WI ChiComs not defeated at Quemoy in 1949, do they invade Taiwan in 1950?

raharris1973

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In October 1949 the battle of Guningtou on the offshore Chinese island of Quemoy/Jinmen/Kinmen bucked the year's trend of Chinese Communist victories and Chinese Nationalist failures. It also revived the morale of at least the Taiwan-based Chinese Nationalist forces and shocked the Chinese leadership into looking at painstaking preparations that could be required to successfully invade Taiwan and other offshore islands. As it turned out, while preparations were being made, and China seized Hainan and some other offshore islands in the interim, by May 1950 the PRC was thinking an invasion of Taiwan was at least months away, if not something impractical until 1951.

...and then the Korean war started and the US interposed the 7th fleet. And then the Chinese started fighting in Korea about four months later, all resulting in a Taiwan invasion dropping from the PRC's immediate "to-do" list.

What if ChiNats just never garrison Quemoy as much prior to October 1949, or, the ChiComs get very lucky and ChiNats unlucky.

Here is wiki background on the battle, which suggests some potential PoDs:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Guningtou

If the PLA does not face its historic setback, would Mao keep pushing his armies to finish the job in Taiwan, to the point that he initiates an invasion of Taiwan before the Korean War starts on June 25th, 1950.

If launched in the spring of 1950 or in early to mid-June, an invasion will be one of two things, either a disaster for the PLA, or the last campaign of the Civil War and final humiliation and defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. Either way it could have interesting effects on US foreign policy, US domestic politics and the Korean War. What might those be?
 
In October 1949 the battle of Guningtou on the offshore Chinese island of Quemoy/Jinmen/Kinmen bucked the year's trend of Chinese Communist victories and Chinese Nationalist failures. It also revived the morale of at least the Taiwan-based Chinese Nationalist forces and shocked the Chinese leadership into looking at painstaking preparations that could be required to successfully invade Taiwan and other offshore islands. As it turned out, while preparations were being made, and China seized Hainan and some other offshore islands in the interim, by May 1950 the PRC was thinking an invasion of Taiwan was at least months away, if not something impractical until 1951.

...and then the Korean war started and the US interposed the 7th fleet. And then the Chinese started fighting in Korea about four months later, all resulting in a Taiwan invasion dropping from the PRC's immediate "to-do" list.

What if ChiNats just never garrison Quemoy as much prior to October 1949, or, the ChiComs get very lucky and ChiNats unlucky.

Here is wiki background on the battle, which suggests some potential PoDs:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Guningtou

If the PLA does not face its historic setback, would Mao keep pushing his armies to finish the job in Taiwan, to the point that he initiates an invasion of Taiwan before the Korean War starts on June 25th, 1950.

If launched in the spring of 1950 or in early to mid-June, an invasion will be one of two things, either a disaster for the PLA, or the last campaign of the Civil War and final humiliation and defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. Either way it could have interesting effects on US foreign policy, US domestic politics and the Korean War. What might those be?
I believe Harry Truman's foreign policy saw supporting the KMT after their defeat as fruitless and were unwilling to intervene if the PLA went after Taiwan. Eisenhower's foreign policy changed that. Had the PLA succeeded in taking Taiwan and then intervened in Korea, belief in the Domino Effect might be taken more seriously, and Eisenhower and future presidents devote more into combating the spread of Communism in Asia.
 
I believe Harry Truman's foreign policy saw supporting the KMT after their defeat as fruitless and were unwilling to intervene if the PLA went after Taiwan.

See
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-the-prc-captured-taiwan.464050/#post-18633816 where I discuss pre-Korean War US attitudes toward Taiwan and conclude "In short, the possibility that the US would have intervened militarily even without the Korean War and even without a coup against Chiang cannot IMO be dismissed entirely. For one thing, the Pentagon by June was recommending a military fact-finding mission by General MacArthur to Taiwan; it might have been difficult to prevent that from leading to a full-scale military commitment, because once the general set foot on Taiwan, the prestige of the US would be at stake. For that reason, George Kennan urged that before a military survey was sent, two conditions had to be met: the removal of Chiang from power and a commitment by the Joint Chiefs to "go the whole hog if required." https://books.google.com/books?id=260sUA3BzIcC&pg=PA27 (It is possible that by June Chiang was so desperate that he would have "voluntarily" resigned to get US backing for Taiwan; supposedly he said as much in a secret letter to Truman.) But there was certainly no decision for such intervention before the Korean crisis. The non-interventionist line was weakening but had not yet been abandoned."
 

raharris1973

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My thinking is that if there is no Quemoy setback for the PRC they pull out all the stops to try an invasion of Taiwan between March and June 1950. The inadequately prepared invasion becomes a debacle, for the Communists. Between the highlighted importance of Taiwan and partial redemption of the Chinese Nationalist military reputation and domestic political clamor, the Truman administration decides a repeat invasion cannot be tolerated, and the US unilaterally declares “neutralization” of the Taiwan straits, and a raising of US signaling of interest in protecting the Pacific Rim. Consequently, Stalin shuts down KIM I’ll-Sung’s request to invade the south and instead restrains North Korea.

No Korean War, just border clashes and guerrilla activity from time to time. ROC Taiwan holds on to Taiwan and the Penghus/Pescadores, but not the immediate offshore islands like Matsu.

PRC is pissed off at the USA and seeks and receives military and naval modernization assistance from the USSR.

The PRC steps up aid to the Viet Minh significantly. The US increases aid to France and the Bao Dai regime.

Without a Korean War distracting both the PRC and USA, Indochina escalates, with the Chinese-backed French able to inflict a Dien Bien Phu style defeat on the French in 1952, while France is strained politically and seeks to negotiate a way out. Then what?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
My thinking is that if there is no Quemoy setback for the PRC they pull out all the stops to try an invasion of Taiwan between March and June 1950. The inadequately prepared invasion becomes a debacle, for the Communists. Between the highlighted importance of Taiwan and partial redemption of the Chinese Nationalist military reputation and domestic political clamor, the Truman administration decides a repeat invasion cannot be tolerated, and the US unilaterally declares “neutralization” of the Taiwan straits, and a raising of US signaling of interest in protecting the Pacific Rim. Consequently, Stalin shuts down KIM I’ll-Sung’s request to invade the south and instead restrains North Korea.

No Korean War, just border clashes and guerrilla activity from time to time. ROC Taiwan holds on to Taiwan and the Penghus/Pescadores, but not the immediate offshore islands like Matsu.

PRC is pissed off at the USA and seeks and receives military and naval modernization assistance from the USSR.

The PRC steps up aid to the Viet Minh significantly. The US increases aid to France and the Bao Dai regime.

Without a Korean War distracting both the PRC and USA, Indochina escalates, with the Chinese-backed French able to inflict a Dien Bien Phu style defeat on the French in 1952, while France is strained politically and seeks to negotiate a way out. Then what?


So the result of the above is no Korean War at least in the early 1950s, just a smaller and cheaper Taiwan war and standoff to support regional containment.

Then the next item to come to a head is French Indochina. It may get settled a couple years early along the lines of the OTL Geneva settlement-of 1954.

Or, the two sides might not be able to come to an agreement. Maybe the US committing ground troops to Vietnam 11 to 13 years before OTL. The US is not tired from a previous war in the Asian mainland (in Korea) and has no military respect for the Red Chinese.

Alternately, or at the same time, The Communist side may not be willing to do the temporary partition compromise. The Chinese are pissed at the Americans but have not seen them willing to find a ground war in Asia.

The US could have an analog of its fighting the VC, but earlier, against the Viet Minh, and not just in the south but across all Vietnam and Indochina.

Or when the Americans go in, the Chinese can counter intervene.

Magic 8-ball says “results uncertain”.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Had the PLA succeeded in taking Taiwan and then intervened in Korea, belief in the Domino Effect might be taken more seriously, and Eisenhower and future presidents devote more into combating the spread of Communism in Asia.

So, since the fighting positions of Taiwan and maybe South Korea are lost, what does this mean in practical terms to commit more to Asia? I guess it means the US sending ground troops into French Indochina to prevent negotiations that might leave the Communists with territory. Intervention on India's side if there is a later Sino-Indian War. Ground troops in the Philippines (even though they are not actually needed).
 
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