Thanks for the advice guys, I appreciate it.
The Soviets took a number of prisoners when first crossing the border by surprising them in their barracks, although obviously this was a case where the Japanese were taken prisoner before they could even comprehend they were being attacked, much less put up any kind of fight. I recall Hastings mentioning some instances, if I could just find my copy of Nemesis...
That's a lot different than thousands of Japanese just throwing in the towel ala the Italian Army in North Africa.
Page 156 of the Leavenworth Paper:
"Soviet operational techniques surprised and confused the Japanese. In particular, the Soviet tendency to seek and achieve bypass of fortified positions befuddled Japanese commanders. Soviet units crossed terrain the Japanese considered impassable. The Japanese could not parry Soviet attacks that occurred on virtually every possible axis of advance."
Page 157:
"Perhaps most distressing to Japanese commanders were the pesky Soviet forward detachments constantly probing, bypassing, and attacking deeply. The detachments prevented the establishment of coherent defenses and, when stopped or damaged, they simply reformed or were reconstituted."
Page 174:
"Setting aside Soviet actions, the Japanese High Command reacted sloppily or indecisively, whether because of overconfidence, complacency, confusion, or pessimism... confusion reigned at the top and area army and army orders conflicted. Thus, many units unnecessarily withdrew from combat while others were swallowed up by it."
Again, Page 174:
"Speedy advance would preempt initial or subsequent Japanese establishment of a solid defense and would secure strategically critical territory."
Page 176:
"In order to generate initial success and to maintain offensive momentum, the Soviets carried
That's well and good, but the war ended before the campaign could progress past the initial phase. As has already been shown, the Japanese Command had gotten over the shock of the first days of the invasion and their situation was far from hopeless. Put simply, the point I'm trying to make here is that while the Soviets would have
eventually won in Manchuria and Korea, yes, the fight was nowhere near over as the main battle had yet to take place.
I count 3 divisions (the 107th, 119th, and 123rd) and 3 brigades (the 80th, 136th, and 135th) which are either cut-off or are about too be in the north. In the East, I notice that a Soviet force has penetrated behind the positions of the 112th, 127th, 79th, 124th, 128th divisions and the 132nd Brigade. The Tunghua area is also rather further south then that... only the 134th battalion and 125th division are actually inside of it.
The Kwantung Army had a much shorter distance to cross than the RKKA. In the north, the 136th Brigade was already retreating to the south and looked as if it stood a good chance of getting away. However, the 107th, 123rd, and 119th divisions, along with the 135th and 80th brigades were tied down and probably would have been lost. While serious, this was not in any way the "main strength" of the Kwantung Army.
And there is literally nothing substantial in the way of the Trans-Baikal Front, of course.
That may have been true, but the Third Area Army was already positioned at the Hsinking-Mukden line in preparation for the withdrawal to Tunghua. The Transbaikal Front would have had to really get it's act together if it wanted to beat them there.
So 7 divisions and 4 brigades are what?
There were no places in which retreating Japanese forces were out-ran by Red Army units advancing in front of them. The downward-pointing penetration in the east (the Soviet 5th Army) was contained following the Battle of Mutanchiang by the rearguard of the 1st Area Army, which JM-154 reports was holding its positions by the end of the war. The thrust into Korea also made no great progress until after hostilities ceased, as the Soviet attacks there essentially amounted to reinforced probes. Fighting in Korea was described as light (<1000 casualties) in comparison to other sectors. A battalion-sized amphibious landing at Najin was also reported and opposed. Neither move was apparently serious enough to threaten the general withdrawal to Tunghua.
For general reference: here was the front line as of August 15th:
Except Soviet records do not indicate this, although this could be due to the delays and problem of communication.
Probably.
Even though your map shows Red Army forces having advanced behind the positions of no less then 5 Japanese divisions and at 3 brigades at several points...
In no places did the Soviets
catch up to and
overrun retreating Japanese forces.
Encirclement of forces that are standing and fighting (i.e, not falling back on Tunghua) is a much different matter. Only in the far north were 3 divisions and 2 brigades in danger of being lost: the 119th Division and 80th Brigade at Pokotu, the 123rd Division and 135th Brigade far to the east of that (though the 2nd Far East Front was described as having advanced comparatively slowly, they nevertheless would probably have been cut of by 1st Far Eastern Front), and finally the withdrawing 107th Division, which was about to be cut off from the south. None of this, however, was a mortal danger to the main body of the Kwantung Army.
So a figure compiled by second-hand sources by a government agency operating off of what is probably no information is regarded as reliable?
Most the sources I'm reading (like Glantz or Richard Frank) cite 80,000 KIA.
If it's an official government figure that has survived review since 1964, I'd imagine it would be accurate. Despite the chaos of the campaign, casualties wouldn't have been that difficult to figure out: all that was required was an examination of unit rolls, the reports of the medical corps, the Soviet POW tally, etc.
Glantz and Frank cite the Soviet
claim of 80,000 dead, and Soviet claims are notoriously exaggerated. The Soviets
claimed to have inflicted 84,000 dead in Manchuria, just like they claimed to have inflicted 61,000 casualties at Khalkhin Gol or shot down 1100 US aircraft in Korea. As we've seen from Vietnam, any casualty list measured by body count can be subject to inflation by a factor of five or more.
"Developed"? I suppose in comparison to, say, Tibet or Mongolia the road and rail system in northern China was developed, sure.
It was better than you'd think, especially from the Peking area to the north. Here is a map of the major rail lines in Manchuria and the surrounding region, (not including highways, and there were several):
As can be seen, there were two major lines extending from northern China into southern Manchuria. Even by the 15th they were still some distance from the frontline, and with Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army advancing east, only the Soviet-Mongolian cav/mech group was an immediate threat to them.
Characterizing Ichi-Go as a mechanized offensive made me laugh. 800 tanks (the best of which are so vastly inferior to the T-34s and JS-2s that they might as well just blow up now and get it over with) dispersed overwhelmingly in a infantry or breakthrough-support role does not constitute a mechanized offensive. The Japanese never possessed the large independent armored formations like the Soviet Tank Corps or German Panzer Divisions that are the basic perquisite for such offensives. And while it may have worked wonders against the barely functioning Chinese militia, it would have enjoyed vastly less success attacking into the teeth of a vastly superior armored force.
The initial phase of Ichi-Go (Ko-Go) was lead by the IJA 3rd Armored Division and employed enough independent tank formations to make 3 divisions more. Overall there were 510,000 men, 15,500 trucks, 6,000 guns, 800 tanks, 700 planes, and 100,000 horses. The Japanese did not disperse their armor over a wide area, rather they concentrated it to achieve a decisive breakthrough and rapid encirclement as per their "mobile mass" doctrine. This took place most spectacularly at Luoyang, where between 200,000 and 390,000 Chinese were encircled. At the end of the battle 40,000 prisoners were taken while 583 guns were destroyed or captured. According to General Stilwell, Ichi-Go inflicted overall casualties of 300,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, and 80,000 prisoners on the Chinese. In addition, losses of 6,723 guns, 190 aircraft, and thousands of vehicles were reported. The Japanese achieved these results at a cost of 100,000 casualties.
The Chinese were not, as you say, "barely functioning militia," but regular army forces. They fought with determination and tenacity, and the fact that their dead outnumbered their wounded and prisoners 1.7 : 1 bears testament to this. In 1942, when the Japanese were mopping the floor with the Western Allies, only the Chinese managed a major victory (3rd Changsha). Chinese forces also performed admirably in Burma, and showed themselves worthy opponents in Korea. They were not the Red Army of the Soviet Union, but they were
not pushovers.
On the subject of the Japanese tanks themselves, while they may have been inferior to the T-34 and IS series vehicles in a straight-up fight, the latter two were by no means invulnerable. The US Army handbook on Japanese anti-tank warfare notes that the Type 1 47mm could penetrate any armor on the M4A6 at ranges of up to 800 yards. The Type 88 75mm and Type 90 75mm guns could also penetrate 70mm and 61mm at 1500 yards, respectively. The Type 88 was one-third as heavy as the FlaK 36, while the Type 90 weighed the same as the Pak 40.
Only the little fact that they had mauled and destroyed far more powerful counter-offensives in past operations.
They would be getting hit in the flank with overextended supply lines. I don't doubt the Red Army would have eventually won, it just would have been extremely disruptive to the attack on Tunghua, and would have given the Kwantung Army there invaluable time to prepare.
No, the Red Army. The United States had the most powerful armedforces at the time, but the Red Army was likely the more powerful ground force then the US Army.
I would disagree with you on this. This debate is for another thread, but I'll just say that US logistics, firepower, and air power (the USAAF was still part of the Army) were superior to the Soviets in every way. And having 7 million men under arms (even after the partial demobilization following the defeat of Germany) helps too.
Or more accurately: they did not recognize the threat.
The garrison on Sakhalin and the Kurils was mostly intact: the fighting had barely begun.
Sakhalin is a mere 50 miles from Hokkaido.
Not from port to port it isn't. The best port facilities were located nearly halfway up the island, and using them effectively means neutralizing the Japanese forces (~40,000 men) on that island. There is also the question of air support.
Rumoi contains a notable port facility and an airfield.
I meant on Sakhalin. Completely securing that island would probably have taken about a month, by which time defenses could be readjusted upon it becoming clear there was no threat to Hokkaido to the south.
Of course. But then the US was thinking in terms of how they would do an amphibious assault: one big, overwhelming landing that overpowers the enemy defenses. The Soviets, on the other hand, were thinking in terms of making unopposed landings at places where the enemy simply had no defenses, thereby making overwhelming force unnecessary.
Given that the Soviets would be continuously reinforced while the Japanese are stuck with what they have on the island (as the Americans had already severed traffic between Honshu and Hokkaido in July), yes.
Given the prerequisites for staging such an assault (even one taking place in stages), there would be ample time for the reorganization of defenses. The Japanese already learned their lesson about ignoring "raids in strength" at Guadalcanal: by the time of Operation Downfall their doctrine in protecting the Home Islands was to crush any and all beachheads with artillery followed by a swift attack by tanks and infantry.
The VVS was far superior to anything the Japanese had at the time in terms of both quantity and quality and Rumoi is within range of aircraft operating from the Soviet Far East, Korea, and Sakhalin. And the Red Banner Pacific Fleet may have been 4th rate, but a 4th rate navy that is still afloat beats out a 1st/2nd rate one which has been completely sunk or immobilized.
What was the VVS going to do against massed air attacks? The US Navy, which operated more and better aircraft than the Red Air Force in the Far East (with better pilots to boot) could not stop the all the Japanese over the open ocean at Okinawa. The forces available to the Soviet Pacific Fleet for a Hokkaido operation consisted of a handful of Lend-Lease LCIs, patrol craft, trawlers, torpedo cutters, sub-chasers, minesweepers, and a hodgepodge of other slow-moving craft. These forces had conducted no exercises, either combined or on their own initiative, and had virtually nil gunfire support or anti-air capability. Even a relatively small detachment of Japanese aircraft could totally annihilate them.
Approximately, yes. But then the invasion force for Sakhalin sailed 500 miles and invasion forces that landed in North Korea had to traverse 150-250 miles, depending on which specific landing you are talking about.
But the forces involved in the Sakhalin or Korea operations didn't have to shuttle reinforcements back and forth to shore up an outnumbered beachhead under sustained air attack...
As Korea will have been overrun at that point, you can remove those.
And it would take a long while for the Soviets to do this: combined Japanese Army and Navy forces in Korea numbered 335,900, and would be fighting on easily defensible terrain. This is of course AFTER the RKKA dealt with Tunghua and probably another half-million-odd defenders there.
Which are all on the wrong end of the island awaiting the aforementioned final battle against a massive American invasion force, not what will initially be interpreted as "Soviet raiding forces".
Not quite. While a large portion of Japanese air strength was in Kyushu or Honshu, the IJN had the 12th Air Fleet deployed at Ominato, while the IJA had the 1st Air Division and 20th Air Brigade based at Otaru. All of these units were in a position to interdict a Soviet naval force.