WI Cavalry Blitzkreig

While playing Civ 3 today I happened to reach heavy bombers while still being a bit far from tanks and decided to use them as an odd version of a blitkreig.

Could a situation where military aircraft used in the initial German blitkreig or an equal level of technology and capabilities, are used in a similiar fashion to tanks and armor in a sort of blitzkreig?

How does this effect the Second World War, or even the end of the First World War?
 
Basically, no. Not in a smokeless powder repeater (hell even blackpowder repeater) rifle enviroment and definitly not in a WWII tank assault manner which basically means massing your armor (in this case cavalery) for a charge through enemy lines. Casualties will be horrendous because horses are not tanks and they have to stay close together to stay coordinated in tight formations which leaves them ridiculously vulnerable.

In short this is a HORRIBLE idea when you have rifles everywhere. It basically killed the idea of horse cavalry entirely
 
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Depends on the cavalry - in the 20th C most cavalry were 'mounted Infantry' (aka dragoons) particularly in the Commonwealth armies - in that they used Horses as they were the fastest way of moving a fully equipped infantryman cross country before the invention of practical cross country vehicles.

So the idea is not so much as to fight from horse back but to get a force of men to a given position much faster than would otherwise be the case.

Once at the position they would dismount to fight on foot with 1 man in 4 taking the horses away to relative safety

The advent of continental 'static' trench warfare - wire and lots of Machine guns made this tactic potentially disastrous - but guess what - infantry advancing on foot across the same land fared no better - sometimes a lot worse as they were exposed for longer.
 
The advent of continental 'static' trench warfare - wire and lots of Machine guns made this tactic potentially disastrous - but guess what - infantry advancing on foot across the same land fared no better - sometimes a lot worse as they were exposed for longer.

The comparison isn't really valid as infantry was a lot more flexible tactically in terms of taking advantage of terrain and supporting arms, not to mention they are far easier to command and coordinate, resulting in what basically amounts to modern day infantry tactics which haven't changed that much since then, you could not do that with cavalry based infantry.
 
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For artillery, use tachankas or if at a particularly late date, early off-road vehicles to make a proto-technical.

But I don't think this would work well outside of an area like, say, the Great Plains or Siberia.
 

Redbeard

Banned
In the Russian Civil War large scale mounted units were used with enough succes for the Red Army to keep a big cavalry arm well into WWII. They did have sabers and did occasionally perform charges (usually with catastrofic results for the cavalry), but usually fought dismounted. In an open landscape with few or bad roads horses are a low tech way to get fairly mobile. The number of men and not at least the amount of ammo that can be carried is so limited however, that the mounted unit can't be expected to overcome determined opposition.

BTW the Red Army depended on the horse as the main logistic instrument well into WWII, far more than the Wehrmacht (I only have figures for Barbarossa, later deliveries of wallied trucks might have changed it, but still many hores by 1945).
 
It seems that the original poster, and at least one other, are unfamiliar with the OTL Battle of Megiddo (1918), where Allenby used deception to shield a massed infantry and artillery attack to blast a hole in the Ottoman lines to allow exploitation by the Desert Mounted Corps of Australian, British, Indian and New Zealander cavalry and mounted infantry, together with a handful of armoured cars and armed motor cars, which resulted in the destruction of an entire Ottoman Army Group, and the capture of Damascus and Aleppo. Throw in the use of British and Australian airpower to take out enemy command and control in the initial phase and then later to massacre retreating enemy formations, and you have an operation that would make a German general green with envy. If memory serves, the speed of exploitation was not matched until the Israelis in 1967.
 
PoV nailed it.

It is also forgotten the Red Army of 1944-45 used cavalry corps to add mobile units to they offensive. These were used as a sort of lighter version of the small number of motorized rifle corps. In strength & firepower the cavalry corps ranged from a light to robust division & sometimes included a tank brigade & usually a assault artillery unit of the SU & JSU type AFV. The horse mounted rifle, MG, mortar, AT, and light artillery brigadess had mobility similar or better than truck mounted infantry brigades. They were often used in regions with inferior automotive roads.

So from the two examples here horse mounted corps still had operational utility as a mobile unit. & were used in breakthrough operations. Most of the problems with cavalry in this era came from tactical issues. by using the horses as a substitute for trucks & tactically fighting as infantry the cavalry was capable of supporting breakthrough operations.
 
As per OP this isn't really what was meant (I think) as the cavalry isn't doing the breakthrough but exploiting the breakthrough provided by the infantry, artillery and aircraft. But I do think it's a valid operational concept and one that could have been implemented from about 1880 onwards (minus the aircraft). You really need lightweight horse drawn machine guns and artillery to make it work but those were available
 
The comparison isn't really valid as infantry was a lot more flexible tactically in terms of taking advantage of terrain and supporting arms, not to mention they are far easier to command and coordinate, resulting in what basically amounts to modern day infantry tactics which haven't changed that much since then, you could not do that with cavalry based infantry.

The thing is what did cavalry (Horse Mounted infantry) and the majority of Foot infantry evolve into?

Motorised and Mechanised Infantry - operating with integral Wheeled or tracked Transport form the majority of today's armed forces - why? Because its the quickest (and often safest) way of getting around a battlefield.

Even 'light' infantry formations use Helicopters to move around and on occasion have been known to jump en mass out of perfectly serviceable aircraft into a potential battlefield rather than walk!

In 1914 a mounted Cavalry man was 'no less' an Infantry man once dismounted as a modern Paratrooper or Guardsman or Marine is once 'they' are dismounted from their transport of choice and equally able to exploit terrain and supporting arms as any 'foot' infantry formation can once they have done so - they are just a lot faster and can cover a greater area of a given battlefield.

At the same time Horse mounted infantry that is engaged by Rifle MMG and Artillery fire while mounted is not any more vulnerable than a given Infantry formation in column of march or a horse drawn Artillery Regiment in 'Harness' . Which is why all 3 tended not to do so if knowingly in range of the enemy if they could at all help it!

Had allied Cavalry not existed in WW1 then there are several Battles where the German Army might have broken through as foot Infantry would have been too slow to react.

Basically considering Cavalry to be useless in the face of then modern weapons and trench warfare ignores how they were supposed to be and in many cases where used

In WW1 its easy to say that 'Command and Control' was not good enough to make use of that speed advantage - the very same is also true of Infantry and Artillery once the battle became 'fluid' (many many examples of Commanders having no clue where their subordinate Infantry and artillery units where - sometimes for days) and it was only towards the end of the war that the Principle armies learned how to better control the various arms.
 
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Basically considering Cavalry to be useless in the face of then modern weapons and trench warfare ignores how they were supposed to be and in many cases where used

My take it is more a misunderstanding of the difference between operational and tactical levels. The former is often not understood at all, or confused by how the two overlap.

In WW1 its easy to say that 'Command and Control' was not good enough to make use of that speed advantage - the very same is also true of Infantry and Artillery once the battle became 'fluid' (many many examples of Commanders having no clue where their subordinate Infantry and artillery units where - sometimes for days) and it was only towards the end of the war that the Principle armies learned how to better control the various arms.

Napoleon managed to create operational and tactical manuver speeds not thought possible in that era, and considered impractical in the modern era when electronic communications fail. He, and like minded commanders, did it though a focus on the operational level, giving subordinates a clear idea of the objectives & their role, and leaving them free to adjust to tactical circumstances. Unlike many less sucessful commanders Napoleon worried less about the current tactical situation & was less prone to micromanage. Thus without a constant flow of detailed reports upwards and detailed orders downwards Napoleons corps commanders were able to were able to manuver more independantly and faster than the opposition.

Modern communications can actually clog up and slow a units operations if they are misused. Constant demands for information and special reports distract the subordinates from there own command/staff function, & then a constant stream of detailed orders & coordinating instructions further degrade their speed of action.
 
While you can use cavalry to exploit an opening in relatively open terrain, there are some major limitations to this. Even a light infantry screen with automatic weapons will cut the cavalry to pieces. The other problem is that while for relatively shirt sprints cavalry can be very quick, compared to motorized transport which needs much less rest (although of course maintenance), the reason the Mongols moved so quickly is that they were very lightly burdened and had multiple remounts so they could switch off often - not the case for modern military cavalry. One aspect of blitzkrieg is that the mobile/armored elements once they got in the rear areas could crush those elements. Even if the cavalry gets there, they are not better armed than rear area units, less shock value.

cavalry action in the rear areas (like Stuart in US Civil War) could be a pain in the ass, but not the breakthrough.
 
What happened in the Second World War was the Soviets used Tanks and Horses together side by side. Each gave each other cover. Tanks would be the tip of the spear and break through the lines while cavalry mopped up. When fuel or breakages happened the Cavalry acted in defensive mode. They also cleared areas were Tanks could not go. The common tactic was to have the first line charge with swords, the follow up was with firearms.
 

Redbeard

Banned
My take it is more a misunderstanding of the difference between operational and tactical levels. The former is often not understood at all, or confused by how the two overlap.

What is your definition of operations and tatics, and hence the overlap? I ask because I was taught operations and tactics in another language than English, and as I recall we did not use any similar expressions, but rather what in contemporary English is called "operations" gradually took over from "tactics" as you moved up the unit sizes and at least at "independent troop unit" level (Brigade/Division) it was more operations than tactics. I guess what we called "Troppeføring" (Truppenführung) is close to "operations".

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Modern communications can actually clog up and slow a units operations if they are misused. Constant demands for information and special reports distract the subordinates from there own command/staff function, & then a constant stream of detailed orders & coordinating instructions further degrade their speed of action.

Exactly ! And applies as well to many modern civilian organisations. Because it is possible to get reports on this and that management spend all their effort asking (screaming) for reports and don't see anything but the reports, not even realities, but issue an endless stream of micromanagement deducted from the reports. Not at least many Government institutions have suffered (New Public Management).
 
What is your definition of operations and tatics, and hence the overlap? I ask because I was taught operations and tactics in another language than English, and as I recall we did not use any similar expressions, but rather what in contemporary English is called "operations" gradually took over from "tactics" as you moved up the unit sizes and at least at "independent troop unit" level (Brigade/Division) it was more operations than tactics. I guess what we called "Troppeføring" (Truppenführung) is close to "operations" ...

I never met a clear definition of this. The definitions offered in the FM documents are useful only as far as the narrow context of the documents. In one sense it depends on your position. If you are in the HQ of a reinforced battalion task force then you are looking at the TF actions as a operation & the actions of the companies as tactical. But, from the perspective of the Division or corps HQ everything you see at the battalion or brigade level is tactical. The US Army publications I've read identify the "Corps" as the largest & primary tactical formation. But one routinely finds the term 'operational' & 'operation' attached to the actions of corps, or smaller units. In the 19th Century the terms seems to be unknown in the US Army lexicon. Sometimes one sees the term "Grand Tactics" applied to the activity of units from Brigade to Corps. When I moved up to the divsion/corps level staff I gradually dropped the terms & provided a small bit of clarity by referring to activity as 'company action', brigade action, platoon action, ect...

If one must attempt a definition of each; then perhaps tactics is the action of applying specific weapons & firepower, both in shooting and manuvering. Operations would be the application of larger groups of units over a longer time. This still does not work well because in modern warfare even small units like squads are combined arms formations.
 
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Exactly ! And applies as well to many modern civilian organisations. Because it is possible to get reports on this and that management spend all their effort asking (screaming) for reports and don't see anything but the reports, not even realities, but issue an endless stream of micromanagement deducted from the reports. Not at least many Government institutions have suffered (New Public Management).

Fortunately in the US there has been a opposing school of management devoted to simple and clear communication & focusing on larger issues and not on what color the paper stapler is. This school struggles but provides a tiny light of hope.
 

Redbeard

Banned
I never met a clear definition of this. The definitions offered in the FM documents are useful only as far as the narrow context of the documents. In one sense it depends on your position. If you are in the HQ of a reinforced battalion task force then you are looking at the TF actions as a operation & the actions of the companies as tactical. But, from the perspective of the Division or corps HQ everything you see at the battalion or brigade level is tactical. The US Army publications I've read identify the "Corps" as the largest & primary tactical formation. But one routinely finds the term 'operational' & 'operation' attached to the actions of corps, or smaller units. In the 19th Century the terms seems to be unknown in the US Army lexicon. Sometimes one sees the term "Grand Tactics" applied to the activity of units from Brigade to Corps. When I moved up to the divsion/corps level staff I gradually dropped the terms & provided a small bit of clarity by referring to activity as 'company action', brigade action, platoon action, ect...

If one must attempt a definition of each; then perhaps tactics is the action of applying specific weapons & firepower, both in shooting and manuvering. Operations would be the application of larger groups of units over a longer time. This still does not work well because in modern warfare even small units like squads are combined arms formations.

Very similar to my own experience and anyway I'm glad that I haven't missed any bulletproof definition.

I came to think about the post WWII discussions about Hitler's (mis)management of army operations. His critics among the German generals said, that while Hitler had a reasonable and intuitive understanding of how a Division fought, he had absolutely no clue about higher levels.

Probably very simplified, but I can see how "tactical" the command of a WWII Division could be and how "operations" accelerate at Corps or higher level.

I certainly agree that the borderline has moved down the unit size. 200 years ago a battalion was a block of men on the battlefield that could deploy in a very limited number of formations and all inside the shouting and viewing distance of the commander. Now it is a very complex machine and expected to include and co-ordinate so many aspects - tasks, weapon systems, logistics etc. - that leading a modern battalion probably is more "operational" than leading a Napoleonic Armycorps.
 
I certainly agree that the borderline has moved down the unit size. 200 years ago a battalion was a block of men on the battlefield that could deploy in a very limited number of formations and all inside the shouting and viewing distance of the commander. Now it is a very complex machine and expected to include and co-ordinate so many aspects - tasks, weapon systems, logistics etc. - that leading a modern battalion probably is more "operational" than leading a Napoleonic Armycorps.

A mid to late 20th Century 'battalion' may have a larger command staff than Napoleon had for the Grand Armee.
 
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