WI British AEW by 1982.

WI for various reasons both the RAF and RN had their AEW just entering service on April 1st 1982 when the Falklands started? Say two Nimrod AEW3 and one Sea King AEW2 for eg.

Before everyone tells me how impossible this is, I know the Nimrod failed and I know the SK was a result of the Falklands, so don't try to educate me about this. However Nimrod AEW studies started in the 60s, so it's not unreasonable to expect a result by 1982, which in the mid-late 70s was the expected IOC. Also the SK was the result of pre-Falklands Low Altitude Surveilance Task (LAST) studies, which is why it got into service so fast.

The RAF could only mount one long range (Vulcan, Victor MR, Nimrod, Hercules) mission into the Falklands per day, so with maybe 3 planes and not too much loiter time would they even bother trying to give the task force AEW cover? I'd imagine that with a prototype already flying the RN could get perhaps 3 SKs on decks by 1st May, and perhaps a couple more by 21s May for the landings. How much difference would this make? Could the RN station Type 64 combo missile traps west of the islands utilising SK AEW with hover refueling techniques?
 
I thought the Sea king equipped for AEW were proposed before the Falklands but the government rejected it on grounds of cost/need. in that case it wouldn't have needed much of a change to see them in service in time.
 
Exactly, but WI the govt decided that it would fund a prototype, and it was flying in April 1982?
 
Exactly, but WI the govt decided that it would fund a prototype, and it was flying in April 1982?

Improved warning of air attacks. If I recall aright, the San Carlos attacks were considered to have happened due to the lack of AEW; with this in place perhaps the attacks fail.
 
AEW means fewer pointless CAP flown by Shars, fewer diversions for spurious contacts and surveillance.

More effective use of Shars and AEW almost certain to have avoided Super Etendards with Exocets surprising the Sheffield.

Great for supporting the shipborne airdefence through increased warning time. Forcing Argies to fly very low during much of approach - blinding them and vastly decreasing their range of operations.

Depends how they were positioned if AEW was to help greatly during the actual landings - you'd really want them in a position to spot oversea transit to Islands, where they'd work best, but with limited assets it'd be dangerous.

The RN knew it was handicapped without AEW, but given economic situation and role in NATO it was not seen as a vital tool to re-introduce since the RAF and/or USN would see to AEW - after all, look at the politics surronding fixed wing naval aviation itself.
 
Apparently the SK AEW2 searches a 'donut' pattern out to about 75 miles, which I found interesting. It also had only 2 operators and voice communications, so could be overwhelmed with enough numbers/threat axes. Unlike the E2 & 3 and the hypothetical Nimrod it was basically a point defence system which alone would encounter real problems on May 21.
So there's going to be no loitering over San Carlos, tracking 400 targets and effortlessly directing dozens of engagements by planes and ships. It could probably cover the Carriers and one other place. So does the RAF make a huge effort to put a Nimrod over San Carlos on May 21?
 
It was never intended to be as good as a fixed wing AEW aircraft; it was just the simplest, cheapest means to provide some cover for the fleet above and beyond that provided by other aircraft/picket ships. Even the old Gannets were better in many respects. Remember that the RN had pre-1982 pretty much decided it was a NATO "WW3" navy and thus working in range of land bases or the USN. (Especially after the RAF lied and moved Australia.)
 
It was never intended to be as good as a fixed wing AEW aircraft; it was just the simplest, cheapest means to provide some cover for the fleet above and beyond that provided by other aircraft/picket ships. Even the old Gannets were better in many respects. Remember that the RN had pre-1982 pretty much decided it was a NATO "WW3" navy and thus working in range of land bases or the USN. (Especially after the RAF lied and moved Australia.)
 
If some sort of AEW could be provided the obvious effect for the war at sea would be hopefully less ships sunk due to more effective use of Harriers, and the end of using Frigates as picket ships.

If this resulted in the Atlantic Conveyor not being sunk, then the ground war could be very different. The helicopters which went down with the ship could be used to carry troops round the Island. Thus we could have side stepped Goose Green, and possibly avoided the Bluff Cove landings and carried out the battles for Stanley earlier. BUT Goose Green taught (or re-taught) some important lessons as reguards giving simple clear orders, attacking at night, and avoiding head on battles. If it had not happened, at least the first set of attacks on the hills around Stanley might not have gone so well.
 
It's the ability to put ships closer to harms way that makes the SK AEW valuable. I think the carriers could have operated much closer to the action, and given the Shars considerably longer time on station if they could count on catching low level attacks at 75 miles. The same applies to missile trap combos, they could be used agressively if they knew they weren't going to get ambushed by low level attack. I think better placement of ships, and better results from their radars, weapons and fighter control would be more important than the interceptions guided by the SKs themselves.

Would it be worth the RAF sending an AEW Nimrod, with it's exellent capabilities, down for a few hours coverage a day? Even if it was only on key days, such as D day for the landings?
 
Well, they could've sent a Shackleton down there, I suppose, but they didn't.

Trying to remember, weren't the Shackleton's on the verge of falling out of the sky by this stage? I might be wrong but I think by 82 the problem was keeping them fit to fly in circles over the UK, let alone to the Falklands
 
Trying to remember, weren't the Shackleton's on the verge of falling out of the sky by this stage? I might be wrong but I think by 82 the problem was keeping them fit to fly in circles over the UK, let alone to the Falklands

Dunno, but they were in-service until the early 90s.
 
The book I'm reading on AEW says that the Shakelton was called '30,000 rivets flying in formation', and wasn't able to support the RN during the Falkands. I'd assume it just wouldn't have the range, nor the IFR capability to extend it's range, its APS20 system would have been worse than the SK AEW anyway.
 
HMAS Melbourne was still floating and only recently in reserve in 1982 (it was due to be replaced with HMS Invincible)

Is there someway to into the vicinity of the Falklands, perhaps with some E-2 s or Gannets on board?
 
E2s would be way too big, but E1 Tracers would fit just fine. Not that the Melbourne could go, a much needed refit was cancelled in 1981 to save money since we were getting the Invincible. This is a very different TL, where we keep the Melbourne going and get a handful of E1s to fill out her very small airgroup, and then send her to the Falklands upon a British request.

On a tangent, WI instead of putting the TASS AEW into the Nimrod it was put into the VC10 instead? There's commonality with the transport and tanker fleet and the airframe size would solve many of the problems that arose in the system, such as computer cooling and memory space.
 
The book I'm reading on AEW says that the Shakelton was called '30,000 rivets flying in formation', and wasn't able to support the RN during the Falkands. I'd assume it just wouldn't have the range, nor the IFR capability to extend it's range, its APS20 system would have been worse than the SK AEW anyway.

That sort of fits in with my half-memories from the time. It was justn't up to the job and were getting worn out
 
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