WI: Corwin Amendment

Right. The courts could come up with some pretty idiosyncratic definitions of what 'domestic institutions' are, but the most obvious stuff is family law, which is almost always left to the states anyway.
 
I'm not sure how you square the idea of 'free labor' extending for thousands of years when slavery and serfdom where the primary economic foundations of nearly every society and great power until the Enlightenment era :rolleyes:
There are societies with free labor, and those with slave labor. There are even slave societies which also incorporate free labor. The point is that you've misconstrued a restatement of labor law appearing in 1877 as retroactively labeling free laborers as "held to labor," a term of art with a very specific meaning that is exclusive of free labor.

Regarding legislative history, without moving this topic into Chat, I think we can all agree that legislative history has little to do with how constitutional amendments are interpreted.
No, we cannot. Legislative history is relied upon heavily by judges in interpreting any law.

The Second Amendment, for example, clearly meant for the right to bear arms to be exercised within the context of militias. The Fourth has been consistently rolled back in its extent, while the Tenth is, arguably, routinely ignored.
I agree that DC v Heller was wrongly decided for that very reason. You can't just pretend that the words "well-regulated militia" don't appear either.

To say that 'legislative history' would prevent the application of the Corwin Amendment to other state institutions asides from slavery is something of folly, IMHO.
Well, that's your opinion. American courts do not share it.

Further up the thread mrmandias raised the issue of family law, a position I hadn't even thought of (and I'd be interested in hearing more from him on the topic), so its fairly clear the Amendment could be applied to other state institutions.
And I'm equally sure that it would not. The debates in Congress over the amendment, as well as its historical context, make its purpose clear. The courts would not extend it to non-slavery issues any more than the courts have held that conscription violates the 13th's ban on involuntary servitude.
 
And I'm equally sure that it would not. The debates in Congress over the amendment, as well as its historical context, make its purpose clear. The courts would not extend it to non-slavery issues any more than the courts have held that conscription violates the 13th's ban on involuntary servitude.

And I'm equally sure that it would. You have effectively re-written the Amendment to take the domestic institutions language out of it. But courts use legislative intent to make exceptions to general language (as with your OTL 13th Amendment example), not to hold that general lanuage isn't general.

In fact, we have a real world example of the OTL 14th Amendment, which was intended to give civil rights to former slaves. But because it was written in general language, the courts have interpreted it more broadly than that.
 
In fact, we have a real world example of the OTL 14th Amendment, which was intended to give civil rights to former slaves. But because it was written in general language, the courts have interpreted it more broadly than that.

Indeed, and the Corwin Amendment is written in such an alike generalized language - asides from the specification of persons held to labor - that it could be applied to several areas. It would be up to the courts to decide what constitutes 'domestic institutions' of the States.
 
I'm afraid all this discussion of "held to labor" is totally irrelevant. The amendment would prohibit Congress from interfering with any of "the domestic institutions" of a state - not limited to people held to labor. Right?

Yes, I believe so, and Michigan law since 1881 has held "That all educational, charitable, reformatory and penal institutions, supported wholly or in part by the state, shall be known as state institutions."
 
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