WI: Communist victory at Cuito Cuanavale (1987)

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (fought with intervals between late 1987 and early 1988), was an interesting occurence in African post-colonial history, fought between the Angolan communist government forces of the MPLA with its army, the FAPLA, alongside Cuban auxiliaries, on one side, and the anti-communist Angolan UNITA rebels, aided by South Africa, on the other. Analyses of the battle tend to be inconsistent, but the consensus seems to be that the engagement was tactically and strategically inconclusive. Its most known effect was kickstarting peace negotiations between both parties in the conflict, that led to the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from the conflict and the independence of Namibia.
But what if the battle had been a decisive victory for one of the fighting parties, in this case, the communists (FAPLA and Cubans)? Could we see the South African border war going out of control and spilling into South Africa, possibly leading to a red Namibia (ephemeral or permanent)?
 
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (fought with intervals between late 1987 and early 1988), was an interesting occurence in African post-colonial history, fought between the Angolan communist government forces of the MPLA with its army, the FAPLA, alongside Cuban auxiliaries, on one side, and the anti-communist Angolan UNITA rebels, aided by South Africa, on the other. Analyses of the battle tend to be inconsistent, but the consensus seems to be that the engagement was tactically and strategically inconclusive. Its most known effect was kickstarting peace negotiations between both parties in the conflict, that led to the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from the conflict and the independence of Namibia.
But what if the battle had been a decisive victory for one of the fighting parties, in this case, the communists (FAPLA and Cubans)? Could we see the South African border war going out of control and spilling into South Africa, possibly leading to a red Namibia (ephemeral or permanent)?

Internal security within South Africa was solid, and SADF could never be threatened by the Communists to sufficiently engender a negative outcome in Namibia. In any case, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR over the next few years mean that any Communist victory is extremely fleeting.
 
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (fought with intervals between late 1987 and early 1988), was an interesting occurence in African post-colonial history, fought between the Angolan communist government forces of the MPLA with its army, the FAPLA, alongside Cuban auxiliaries, on one side, and the anti-communist Angolan UNITA rebels, aided by South Africa, on the other. Analyses of the battle tend to be inconsistent, but the consensus seems to be that the engagement was tactically and strategically inconclusive. Its most known effect was kickstarting peace negotiations between both parties in the conflict, that led to the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from the conflict and the independence of Namibia.
But what if the battle had been a decisive victory for one of the fighting parties, in this case, the communists (FAPLA and Cubans)? Could we see the South African border war going out of control and spilling into South Africa, possibly leading to a red Namibia (ephemeral or permanent)?

Cuba could only sustain a limited commitment to the MPLA even with the Soviets footing the bill; it was Cuban, not Soviet, troops who were coming home in body bags. The Soviets after their Afghan disaster had little interest in a major adventure in Africa and lacked the naval resources to ever sustain it. Gorbachev was already moving towards an end to the Cold War. The white South Africans had suffered battle losses and were eager to get out if the Cubans did. The MPLA leaders were more interested in getting rich than in spreading world revolution. UNITA leader Savimbi was a monster--an embarrassment to his CIA handlers and maybe even to his Chinese allies (the latter were only involved to make trouble for the Soviets). It is hard to imagine a plausible scenario in which things would veer completely out of control. Certainly, no movement in sub-Saharan Africa had the military forces to seriously threaten the borders of the apartheid state.
 
Cuba could only sustain a limited commitment to the MPLA even with the Soviets footing the bill; it was Cuban, not Soviet, troops who were coming home in body bags. The Soviets after their Afghan disaster had little interest in a major adventure in Africa and lacked the naval resources to ever sustain it. Gorbachev was already moving towards an end to the Cold War. The white South Africans had suffered battle losses and were eager to get out if the Cubans did. The MPLA leaders were more interested in getting rich than in spreading world revolution. UNITA leader Savimbi was a monster--an embarrassment to his CIA handlers and maybe even to his Chinese allies (the latter were only involved to make trouble for the Soviets). It is hard to imagine a plausible scenario in which things would veer completely out of control. Certainly, no movement in sub-Saharan Africa had the military forces to seriously threaten the borders of the apartheid state.
So, in order to up the odds for the Communists, we'd require a more bellicose Soviet leader than Gorbachev, even if it means that Soviet economic instability comes a bit sooner? Or a refocusing of Soviet military attention from Afghanistan to Angola?
 
Could be their version of the Afghan battle of jalalabad, a flashy morale boosting victory but ultimately not something that can change the outcome
 
Top