How would the French resistance and the future of France itself be affected if Charles de Gaulle was shot down and killed while flying to Britain to seek refuge?
WI: Charles de Gaulle dies in 1940?
- Thread starter CenturionMagnus
- Start date
More like there is no free france at all. France get a millitary occupation like Germany.
Anaxagoras
Banned
Without de Gaulle, there is no Free France. There really was no one else to do the job (had there been, Roosevelt and Churchill would have happily tossed de Gaulle aside). And with no Free France, the Vichy regime will gain much more creditability both inside and outside France. British attacks on Vichy territory would have been seen by the world is a far less positive light than IOTL.
Impossible, Giraud was kept prisoner from 1940 to 1942, until he managed to evade from Konigstein.
Without de Gaulle you don't have a somewhat government-in-exile with the allies, less troops in the Free French Forces, and many unorganized Résistance groups. France interests will be overlooked by the Allies, Vichy considered as the only french government, and without any real alternatives to it a military administration for France after the Liberation.
Cook
Banned
The suggestion that if de Gaulle had died there would not have been a Free French government is, frankly, ridiculous. Regardless of de Gaulle there would have been a Free French for two reasons; firstly because there were French soldiers and sailors in England, many of whom still wanted to fight, they would have organised some organisation to represent their interests. And secondly, and more importantly, because the British needed there to be a Free French government so that they can avoid the impression that they were plundering the colonies of their erstwhile ally.
When de Gaulle landed in England there were 21,000 French troops there; men who’d taken part in the Norwegian campaign or who had been evacuated from Dunkirk. None of them had fought under de Gaulle and few would have known much about him or been inspired by what they did; de Gaulle had spent most of the First World War in a German prisoner of war camp, hand been promoted slowly in the inter-war period, had written a book on strategy that had been ridiculed in France, his involvement in the fighting in 1940 had consisted of a few days and had seen the armoured division he commanded almost completely destroyed without even slowing the German spearheads, before he’d been asked to join the collapsing Reynaud government as its most junior minister. As things turned out, less than a third of them joined the Free French army, most preferring to either be repatriated to France or go into internment in England. Those that did join the F.F. did so for reasons other than enthusiasm for de Gaulle, as he him-self fully admitted. De Gaulle described their motivation as:
‘A taste for risk and adventure pushed to the pitch of art for art’s sake, a contempt for the cowardly and the indifferent, a tendency to melancholy and so to quarrelling during the periods without danger, given place to an ardent cohesion in action, a national pride sharpened to the extreme by their country’s ill-fortune and by contact with well equipped allies, and above all, a sovereign confidence in the strength and courage of their own conspiracy.’
Nor was de Gaulle any more successful in rallying French colonies to his banner; only French Equatorial Africa went over to the Free French cause, and for reasons entirely unrelated to de Gaulle’s leadership. At Dakar, the last campaign against the Vichy French where Free French forces took the lead and de Gaulle commanded in person, the allies were defeated. After that, allied forces led the campaigns in Vichy colonies, often without any prior consultation with de Gaulle. Nor did progressively greater success inspire more enthusiasm for the Free French cause; Vichy forces in Madagascar and the Levant fought bitterly hard to the finish and almost all declined to join the Free French, instead choosing to be repatriated.
The Free French forces fighting in the Levant and North Africa were not commanded in the field by de Gaulle, he was the political, not military leader of a government in exile that served British needs; they wanted someone who they could hand over liberated Vichy colonies to and thereby avoid appearing to be plundering the France; the Fashoda complex. Nor was de Gaulle the British first choice; that had been Georges Mandel, the French Interior Minister, who General Spears had been sent to France to persuade to join him in flying to England. Unfortunately Mandel decided to head for French North Africa and try to rally French resistance from there, was arrested by Petain and ended up being murdered by the Gestapo.
Without de Gaulle, someone else would have filled the position and the Free French would have proceeded much as they did. The shape of post-war French politics would have been different, possibly immensely different depending on who stepped forward to fill the gap, but during the war and in the allied conferences that decided the immediate post-war period, little would have changed.
When de Gaulle landed in England there were 21,000 French troops there; men who’d taken part in the Norwegian campaign or who had been evacuated from Dunkirk. None of them had fought under de Gaulle and few would have known much about him or been inspired by what they did; de Gaulle had spent most of the First World War in a German prisoner of war camp, hand been promoted slowly in the inter-war period, had written a book on strategy that had been ridiculed in France, his involvement in the fighting in 1940 had consisted of a few days and had seen the armoured division he commanded almost completely destroyed without even slowing the German spearheads, before he’d been asked to join the collapsing Reynaud government as its most junior minister. As things turned out, less than a third of them joined the Free French army, most preferring to either be repatriated to France or go into internment in England. Those that did join the F.F. did so for reasons other than enthusiasm for de Gaulle, as he him-self fully admitted. De Gaulle described their motivation as:
‘A taste for risk and adventure pushed to the pitch of art for art’s sake, a contempt for the cowardly and the indifferent, a tendency to melancholy and so to quarrelling during the periods without danger, given place to an ardent cohesion in action, a national pride sharpened to the extreme by their country’s ill-fortune and by contact with well equipped allies, and above all, a sovereign confidence in the strength and courage of their own conspiracy.’
Nor was de Gaulle any more successful in rallying French colonies to his banner; only French Equatorial Africa went over to the Free French cause, and for reasons entirely unrelated to de Gaulle’s leadership. At Dakar, the last campaign against the Vichy French where Free French forces took the lead and de Gaulle commanded in person, the allies were defeated. After that, allied forces led the campaigns in Vichy colonies, often without any prior consultation with de Gaulle. Nor did progressively greater success inspire more enthusiasm for the Free French cause; Vichy forces in Madagascar and the Levant fought bitterly hard to the finish and almost all declined to join the Free French, instead choosing to be repatriated.
The Free French forces fighting in the Levant and North Africa were not commanded in the field by de Gaulle, he was the political, not military leader of a government in exile that served British needs; they wanted someone who they could hand over liberated Vichy colonies to and thereby avoid appearing to be plundering the France; the Fashoda complex. Nor was de Gaulle the British first choice; that had been Georges Mandel, the French Interior Minister, who General Spears had been sent to France to persuade to join him in flying to England. Unfortunately Mandel decided to head for French North Africa and try to rally French resistance from there, was arrested by Petain and ended up being murdered by the Gestapo.
Without de Gaulle, someone else would have filled the position and the Free French would have proceeded much as they did. The shape of post-war French politics would have been different, possibly immensely different depending on who stepped forward to fill the gap, but during the war and in the allied conferences that decided the immediate post-war period, little would have changed.
de Gaulle's early demise would have some pretty big effects on Canadian politics. His little stunt in Montreal in 1967 gave significant credibility to the Quebec separatist movement.
After reading your very informative post I'm left wondering about your conclusion.
Without de Gaulle is it possible that an alternate Free French are more successful? Would a higher profile leader be able to convince more Frenchmen to come across or manage a victorious Dakar?
Wasn't for example Pierre Clostermann's father some kind of high positioned diplomat in London in 1940? As said before, somebody else could try.
Cook
Banned
A higher profile leader leading to a more successful Free French was certainly possible, but depended entirely on events during the last days before French Capitulation.
When the government abandoned Paris and relocated to Bordeaux, the righting was well and truly on the wall; France would fall. Premier Reynaud proposed to General Weygand that the French should do as the Dutch had done; seek a military capitulation only, while leaving the government freedom of action to continue the struggle from overseas. Weygand indignantly refused and Reynaud, despite having the authority to dismiss Weygand for failure to carry out orders, did not do so, instead he resigned; he was by that stage on the verge of a mental and physical breakdown. If Reynaud had dismissed Weygand and appointed someone else as commander of the French army, with authorisation to capitulate only those forces in mainland France, those members of the government willing to continue the fight could have flown to either North Africa or England and been able to issue orders to the French colonies with the full authority of the legitimate French Government.
The French cabinet were divided between those in favour of capitulation and those wanting to continue the struggle from France’s overseas empire. In Anglo-American terms these would have been ‘the hawks’ and ‘the doves’, in France they were referred to as ‘the hards’ and ‘the softs’, which possibly suggests something concerning French though processes at the time. By the 14th of June, the softs formed a definite majority of the cabinet, but there were still key members in the hards camp, principal amongst them being Interior Minister Georges Mandel and Defence Minister (and former Prime Minister) Edouard Daladier, both of whom headed for North Africa to try to continue the struggle from there. The Minister for the Navy, Cesar Campinchi and the Minister of State, Louis Marin, were also leading hards.
If either Mandel or Daladier (or in a best case scenario, both) had flown to England but otherwise events continued as IOTL; Reynaud resigning, Petain becoming premier and asking for an armistice, then they would have had much more pull than de Gaulle had, both in terms of being able to persuade French soldiers there to join the Free French and in politically when dealing with the British and Americans. Daladier in particular, could have used the dissolution of the French parliament on July 10th and Petain’s assumption of the presidency to denounce him and declared that he, as most senior remaining member of a legitimate French cabinet sworn in by President Lebrun, was assuming the duties of the premier and leading a French Provisional Government in Exile.
As heads of an exile government, neither Daladier nor Mandel would have been perfect, but then an obscure Brigadier-General with no political experience and a prickly personality wasn't either. Daladier was a virtual manic depressive who sustained himself through the crisis of 1940 by drinking heavily; many witnesses describe him reeking of Absinthe during cabinet meetings, but his public image was stronger and inspired more respect than his private one. Mandel’s character was outstanding for the role of an exiled leader; he’s was calm, unflappable, resolute and determined, the only thing going against him was that he was a Jew, and this was something that the Vichy regime and the Germans would have used for maximum propaganda effect. The best scenario would have been for both Daladier and Mandel to have got to England, preferably with Campinchi as well; Daladier would have become the head of the provisional government with Mandel providing the reliable anchor and capable administration, while Campinchi would have been able to issue orders to the French Fleet with at least some confidence of outweighing the orders issued by Darlan.
None would have equalled the prestige of Petain, but they all had more political prestige, clout and public profile than de Gaulle had, with the possibility of more colonies and men joining the Free French cause.
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I like your analysis. I've only ever seen a France fights on (government flees) and randomish junior guy (OTL DeGaulle) fights the legitimate government. Nice to see a middle road.
That is true, but if another French leader said the same thing, how would the reaction be different?
Cook's posts sum up the situation so well, that they don't need much supplementation. I offer one clarification: some Free French forces were still in the field after Dakar, in particular Leclerc's army which marched across the Sahara from Chad and linked up with the British in North Africa.
After the Liberation of Paris, one situation that De Gaulle handled well was the early disarming of resistance militias in late 1944. Many of these were Communist, and could have created severe problems later had not De Gaulle acted as he did.
After the Liberation of Paris, one situation that De Gaulle handled well was the early disarming of resistance militias in late 1944. Many of these were Communist, and could have created severe problems later had not De Gaulle acted as he did.
A new and less offensive leader arises for Free France. I find it impossible to imagine a successor to de Gaulle who was less pleasant.
Weygand did not want responsibility for French surrender to be on the military's hands only. Kind of a wierd position by Weygand since the military is there to do the governments bidding in the best interests of the country.
But if something like this happened where the French surrendered metropiltan France, but the government carried on the struggle, from the viewpoint of June 1940. You expose France to a possibly cruel occupation of the entire country for many unknown amount of years, (i.e like OTL Poland) without any leverage over the occupiers that the Vichy regime and its remanining military assets provided (i.e. its fleet and colonial bases).
It was a logical decision at the time to create a Vichy regime.
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American administration of France at the liberation would be very likely they even started to print money in 1944 otl.
Cook
Banned
When Weygand arrived back in France from Syria to assume the position of Commander of the French Army in May 1940 and was briefed on the situation, he exclaimed, “If I had known it was this bad I would never have come!”
His sole concern throughout was his personal reputation.