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According to a military review article, the three candidate points for
an amphibious descent on Korea for the UN forces were Inchon, Kunsan
(in southwest Korea, and the favorite of most observers) and Chinampo,
the port serving Pyongyang.

The pros and cons of Chinampo have not been compared as directly as
the Inchon versus Kunsan options.


There were two arguments disqualifying Chinampo as final choice. The
first was a lack of a UN mandate to attack northward at this time (in
OTL the US got UNGA assent in September, after the Inchon victory),
and secondly, it was "too far north", which is a rather vague
explanation.


So, what if the political hurdle is overcome. For instance, although
the initial presidential decisions and US-backed UNGA resolutions only
authorized using force south of the 38th parallel, before long, air
and naval ops were permitted north of the line.


Part of the rationale for that limit, besides escalation worries, was
the initial feeling in Korea that the North Koreans might just pull in
their horns once they saw US-UN forces showing the flag. By the
middle of july and certainly by August it was clear that was not going
to happen.


Say MacArthur is hot for going to Chinampo & Pyongyang, its really his
favorite. And then the Truman Administration gets UNGA authorization
to go north of the parallel with any forces. Diplomatically, the
shift is sold as a psyops measure that probably is nowhere near to
realization, but is needed to underline the seriousness of the
situation to Beijing and Moscow, hopefully leading to them choosing to
exert pressure on North Korea.


So, the landing is prepared for Korea's northwest coast.


Pro's Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:


- Hits North Korean political center of gravity
- Does more than any other options to decively cripple North Korean
sources of power
- Leaves US/UN forces with greater ability to catch any Pyongyang
regime officials fleeing into the hinterland
- Makes for a very non-permissive environment for deployment of PRC or
Soviet forces in northern Korea
- Cuts off NKPA ultimate sources of supply and command
- Inchon had nasty tides, tidal flats and seawalls. Maybe Chinampo's
an easier landing area, with fewer mobile forces streaming through.
-fewer mobile enemy forces streaming through, even harder for NKPA to
try to solve anything with a retrograde movement
-The Chinese are much less prepared to intervene at this point, they
are forced to decide to intervene, or hopefully not, earlier


Con's of Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:


-"too far north" by itself doesn't count as a disqualifier, but
perhaps someone else can elaborate on specific problems the distance
would cause.
-North Korea, which once feared ROK invasion, make have better
prepared fixed fortifications, static garrison forces and solid
contingency plans for defending Chinampo and the capital prepared to
what it has improvised for the newly conquered Seoul-Inchon area
-It will take much longer to unite forces landing in Chinampo with
forces breaking out from Pusan, and it will take longer to liberate
South Korean population centers and to enlarge ROK forces and shove
them north to reinforce USMC, compared to OTL
-The Chinese can still intervene in some strength, maybe its enough
for their purposes against US/UN forces that are geographically harder
to reinforce.
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