WI Case Blue focues on Leningrad

Disclaimer:
I guess a have a repeatedly naïve approach to the subject and previously I asked if the Germans could simultaneously go for Kiev and an early Typhoon in 1941.

However, in this thread I am hearing that a lot of OTL case blue forces would be staying with AGS, and want to give it a go Again: Could the planned forces for Nordlicht be transferred with the air corps, while the Germans still went for something like OTL case blue. Off course it would not get as far, but could they inflict some of the early losses on the SU and maybe get beyond Rostov, securing the Don and establish a bridgehead?
I am saying this because it would be quite difficult to persuade Hitler not to go for Ukraine, but it would be easier to go convince him to go for Ukraine and Leningrad.
As I understand it there was an OTL discrepance between the general staff wanted to destroy SU armies and Hitler wanting to secure ressources. In this light, a POD could even be a trick by the general staff that allowed them to bag the millions or so soldiers in the North, while risking to fall short of expectations in the South, but still securing the grain.
 

Deleted member 1487

Disclaimer:
I guess a have a repeatedly naïve approach to the subject and previously I asked if the Germans could simultaneously go for Kiev and an early Typhoon in 1941.

However, in this thread I am hearing that a lot of OTL case blue forces would be staying with AGS, and want to give it a go Again: Could the planned forces for Nordlicht be transferred with the air corps, while the Germans still went for something like OTL case blue. Off course it would not get as far, but could they inflict some of the early losses on the SU and maybe get beyond Rostov, securing the Don and establish a bridgehead?
I am saying this because it would be quite difficult to persuade Hitler not to go for Ukraine, but it would be easier to go convince him to go for Ukraine and Leningrad.
As I understand it there was an OTL discrepance between the general staff wanted to destroy SU armies and Hitler wanting to secure ressources. In this light, a POD could even be a trick by the general staff that allowed them to bag the millions or so soldiers in the North, while risking to fall short of expectations in the South, but still securing the grain.
What would happen is in May-June rather than sending about 4 or some infantry divisions that would have gone to AG-South, they'd be sent to AG-North instead. The OTL 11th Army divisions that were sent to AG-North in June-August would stay with AG-South instead to compensate. Störfang, the assault on Sevastopol in June, wouldn't happen ITTL in favor of going after Leningrad first. VIII air corps is sent north after 2nd Kharkov is wrapped up. In June while waiting for VIII air corps the new divisions would work with the other 18th army divisions to attack the Pogostye bulge where most of the Soviet 54th army was crammed. They would get the huge siege train of artillery in June instead of 11th army, as the assault of Sevastopol wouldn't happen here to get Leningrad to happen instead. With the Pogostye bulge eliminated and at least 2 corps of experienced, but worn 18th army divisions freed up, two of the fresh 300 series divisions brought in in May-June would hold the sector where the rest of the Soviet 54th army was, as it was unable to attack. The Pogostye operation (Moorbrand) would probably have maimed 2 of the 4 divisions sent in May-June, the inexperienced new 300 series divisions. So probably they'd have to be withdrawn and kept as a reserve for Nordlicht as they rebuilt, while the remaining fresh 2x 300 series divisions hold the line for all the worn veteran divisions freed up from eliminating most of the Soviet 54th army. They'd need time to take on replacements too, which would come at the expense of AG-South as their offensive is delayed.

With Nordlicht going first and getting certain resources like extra air support and replacements that were denied it IOTL to buff up AG-South, AG-South really couldn't run OTL Case Blue, because even putting aside the replacements issue, VIII air corps was a crucial element in their offensive success in late June:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue#The_offensive
Close air support from the Luftwaffe also played an important role in this early success. It contained the Red Air Force, through air superiority operations, and interdiction through attacks on airfields and Soviet defence lines. At times, the German air arm acted as a spearhead rather than a support force, ranging on ahead of the tanks and infantry to disrupt and destroy defensive positions. As many as 100 German aircraft were concentrated on a single Soviet division in the path of the spearhead during this phase. General Kazakov, the Bryansk Front's chief of staff, noted the strength and effectiveness of the Axis aviation.[27] Within 26 days, the Soviets lost 783 aircraft from the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Air Armies, compared to a German total of 175.[28]

Only two weeks into the operation, on 11 July, the Germans began to suffer logistical difficulties, which slowed the advance. The German Sixth Army was continually delayed by fuel shortages. Eight days later, on 20 July, shortages of fuel were still undermining operations, leaving many units unable to execute their orders. The 23rd Panzer Division and 24th Panzer Division both became stranded during the opening phase. Once again, as it had done during the Norwegian Campaign in April 1940, and Barbarossa in 1941, the Luftwaffe's Junkers Ju 52 transport fleet flew in supplies to keep the army going. The situation remained difficult with German troops forced to recover fuel from damaged or abandoned vehicles, and in some cases, leave behind tanks and vehicles with heavy fuel consumption to continue their advance. This undermined the strength of the units, which were forced to leave fighting vehicles behind. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe flew in 200 tons of fuel per day to keep the army supplied.[31] Despite this impressive performance in keeping the army mobile, Löhr was replaced by the more impetuous and offensive-minded von Richthofen.[32]

What AG-South could do was more operations in the meantime like Wilhelm and Friedericus II to wear down the Soviet forces in Ukraine and pin them down too.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=138409

They'd have to pick a chunk of the line and lop it off in a shallow pincer, which could be supported by IV Air Corps, the remaining air support after VIII Air Corps heads north and what was there to support that June offensive operations IOTL while VIII AC was attacking Sevastopol. The problem is there isn't easy bulges to attack by late June because the line had already been smoothed out by previous operations. They could do a series of limited ops to hopefully distract the Soviets and inflict casualties as a prelude to the Voronezh thrust and hope they don't trigger a major Soviet commitment of forces...but that would actually help Nordlicht by preventing them from appearing in the north. So while running OTL Case Blue is out of the question, more limited operations could be launched with overwhelming force to hurt worn Soviet armies in the area in the meantime while they wait.

Edit:
Looking at a German situation map I have from June 25th 1942 in Ukraine, the day Friedericus II ended, there are plenty of opportunities for shallow operations by 6th army in the aftermath of their offensive to achieve new river defensive lines by shallow penetration against Soviet armies on their new front around Belgorod. On the map west of I think the Oskol river the Soviet 28th army (marked with a question mark on the map) seems to be in a vulnerable position and could be pincered with a shallow halt line on the Oskol river at the end. That would open up the Soviet 21st army to the north on it's southern flank and enable mobile divisions to strike north rapidly and cut their retreat back to the Oskol river and potentially eliminate a Soviet Tank Corps in the process.

In the below map where the German 44th division is in the south and the 113th in the north would be where to insert the pincers and drive to/along the river lines to gobble up those Soviet forces and in the aftermath then turn north and strike against the neighboring Soviet 21st army in June-July.
limited case blue op.jpg
 
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Deleted member 1487

I was looking through Ziemke's "Moscow to Stalingrad" about the early stages of Case Blue and apparently Stalin ordered an offensive against Orel on July 5th. If German forces are sitting still even without the Reichel Affair (liaison plane shot down with an officer and plans for Case Blue being capture right before it started) Stalin probably would order something offensive in the area to push the Germans off base in early July if they continue to launch pincer attacks against Soviet armies in Ukraine. If the Soviets toss in 5th Tank Army to attack Orel they might well find themselves on the business end of 4th Panzer army waiting for Case Blue to start, plus AG-center and -south air support.
 
the average Soviet rifle division in the Southwestern and Southern Fronts had an average manpower strength of around 5,000 men while holding an average front of 16 kilometers. The Soviet rifle divisions north of Orel, on the other hand, generally averaged 10-11,000 men and held frontages of around 8 kilometers.
...
Generally the same as in the Southwestern on the left wing. It's only once you get up around the region east of Orel that the average strength jumps back up to that of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. The Sosna-Olyum River seems to be the main geographic dividing line here.

In Colossus Reborn, Glantz provides average figures for one army in this timespan, namely the 61st which held the left flank of Western Front (northeast of Orel - and north of the Sosna-Olyum River)
That army's units is listed at 60% strength or ~7,600 men per divsion on 5.July (right before its units went into action).

Roughly a month later, on 1.Aug he lists 31st Army at an average strength of ~9,500 men (before launching the Rzhev-Sychevka offensive).

Given those figures, I'm suprised to hear of an estimated average strength of 10-11,000 men in the Western Front, and would be very interested in looking into the source of that information.


Obviously. Second Kharkov was a fools errand given German deployments. Had the Soviets kept to the defensive and entrenched those formations, placing the mobile formations in reserve, they would have been much stronger and able to absorb the German blow more effectively.

When I mentioned the prelude operations to Blau, I wasn't really thinking about 2nd Kharkov (although it obviously played a part as well).
Instead, I was thinking of the two operations launched in June, specifically to weaken the Soviet defense while providing better starting positions for the main attack.

Generally, I can think of four different explanations for the average strength difference between the units in the path of Blau and the Fronts in the central sector:

(1) South Western Front suffered about 50k casualties in the last two weeks preceding Blau in the two prelude operations.
(2) They were, among others, facing the 2nd Hungarian Army and VI Rumanian Corps, neither of which possesed the same offensive capability as their German counterparts.
(3) The Red Army put a higher priority on strengthening the central sector
(4) The figures mentioned are slightly exaggerated

The end result is probably a result of a combination of these explanations. In order to properly weigh the different factors against each other, we probably need to take a closer look at your source.

Anyway, my key argument here was that point (1) is a product of German, and not Soviet, actions.
The Soviet defenders were weaker and holding a more difficult frontline because of the two prelude operations.



Which wasn't very. Even before 2nd Kharkov the Soviets recognized the flaws in their initial TO&E and were working to get a better one out there. Second Kharkov was a brutal reinforcing point that put the priority on reorganizing them into overdrive.
...
Likely their Guards formations.

After 2nd Kharkov, the Soviets did reorganize the Tank Corps, adding a third Tank Brigade and some additional support units (increasing the manpower by 1/3). All before Blau.
And while the Guards Rifle Divisions were good, I doubt the various Front commanders would trade a Tank Corps for a GRD any time soon.
And even if some would, can we at least agree that the Tank Corps of July were considered to be one of the top two most important unit types in the Red Army?
Which still means we can use their disposition as a good gauge of the Red Army strength disposition.



Yeah, but best I can tell most of the Briansk Front's tank corps were up on it's right wing north of the Sosna-Olyum river as was the 5th Guards Tank. Even the two that weren't, the 24th and 17th, were right on top of it's southern bank from a operational perspective. 3rd Tank Army was up around Tula. Given the rapidity with which they redeployed to an attack well to the south, an attack against the Briansk Front's right wing or against the Southwestern Front would have wound up facing most of them on the first day.

2on the Briansk Front's left wing, 12 in the Southwestern Front, 6 in the Southern. Compared to 5 on the Briansk Front's right wing, 17 in the Western Front, and 12 in the Kalinin... although 1 of those is in the Vladimirskoe salient so yeah...

Looking at Briansk Front they had the following roster (from North to South)
3rd Army (no TC in close support) (+ 2 Tank Brigades)
48th Army (no TC in close support) (+ 2 Tank Brigades - 1 of which was sent south on the second day of the operation)
13th Army (1st TC in close support) (+ 1 Tank Brigades)
40th Army (16th TC in close support and 17th TC in distant support) (+ 2 Tank Brigades)

With the 5th Tank Army in reserve roughly behind the 13th Army (the 3rd Tank Army was not part of Briansk Front - and not considered operational).
And the 4th and 24th TC were, as mentioned in my previous post, deployed further south as part of the Southwestern Front.

Now, the German attack on the 28th June hit the Briansk Front at the juncture of 13th and 40th Army.
Note that all seven Tank Corps (both the 5 actually belonging to Briansk Front, and the 2 you errounously placed in Briansk Front) were either aligned on line with, or further south of the main German attack.

Can we agree that your initial claim that these 7 TC's should be counted against the "central" grouping defending on the Moscow direction, and thus not in the direction of Blau was misguided?

Except for the fact that the commitment of armor had already achieved their breakthrough on the very first day. The armor wasn't committed to stem the Germans as they broke through the Soviet defenses, it was committed to stem a German exploitation of already broken Soviet lines in what was already a fluid front.

I realize that we have a different definition of what the German decisive breakthrough was.
You seem to be of the opinon that the breakthrough occured once the Germans were past the first Soviet line of defense (which happened on the first day of combat).
While I look at the period after the Germans had both (1) broken through the Soviets lines and (2) defeated the Soviet operational reserves counterattacking the penetration, as the time of the decisive breakthrough (which occured about 10 days into the attack).

It would seem that if one adheres to your viewpoint (or at least my interpretation of your viewpoint), then it doesn't really matter if the mobile reserves were positioned one day away from the schwerpunkt of the attack (as was the case in Blau), or if they were positioned a week or two away. Once the battle turns fluid, the Germans have achieved their decisive breakthrough and won the day.
Instead, it all dependes on the strength of the frontline, and the infantry units ability to prevent a breakthrough.
Which brings us back to the example of 39th Army, in which the infantry units failed to do precisely that.

But then again, I adhere to the second viewpoint, that the key success criteria of Blau I was the Germans ability to defeat 14 of 18 operational Tank Corps within two weeks of the attack, thus leaving the entire southern sector ripe for the taking once Blau II started. And the fact that they had to defeat such a sizeable portion of the Soviet tank force early on, indicates that the common viewpoint that the first few weeks of Blau was easy pickings is in need of a reevaluation.


The Vladimirskoe salient was unusual ... but the same uniqueness limits it's applicibality in judging an attempt to pincer the whole Kalinin Front.

I don't necessarily disagree strongly with this, expect to note that the distance between the Rzhev and the Demiansk salients was quite small as well, and a concentrated attack from both directions could be able to quickly reduce it further into a major threat for the Red Army.
 

Deleted member 1487

Now that I have the time to really reply here and because I guess I'm a glutton for punishment with these long pointless arguments, here we go.
And part of the German plan for Stalingrad was to disrupt import supplies via the Volga. But it didn't happen despite the fact that they only had to cover a scant kilometer and had every single artillery piece in the 6th Army in range of the Soviets landing site alongside multiple bomber wings. Part of the plan for Kursk was that they disrupt the movement of supplies into the salient. But it didn't happen despite the fact there was just a single rail track into the salient. It's not that the Germans lacked the resources or didn't try very hard, as much as you pretend otherwise, we can see exactly what the overall results of the raids they launched was: bupkiss. And these weren't one-off things either, they were concerted campaigns that lasted for months.
The Stalingrad situation was quite a bit different than the Leningrad one given that 4th Air Fleet had two separate army groups to support over the most enormous part of the front, plus at Stalingrad they also had to help guard the flanks, offer CAS in the city, interdict beyond the Volga AND interdict at the Volga after having fought multiple major air actions in September-October leading up to that point since May 1942, plus having poor logistics and no built up basing. Virtually none of that would be the case with AG-North in June-July 1942.
The 6th army too wasn't purely focused on the city at all times, it had a huge front to contend with too and fight for, as it was experiencing flank attacks:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...ngrad_-_Preparations_for_Operation_Uranus.png

The Volga river traffic was cut at other places in the river, but at any one time pretty much only a single corps was dedicated to fighting in the city and their artillery was primarily focused in infantry support. Though according to this air support was effective:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad#Air_attacks
In mid-October, the Luftwaffe intensified its efforts against remaining Red Army positions holding the west bank. Luftflotte 4 flew 2,000 sorties on 14 October and 550 t (610 short tons) of bombs were dropped while German infantry surrounded the three factories. Stukageschwader 1, 2, and 77 had largely silenced Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga before turning their attention to the shipping that was once again trying to reinforce the narrowing Soviet pockets of resistance. The 62nd Army had been cut in two, and, due to intensive air attack on its supply ferries, was receiving much less material support. With the Soviets forced into a 1-kilometre (1,000-yard) strip of land on the western bank of the Volga, over 1,208 Stuka missions were flown in an effort to eliminate them.[3]:p.84
That's a cite from Bergstrom.

But again understand the differences here, that was fighting for a city, street by street over a relatively narrow river. For Leningrad the interdiction would be over a big lake where ferries couldn't quickly move back and forth, plus air attacks wouldn't have to be against heavily built up urban areas, as the German plan was to attack the more open ground outside the city. When they fought over similar terrain east of the city during the August 1942 Sinyavino offensive they achieved heavily favorable casualty exchanges and won their counteroffensive efforts, encircling and wiping out 2nd Shock army yet again...but without 8th air corps support, it was mostly achieved with just artillery; here the Germans would be attacking similar terrain with greater artillery support AND the best ground support air corps in the Luftwaffe. At Kursk one double track rail line plus of course all the roads where supplies could be driven in was a FAR greater flow of supplies than the lake barge traffic coming in via Ladoga. Even there the Soviets only checked the German penetration (with 3:1 losses) due to throwing huge counterattacks against German forces and outnumbering them heavily while having air parity and AFV superiority in numbers.

And yet it was the Germans who were in the end worn away to nibbons while the Soviets simply replaced their losses and went over to prosecute a successful offensive.
In 1943 in the central front of the war; that wouldn't remotely be the case at Leningrad even if Stalin is able to get reinforcement to attack from the East sooner than IOTL. Logistics to the Leningrad area were tougher than to Kursk and by summer 1942 Soviet industry and Lend-Lease were nowhere close to what they were by summer 1943.

Artillery dominance is not in evidence and air dominance did not produce results for the Germans in these battles in this time period.
You haven't provided any sources about Soviet artillery in Leningrad, so you can't claim that; the Germans would have the Sevastopol siege train of 1000 artillery guns of heavy calibers, plus VIII air corps. IOTL according to Bergstrom the Luftwaffe was in fact able to silence Soviet artillery and heavily interdict their river supply/reinforcement traffic in October 1942.

A number of the guns are indeed capable of ranging out that far. And not all the weapons were concentrated in Krontstadt. The Soviets even mounted some guns on railway carriages and used those to great effect as well. Their mobility will allow them to intervene anywhere on the Isthmus.
Source proving that then. You've consistently failed to source any claims about Soviet Leningrad based artillery despite being repeatedly asked. We know what the Germans had at Sevastpol and what it was able to do there:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941–42)#Axis
306th Army Artillery Command[13]
  • Elements 672nd Artillery Battalion—one Schwerer Gustav Dora
  • 833rd Heavy Mortar Battalion—two Karl-Gerät
  • 688th Railroad Artillery Battery—three 28 cm lg.Br.K
  • 458th Heavy Artillery Battery—one 42 cm Haubitze(t)
  • 459th Heavy Artillery Battery—one 42 cm Gamma Mörser
  • 741st, 742nd, and 743rd Artillery Battalions—four 28 cm Hb. each
  • 744th Artillery Battalion—two 28 cm Küst.Hb.
  • 624th Heavy Artillery Battalion—six 30.5 cm Mrs. and nine 21 cm Mrs.
  • 641st Heavy Artillery Battalion—four 30.5 cm Mrs. and one 35.5 cm Haubitze M1
  • 815th Heavy Artillery Battalion—six 30.5 cm Mrs.
That was just the heavy siege guns.

And likely prove just as effective as they did against the Soviet Sevastopol artillery: not very.
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2015/09/10/heavy-artillery-at-leningrad/
The evaluation of the effectiveness of German artillery in the siege is a rather complicated undertaking since: 1)the reports of the damage caused were kept secret in Soviet era; even today the official Russian point of view is that the royal palaces at Peterhof and Pavlovsk were demolished by the Germans, while in fact they were wiped off by the Soviet 152 mm guns. 2) it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between damages caused by the German air-raids and artillery strikes. The official Soviet data claims that there were some 5000 bombs dropped and 150,000 artillery shells fired at the city, damaging 840 industrial objects, destroying 3,200 stone or concrete houses and further 7,100 damaged heavily.

It is rather easier, however, to judge about the effects of the German artillery barrages on the naval forces of the Red-banner Baltic Fleet. For instance, on the 18th of September, 1941, between 11.47 and 13.37 the Soviet heavy cruiser “Petropavlovsk”(previously known in Kriegsmarine as “Lutzow” before being sold to Soviet Union in 1939) came under fire of the German 210 mm guns of the 768-th Motorized Artillerie Abteilung, receiving up to 12 hits. The cruiser received heavy damage under the water-line, its artillery systems were not functioning, and a fire had erupted; 10 crewmembers were KIA and 20 MIA, while “Petropavlovsk” slowly sank for the depth of some 1-2 metres in the Coal haven of the Leningrad Commercial port. On September 27th, 1941, the German artillery has sunk the cannon boat “Pioner”; on the 7th of October–old coastal defence battleship “Smerch”, decommissioned several decades ago, which was repaired and sunk again in 1942; on the 4th of October the notorious training cruiser “Aurora” was sunk in Oranienbaum after several artillery shells hit its deck; on the 24th of April 1942 the hull of the cruiser “Butakov”, still under construction, was sunk too. All in all, the German artillery alone is responsible for sinking 44 naval units, including, except of those covered above, submarines L-1, M-72 and M-96, torpedo boats N 103 and N 123, trawler N172 and many other.

Many Soviet naval vessels were heavily damaged by the German artillery fire in 1941-1942. The battleship “Marat”, which was ostensibly “sunk” by Hans-Ulrich Rudel on September 23, 1941, but soon repaired so that turrets N3 and N4 became active again, was hit by 5 shells on 15.09.1941, piercing the decks and blowing up the engine, on 12.12.1941 it suffered 3 more hits of the 203 mm shells and on 28.12.1941 3 direct hits and several German shells exploding near the battleship. The deck was reinforced by the granite plates of the Neva embankment, and yet the ship was targeted again successfully on 25.10.1942 with 3 305 mm shells, one 203 mm shell on 06.11.1942 and one 203 mm shell on 08.10.1943. The repeatedly battered vessel was decommissioned in 1953.

On the other hand, the Soviet battleship “October Revolution” was hit by German artillery fire on several occasions(6 direct hits on 8-10.10.1941, one hit on 14.12.1941, two hits on 23.03.1942, several hits on 16 and 18 April 1942), and as a result of these episodes the vessel was significantly damaged, as probably any other Soviet ship based in Leningrad or Kronschtadt. The reason they eventually survived was the Germans usually employed 105-210 mm artillery systems not capable of sinking a heavily armoured cruiser or battleship, but causing enough damage to make the vessels inactive for long periods of time. Moreover, the crews often performed remarkably in salvaging their vessels after direct hits and resulting fires.

The other target of German artillery attacks was the Scientific Research Artillery Range near the railway station of Rzhevka, where Soviet artillery systems were tested and large stocks of ammunition were stored. On the 29th of March, 1942, a Luftwaffe reconnaissance plane detected a large number of railway freight-cars, and between 17.00 and 19.00 the German artillery pounded the spotted targets ferociously, mounting the barrage on the following morning. Eventually a load of ammonal explosive was detonated, causing chain reaction of the Soviet ammunition echelon, killing several hundreds of people.

Pretty much any of them, using your map. These were big naval-sized guns that generally had ranges of nearly 20 miles.
Then you can provide a source proving that, right?

Pick a book on the Battle of Leningrad that discusses the fighting, literally any book. Hell, just look up the history of the city. The fact the region south of a city is a massive peat swamp is well known. It even gets mentioned in some books that cover the Eastern Front as a whole when they get around to Leningrad, like Absolute War. I don't know why you're so in denial about this.
Thing is that didn't stop the Germans from encircling and destroying the Soviet 2nd Shock Army twice in swamps, hills, and forests in the Leningrad Oblast region with hugely favorable casualty ratios. There really isn't a reason to think the Soviets would be able to really stop them, inflict prohibitive casualties, or hold them up for that long especially with proper air support. I mean from August-September 1941 the Germans repeatedly fought through swamps and terrible terrain to the very gates of Leningrad and only stopped because Hitler ordered them to encircle it, not storm it.

Indeed. But that's on the premise it succeeds. It might, it might not.
Based on the history of fighting over Sevastopol, the destruction of 2nd Shock army twice in about 6 months, and the huge amount of fire support the Sevastopol siege train and VIII air corps could generate indicates the plan would work just fine on schedule.

Was that transferred over? Because on June 29th, I found it under the XVIII Corps helping to hold the line east of Lyubin.
If fought in the Sinyavino offensive in August 1942 and was detailed to fight in Nordlicht.
https://translate.google.com/transl...i/12._Panzer-Division_(Wehrmacht)&prev=search
until it was deployed at Ladoga from May to September 1942


Some searching about and I found the 190th StuG Battalion under the LIV Corps. Not seeing any others though...
That's the one I saw, so perhaps that is it unless AG-North had some or Hitler orders more battalions/brigades there to help with the effort. But if 12th Panzer is part of it then just the one might be plenty.

You mean like they failed to do at places like Sevastopol and Stalingrad.
What armor were the Soviets using at Sevastpol and Stalingrad?

Which generally did not break the Soviet defenses nor prevent their counter-attacks that slowed and bled the Germans.
Sinyavino offensive says otherwise. The Soviets didn't really use heavy counteroffensives at Sevastpol for artillery to rapidly target.

Yeah, the 23rd Independent Army had overall command of those formations, as well as the rest of the Leningrad Front's operational reserves. All told, the Leningrad Front has 6 divisions and the three armored brigades as it's operational reserve. If the Soviets get desperate enough, they could pull out of the Oranienbaum bridgehead and commit those forces as well or try to ferry additional formations across Lake Ladoga.
Assuming they could pull them out. A large unit of artillery was supposed to be tasked interdicting Kronstadt. And again the Germans in the north repeatedly wiped out hundreds of thousands of Soviet attacking or defending troops in the swamps from 1941-42 IOTL with hugely lopsided casualty ratios, so just because the Soviets had maybe 200k men they could defend with in the specific area the offensive would take place, doesn't mean that would do much stop the Germans or inflict necessary levels of casualties on them to make it a phyrric victory. I mean the Germans wiped out more than 6 division equivalents in August 1942 at Sinyavino, despite having to attack into heavily wooded, hilly, swampy terrain with far less air support than would be available IOTL to attack Leningrad. The Sinyavino heights and Putlov heights aren't that much different. Ferrying units across Ladoga would depend on how quickly units could be moved by rail to Ladoga city, how much shipping there is available, and how badly it would disrupt shipping in of supplies. In the end it might well just increase Soviet body count. Likely they'd try and keep up flow of supplies into the Leningrad Isthmus and attack from the East as soon as possible (OTL not until August 1942, too late ITTL), which did not have a history of going well until after Stalingrad and the removing of large forces from AG-North to help on other fronts.

Oh, if the Germans are going to launch their attack piecemeal that means the Soviets are free to concentrate the bulk of their defenses and defeat each attack piecemeal.
Or find their manpower concentrated for German artillery and air power to smash to bits, while limiting German manpower exposed to Soviet counter measures. With 1000 artillery pieces and VIII air corps plus 1st air fleet the Soviets are badly outgunned.

Your own map shows it nicely enough. Three divisions for every ten miles of
Which based on the average strength of divisions, which is what 7000 men in 1942?, maybe 2100 men per mile? Should be easy for the heavy guns to demolish.

They tried with more then enough planes continuously throughout the entirety of 1941-42 for us to get a good picture of the results.
Really only in August-September 1941 and they broke the Luga Line and rushed on Leningrad, encircling the city, not storming it, based on Hitler's orders. By early September VIII air corps had been stripped off to go prepare for Operation Typhoon, same with most of AG-North's armor and motorized divisions. In early August VIII air corps was used to counter the Staraya Russa offensive and inflict over 150k casualties on the Soviets plus push them back to the Valdai Hills. Seems like air power worked pretty damn well when it was actually present in sufficient strength.

Not surprised. You're already showing that your research is pretty poor, given that you clearly don't have any idea about the state of the Soviet defenses in the city or, rather more likely, haven't bothered to look them up and just looked purely at the German side of things. Because only the Germans have any agency in all of this. It's no wonder you always presume their success as a matter of course regardless, you only ever look at things from their point of view and only ever assume that their actions matter.
As the attacker they have the concentration of resources. Info on Soviet defenses online is sparse and again given German success breaking much more prepared defenses around Sevastopol with the same siege train and air support shows that they would be able to break Leningrad even more easily due to no pre-war defenses in the attack area, the history of German forces breaking Soviet defense lines in the area with heavy artillery support and inflicting disproportionate casualties on the enemy to do so, plus doing it with limited air support throughout the siege period. And you haven't shown any source that demonstrates Soviet defenses would be a major obstacle to a determined offensive with sufficient firepower.

And you do seem to be projecting your own faults regarding reading too many Soviet biased resources.

Wrong, actually. Things really started getting better late in the first winter, once the Soviets got their organizational chaos unfucked. Fatalities began to dip in March and continued to decline despite the thaw because the Soviets managed to bring in enough food to last through it. Then when the ice cleared enough, the boats picked up the slack. Likewise, supplies of ammunition and fuel were always adequate to sustain the fighting forces within the city.
Getting better by late winter in early 1942 after nearly 1 million civilians had died and hundreds of thousands had been evacuated over an ice road doesn't suggest that they had the volume of resources coming in in July 1942 to stop a determined offensive with major artillery and air support. You've asserted it, but not provided any sourcing to support it.
The fatalities dipping in March is after nearly 1 million people had died and hundreds of thousands had already been evacuated. If anything that shows less than sufficient supplies were coming in than the 'burden' of supply having been reduced due to fewer people being in the Isthmus. Got some source about the volume of supplies coming in in July 1942 and what the requirements were per month in a quiet period? How about for a major defense? The only time there had been a major push on Leningrad was in September 1941 and that was primarily and order to encircle the city and before pre-encirclement stock piles ran low. So it is meaningless to say that ammo didn't run low in the city IOTL, because they hadn't faced a major offensive to take the city after encircled IOTL. The Germans were never able to get Nordlicht in motion IOTL and used their strength to take Sevastopol, launch Case Blue, fight around Rzehv, and invade the Caucasus and nearly totally conquer Stalingrad (plus fight in North Africa). OTL is then not instructive to what supply needs or abilities to get those supplies in would be if they faced a major push in 1942.

Except you didn't actually provide evidence that they even managed meaningful disruption. Indeed, the only article posted indicates the exact opposite in calling them so drastic a failure.
I said disruption, which they would be able to achieve during a critical offensive ITTL when ever supply run counts. Even sinking a handful of supply ships matters when they are fighting for their lives against a major offensive and ammo is at a premium.

Because they did? The supplies flowed handily over the lake during the summers and deep winter despite German efforts at interdiction.
Minor efforts. They had less than 10 ships trying to attack Soviet shipping and 1st Air Fleet IOTL was probably the weakest air fleet except for maybe the 5th in Norway/Finland. With 8th air corps it's a different game entirely.

Correct. But the Germans would be advancing a hell of a lot slower, which nicely balances it out.
Depends once they punch through the first line. Plus Stalin issue orders not to retreat repeatedly; given the short depth needed to penetrate with sufficient resources they could do what they did at Kursk, penetrate 6 miles on the first day and very nearly have achieved their objectives. Unless Soviet forces are going to disobey the no retreat orders they are going to get pocketed.

Given that the Soviets had a massive surplus of reserves, that isn't as much an issue as you pretend it is.
In Summer of 1942 Soviet reserves are finite, as it equipment, this isn't summer 1943 yet. Plus rail lines to the Volkhov are limited and will take time to amass and ready forces...because if they don't 2nd Shock army shows what happens with rushed operations. And there is action going on in Rzhev, Demyansk, and in Ukraine. Plus Stalin ordered an offensive to Orel in July, so it is a question about priorities.

So they weaken themselves, frittering away precious men, material, and supplies in things that don't do much more then drive the Soviets back a few kilometers. Oh yeah, this is a recipe for a first phase Blau just as successful as OTL. :rolleyes:

And what if trying to take Leningrad fails? Or if it takes so long that it's August or even September by the time it's over?
Given the casualty ratios during Wilhelm and Friedericus II (not to mention 2nd Kharkov) the expenditures are hardly a problem to wipe out the major Soviet formations in front of them, especially equipment and trained/experienced Soviet manpower. The goal would be to attritt them favorably, force Stalin to commit replacements/reserves to an area that is away from the major push up north/around Rzhev, and then have to face even worse trained and equipped forces that would replace the existing weakened Soviet forces in the area. Better than sitting still and letting Soviet forces recover and dig in and later be able to offer greater resistance.

Taking Leningrad is not going to fail in July 1942 given the resources committed to the effort. It would probably take into August to fully take the city after cutting off the city from Ladoga supply and by the time the Soviets have built up for their own counteroffensive to take the city the Germans will be free to turn on them and either check them or inflict another Sinyavino. Plus then Soviet reserves are not available to stop Case Blue.

Did you seriously just outright deny the historical fact that the Red Army in 1942 managed to generate millions of new soldiers alongside tens of thousands of AFVs and guns that not only replenished the massive losses they took during the course of spring and summer 1942, but even expanded it, all of which is fully indicative that they did indeed already have the ability to rapidly replace losses? Your claims are beginning to become downright farcical.
Over the course of the year sure, but in 1 additional month and commit it to Ukraine when operations are going on in other fronts? Soviet production and receipt of LL was ramping up over the course of the year, but had it's limits in summer 1942 especially with the success of Operation Kremil convincing Stalin to hold back resources to defend Moscow until too late. Stalin wasn't convinced the Germans could attack in Ukraine by the end of June, refusing to believe the capture intel about the Case Blue plan, which mean fixing up Southwest Front isn't going to get priority with Leningrad being attacked, Operataion Kremil working, and fighting along the central axis picking up.
You seem to have a problem looking at an ATL, ignoring the evidence from OTL that doesn't fit your biases, and then looking at aggregate data over a year for the entire theater and claiming that is proof to fit your argument.
 
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