What if the Viking Age continued for several more centuries? And what if Scandinavia remained an international locus of trade and military power well into the Middle Ages and Renaissance?

How could the Viking Age last longer? Here are a few different possibilities.
  1. Prolong the flow of silver from the Middle East and Central Asia, by keeping the Abbasid Caliphate, the Khazar Khaganate, or the Samanid Empire, alive as states. The trade networks created in Kievan Rus' persist in greater strength, allowing the Northwest European emporia (artisanal trading posts) to remain connected to the Silk Road. This would encourage further Norse maritime expansion, which had always been driven primarily by economics.
  2. Have the Norse take over England permanently. Hence, the Norse-Gaels in Ireland and Scotland could receive more Anglo-Danish (or Norwegian) support, and the wars between England and France would become a direct continuation of Norse raids on Francia.
  3. Varangians become more prominent in Poland's drużyna (retinue), and Poland is founded in the same way as Kievan Rus'. A Viking Poland would threaten East Francia and preclude German dominance of the land east of the Elbe, preventing Hanseatic prominence in the Baltic Sea trade.
 
Viking Age was basically the answer to two crisis.
1) Frankish revival in the late VIIth century onwards threatened the traditional "thalassocracies" of the North Sea which took more and more importance with the relative decline of Mediterranean trade for Western Europe (less related to Arab Conquest than general geopolitical/economical withdrawal of ERE).Namely Frisians and Danish traders. It was coupled with a sense of pressure from Franks which not only took forecfully back their extended sphere of influence from the VIth in Central and Northern Europe, but definitely went beyond to the point bordering Scandinavia and enforcing their hegemony.
2) The Abassid (and in a lesser way Spanish Umayyad) economical crisis really did a number on a Scandinavia which was used to long-range trade (Asian products were found in burial site of the pre-Viking Age) and at some point, if products didn't came to Scandinavians, Scandinavians were going to go for the products (especially with the lesser trade of precious metals). And their little dog too.

Furthermore, both of these crisis were translated to political crisis : Danemark was maybe divided in maximum 4 or 5 petty-kingdoms with a probable sense (and devices?) of unity. But royal authority was challenged by, let's call them factions or groups which benefitted more and more (politically, morally and economically) from raiding.But at some point, this caused a reshuffling of power and political unstability can only prolong itself so far, especially as post-Carolingian kingdoms certainly learned how to defend themselves efficiently from one hand, and whoever managed to rule in Eastern Europe not really willing to see their coast plundered.
At some point, everyone wanted some stability to enjoy and rule upon.
It's where Christianisation kicked in, because it represented both a tool of stability, and an entry into "wider world" so to speak.
Eventually, the sheer strength of an unified, state-sponsored, religious institution was hard to ignore, especially as it appeared as a political mean to sacralize (or to strengthen) political power of what remained a largely held-in-check chiefdom (in the sense of simple/complex chiefdom) from one hand, and as a symbol of wealth from another (more or less the same way Romanization made its way into Barbaricum, or with self-inflicted westernisation in Japan, all proportions kept).

To adress quickly your particular points the best I can :

1 - The economic crisis in Near-East was more or less bound to happen at this point (and was political before being economical). Granted, the civil wars certainly didn't help at all, but dynastical instability was more or less a feature of medieval Arabo-Islamic states, not a bug. This could be delayed but not prevented, altough @John7755 يوحنا is far more knowledgable about this place and period than I. As for Khazars, they were pretty much as dependent from this than proto-Rus' (which they more or less, indirectly, organised into early states).
Note that Scandinavian emporiae (as in harbours connected to political centers) really develloped themselves with the Viking Age, tough. Crisis doesn't mean retraction.

2- Scandinavian powers, once rooted outside Scandinavia, only had passing ties with the "old land", and quickly assimilated themselves not only culturally but geopolitically.
The problem with "North Sea empires" (Canute's dominion is the best known, but not the only one, even if not all included England) is that they tended to crumble really easily under their own weight : each nobility and elite had its own interets and culture, and the royal hegemon wasn't popular even in Scandinavia (the geopolitical anarchy doesn't really favour "king stronk" attitudes), but it's the only way to efficiently mobilise and Scandinavian forces, AND whichever polities were issued from deep raids. But again "permanently" seems to works until we realize that it means the "Norse" part of Norse-[INSERT FAVOURITE TARGET] gets accultured in a matter of mere generations and part of the regional political horizon.
While post-Carolingian polities were in deep crisis, it was mainly political and managable enough trough a series of mobilisation devices. Eventually, you had few losses of authority due to Norman raids along the Atlantic coast, altough you can't say that for the economical consequences.

Not that the political crisis of the post-Carolingian Europe could be prolonged for some decade (it wouldn't require much, relatively speaking, than Germany being unable to really unify itself, but this not much is already something fierce). Not that England couldn't be dominated by Anglo-Danes ensembles.
But continuous? I can't really see it continuing past some decades at the very best myself. I could be wrong, and possibilities in Poland are indeed interesting (tough the western Slavic chiefdoms and coalitions weren't pushover themselves), but I'm not really sure how it could be done as you require.
 
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Viking Age was basically the answer to two crisis.
1) Frankish revival in the late VIIth century onwards threatened the traditional "thalassocracies" of the North Sea which took more and more importance with the relative decline of Mediterranean trade for Western Europe (less related to Arab Conquest than general geopolitical/economical withdrawal of ERE).Namely Frisians and Danish traders. It was coupled with a sense of pressure from Franks which not only took forecfully back their extended sphere of influence from the VIth in Central and Northern Europe, but definitely went beyond to the point bordering Scandinavia and enforcing their hegemony.
2) The Abassid (and in a lesser way Spanish Umayyad) economical crisis really did a number on a Scandinavia which was used to long-range trade (Asian products were found in burial site of the pre-Viking Age) and at some point, if products didn't came to Scandinavians, Scandinavians were going to go for the products (especially with the lesser trade of precious metals). And their little dog too.

Furthermore, both of these crisis were translated to political crisis : Danemark was maybe divided in maximum 4 or 5 petty-kingdoms with a probable sense (and devices?) of unity. But royal authority was challenged by, let's call them factions or groups which benefitted more and more (politically, morally and economically) from raiding.But at some point, this caused a reshuffling of power and political unstability can only prolong itself so far, especially as post-Carolingian kingdoms certainly learned how to defend themselves efficiently from one hand, and whoever managed to rule in Eastern Europe not really willing to see their coast plundered.
At some point, everyone wanted some stability to enjoy and rule upon.
It's where Christianisation kicked in, because it represented both a tool of stability, and an entry into "wider world" so to speak.
Eventually, the sheer strength of an unified, state-sponsored, religious institution was hard to ignore, especially as it appeared as a political mean to sacralize (or to strengthen) political power of what remained a largely held-in-check chiefdom (in the sense of simple/complex chiefdom) from one hand, and as a symbol of wealth from another (more or less the same way Romanization made its way into Barbaricum, or with self-inflicted westernisation in Japan, all proportions kept).

To adress quickly your particular points the best I can :

1 - The economic crisis in Near-East was more or less bound to happen at this point (and was economical before being political). Granted, the civil wars certainly didn't help at all, but dynastical instability was more or less a feature of medieval Arabo-Islamic states, not a bug. This could be delayed but not prevented, altough @John7755 يوحنا is far more knowledgable about this place and period than I. As for Khazars, they were pretty much as dependent from this than proto-Rus' (which they more or less, indirectly, organised into early states).
Note that Scandinavian emporiae (as in harbours connected to political centers) really develloped themselves with the Viking Age, tough. Crisis doesn't mean retraction.

2- Scandinavian powers, once rooted outside Scandinavia, only had passing ties with the "old land", and quickly assimilated themselves not only culturally but geopolitically.
The problem with "North Sea empires" (Canute's dominion is the best known, but not the only one, even if not all included England) is that they tended to crumble really easily under their own weight : each nobility and elite had its own interets and culture, and the royal hegemon wasn't popular even in Scandinavia (the geopolitical anarchy doesn't really favour "king stronk" attitudes), but it's the only way to efficiently mobilise and Scandinavian forces, AND whichever polities were issued from deep raids. But again "permanently" seems to works until we realize that it means the "Norse" part of Norse-[INSERT FAVOURITE TARGET] gets accultured in a matter of mere generations and part of the regional political horizon.
While post-Carolingian polities were in deep crisis, it was mainly political and managable enough trough a series of mobilisation devices. Eventually, you had few losses of authority due to Norman raids along the Atlantic coast, altough you can't say that for the economical consequences.

Not that the political crisis of the post-Carolingian Europe could be prolonged for some decade (it wouldn't require much, relatively speaking, than Germany being unable to really unify itself, but this not much is already something fierce). Not that England couldn't be dominated by Anglo-Danes ensembles.
But continuous? I can't really see it continuing past some decades at the very best myself. I could be wrong, and possibilities in Poland are indeed interesting (tough the western Slavic chiefdoms and coalitions weren't pushover themselves), but I'm not really sure how it could be done as you require.

But the "Rurikid empire" was a good example of a relatively fast assimilation with almost a complete loss of the "Norsern idenity" and the same goes for Normandy:

1. In Rurikid Rus the 3rd generation (and perhaps even the 2nd) of the Northern princes had Slavic names as often as the Scandinavian ones. They seemingly adopted the local language and whatever was passing for the local culture. Probably the most resilient thing was the warfare.
The most ambitious and bellicose of the early Rurikid rulers, Sviatoslav (mid-/late-X century), still was pretty much "Nordic" in that area: his "army" was moving on a horseback but fighting on foot in the shieldwall formations (as was described by Leo the Deacon and pretty much like the Saxons did in 1066). However, by the late XI - early XII the whole thing was adopted to the local conditions and enemies: the main force was armored cavalry with a later addition of the light mounted archers to deal with the nomadic southern neighbors. The infantry became secondary and mostly limited to the city militias. The close connections with Scandinavia persisted for a while but they were quite "peripheral".

2. In Normandy the process was quite similar: in a couple generations it was difficult to find a person speaking any Scandinavian language and army of Billy the Bastard was as "modern" as it gets being a combination of armored cavalry, archers, and infantry.

My point is that "the viking age" was, besides other factors, limited by the assimilation processes: the overly successful "Vikings" had been simply disappearing by merging with the conquered locals. And, of course, the limits of the successful conquests had been reached somewhere close to the early XI - there were new military models which had noticeable advantages over the old Norse warfare style.
 
It was my point exactly. Norse polities tended to be mixed ans acculturated right from the beggining, and actually needed to be part of local network to ne viable.
I mentioned Poland essentially as a potentialités diversion for Germany ans slighty longer raid période on thé baltic

In thé future, dont quote the whole of long posts please
 
Well, you can look at the Normans as the continuation - I don't mean in England, I mean in Sicily, Italy and against the Byzantine Empire. The same forces were at play - the land at home was not enough to hold them, and younger sons especially headed out with their own warbands to make their fortune in richer areas
 
It was my point exactly. Norse polities tended to be mixed ans acculturated right from the beggining, and actually needed to be part of local network to ne viable.
I mentioned Poland essentially as a potentialités diversion for Germany ans slighty longer raid période on thé baltic

AFAIK, at least some of the early "viking trade routes" had been passing through the (in modern terms) Polish and/or Lithuanian territories, basically using all available riverways from Dnieper to Dniester and even Danube. The cultural connections definitely existed so this should be quite viable. Of course, the "vikings", especially in the broad meaning of the term, were not just the raiders but also the merchants and mercenary soldiers so the whole thing could be reasonably peaceful.
 
Well, you can look at the Normans as the continuation - I don't mean in England, I mean in Sicily, Italy and against the Byzantine Empire. The same forces were at play - the land at home was not enough to hold them, and younger sons especially headed out with their own warbands to make their fortune in richer areas
I saw this argued from time to time, but I'm not really convinced : not only there is no archeological evidence that either in Scandinavia, either in Xth century Normandy you had overpopulation; but several Norman families involved in Spain or Italy were as much issued from Anglo-Dane and Frankish families (you had a quick mixup, in no small part due to an early networking from Rollo even before 911).
Truth to be told, you don't have a that distinct behaviour from Xth/XIth Norman miles and nobility than their neighbours. The main difference would rather, IMO, comes from how counts of Rouen/dukes of Normandy managed to hold their principalty in one piece and avoid the feudal desintegration that marked most of France.You'd argue that Flanders did too but you didn't have the same kind of conflicrts which forced ambitious nobles (and not just younger sons : Serlon de Hauteville was a minor lord, but he still had titles and land and nevertheless helped his brothers in Italy This is more of a cliché about Crusades, where it's still mostly wrong).

It could be argued, this said, that the tradition of temporary service and quasi-mercenariship that existed among Norman nobility could have, at least partially, an Anglo-Dane origin and being a cause of Norman aventurism, and I rather agree with this. But it's no more a continuation of Viking Age than the service of Aquitain nobility in Spain is a continuation of Carolingian campaigns.

AFAIK, at least some of the early "viking trade routes" had been passing through the (in modern terms) Polish and/or Lithuanian territories, basically using all available riverways from Dnieper to Dniester and even Danube. The cultural connections definitely existed so this should be quite viable. Of course, the "vikings", especially in the broad meaning of the term, were not just the raiders but also the merchants and mercenary soldiers so the whole thing could be reasonably peaceful.
I think you're making a reference to the Amber Road?
The question why wasn't it more used and "vikingized" is interesting, but I'd propose that trade roads shifted a bit in the Xth : for instance, while Itil/Volga was mostly used up to this point, the Abbasid economical crises (among other reasons, maybe the Caucasian geostrategical changes?) ended up bolstering Constantinople and Black Sea roads, while Bulgarian takeover (and maybe, the vaacum that represented Frankish, temporary, dominion over Pannonian Plain) led to a less usable Amber/Danubian road?

Then again : you might be able to see a deeper Scandinavian presence in Poland with the right geopolitical shifts (let's say that, for some reasons, Byzzies are able to enforce their authority up to Danube, among other possibilities such as Late Carolingian influence contracting even more in the Xth Central Europe), you might see Scandinavian taking the lead on the complex chiefdom network already discernable by the early Xth century (and possibly in a more advanced stage than northern Rus'). Again, we're talking of a Lecho-Norse entity rather than colonisation (then again, there's no indication whatsoever that settlement was a prime motivation of Viking establishments), Truso playing a similar role than Varangian establishments in northern Rus'.
As for being reasonably peaceful...More often than not, Scandinavians had to defend their newly gained influence/power against their neighbours, even when integrated within larger networks (one could say this was a sign they were integrated, because they fought for dominance within said geopolitical ensemble), so I'd rather expect a mix of conflict and negociation.

And from there, as Anglo-Dane establishment in England, you could have bases for further raids in Germany and Central Europe. It wuldn't be this much longer, of course.
 
I saw this argued from time to time, but I'm not really convinced : not only there is no archeological evidence that either in Scandinavia, either in Xth century Normandy you had overpopulation; but several Norman families involved in Spain or Italy were as much issued from Anglo-Dane and Frankish families (you had a quick mixup, in no small part due to an early networking from Rollo even before 911).

But I'd assume that in this context "overpopulation" applies mostly to the noble families. After all, the Duchy of Normandy was neither too big nor too rich (AFAIK) so a reasonably big number of the junior sons could represent obvious problems. Anyway, while the Norman activities in Sicily and elsewhere were not the same as the viking raids, at least some historic tradition still existed.


I think you're making a reference to the Amber Road?

Not quite. The Amber Road was going from the Baltic coast to Italy and was mostly about the amber trade but there were also early medieval trade roads leading to the Black Sea with the "merchandise" being much more diverse with a heavy emphasis upon the slave trade.


The question why wasn't it more used and "vikingized" is interesting,

AFAIK, it was not "vikinized" from the very beginning: while the Norsemen were participating, so were the Muslim traders and the local suppliers of the "merchandise".


but I'd propose that trade roads shifted a bit in the Xth : for instance, while Itil/Volga was mostly used up to this point, the Abbasid economical crises (among other reasons, maybe the Caucasian geostrategical changes?) ended up bolstering Constantinople and Black Sea roads, while Bulgarian takeover (and maybe, the vaacum that represented Frankish, temporary, dominion over Pannonian Plain) led to a less usable Amber/Danubian road?

One of the factors was decline and destruction of the Khazar state in the late X - XI centuries. Most of the "vacuum" had not been properly filled with the Lower Volga and the Black Sea steppes in general being taken over by the Polovtsy and no single state being created there until the Mongolian conquest which was making the regular trade rather difficult (OTOH, as soon as the Kipchak/Golden Horde was established there was a noticeable bust of the Volga-based trade). Route by the Dnieper was mostly secured by the Kievan Rus, except for the lower flow of Dnieper so Byzantine empire the was more or less logical end goal.

IIRC, the lower end of the Danube road also was quite messy in the Xth century but I'm not sure that the trade along this route ceased to exist. OTOH, with the population along the Dniester and Danube being more and more Christianized, there could be problems with selling Christian slaves on Byzantine markets and you can't maintain a profitable trade on amber alone. ;)
 
But I'd assume that in this context "overpopulation" applies mostly to the noble families.
There's no real evidence that it was more the case in Normandy than elsewhere, tough. Rollo, Anglo-Danes and Norses settling in Normandy in the Xth doesn't seem to have provoked much of a demographical issue.

After all, the Duchy of Normandy was neither too big nor too rich (AFAIK) so a reasonably big number of the junior sons could represent obvious problems.
Then again, the (known) issue isn't entierely there (well, yes, it is a bit for Contentin see below) : the particularity of Normandy compared to France in general was that the ducal power was particularily important and intrusive to Normand nobility.for what matter services while limitating their autonomy. Furthermore, the Norman revolt of 996, as a reaction against Norman nobility abuse from the peasantry and a failed rebellion of nobility against the duke both ended with a general freeing of peasantry (servage virtually disappear from the region from this point onwards) and nobiliar ambitions being cutted down.
At this point, yes, the still present tradition of foreign service (which wasn't specifically Norman tough) kicked in (many Normans went in Spain or England and of course in Italy), but it's not this much of an overpopulation (unless twisting words that they loss meaning) than research of prestige and revenues on which all sons participated. Younger sons are more "obvious", because elders still inherited the ancestral lands. And southern Italy is a bit particular because, contrary to Spain, the general geopolitical ensemble was unstable enough that takeover (which may not have been the goal at the very beggining, contrary to the ducal conquest of England) to slowly happen.

at least some historic tradition still existed.
Which ones? I don't claim t be a specialist on this so not remembering precise exemples isn't really any evidence, but what do you have in mind? Because while the tradition of service may comes indirectly from Scandinavian roots, it was really similar to what you found in nobiliar societies in France generally at this point. The one thing I could see being attributed to historical tradition would be the reaction of Norman peasantry against abusive dominance of their nobility on traditions of freemanship.

There is a, limited, map on the proportion of people settling to Italy from 275 families.
cartenormandie.jpg


This is a map of the rough settlement of Norses and Anglo-Danes in Xth century Normandy.
Normandie-viking.png


One would expect Rouennais to have been a place where an at least equivalent proportion of men would have been gone if it was about a "Viking tradition" (I won't go too much about the necessary different traditions between Hiberno-Norses and Anglo-Danes).
Not, again, that the tradition of service and "expatriation" wasn't something that can't be traced to Scandinavian origins, but I think what definitely made the difference in Normandy is the strength of the ducal power which didn't allowed for small negociations or willfull blindness as you had in particularily divided ensemble as in Aquitaine where banishment could be something really technical.

I'll certainly grant you, however, that Contentin was the "lesser" part of Normandy when it came to wealth, and that it tended to be the "far-west" of Normandy in the Xth, used to conflict with Bretons due to absence of real limits; and that it might have a significant influence on foreign service and mercenariship.

Not quite. The Amber Road was going from the Baltic coast to Italy and was mostly about the amber trade but there were also early medieval trade roads leading to the Black Sea with the "merchandise" being much more diverse with a heavy emphasis upon the slave trade.
I saw Amber Road, at least for medieval times, being extended to Danubian basin rather than to Italy, tough. And apparently, this was the case in Antiquity too.
I think we're essentially speaking of the same thing there, don't you agree?

AFAIK, it was not "vikinized" from the very beginning: while the Norsemen were participating, so were the Muslim traders and the local suppliers of the "merchandise".
Not along the Amber/Danubian road, which we're talking about. And even for the Itil/Volga road (or more generally) Muslims traders were essentially at the recieving end of the trade rather than actively opening roads. Not that you didn't have a lasting influence or economical presence, of course, but I'm under the impression middle-men as Bulgars were rather more present than Arabo-Persian traders (and they were islamized relatively late) compared to the active part Varangian assumed.
As for why the "middle road" wasn't Varangianized, i'd expect that the lack of noticable polities enough was for something : the Pannonian Plain was underpopulated to the point Carolingians called it a desolation or a solitude, and Bulgars really had their grasp on lower Danube. I wonder how much Veleti couldn't be taken over by Danes (altough it was maybe too close from Danemark to be viable as a distinct petty kingdom, and too close from Germany sphere of projection for not requesting curbing down late Carolingian Germany to begin with) or maybe having Pomeranian, instead of southern coalitions, forming a stronger entity in the Xth century, with Varangians taking over from Truso. Just my two cents.

IIRC, the lower end of the Danube road also was quite messy in the Xth century but I'm not sure that the trade along this route ceased to exist
While it really never stopped, Bulgarian takeover certainly messed up things. So maybe an even earlier PoD where Bulgars doesn't manage to advence so far (which would fit, TBH, with my earlier proposal having Byzzies keeping control of Lower Danube) and whatever Slavic principalties and complex chiefdoms orbiting former Carolingia marking down the road to the Danube.

OTOH, with the population along the Dniester and Danube being more and more Christianized, there could be problems with selling Christian slaves on Byzantine markets and you can't maintain a profitable trade on amber alone. ;)
This is never, ever going to be a problem : a lot of slaves from Slavonia, either captured by Franks or Byzzies were sold and castrated in Constantinople. The main reason Franks stopped to do so is that they weren't this much able to sell them to Arabo-Andalusian anymore (well, that and slavery being immoral. Sure).[/QUOTE]
 
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Viking Age was basically the answer to two crisis.
1) Frankish revival in the late VIIth century onwards...
2) The Abassid (and in a lesser way Spanish Umayyad) economical crisis really did a number on a Scandinavia which was used to long-range trade...
I agree on the first point.

On the second point, when you say Abbasid crisis, you refer to the Abbasid Revolution, right? Though it represents a crisis for the Umayyads, over the following decades the establishment of the Abbasids represents a concentration wealth in Baghdad and an increase of demand for goods obtained from long-range trade, which continued through several political crises.

Wladyslaw Duczko in Viking Rus: Studies on the Presence of Scandinavians in Eastern Europe, suggests that:

"[Baghdad's] booming economy activated even the region north of the Caucasus turning it to the one of the most important places of exchange in this part of the continent. The news about these great economical possibilities soon became known to Scandinavians, who immediately adjusted to the situation by offering a range of commodities including furs, swords, wax and, most of all, slaves. The boom in trade caused the number of people from Middle Sweden engaged in the eastern developments to rise dramatically.​

Furthermore, both of these crisis were translated to political crisis... and whoever managed to rule in Eastern Europe not really willing to see their coast plundered.
At some point, everyone wanted some stability to enjoy and rule upon...
It's where Christianisation kicked in, because it represented both a tool of stability, and an entry into "wider world" so to speak.
Eventually, the sheer strength of an unified, state-sponsored, religious institution was hard to ignore, especially as it appeared as a political mean to sacralize (or to strengthen) political power of what remained a largely held-in-check chiefdom (in the sense of simple/complex chiefdom)...
Well, it is certainly true that there were strong factors encouraging the adoption of Christianity thanks to its presence as an organized religious institution. However, a more organized Scandinavia doesn't necessarily have to mean an end to foreign military interventions, or to a widespread system of trade.

Most definitions of the Viking Age continue after the conversion to Christianity. For example, no one excludes the Christian kings of Olaf Tryggvason, Sweyn Forkbeard, Canute the Great, or Harald Hardrada from the Viking Age. We can also look to the expedition of Ingvar the Far-Travelled, one of the most far-flung "non-monarchical" Viking raids well into the era of Christianization. (Of course, Ingvar's raid itself could reveal recognition of economic crisis, with attempts to establish new trade links after the collapse of the Khazars.)

Whoever managed to rule in Eastern Europe wouldn't want their coast plundered... but much of this coastal area wasn't Christian anyway. The Baltic coast was largely pagan and the Scandinavian kingdoms did extend maritime control and conquest into these regions as Christian crusaders. The Normans becoming military adventurers in the Mediterranean, could show that there was a "niche" for travelling and raiding warriors in succeeding centuries.

To adress quickly your particular points the best I can :

1 - The economic crisis in Near-East was more or less bound to happen at this point (and was political before being economical). Granted, the civil wars certainly didn't help at all, but dynastical instability was more or less a feature of medieval Arabo-Islamic states, not a bug. This could be delayed but not prevented, altough @John7755 يوحنا is far more knowledgable about this place and period than I. As for Khazars, they were pretty much as dependent from this than proto-Rus' (which they more or less, indirectly, organised into early states).
Definitely true. The Abbasid collapse can't be delayed permanently, and the rebellions likely reveal an underlying instability in the Abbasid state.

But in face of this instability, I wonder if one of the rebellious factions such as the Buyids could have been more successful, and despite originating as an usurping faction responsible for the Abbasids' decline, could have then created a new "stability" quickly enough to revive economic development. Let's imagine that the Buyids go on to form not just an Iranian Intermezzo but a de facto Persian Empire in terms of landmass, profiting from the contemporaneous Islamic expansion into India. This could potentially revive mining operations to an extent that it could fund continued imports of raw materials from Kievan Rus'. The Ghaznavids also seem to have had potential, and might have been able to absorb the former lands of the Buyids or Samanids.

The problem with "North Sea empires" (Canute's dominion is the best known, but not the only one, even if not all included England) is that they tended to crumble really easily under their own weight : each nobility and elite had its own interets and culture, and the royal hegemon wasn't popular even in Scandinavia (the geopolitical anarchy doesn't really favour "king stronk" attitudes), but it's the only way to efficiently mobilise and Scandinavian forces, AND whichever polities were issued from deep raids...
Very good point. Also, many scholars argue that Canute the Great didn't actually intend to form a lasting united North Sea Empire or create it as an institution. I think his successors though, potentially might have been more motivated to do so, as they were then reuniting a former empire in recent memory. They then had the concept of "Cnut's Empire" even if he himself didn't. Perhaps a mid 11th century Danish defeat of Norway, or Norwegian defeat of Denmark, (Harald Hardrada or Sweyn II Estridson, despite not being descendants of Cnut) and subsequent hegemony by either victorious kingdom could have stayed united. Of course, it would take several attempts at reconquest and unity and probably purges which incite their own divisions and dissent. This would probably distract from Norse maritime expansion.
 
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On the second point, when you say Abbasid crisis, you refer to the Abbasid Revolution, right?
I was referring to the IXth/Xth centuries crises, rather. Eventually Arabo-Islamic economical network wasn't really this much harmed by the Umayyad overthrow (the biggest losses were in the Islamic West, Ifriqiya, Maghrib and al-Andalus, which weren't really cores and largely autonomous already).
The problem rather comes from the mid-term consequences of Abbasid takeover, namely political consequences : sh'ia revolts, loss of more peripheral and economically relevant regions as Persia and Egypt, political-religious troubles culminating with Zanj revolt (which did a number, at least for a time, on plantation economy) and generally all of this being a financial drain.
Note that it's not really something specific to Abbasids, as Umayyad Spain suffered something similar (and with decline of peninsular silver mines) or Tulunid Egypt.

As a result of political instability, you ended up with inflation, productive decline,fiscal drain (both from central authority and officials), budgetary issues leading to government taking significantly more than redistributing not only directly but indirectly as well (such as the lack of great works)
Generally speaking, the Xth century wasn't that a good period for the cores of the Arabo-Islamic world, altough not catastrophic (a comparison with the late crises of Romania could be made there)

I would rather consider Buyid's takeover to have really put thing backs in order, but Abbasids themselves weren't blind to the issues and tried resolving these, with partial success, and Buyid's generalisation of iqta had, while stabilizing effects, long-term consequences.

Anyway this crisis was felt in Scandinavia for obvious reasons, but as well in western Europe generally (products from eastern Mediterranean basin became rare or virtually absent in the late IXth and Xth centuries, while present during the VIIIth/IXth centuries). Again comparing two different events, there was something similar with the contraction of Roman presence in Latin Europe by the late VIIth/VIIIth centuries due to costly Romano-Persian wars and Arab conquests, which really dynamised already blossoming North Sea trade.

Well, it is certainly true that there were strong factors encouraging the adoption of Christianity thanks to its presence as an organized religious institution.
Its close association with prestigious and relatively strong political model was certainly another factor.

However, a more organized Scandinavia doesn't necessarily have to mean an end to foreign military interventions, or to a widespread system of trade.
I think it does mean that a bit, tough : while you're right pointing out Christianisation didn't meant immediate or short-term halt to raids, but it's quite implicit IMO that Christianisation meant integration of these polities within a normative network of political and economical exchanges (not just for Scandinavians, but Slavs and Hungarians as well). The sheer economical/cultural gravity of Eur
We cope at this point makes systemic alternatives quite difficult.

Most definitions of the Viking Age continue after the conversion to Christianity. For example, no one excludes the Christian kings of Olaf Tryggvason, Sweyn Forkbeard, Canute the Great, or Harald Hardrada from the Viking Age.
I saw arguments about how Knut and Harald Hardada as the end of Viking Age, and the beggining of active integration of Scandinavian polities in Europe, for various reasons : royal campainging instead of autonomous "guilds" and nobles, objectives being less raids than imposing political and fiscal authority, etc.
Nobody denies, of course, there is a direct continuation but as arbitrary divisions goes, putting it before Sven Forkbeard makes more sense than afterwards IMO. That said, it's not perfect, because Olaf Tryggvason rather wells fit the Viking Age model.

Long story short, I don't think Christianisation changed practices for itself (Haakon of Norway is quite interesting on this regard), but Christianisation tended to imply geopolitical changes of perception eventually.
You could argue that if Norway could have reclaimed Northumbria after the mid Xth century, the distinction on this regard could have been more blur : again, it's essentially about arbitrary division for me there.

We can also look to the expedition of Ingvar the Far-Travelled, one of the most far-flung "non-monarchical" Viking raids well into the era of Christianization. (Of course, Ingvar's raid itself could reveal recognition of economic crisis, with attempts to establish new trade links after the collapse of the Khazars.)
I do think that's a better exemple, to be honest. That being said, early Sweden was still in a stituation of political division at this point, knowing a more slow evolution than Danemark (which own unification might have been delayed by the IXth century) and Norway. It's understable that the political/cultural changes felt elsewhere didn't there : I don't think we can consider this "well into the era of Christianisation", but rather at this beggining in Sweden.

Whoever managed to rule in Eastern Europe wouldn't want their coast plundered... but much of this coastal area wasn't Christian anyway.
Which is really besides the point (to be honest, I don't know why you say this) : what I said was, in the case of an earlier state-building in modern Poland (I mentioned, rather than Vistulians or Veleti, Pomeranians managing to form a strong complex chiefdom), whoever would rule there wouldn't just accept Viking takeover, and that their predominance on the region wouldn't be peaceful. That's all (even if I think that, ITTL, you'd have probably the baptism of one or two Pomeranian dukes/kings as it happened with Veleti and Vistulians, but nothing leading to an earlier Christianisation as in these exemples).

But in face of this instability, I wonder if one of the rebellious factions such as the Buyids could have been more successful, and despite originating as an usurping faction responsible for the Abbasids' decline, could have then created a new "stability" quickly enough to revive economic development.
As said above, I agree that Buyids may have represented a factor of stabilisation in Iraq. But this was in the late Xth century, while Abbasid decline was significantly more advanced than in the IXth century. I agree with @John7755 يوحنا there that Samanids weren't really a threat for Abbasids, being rather focused on the eastern periphery.

We could argue that the unability of the Abbasids to take down Tulunids could accelerate their demise, not in the sense that it would change much economically (Fatimid takeover happened really quick, altough ITTL, Abbasids could loose more of Syria as well) but as a moral defeat and hasten things.

But maybe it would be better to preserve Abbasids hegemont in Near-East : we could , as proposed by John, crushing Qarmatians as soon as possible to give Abbasid some breathing space. Or even prevent Fatimid takeover of Egypt which might be more interesting (while difficult).
Here's why ; let's imagine Umayyads are unable ITTL to restore order to a significantly crippled Muslim Spain (there were muladi, berber, arab, urban, christian revoltees more or less everywhere). Conversly, Egypt is less interesting and ripe for the taking than IOTL because...reasons (this is the main difficulty, to be honest, and not easy to resolve).
al-Maghrib being a mess of various tribes, states, factions and different affiliations, often under Umayyad influence IOTL, and pro-Fatimid faction never managed to take the lead durably (places switched hands on a 10 to 20 year basis). Umayyads being unable to intervene as much as they did IOTL in the region; and you have to make Morroco somewhat interesting enough for Fatimids that they clientelize (I dare not say outright conquer, but a partial conquest will be needed) the various Berber kingdoms.
al-Andalus is relatively easier. Some rebels as Ibn Hafsun did pledged alliegance to Fatimids IOTL, so some muladi support to a Fatimid conquest could work. And giving that preventing Ummayad revival in Spain would likely end up with an earlier Christian advance (which in turn could be something strengthening Christian principalties on the other side of the Pyrenees, including against Vikings, you can't have your cake and eating it), but Fatimids could pull an Alomhad while taking the whole lead on Islamic West.

This should give Abbasid enough breathing space in Near-East, without Qarmatian revolutionnaries and Fatimid patronage and alliance.

That being said, I don't think it would lead to a much prolonged Viking Age in the Atlantic, and while possibly so in Eastern Europe, I could rather see Volga Bulgaria and possibly Khazars being strengthened by a renewed stability in Iraq, so that's not even a given for this region.

Very good point. Also, many scholars argue that Canute the Great didn't actually intend to form a lasting united North Sea Empire or create it as an institution. I think his successors though, potentially might have been more motivated to do so, as they were then reuniting a former empire in recent memory.
I think the key there is the nature of Scandinavian kingship that tended to consider that titles to be inherited as a same package : if the kingship of Norway was at some point associated with the kingship of England or Danemark, then both were tied up and ground enough for claiming re-uniting them on a personal level.
 
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