The Operation Hush, the British plan for a landing on the Belgian coast, is one of the most fascinating subjects for alternate historians. A discussion, in this forum, started in 2008 and never finished. What if the British executed their plans in August 8th 1917, during the Third Battle of Ypres? What if the 1st British Division could land behind the German lines near Ostende and Zeebrugge, the two main targets of the ongoing battle of Ypres? Why the operation was cancelled?
Just a little background: during the Spring 1917, third year of WW1, the Entente troops in the Western Front gained a strong numerical superiority to Germans. Ludendorff ordered to his troops to entrench beyond the Siegfried (Hindemburg) Line and all German hopes for a victory rested on the unlimited submarine war. A first Anglo-French attempt to breach the Hindemburg Line failed with heavy losses and resulted in French mutinies and demoralization. On April the Us entered the war on the Entente side. In May, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed a defensive strategy for the Western Front, waiting for American troops. But the British command decided for a second offensive, in the Flanders sector, aiming to seizes the German U-Boot bases of Ostende, Zeebrugge and Bruges. This was a two pronged operation: the first branch (the main one) had to breach German lines at Ypres. A subsidiary attack had to be launched by sea: one division had to be landed on the Belgian Coast, behind the German lines.
It was not like the Dardanelles, loosely planned and executed by inexperienced troops and officers. The “Operation Hush” was accurately planned and studied, the units assigned to the task were well trained, as we can see in this paper: http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number1_Apr02/pdf_april02/pdf_page.pdf
But Haig (Cinc of British troops in France), Robertson (Cinc of Imperial HQ) and Jellicoe (First Lord of Sea) never authorized the operation, because the British advance at Ypres was halted in the first week and a landing behind the German lines was eventually too risky.
What if they took the risk?
The operation can’t be compared to Gallipoli (as we saw) nor to WW2 landing at Dieppe. In both disasters, British troops landed in distant shores and had to give supply to their beachheads only by sea. In this case, like WW2 Anzio, the landing zone is relatively close to the frontline and the beachhead could be reached by an advancing land force. The problem of Anzio and the cause of its strategic failure is that the beachhead was really too far from the frontline: more than 120 km.
But in the Operation Hush, the landing zone was just 1,8 km from the frontline. Such a short distance could be covered by an advancing force in two or three days by WW1 standards. The British landing force (the 1st division) had to be supplied by sea just for the first 48-72 hours of operation, then it could be reached by the XV Army Corps, advancing from Nieuport.
The Germans were prepared for a landing and the coast was heavily fortified. The German Maritime Division, who covered the area, was an élite unit. Heavy naval gun batteries covered the infantry. “As long as the Coastal batteries are not put out of action, which would hardly appear to be possible even after a most violent bombardment of several day’s duration, the attempt to land strong land forces is hopeless” - wrote Admiral Schroeder, the German commander of the area – “the enemy, who is crowded in his boats, must be annihilated before he reaches the beach”. On July 6th it launched a preventive assault (Operation Strandfest) which inflicted heavy losses to the British XV Corps. This preventive battle, contributed to the cancellation of Operation Hush.
What if the Operation Hush was carried on? Should it result in a British defeat? Should it be a striking victory? What could be the tactical and strategic consequences of a victory?
Just a little background: during the Spring 1917, third year of WW1, the Entente troops in the Western Front gained a strong numerical superiority to Germans. Ludendorff ordered to his troops to entrench beyond the Siegfried (Hindemburg) Line and all German hopes for a victory rested on the unlimited submarine war. A first Anglo-French attempt to breach the Hindemburg Line failed with heavy losses and resulted in French mutinies and demoralization. On April the Us entered the war on the Entente side. In May, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed a defensive strategy for the Western Front, waiting for American troops. But the British command decided for a second offensive, in the Flanders sector, aiming to seizes the German U-Boot bases of Ostende, Zeebrugge and Bruges. This was a two pronged operation: the first branch (the main one) had to breach German lines at Ypres. A subsidiary attack had to be launched by sea: one division had to be landed on the Belgian Coast, behind the German lines.
It was not like the Dardanelles, loosely planned and executed by inexperienced troops and officers. The “Operation Hush” was accurately planned and studied, the units assigned to the task were well trained, as we can see in this paper: http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number1_Apr02/pdf_april02/pdf_page.pdf
But Haig (Cinc of British troops in France), Robertson (Cinc of Imperial HQ) and Jellicoe (First Lord of Sea) never authorized the operation, because the British advance at Ypres was halted in the first week and a landing behind the German lines was eventually too risky.
What if they took the risk?
The operation can’t be compared to Gallipoli (as we saw) nor to WW2 landing at Dieppe. In both disasters, British troops landed in distant shores and had to give supply to their beachheads only by sea. In this case, like WW2 Anzio, the landing zone is relatively close to the frontline and the beachhead could be reached by an advancing land force. The problem of Anzio and the cause of its strategic failure is that the beachhead was really too far from the frontline: more than 120 km.
But in the Operation Hush, the landing zone was just 1,8 km from the frontline. Such a short distance could be covered by an advancing force in two or three days by WW1 standards. The British landing force (the 1st division) had to be supplied by sea just for the first 48-72 hours of operation, then it could be reached by the XV Army Corps, advancing from Nieuport.
The Germans were prepared for a landing and the coast was heavily fortified. The German Maritime Division, who covered the area, was an élite unit. Heavy naval gun batteries covered the infantry. “As long as the Coastal batteries are not put out of action, which would hardly appear to be possible even after a most violent bombardment of several day’s duration, the attempt to land strong land forces is hopeless” - wrote Admiral Schroeder, the German commander of the area – “the enemy, who is crowded in his boats, must be annihilated before he reaches the beach”. On July 6th it launched a preventive assault (Operation Strandfest) which inflicted heavy losses to the British XV Corps. This preventive battle, contributed to the cancellation of Operation Hush.
What if the Operation Hush was carried on? Should it result in a British defeat? Should it be a striking victory? What could be the tactical and strategic consequences of a victory?