the occasional war fever), but it was seen as a wholly realistic occurence, to make full preparation against. And after the Triple Alliance, so war with France, on either side.

Why? As Wiking points out, the French and Russians have fight in them in this scenario.

Not necessarily in Rome's eyes. Or the Italian government may make the expectation that Britain is going to stay neutral.

That's not how it works. I'm an Italian businessman making money off French trade. Do I want war with France? No! I use my political influence to stear the nation away from it. The Franco-Italian link was the extant one.

The German-Italian one was quite important, too, yet it did not stop Italian belligerance.

In Italy, shipping interests keen to eliminated the competition at Trieste whipped up war-fever.

They were but a minor element in the coalition of interests that supported the pro-war lobby. ITTL the same shipping interests may instead aim to cut down French competition in the Med.

This is requiring Italy to bet on the unseeable future being to their liking (ignoring pan-Germanism as usual). Better to consider the present. What exactly does Italy lose in the event of Entente victory, whether Italy is involved on the Entente side or neutral?

In the case of neutrality, it loses a major chance to affirm its status as a great power. That was the true main motivation for Italian WWI belligerance, to affirm its status as a great power by cutting down one of its traditional rivals, Austria or France. Everything else, including the irredenta, were smokescreens.

That Vienna let him get away with it speaks volumes.

Yup, that Franz Joseph had terrible judgement in picking his generals (not a surprise if you look at the militayr record of Austria past 1848). Conrad was an albatross around Austria's neck, an old fool whose strategic incompetence was only matched by his taste for advocating unprovoked pre-emptive wars against real or assumed enemies of Austria, one day Serbia, the other day Italy, the day after that Serbia again.

War is seldom a profitable pursuit for statesmen and it certainly wasn't for Italy in those circumstances (the population of the territories they gained in Europe was, IIRC, about equal to their war casualties - and it was mostly Germans or Slavs rather than Italian lads in their prime).

True, but ultimately irrelevant from the PoV of Italian elite at the time, see my point above.

The immediate military consequences, which should always be foremost in anyone's mind in entering an ongoing and undecided war.

I need to remind you that this be a war that the country has been preparing to fight for three decades.

Why? The sea is right there, you know. Why must the French necessarily do the worst possible thing when they have a perfectly viable alternative.

Which one ? An amphibious landing ? It would have been the French Gallipoli, even assuming that with a two-front war, and no BEF, the French Army has the men to waste in such a foolish errand.

We can shadow them ominously, like what happened to Rozhestvensky. We absolutely don't want the Germans to win, so why not use our clout to limit their options within the bounds of neutrality?

What Britain can do within the bounds of neutrality is not going to harm Germany's chances to win in any meaningful way. So the RN shadows the HSF while it sails from Kiel to La Spezia. Big deal.

The difference between Caporetto and a seizure of Rome ought to be obvious.

ROTFL. 1914 isn't 1849 and the Italian Army isn't the ragtag militias of the Roman Republic. Italy has been preparing for this kind of war since 1882, amphibious landings were much more troublesome in WWI than in WWII and even in the 1940s. quite troublesome to pull it off in Italy, by armies much more powerful than the French one. Little doubt that it would be the French Gallipoli.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I love your description of the irredentist claim on Savoy as "worthwhile". The claim on Savoy was delusional for the only reason that the population living in Savoy was NOT Italian at all and that Italian was not and had never ever been spoken in the area.

All true, but it was an historical claim, since an Italian state had owned the area for centuries. Same situation as for Dalmatia, Italians were actually a minority there in 1914, but it was deemed Italian for historical reasons (Venice had owned the area for a long time, and the decline of Italian population had been a recent phenomenon).

My point was that those claims were worthwhile from the PoV of a Belle Epoque Italian nationalist.
 
I love your description of the irredentist claim on Savoy as "worthwhile". The claim on Savoy was delusional for the only reason that the population living in Savoy was NOT Italian at all and that Italian was not and had never ever been spoken in the area.
On the basis of language and "ethnicity" France had a much more legitimate claim to the Aoste Valley, Bardonneche, Suse, Tende and Sestrieres. One which we sadly did not press upon in 1945.

Ethnicity does not equal national identity.
 

Eurofed

Banned
The only thing I have to add to I Blame Communism's excellent retort is that the Italians won't be able to import enough coal from Germany or AH. The Alpine passes won't allow through enough, so everything with Italy needs to be shipped in. AH ports don't have enough capacity to ship it in from Germany, which already needs all the coal it can get and cannot afford the cost of diverting its limited locomotives to Austro-Hungarian ports to ship its limited coal across the Adriatic.

And the Italian Navy needs either coal or oil to run, which it will not be able to do with its needs not met by its allies. Also, it won't be able to raise capital to pay for US coal or oil and US shipping, because the US was insisting on a cash-and-carry policy until 1917. The British won't be giving out loans, which is how the Italians paid for things OTL. So how is Italy going to raise the money to buy things, especially when France can interdict the Mediterranean shipping routes with its larger navy?

Italy may in all likelihood import enough coal from Germany through the Alpine passes to feed the vital parts of its war machine, that is the northern Italy industrial area (which had a fairly good railway network), the army, and the navy. The Adriatic is a CP lake and can be used for coastal shipping. And what commodities aren't shipped by its allies by land can be bought from America by sea. The French navy was nowhere so good that it could interdict the Med alone against the Italian one, much less so the combined Italian, Austrian, and Turkish ones, even less so if a portion of the HSF shifts to the Med. France alone has not the power to blockade the CP, not Germany and not Italy. As for the loans, if Britain won't give them, America will.

Logistically Italy cannot fight against France, let alone Britain,

All this Ententewank is making me sick. :rolleyes:

which doesn't even take into consideration the internal political ramifications of fighting on the side of their hereditary enemy,

I need to remind you that the Italian pro-war lobby started by agitating to join the CP. The bulk of the pro-war faction was indifferent about which side Italy would join. The bulk of the anti-war faction was opposed to the war per se, it did not favor a side, and the pro-war nationalists were very efficient in overcoming it.

who won't give up unredeemed Italian lands (there is no way AH COULD even give up the Italian speaking areas without causing massive political troubles among every 'unredeemed' ethnic group in the empire).

Probably true for Trieste whose ownership had meaningful economic consequences for Austria. But Trento or Gorizia ? Magyars, Czechs, Poles, and Croats didn't give a damn about them. It didn't need to give up all of the irredenta to win Italy over.
 
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Pardon me for cherrypicking, but isnt Tende in France?

It is indeed, but from what I read once some folks in Paris claimed a much larger area which was not awarded for various reasons.
My point was that if Italy can claim Savoy, then France can also claim parts of Italy on the other side of the watershed for both cultural and historical reasons.

Mulder said:
Ethnicity does not equal national identity.

In the case of Savoy it is very hard to make the case for an Italian identity in the region. True the Italian Monarchy was after all created by the Savoia dynasty and there is an undeniable historical connection between Savoy and Lombardia.
Yet at the same time there are also similar connections with the Lyonnais and the Dauphiné area further compounded by the fact that Savoyards spoke a dialect of Arpitan (Franco-Provencal).
On balance it therefore maks more sense for Savoy to be part of France but the cultural and linguistic specificities of the region shoud be respected. Something which is sadly not always the case at present in France.
 
Nobody in the late 19th century expected a war with other European powers 'soon' (apart from the occasional war fever), but it was seen as a wholly realistic occurence, to make full preparation against. And after the Triple Alliance, so war with France, on either side.

It's true that the generals broadcast that the traisn would roll as soon as the snow had melted from the Balkans every damn year - and provide them with work, handily enough. Did anyone else pay much attention, especially prior to the turn of the century?

Look at the Bulgarian crisis. The Russians have no idea how they're actually going to get Bulgaria, the Germans won't fight in a hundred years, Britain's navy is a joke, and the three of them collectively decide that it's all too much bother for a place like Bulgaria. The prizes for the capitalist and the statesman were outside Europe in those decades.

Bismarck juggled alliances rapidly to balance his assets against each threat. He was too clever to break treaties, but he was clever enough to sign treaties which he had no intention of obliging. I will have to re-read what Taylor says about the Triple Alliance, but it was a calculated manouvre from Berlin.

Bismarck never took Italy any more seriously than her (then small) physical power made him. And why would the junker's junker bother himself about the darling of liberals? One moment, he told his correspondants that Italy was not a great power - but when he needed threats to justify his plans, he raised the dread prospect of a Russo-Italian alliance. He used Italy as a balancing factor in his equations, safe in the knowledge that the Italians could do little about it.

Not necessarily in Rome's eyes. Or the Italian government may make the expectation that Britain is going to stay neutral.

The point is that even with Britain neutral, the French and Russians can give the Germans a hard run of it. The Germans certainly thought so, of WW1 wouldn't have happened.

The German-Italian one was quite important, too, yet it did not stop Italian belligerance.

It was smaller, which is another factor to add to the ledger along with Austria's Ancestral Enemy status, the much lesser risk involved in a fight with Austria, and the more attractive prospects of a world arranged by the Entente.

They were but a minor element in the coalition of interests that supported the pro-war lobby. ITTL the same shipping interests may instead aim to cut down French competition in the Med.

Not really. The point was that Austria's seaborne trade went through either the Danube or Trieste and to a lesser extent Fiume. If the Italians annexed those cities, they gained control of the bottleneck to that whole system and were in a position to make Austria's considerable shipping interests uncompetative. The soap and steel of Brno would now have to be carried away in Italian ships.

Are the Italians in a position to make the French Mediterranean ports uncompetative if they win? Except for Nice, no, and Nice was not a hugely important commercial port. The whole south of France had less of an important hinterland to begin with, too.

If the shipping firms could benefit from either policy equally, why do you think they agitated for war with Austria? Garibaldian patriotism? Much as that motivated plenty of people, it was certainly helped by cold hard cash.

In the case of neutrality, it loses a major chance to affirm its status as a great power. That was the true main motivation for Italian WWI belligerance, to affirm its status as a great power by cutting down one of its traditional rivals, Austria or France. Everything else, including the irredenta, were smokescreens.

There's a strong case to made for that outlook, but arbitrary tracts of land - in this case the rocky Adriatic shore and the rockier Alps - often become inextricable from national grandeur. If Italy was going to assert her prestige, she would do it fighting her arch-rival. This was also the more sensible choice from a military and political standpoint - especially when you consider Cadorna's supreme over-confidence about his ability to march on Vienna.

Yup, that Franz Joseph had terrible judgement in picking his generals (not a surprise if you look at the militayr record of Austria past 1848). Conrad was an albatross around Austria's neck, an old fool whose strategic incompetence was only matched by his taste for advocating unprovoked pre-emptive wars against real or assumed enemies of Austria, one day Serbia, the other day Italy, the day after that Serbia again.

Quite - and do you think this made it any easier for the two countries to be reconciled? It's as reasonable to suppose that Austria would suddenly quit Bosnia because the Germans are determined to court Serbia.

True, but ultimately irrelevant from the PoV of Italian elite at the time, see my point above.

What was it Hamlet said?

...I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men,
That, for a fantasy and trick of fame,
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain?
...

Again, a legend builds up around certain unremarkable portions of our earth on behalf of which thousands of young men are condemned to death. The Italian troops heading to the front chalked 'Trento' onto their carriages. You can't just switch the gears on something like that, anymore than Hitler could decide in 1939 that he'd rather have North Schleswig than Danzig.

I need to remind you that this be a war that the country has been preparing to fight for three decades.

And given how prepared they turned out to be for the realities of Alpine warfare with Austria, what good exactly does that do them? :p

'Preparation' is another one of these magic words like 'diplomatic resources'. One cannot prepare one's way out of naval inferiority or over a range of gigantic mountains.

Which one ? An amphibious landing ? It would have been the French Gallipoli, even assuming that with a two-front war, and no BEF, the French Army has the men to waste in such a foolish errand.

And what was the situation of the Italiahn defences at the time? Guns on every inch of coast, well-hardened? Good troops ready to rush to the coast? Erskine Childers pointed out in The Riddle of the Sands that a German army in lighters could have landed at their leisure around the Wash, and that book triggered a national panic that led to among other things the reform of the army, the creation of the TA, and the establishment of Rosyth. And still the Germans bombarded East Anglia quite easily enough, IIRC. Had Italy created a comprehensive national system that made every inch of a largely straight coastline as defensible as Suvla Bay?

The Dardanelles have been perhaps the most strategic waterway in the world since the Persians came to chastise Athens and Sparta, and as a bonus they're absurdly defensible: rocky hills on a tiny spit of land. Recall, also, that the Ottomans had young boys passing grenades up, and used wooden catapults to supplement their ordinance. It was a national effort to defend the City.

As to numbers, this is all assuming that the French have taken equivelant casualties facing a much smaller portion of the German armies. Not to mention that they aren't going to go to Gallipoli.

What Britain can do within the bounds of neutrality is not going to harm Germany's chances to win in any meaningful way. So the RN shadows the HSF while it sails from Kiel to La Spezia. Big deal.

It's an implicit threat of war in the event of misbehavior. If the Germans didn't give a flying damn about British threats, they would have invaded Belgium, no?

ROTFL. 1914 isn't 1849 and the Italian Army isn't the ragtag militias of the Roman Republic. Italy has been preparing for this kind of war since 1882, amphibious landings were much more troublesome in WWI than in WWII and even in the 1940s. quite troublesome to pull it off in Italy, by armies much more powerful than the French one. Little doubt that it would be the French Gallipoli.

And have you ever stood in an Italian fortification on the beaches of the Latium? They last. I have seen plenty of our bunkers in the Forth. WHat were the Italian plans in the event of a landing? Which troops - mobilised from the length of the country - would rush to the defense?

I'm not saying the French would win, I'm saying the threat is real and adds another to Italy's long list of reasons of reasons not to make war with France.

What is "this kind of war", in any case? And where were those preparations in the valley of the Isonzo?

It was justified by strategic reasons, since it allowed Italy to reach the watershed.

I'll file it with Poland's urgent need for frontage on the sea and France's absolutely necessary riverine border.

Probably true for Trieste whose ownership had meaningful economic consequences for Austria. But Trento or Gorizia ? Magyars, Czechs, Poles, and Croats didn't give a damn about them. It didn't need to give up all of the irredenta to win Italy over.

Need I remind you that the Hungarian exiles proposed a rising during the Venetian War, and that the Austrian constitution was a more-or-less direct result of defeat in Italy?

The Croats, of course, gave plenty a damn about Italian irredentism - although in a very different fashion to, say, the Romanians.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Bismarck juggled alliances rapidly to balance his assets against each threat. He was too clever to break treaties, but he was clever enough to sign treaties which he had no intention of obliging. I will have to re-read what Taylor says about the Triple Alliance, but it was a calculated manouvre from Berlin.

Nonetheless, He was ready to step on Italy's side during the Italo-French war-panics of the 1880s.

Bismarck never took Italy any more seriously than her (then small) physical power made him. And why would the junker's junker bother himself about the darling of liberals? One moment, he told his correspondants that Italy was not a great power - but when he needed threats to justify his plans, he raised the dread prospect of a Russo-Italian alliance. He used Italy as a balancing factor in his equations, safe in the knowledge that the Italians could do little about it.

Oh, sure, but please, please do give up your depiction of Bismarck as Metternich reborn. The hidebound ultra-reactionary crazies like Pius IX mistook a sensible conservative constitutional monarchy like the Kingdom of Italy as the spawn of the Jacobins, not a hard-eyed pragmatic realist like Bismarck.

The point is that even with Britain neutral, the French and Russians can give the Germans a hard run of it. The Germans certainly thought so, of WW1 wouldn't have happened.

Actually they thought it might happen in 1930 or so, as Russia modernized.

It was smaller, which is another factor to add to the ledger along with Austria's Ancestral Enemy status, the much lesser risk involved in a fight with Austria, and the more attractive prospects of a world arranged by the Entente.

Not that smaller, France was, albeit admittedly to a slightly lesser degree, the other traditional rival, there was no lesser risk if Britain stays neutral, and for Italy there was no special attractive prospects in a world arranged by the Entente.

Not really. The point was that Austria's seaborne trade went through either the Danube or Trieste and to a lesser extent Fiume. If the Italians annexed those cities, they gained control of the bottleneck to that whole system and were in a position to make Austria's considerable shipping interests uncompetative. The soap and steel of Brno would now have to be carried away in Italian ships.

OTOH, as the interwar showed, if Central Europe and the Balkans end up in the hands of a string of hostile nationalist pawns of France and/or Russia, Italy is not going to get anything significant out of it.

Are the Italians in a position to make the French Mediterranean ports uncompetative if they win? Except for Nice, no, and Nice was not a hugely important commercial port. The whole south of France had less of an important hinterland to begin with, too.

They may make a fair bid to get the Riviera, however, if they win.

If the shipping firms could benefit from either policy equally, why do you think they agitated for war with Austria? Garibaldian patriotism? Much as that motivated plenty of people, it was certainly helped by cold hard cash.

The shipping firms anyway were not among the most important economic interest groups that supported intervention, such as the heavy industry, which were ultimately indifferent which side Italy took.

There's a strong case to made for that outlook, but arbitrary tracts of land - in this case the rocky Adriatic shore and the rockier Alps - often become inextricable from national grandeur. If Italy was going to assert her prestige, she would do it fighting her arch-rival.

But France was the other traditional rival.

This was also the more sensible choice from a military and political standpoint - especially when you consider Cadorna's supreme over-confidence about his ability to march on Vienna.

Or march on Lyon and Marseilles, as the case may be ITTL.

Again, a legend builds up around certain unremarkable portions of our earth on behalf of which thousands of young men are condemned to death. The Italian troops heading to the front chalked 'Trento' onto their carriages.

And they would have chalked 'Nice' ITTL.

You can't just switch the gears on something like that, anymore than Hitler could decide in 1939 that he'd rather have North Schleswig than Danzig.

Funny that you remark it: I may remind that before Nazism, Danzig and the Corridor ranked higher than the Sudetenland in the irredentist aspirations of the German people (although both ranked lower than Austria), yet he went after the Sudetenland before Danzig and the Corridor.

And given how prepared they turned out to be for the realities of Alpine warfare with Austria, what good exactly does that do them? :p

Given that they won't attack until Germany is ready to do it, too, and when it does, France is going to fall out of sheer forces inferiority, Italy is going to suffer less ITTL than in OTL.

'Preparation' is another one of these magic words like 'diplomatic resources'. One cannot prepare one's way out of naval inferiority or over a range of gigantic mountains.

I notice that typically, given a few years and sufficient budget determination, it is quite possible to do at lot about naval inferiority. :p

And what was the situation of the Italiahn defences at the time? Guns on every inch of coast, well-hardened? Good troops ready to rush to the coast?

Forts had been built to shield Liguria, Tuscany and Latium since the '80s, just to protect against a French landing. The railway network, down to Rome and Naples, was fairlt well-developed to shunt troops around, and a front in the French Alps would leave Italy a sizable amount of surplus forces (so much that standing accords with Germany envisaged to deploy some of them in Alsace) Logistically, a successful landing in Latium and Campania was far from simple, as WWII showed, and technology was much less friendly to amphibious operations in WWI.

As to numbers, this is all assuming that the French have taken equivelant casualties facing a much smaller portion of the German armies.

They may leave the same amount of troops in Alsace which they did IOTL, and send to the Eastern front all the troops they sent through Belgium IOTL. I dunno why you insist on ignoring this scenario.

Not to mention that they aren't going to go to Gallipoli.

No, they go to Anzio. Big deal.

It's an implicit threat of war in the event of misbehavior. If the Germans didn't give a flying damn about British threats, they would have invaded Belgium, no?

Which misbehavior ? Germany is sending its ships trhough the Atlantic to shore up his allies and fight an enemy in the Med, through international waters. That's entirely within acceptable behavior, unless Britain suddently pretends it owns the high seas, and America would have very sharp words to say in that case.

And have you ever stood in an Italian fortification on the beaches of the Latium?

They were built soon after the Triple Alliance was signed.

What is "this kind of war", in any case?

A war with France, as part of the Triple Alliance-

I'll file it with Poland's urgent need for frontage on the sea and France's absolutely necessary riverine border.

Oh, sure, never said that it was a rightful or sensible claim. In the end, Italy reaped no real benefit from owning Bolzano/Bozen. The zone has some quite lovely tourist landscapes, but Italy is chock-full with them, and appeasing the German minority with various economic benefits has been a significant burden (although admittedly, they were able to put them to much better use than Naples or Sicily). And Germany was able to invade Italy in 1943 regardless of our possession of South Tyrol.

Need I remind you that the Hungarian exiles proposed a rising during the Venetian War, and that the Austrian constitution was a more-or-less direct result of defeat in Italy?

Sure, but that has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

The Croats, of course, gave plenty a damn about Italian irredentism - although in a very different fashion to, say, the Romanians.

Only insofar as it impinged in territories with significant Croat populations in it, i.e. Dalmatia and Istria. There were no significant Croat minority in Trento, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Trieste.
 
Nonetheless, He was ready to step on Italy's side during the Italo-French war-panics of the 1880s.

In Germany's interests. Italy was weaker, so given that he didn't want war he leaned on the stronger party.

Oh, sure, but please, please do give up your depiction of Bismarck as Metternich reborn.

I wish you'd drop that. While I regard finding moral role-models among the leaders of the past (and present) as a futile effort, I respect Bismarck. He was ruthless, he was smart, he was sensible, he dressed impeccably, he got what he wanted, what he wanted included peace, and he belonged to a species of Victorian conservative that a socialist like me finds much easier to like than most Victorian liberals.

As for Metternich, I try to replace the caricature image of the man that you seem to hold to (he was if anything less conservative than Bismarck: Bismarck believed in God, throne, and an orderly society, whereas Metternich believed in Metternich) with an accurate portrait, but I won't pretend I like the bastard.

The hidebound ultra-reactionary crazies like Pius IX mistook a sensible conservative constitutional monarchy like the Kingdom of Italy as the spawn of the Jacobins, not a hard-eyed pragmatic realist like Bismarck.

Bismarck was hard-eyed and that's why he saw that Italy was much weaker than the other powers and both Rome and several other countries overestimated it because of the liberal legend that surrounded it. He used this.

Actually they thought it might happen in 1930 or so, as Russia modernized.

Source for 1930? Every source I've confronted suggests 1916 - three-year conscription and the completion of the railways. And given how much Russia was able to mobilise even under war conditions, I think Russia and France in 1916 might have had a fair shot.

But if the Germans didn't feel that encirclement was immanent, why did they allow the war to begin?

Not that smaller, France was, albeit admittedly to a slightly lesser degree, the other traditional rival, there was no lesser risk if Britain stays neutral, and for Italy there was no special attractive prospects in a world arranged by the Entente.

1) I was talking about the volume of trade.

2) Besides the irredenta themselves, there were change and opportunity in the Balkans and the ME, A-H humbled, and the possibility of an Italian Adriatic.

OTOH, as the interwar showed, if Central Europe and the Balkans end up in the hands of a string of hostile nationalist pawns of France and/or Russia, Italy is not going to get anything significant out of it.

Apples and oranges. Some shipping merchants got a lot of money out of it, and one thing I would advise you never to do is expect a rich man to put the country's interests before his own.

Who besides Mongolia and Great Socialist Tannu Tuva was a Russian pawn in the interwar?

They may make a fair bid to get the Riviera, however, if they win.

How much? Toulon? If not Toulon, then there still isn't a major port there. There full stop isn't anywhere with the exceptional significance of Trieste.

The shipping firms anyway were not among the most important economic interest groups that supported intervention, such as the heavy industry, which were ultimately indifferent which side Italy took.

I know; the whole diversion is besides the point. I was merely using a real example to show the power of sectional capitalist interests, and how those who made money from France would militate against war.

But France was the other traditional rival.

A few centuries of oppression, three wars of independence, an ongoing rivalry, and a CoS in Vienna demanding pre-emptive war vs a brief period of trade war with the country which summoned Italy into existence?

Or march on Lyon and Marseilles, as the case may be ITTL.

That doesn't change the French threat from the sea.

And they would have chalked 'Nice' ITTL.

I've seen these photographs, I know about the Italians attempts to use "reciprocality" to get Trento. Where are the sources for Nice-mania?

Funny that you remark it: I may remind that before Nazism, Danzig and the Corridor ranked higher than the Sudetenland in the irredentist aspirations of the German people (although both ranked lower than Austria), yet he went after the Sudetenland before Danzig and the Corridor.

Diplomacy isn't a shopping list. Hitler took the opportunities that were given, as anybody would have. Obviously the Italians cared more about the irredenta than Libya or Eritrea but they stuck their noses in their first.

Given that they won't attack until Germany is ready to do it, too, and when it does, France is going to fall out of sheer forces inferiority, Italy is going to suffer less ITTL than in OTL.

The discussion is not about casualties but about how "preparation"supposedly makes the thread of the French navy vanish.

I notice that typically, given a few years and sufficient budget determination, it is quite possible to do at lot about naval inferiority. :p

And in 1914, Italy's navy was still inferior. So much for the "preparation" that had apparently been going on since 1882.

Forts had been built to shield Liguria, Tuscany and Latium since the '80s, just to protect against a French landing. The railway network, down to Rome and Naples, was fairlt well-developed to shunt troops around, and a front in the French Alps would leave Italy a sizable amount of surplus forces (so much that standing accords with Germany envisaged to deploy some of them in Alsace) Logistically, a successful landing in Latium and Campania was far from simple, as WWII showed, and technology was much less friendly to amphibious operations in WWI.

A convincing case - although one that by its nature acknowledges that the threat of a French landing was taken perfectly seriously.

They may leave the same amount of troops in Alsace which they did IOTL, and send to the Eastern front all the troops they sent through Belgium IOTL. I dunno why you insist on ignoring this scenario.

It's exactly the scenario I'm discussing. Are you under the impression that five German armies were halted by the Old Contemptibles and Plucky Little Belgium? The French had several army-sized formations, and their reserves, committed to the battle that developed out of the Belgium thrust. All these can now be sent to Alsace.

Taken as a whole, Frontiers saw roughly equal forces. You've taken five armies off the German side, and one army (the Belgian) and a small army (the BEF) off the Entente side.

No, they go to Anzio. Big deal.

You were arguing that the manpower to go to Italy didn't exist, and I pointed out that there would be no Gallipoli adventure, leaving more men to go to Italy. Once again, you're shifting the terms of the debate.

Which misbehavior ? Germany is sending its ships trhough the Atlantic to shore up his allies and fight an enemy in the Med, through international waters. That's entirely within acceptable behavior, unless Britain suddently pretends it owns the high seas,

IBC's guide to diplomacy 101: absolutely everything is acceptable when it serves our interests and unacceptable when it doesn't.

and America would have very sharp words to say in that case.

Besides being broadly pro-Entente, they'd kept quiet for the last 100 years.

They were built soon after the Triple Alliance was signed.

Then I'll concede the point, although I certainly don't take this as evidence that war was expected. He who wishes for peace...

A war with France, as part of the Triple Alliance-

The Triple Alliance was, again, intended to avert war, like everything Bismarck did after 1880 at the latest.

Oh, sure, never said that it was a rightful or sensible claim. In the end, Italy reaped no real benefit from owning Bolzano/Bozen. The zone has some quite lovely tourist landscapes, but Italy is chock-full with them, and appeasing the German minority with various economic benefits has been a significant burden (although admittedly, they were able to put them to much better use than Naples or Sicily). And Germany was able to invade Italy in 1943 regardless of our possession of South Tyrol.

Poland's case for needing sea-access, or Czechia's for needing the Sudetenland, were however pretty solid.

Sure, but that has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

You just said that the other A-H nations didn't care what happened with Italy. That is the issue at hand.

Only insofar as it impinged in territories with significant Croat populations in it, i.e. Dalmatia and Istria. There were no significant Croat minority in Trento, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Trieste.

Did people in the past not understand precedent?
 

Eurofed

Banned
I wish you'd drop that. While I regard finding moral role-models among the leaders of the past (and present) as a futile effort, I respect Bismarck. He was ruthless, he was smart, he was sensible, he dressed impeccably, he got what he wanted, what he wanted included peace, and he belonged to a species of Victorian conservative that a socialist like me finds much easier to like than most Victorian liberals.

While I take notice of your statement, I honestly have to state that in the past, I stumbled upon statements of yours about Bismarck that seemingly depicted him as a ultra-conservative caricature that feared Jacobins behind every corner. At least by the time he became Chancellor, this was not surely the case. He supported status quo, diplomatic or social, only when it benefited his interests.

As for Metternich, I try to replace the caricature image of the man that you seem to hold to (he was if anything less conservative than Bismarck: Bismarck believed in God, throne, and an orderly society, whereas Metternich believed in Metternich) with an accurate portrait, but I won't pretend I like the bastard.

Ok, next time you seemingly go on that angle, I shall use Pius IX as a comparison retort instead, if I remind to. :p;)

Source for 1930? Every source I've confronted suggests 1916 - three-year conscription and the completion of the railways. And given how much Russia was able to mobilise even under war conditions, I think Russia and France in 1916 might have had a fair shot.

Ok, let's say 1920 then. 1916 IMO is probably a bit too optimistic a benchmark of efficiency for the Tsarist state, after Stolypin bought the farm.

2) Besides the irredenta themselves, there were change and opportunity in the Balkans and the ME, A-H humbled, and the possibility of an Italian Adriatic.

These are however direct effects of Italy defeating Austria, not benefits from a world arranged to Entente's tastes. On the other side, besides the French irredenta, there were all kinds of opportunities in Africa if France is humbled.

Who besides Mongolia and Great Socialist Tannu Tuva was a Russian pawn in the interwar?

Sorry, I misexplained myself. IOTL interwar, those lands became French satellites, broadly speaking. In an hypothetical early Entente victory ATL, they would have quite possibly become Tsarist Russia's satellites. In neither case, Italy (would have) benefited much.

How much? Toulon? If not Toulon, then there still isn't a major port there. There full stop isn't anywhere with the exceptional significance of Trieste.

It's at the far end of the plausible war claim, but Toulon might be in it, or be put into a Danzig-like status.

A few centuries of oppression, three wars of independence, an ongoing rivalry, and a CoS in Vienna demanding pre-emptive war vs a brief period of trade war with the country which summoned Italy into existence?

Counterexample: attempts to dominate the peninsula that hearkened back half a millennium (see the Sicilian Vespers, Charles VIII, Francis I, Louis XIV), Napoleonic rule, scarcely less fierce rivalry, at least two decades of "Cold War", broadly speaking. As far as most Italian patriots were concerned, gratitude for help in the second war of independence had been nullified by subsequent support for the Pope. As one politician quipped, "Mentana killed Magenta".

That doesn't change the French threat from the sea.

As I said, there were forts, spare troops, and railways to deal with it. And the Italian fleet was not so inferior to the French one.

I've seen these photographs, I know about the Italians attempts to use "reciprocality" to get Trento. Where are the sources for Nice-mania?

Those photographs were shot after months of nationalist propaganda to bring the Austrian irredenta to the fore in the public consciousness. My point is that if the Italian ruling classes had chosen to side with the CP, nationalist propaganda would have focused on the French irredenta, and the picture would show Nice and Corsica instead. It was doable, it had been done for Libya already, the Italian public got in a nationalist fervor about Tripoli, blissfully oblivious of Trento and Trieste at the time.

Diplomacy isn't a shopping list. Hitler took the opportunities that were given, as anybody would have. Obviously the Italians cared more about the irredenta than Libya or Eritrea but they stuck their noses in their first.

And war to grab Libya was made quite popular by nationalist propaganda. So why do you find so difficult to believe that a nationalist war fever could be whipped up against France ?

And in 1914, Italy's navy was still inferior. So much for the "preparation" that had apparently been going on since 1882.

One may argue that the Italian navy was less inferior to the French one in 1914 than in 1882. Given its strategic situation, Italy had to divide its efforts between the Army and the Navy roughly equally, if it wanted to affirm its security.

A convincing case

Good. :D

It's exactly the scenario I'm discussing. Are you under the impression that five German armies were halted by the Old Contemptibles and Plucky Little Belgium? The French had several army-sized formations, and their reserves, committed to the battle that developed out of the Belgium thrust. All these can now be sent to Alsace.

Taken as a whole, Frontiers saw roughly equal forces. You've taken five armies off the German side, and one army (the Belgian) and a small army (the BEF) off the Entente side.

Well, true, but WWI favors defense, so Germans need less forces to shore up Alsace against extra French forces than Germany did to invade Belgium and northern France. And not all of them can go to Alsace. There is still the Alps to man. ;)

You were arguing that the manpower to go to Italy didn't exist, and I pointed out that there would be no Gallipoli adventure, leaving more men to go to Italy. Once again, you're shifting the terms of the debate.

Didn't the majority of Entente forces for the Gallipoli campaign came from the British Empire ? :confused:

Besides being broadly pro-Entente, they'd kept quiet for the last 100 years.

Reasons why America would not be pro-Entente in the scenario I proposed: the CP include a bigger chunk of Europe, so trade with them matters more, they attacked no neutrals while the Entente did, a bigger chunk of American citizens have roots in CP nations.

Besides, one would be wise not to overestimate Anglo-American eternal friendship and camaraderie by the turn of the 20th century. I'll go and remark that given the right diplomatic and political butterflies, it is far from impossible for the American people to take grave offense at the Entente blockade instead of CP USW.

Then I'll concede the point, although I certainly don't take this as evidence that war was expected. He who wishes for peace...

The Triple Alliance was, again, intended to avert war, like everything Bismarck did after 1880 at the latest.

<Shrug> It was expected much as NATO has expected a war with Russia through most of its existance.

Poland's case for needing sea-access, or Czechia's for needing the Sudetenland, were however pretty solid.

Nope, those cases were just as flimsly as Italy claiming South Tyrol or France claiming Rhineland.

You just said that the other A-H nations didn't care what happened with Italy. That is the issue at hand.

Care in the sense of minding whether Italy got a land that the empire as a whole got no significant benefit from, and held no significant folk of theirs.
 
While I take notice of your statement, I honestly have to state that in the past, I stumbled upon statements of yours about Bismarck that seemingly depicted him as a ultra-conservative caricature that feared Jacobins behind every corner. At least by the time he became Chancellor, this was not surely the case. He supported status quo, diplomatic or social, only when it benefited his interests.

My opinions change as I become more informed and I don't for a moment deny it, but I don't remember a time when I was on this forum and didn't have a grudging admiration for the Iron Chancellor. Perhaps where we fail to see eye-to-eye is that I don't think being a convinced conservative was necessarily a bad thing. Sure, Bismarck's belief that the end of his system would eventually result in the triumph of lunatic 'nationalists' and 'socialists' and other riff-raff, the end of proper diplomacy, the reckless creation of a Greater Germany, a terrible treaty with Russia, a catastrophic war, civilisation brought to its knees, a disaster for Germany, and the total destruction of Junkerism may have been the prejudice of a cranky old nobleman, but it was also completely true. :p:D

But certainly Bismarck wanted to preserve the essential features of the systems he had built at home and abroad. Being a sensible man, he knew that you couldn't do that without changing them.

Ok, let's say 1920 then. 1916 IMO is probably a bit too optimistic a benchmark of efficiency for the Tsarist state, after Stolypin bought the farm.

It certainly is optimistic, but remember a) that the Russians actually were producing lots more shells by 1916, enough to get them through the Civil War and b) it's not what we think that matters, its what the German general staff thinks, and they were naturally inclined to be alarmist.

These are however direct effects of Italy defeating Austria, not benefits from a world arranged to Entente's tastes. On the other side, besides the French irredenta, there were all kinds of opportunities in Africa if France is humbled.

All were possible in the event of CP defeat, which would mean Austria reduced and possibly falling apart. All were quite impossible if the CP won. As to opportunities in Africa, Tunisia is nice, but colonies never held a candle to scraps of European land when it came to irrational nationalism.

Sorry, I misexplained myself. IOTL interwar, those lands became French satellites, broadly speaking. In an hypothetical early Entente victory ATL, they would have quite possibly become Tsarist Russia's satellites. In neither case, Italy (would have) benefited much.

If a satellite is a country like communist Mongolia, nowhere in eastern Europe was a "French satellite". They were French allies who's diplomatic interests contradicted those of France often enough. By the same standard, Italy is going to end up as a German satellite in your scenario.

Anyway, Russia wasn't going to establish satellites on the Adriatic. That was beyond their means.

It's at the far end of the plausible war claim, but Toulon might be in it, or be put into a Danzig-like status.

I really see no convincing reason why lands having no historical connection to Italy and which Italy is unlikely to have captured (that's not a slight to the Italian army, but we're talking about WW1 and the bleeding Alps) should be granted in a peace-treaty. Did Italy just annex the whole Tyrol and Carinthia IOTL?

Counterexample: attempts to dominate the peninsula that hearkened back half a millennium (see the Sicilian Vespers, Charles VIII, Francis I, Louis XIV),

So I suppose Britain and France were bitter enemies? The rivalries that mattered in WW1 were the ones dating from after the birth of nationalism.

Napoleonic rule, scarcely less fierce rivalry, at least two decades of "Cold War", broadly speaking.

I seem to remember Napoleon dallying with proto-nationalism in Italy. As for that "cold war", Britain and Russia had had one. A lot of shouting in newspapers; it could have turned to war in either case, but id didn't. There were lots of war-scares in the 19th C.

As far as most Italian patriots were concerned, gratitude for help in the second war of independence had been nullified by subsequent support for the Pope. As one politician quipped, "Mentana killed Magenta".

True enough, but the Austrians had withheld recognition and dreamed about dissolving the country for nearly a decade. The point is that its not realistic to call France just as much of a rival as Austria.

As I said, there were forts, spare troops, and railways to deal with it. And the Italian fleet was not so inferior to the French one.

We often here about this supposed equality of the fleets, we never hear any facts quoted.

Those photographs were shot after months of nationalist propaganda to bring the Austrian irredenta to the fore in the public consciousness.

So the decisions was made at least months before the DoW? What happened to it being a conspiracy of wrong dates that got Italy into the Entente?

My point is that if the Italian ruling classes had chosen to side with the CP, nationalist propaganda would have focused on the French irredenta, and the picture would show Nice and Corsica instead. It was doable, it had been done for Libya already, the Italian public got in a nationalist fervor about Tripoli, blissfully oblivious of Trento and Trieste at the time.

Not ignorant: matters outside Europe were a different business anyway. The French public were raised to a frenzy over Fashoda. Did that mean nobody wanted Alsace any more?

And war to grab Libya was made quite popular by nationalist propaganda. So why do you find so difficult to believe that a nationalist war fever could be whipped up against France ?

Yellow press can whip up a nationalist fervor against Iceland, but only in the interests of the barons who own it. I see no compelling reason why any important person in Italy wants to make war with France. The reasons for war with Austria include, but aren't limited to, a long-standing rivalry stirred up by mutual grandstanding.

One may argue that the Italian navy was less inferior to the French one in 1914 than in 1882. Given its strategic situation, Italy had to divide its efforts between the Army and the Navy roughly equally, if it wanted to affirm its security.

Sure, but that doesn't change the essential facts. If the Italians were confident of stopping the French at sea, they wouldn't have needed serious land-side coastal defences. We never had any in the early 20th C.

Well, true, but WWI favors defense, so Germans need less forces to shore up Alsace against extra French forces than Germany did to invade Belgium and northern France. And not all of them can go to Alsace. There is still the Alps to man. ;)

The French did mobilise more manpower as the war went on, same as everyone. You proposes the Italians standing of the defence in the Alps, so the French hardly need much anyway.

So the Germans can shore up Alsace, creating a stalemate in the west. And now how are their reduced forces in the east going to beat Russia?

Starting to see why a two-front war is hard?

Didn't the majority of Entente forces for the Gallipoli campaign came from the British Empire ? :confused:

Yes, but there were French present as well. It was an aside remark.

Reasons why America would not be pro-Entente in the scenario I proposed: the CP include a bigger chunk of Europe, so trade with them matters more, they attacked no neutrals while the Entente did, a bigger chunk of American citizens have roots in CP nations.

America is not, in spite of its occasional aspirations, some kind of international lawgiver and has cynical interests of its own. That the Germans threatened to dominate Europe to an unhealthy degree was one reason that America turned against them.

Besides, one would be wise not to overestimate Anglo-American eternal friendship and camaraderie by the turn of the 20th century. I'll go and remark that given the right diplomatic and political butterflies, it is far from impossible for the American people to take grave offense at the Entente blockade instead of CP USW.

I'm going to make a slightly controversial statement, but the great mass of people don't care about foreign civilians starving as long as they do it out of sight. USW kills Americans. From an American PoV, that's beyond the pale.

<Shrug> It was expected much as NATO has expected a war with Russia through most of its existance.

So, not at all, because that war would have destroyed civilisation? I agree! :p

Nope, those cases were just as flimsly as Italy claiming South Tyrol or France claiming Rhineland.

Meh, that's another discussion.

Care in the sense of minding whether Italy got a land that the empire as a whole got no significant benefit from, and held no significant folk of theirs.

Its not the Young Czech Committee who are taking the decision, its the Austrian government. They don't want the Czechs, or anybody else, getting funny ideas.
 
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