WI: Could a democratic Russian Republic retain Poland after 1917?

Let's consider a scenario where the first Russian Republic of early 1917 manages to succeed and it becomes a republic with democratic standards as similar as possible to the French/British ones (so, the Bolshevik Revolution is avoided and no USSR is created).

Let's also consider that this republic offers the status of autonomous republics to Finland, Poland, Ukraine and other territories, and they accepted it, at least at as first step towards their nationalistic ambitions, meaning that Russia is also able to assert its authority over the territories occupied by the Central Powers when they retreat.

When WWI ends, Russia is included in the winners side and gets benefits from Versailles and other treaties, maybe including new Polish territories from Germany and A-H like Posen or Galizia.

Would an eventual 'autonomous Russian Poland' (with borders similar to inter-WWs Poland) remain inside a democratic Russian Republic for long? Or would they push hard for full independence, even if in this scenario they might don't have much international support and the risk of a new German invasion would be higher if they separate from Russia?
 
Would an eventual 'autonomous Russian Poland' (with borders similar to inter-WWs Poland) remain inside a democratic Russian Republic for long? Or would they push hard for full independence, even if in this scenario they might don't have much international support and the risk of a new German invasion would be higher if they separate from Russia?

It would be split down the middle. I think if Poland is effectively given the same type of autonomy as in Finland, the independence debate would take on similar dimensions as it did in Finland, where the debate was not so much. 'Should we be independent?" It was more "What is our status in relation to the Russian state?" The Russian government would definitely try to steer the debate into the latter direction, since it's more controllable than the former.

The Poles would be crazy to push for full-blown independence without international backing. They tried to rebel against Russian rule in November 1830 and all they got for their troubles was the integration of Congress Poland directly into the Russian state. The Russian government would definitely use this failed uprising as a propaganda tool to say 'If you smack the hand that feeds you, just remember what happened in 1830'.
 
The Provisional Government on March 30 agreed to the independence of Poland. It stated that it favored "the creation of an independent Polish State, formed of, as a pledge of a durable peace in the remodeled Europe of the future. Bound to Russia by a free military union, the Polish State will be a solid rampart against the pressure of the Central Powers against the Slav nations”. The Polish Government would result from the decisions of a constituent assembly selected by universal suffrage, while the Russian assembly would give its consent to the territorial modifications “indispensable for the formation of a free Poland formed of all its three divisions at present separated”. (London Times, Mar. 31, 1917, p. 6)" https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch29

Admittedly the PG's declaration (which cost it very little, since Poland was in fact in the hands of the Central Powers) did have some ambiguities that could lead to later Russian-Polish conflict. (1) It said that there was to be a "free military union" between Russia and Poland. https://books.google.com/books?id=zqj-oHp4KsgC&pg=PA320 What if the Poles don't freely agree to the "free military union"? (2) Where will the Russian-Polish boundaries be? "All the territories of which the majority of the population is Polish" is hardly definitive guidance for the territories with mixed populations (cities largely Polish and Jewish, countryside mainly Ukrainian or Belarusian or Lithuanian). As usual, the PG dodged the difficult questions by saying that they were for the future Constituent Assembly to decide (while meanwhile they kept delaying the elections to the Assembly…) The Russian liberals and even some socialists will probably insist on getting everything to the east of what was later to be the "Curzon line"; the Poles will want a border much further east.

FWIW, these qualifications did not appear in a manifesto on Poland issued by the Petrograd soviet--which at this time was still controlled by moderate socialists.

In any event, everyone but the reactionaries "in principle" accepted the independence of Poland. Even Denikin was prepared to concede this (as well he might, since he desperately needed Polish aid...) though he insisted on Russia keeping everything to the east of the Curzon Line.
 
Russian Republic could not retain Poland, as it simply never controled it. Russian Empire lost Poland in 1915 and even if Russian Republic still exist at the time of German surrender Poles would proclaim independence before Russians are able to get to Warsaw and Poles would not return under Russian rule willingly.
 
Im unsure a truly democratic Russia could retain White Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, or any of the Caucasus & Asiatic states, let alone Poland.
 
Russian Republic could not retain Poland, as it simply never controled it. Russian Empire lost Poland in 1915 and even if Russian Republic still exist at the time of German surrender Poles would proclaim independence before Russians are able to get to Warsaw and Poles would not return under Russian rule willingly.

Very true. And, realistically, the border issue could not be resolved peacefully (unless democratic Russia retains an o erwhelming military power, which is highly unlikely). Polish traditional claim to Western Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania (or at least part of it) would not go away. Of course, Russia (democratic or not) would have different opinion on this subject and a lot is also going to depend upon status and borders of Lithuania and Ukraine in this scenario (borders of “Ukraine” were not defined within the Russian Empire and in OTL they were defined by a set of specific circumstances); at least in OTL Poland occupied a big chunk of Lithuania and its armies almost reached Kiev. Not to mention that at least Pilsudsky had even greater (if not quite practical) plans regarding anti-Russian confederation. So the chances for a peaceful settlement would be minimal.

Historically, the problem existed since the time of the Congressional Poland: influential Polish personages kept asking Alexander to expand it by including ALL lands acquired by Russia during the partitions: Lithuania, Belorussia, Right bank Ukraine. Perceptions did not change too much on both sides.
 
Very true. And, realistically, the border issue could not be resolved peacefully (unless democratic Russia retains an o erwhelming military power, which is highly unlikely). Polish traditional claim to Western Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania (or at least part of it) would not go away. Of course, Russia (democratic or not) would have different opinion on this subject and a lot is also going to depend upon status and borders of Lithuania and Ukraine in this scenario (borders of “Ukraine” were not defined within the Russian Empire and in OTL they were defined by a set of specific circumstances); at least in OTL Poland occupied a big chunk of Lithuania and its armies almost reached Kiev. Not to mention that at least Pilsudsky had even greater (if not quite practical) plans regarding anti-Russian confederation. So the chances for a peaceful settlement would be minimal.

Historically, the problem existed since the time of the Congressional Poland: influential Polish personages kept asking Alexander to expand it by including ALL lands acquired by Russia during the partitions: Lithuania, Belorussia, Right bank Ukraine. Perceptions did not change too much on both sides.
Restoring 1772 border was still a thing in 1863, but not in 1918. Polish nationalism evolved in meantime.
Regarding eastern border-it was less important question for Poland than western one-Galizia was never part of Russian Empire, while Volhynia and Polesia were not worth much, neither for Poland nor Russia, Poland took do much land in the east IOTL mostly to keep Soviets as far from Warsaw as possible (after 1920 experience) and Russia lost much more valuable areas after ww1 (especially Baltic States) which would be first priority. Depending who is in charge in Poland (Piłsudski and his supporters were sometimes said to "hate Russia more than they love Poland", while Dmowski considered Russia to be Poland's possible ally).
There is also something not that important during 19th century, but more significant after ww1-Ukrainian nationalism, which would be problem for both Poland and Russia.
 
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