WI British “D-Day” on the Belgian Coast in 1917

The Operation Hush, the British plan for a landing on the Belgian coast, is one of the most fascinating subjects for alternate historians. A discussion, in this forum, started in 2008 and never finished. What if the British executed their plans in August 8th 1917, during the Third Battle of Ypres? What if the 1st British Division could land behind the German lines near Ostende and Zeebrugge, the two main targets of the ongoing battle of Ypres? Why the operation was cancelled?
Just a little background: during the Spring 1917, third year of WW1, the Entente troops in the Western Front gained a strong numerical superiority to Germans. Ludendorff ordered to his troops to entrench beyond the Siegfried (Hindemburg) Line and all German hopes for a victory rested on the unlimited submarine war. A first Anglo-French attempt to breach the Hindemburg Line failed with heavy losses and resulted in French mutinies and demoralization. On April the Us entered the war on the Entente side. In May, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed a defensive strategy for the Western Front, waiting for American troops. But the British command decided for a second offensive, in the Flanders sector, aiming to seizes the German U-Boot bases of Ostende, Zeebrugge and Bruges. This was a two pronged operation: the first branch (the main one) had to breach German lines at Ypres. A subsidiary attack had to be launched by sea: one division had to be landed on the Belgian Coast, behind the German lines.
It was not like the Dardanelles, loosely planned and executed by inexperienced troops and officers. The “Operation Hush” was accurately planned and studied, the units assigned to the task were well trained, as we can see in this paper: http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number1_Apr02/pdf_april02/pdf_page.pdf
But Haig (Cinc of British troops in France), Robertson (Cinc of Imperial HQ) and Jellicoe (First Lord of Sea) never authorized the operation, because the British advance at Ypres was halted in the first week and a landing behind the German lines was eventually too risky.
What if they took the risk?
The operation can’t be compared to Gallipoli (as we saw) nor to WW2 landing at Dieppe. In both disasters, British troops landed in distant shores and had to give supply to their beachheads only by sea. In this case, like WW2 Anzio, the landing zone is relatively close to the frontline and the beachhead could be reached by an advancing land force. The problem of Anzio and the cause of its strategic failure is that the beachhead was really too far from the frontline: more than 120 km.
But in the Operation Hush, the landing zone was just 1,8 km from the frontline. Such a short distance could be covered by an advancing force in two or three days by WW1 standards. The British landing force (the 1st division) had to be supplied by sea just for the first 48-72 hours of operation, then it could be reached by the XV Army Corps, advancing from Nieuport.
The Germans were prepared for a landing and the coast was heavily fortified. The German Maritime Division, who covered the area, was an élite unit. Heavy naval gun batteries covered the infantry. “As long as the Coastal batteries are not put out of action, which would hardly appear to be possible even after a most violent bombardment of several day’s duration, the attempt to land strong land forces is hopeless” - wrote Admiral Schroeder, the German commander of the area – “the enemy, who is crowded in his boats, must be annihilated before he reaches the beach”. On July 6th it launched a preventive assault (Operation Strandfest) which inflicted heavy losses to the British XV Corps. This preventive battle, contributed to the cancellation of Operation Hush.

What if the Operation Hush was carried on? Should it result in a British defeat? Should it be a striking victory? What could be the tactical and strategic consequences of a victory?

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I think the biggest problem is that the Germans can send reinforcements faster by rail then the British can move them by ship there.

The attacking forces trying to reach it by land aren't going to get there quicker then German troops defending that region already.

How are you going to win a battle if the defender can reinforce quicker then the attacker? :confused:
 
@FlyingDutchman: but this is problem for all amphibious operations. In Normandy also, Germans had better communications than the Allies.
 
In case of British defeat…
Events could appear like that:

August 7th

0,01 AM: five large special pontoons, 2500 tons each, are loaded in Dunkirk with 2 field artillery batteries, a squadron of Mark IV heavy tanks and two flying columns of cyclist and machine gun motorcycles. They complete their loading process without any problem.

7 AM – 8 PM: the pontoons remain in Dunkirk for the rest of the day; the Harwich Flotilla provided the cover from sea, the RNAS from the air; unfortunately for the British expedition, an undetected German U-Boot spots the pontoons and signals them to Bruges command. Aerial observation, survived to RNAS interceptors, confirms the reports.

9 PM - 10 PM: the pontoons are loaded with troops, 500 men each, from the British 1st division. All the others embark on smaller lighters. Four flotillas of escorting smoke boats arrive at Dunkirk along with the lighters.

10 PM – 0 AM: the pontoons, escorted by the Harwich Flotilla, reach their provisional anchorage, where they are attached to two Monitors each. German submarines alerted by their command, converge to the assembling area and begin to track the British force

August 8th
1 AM – 2 AM: the Harwich Flotilla take its position on the seaward bow, the escorting small smoke boats on the land side. Another flotilla of small boats drive the pontoons to the right landing zones, using lights switched on by the British troops along the Allied held coast and a complex system of guidance, named “taut wire”. The first torpedoes are launched by a German U-Boot against the first pontoon. The large target is easily hit and begin to sink, with all his 500 men and tons of materiel. The Harwich Flotilla begins immediately to drop dozens of depth charges. The German submarines hardly can repeat their first success, but the huge explosion of the pontoon alerts the German gunners of Tirpitz, Deutchland and Raversyde batteries and provides them with the correct location of the enemy.

2 AM – 3 AM: German heavy guns open fire before the British can act, with devastating effects. The monitor Terror engages the Tirpitz and Deutchland batteries, while monitors Soult and Erebus hit hard the Raversyde batteries. All the XV Corps field artillery open fires against the German positions, providing support. But the heavy German naval guns begin to concentrate their fire against the pontoons, before the escorting smoke boats can lay their courtain. German can shoot ignoring the monitors: British medium guns cannot destroy German fortifications, but German heavy batteries can destroy the pontoons with just one well aimed salvo. Admiral Schroeder asks for help and the Fourth Army command orders all the reserves in the area of enemy landing by rail.

3 AM – 7 AM: When the British expedition reaches the landing zone, its forces are already nearly destroyed by German naval artillery. But the Germans are ready and all their reserves are on the spot, ready to act against the landing parties. Just two pontoons can reach the shore line at Middelkerke. Their escorting four monitors, armed with 9 inch guns, ground themselves providing close artillery support. The landing of the first 6 tanks causes no panic on German lines: the iron-monsters are only six and could be easily destroyed by artillery. German shock troops engage them in close combats. They launch six-granades packs against them, while they are trying to climb the sea wall, exposing their “bellies” to the defenders. The tanks are destroyed one by one, while the infantry is engaged and repulsed by intense machine guns cross-fire. By the 7 AM, general Rawlinson, British commander of the Fourth Army, asks Haig to call off the operation. British reserves are never landed. British troops trapped in the beachhead are taken prisoner. Germans suffered heavy losses because of intense British artillery covering fire, but they are in complete control of the battleground.

Possible tactical consequences of a British defeat
British 1st division suffers heavy losses and is nearly destroyed. This is not unusual in WW1, when entire divisions and Army Corps are completely annihilated by enemy fire in few days. But this is a particularly demoralizing defeat, because it humiliated once again (after Dardanelles and Jutland) the British naval power. On the other side, German morale is boosted and resistance along the Ypres salient becomes stronger than ever. The consequences on the Third Ypres Campaign are modest. The British campaign cannot be worse than iOTL. In this case, after a defeat in Middelkerke, they simply add 10.000 losses to the 240.000 lost in the whole Third Ypres Campaign.

Possible theater consequences of a British defeat
No sensible impact on the balance of forces in the whole Western Front; German morale become higher, their resistance along the Hindemburg Line is more motivated, probably the command feels more secure against possible outflanking maneuvers. Tanks could be also a side victim of the Operation Hush. Despite the defense provided by JFC Fuller (who defined the hole Hush affaire as a “cracked mind” plan), Haig is now certain that the tanks are not so useful and is much more skeptical on future tank operations.

Possible strategic consequences of a British defeat
The defeat deepens the “Dardanelles syndrome” in British command. All plans for possible amphibious or naval operations against enemy coasts are scrapped. No impacts on the other fronts.

All the rest is OTL. Of course, for alternative historians, a possible British victory at Middelkerke is much more interesting…

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Yes, indeed, in 1917 there was no possibility to interrupt the rail-traffick by air bombing. Then, Haig and Rawlinson planned to stop it by land. The landing at Middelkerke should have taken place only after the occupation of Roulers railnet, by the advancing troops from Ypres. The landing should have been the second branch of the Ypres offensive, not an isolated action. In this case, German troops could never reach the landing zone, because of the complete interruption of the only useful railway by the XVIII British Army Corps.
 
Much more pragmatic and feasible than Gallipoli. And Gallipoli too was not a foolish plan. It too was feasible, but bad executed.
In 1917, the British have already learnt the lessons of the 1915 amphibious operation and managed to prepare the Operation Hush in any detail. They actually had very accurate maps, 1:1 reproductions of terrain and structures for training, new naval tools and tanks. And very well prepared infantry with veteran men. I really don't think this operation would have been a recipe for disaster.
 

Adler

Banned
A direct invasion of a heavily fortified beach, guarded by elite forces, sea and land mines, uboats and destroyers near. And coastal artillery. Sorry. Suicide mission. IF they got to the beach they would have lost at the end of the day. All British forces on the beaches would be either dead or captured.

Adler
 
In case of British victory…

Events could appear like that:

August 7th
0,01 AM: five large special pontoons, 2500 tons each, are loaded in Dunkirk with 2 field artillery batteries, a squadron of Mark IV heavy tanks and two flying columns of cyclist and machine gun motorcycles. They complete their loading process without any problem.

7 AM – 8 PM: the pontoons remain in Dunkirk for the rest of the day; the Harwich Flotilla provided the cover from sea, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) by air; no German aerial or submarine recon can detect the enemy preparation. Submarines are kept away by the Dover Patrol and by the Harwich Flotilla. The RNAS have already shot down the German observation balloons along the Belgian frontline and prevents any incursion of long range planes.

9 PM - 10 PM: the pontoons are loaded with troops, 500 men each, from the British 1st division. All the others embark on smaller lighters. Four flotillas of escorting smoke boats arrive at Dunkirk along with the lighters.

10 PM – 0 AM: the pontoons, escorted by the Harwich Flotilla, reach their provisional anchorage, where they are attached to two Monitors each.

August 8th

1 AM – 2 AM: the Harwich Flotilla take its position on the seaward bow, the escorting small smoke boats on the land side. Another flotilla of small boats drive the pontoons to the right landing zones, using lights switched on by the British troops along the Allied held coast and a complex system of guidance, named “taut wire”. The German gunners of Tirpitz, Deutchland and Raversyde batteries can’t even see the incoming enemy in a cloudy night without moon.

3 AM: the German batteries discovered the presence of an enemy only when the heavy and medium British naval batteries open fire on them. The monitor Terror engages the heavy batteries near Ostende (Tirpitz and Deutchland), while Soult and Erebus are engaging enemy batteries of Raversyde. All the field batteries of the British XV Corps open fire against the German first line of defense. Five smaller “M” class monitors open fire, with their 9 inch guns to the coastline, near the landing zone, while the smoke escort boats begin to create a deep courtain of smoke which cover the pontoons. The German gunners, submerged by the metal storm and with poor visibility, can’t direct their fire with the necessary accuracy against the approaching enemy. British pontoons arrive on the coast with few losses and can land the first wave of the 1st division at Middelkerke. This area was ill defended by the German Maritime Division, because of the presence of a high sea wall: the German command considered it a too difficult area for an enemy landing. In the area there was only a single line of trenches and barbed wire and few troops. British landing party break German resistance with massive fire power and the use of tanks. The close artillery support is provided by the escorting monitors, which ground themselves at the very moment of the landing and act as fortified batteries. The Mark IV tanks, three for each pontoon, deploy their special inclined wedges and scale the wall quickly, executing a maneuver tested every day, dozens of times, in the last two months. Taken by surprise by “tanks coming from the sea” (the first seen by the Maritime Division men), the German first line goes panic.

4 AM – 7 AM: at 4 AM the German Fourth Army command begins to realize that there is an ongoing British landing on the Belgian coast and orders the reserves to move to the Ostende area. For German strategic reserves, reaching Ostende take 2-3 hours. In the first twenty minutes of landing, the British can fill the beachhead with 15.000 men, with all their equipment and artillery, enough to resist to the eventual counter-attacks of the German Maritime Division supported by the 199th division. The XV Army Corps launch an all-out attack against the German lines North to Nieuport, trying to reach the beachhead soonest possible. In the first three hours of operation, three British “flying columns” of cyclist, escorted by motorcycle sidecars armed with machine guns, rush to the Raversyde batteries. The land side of the German coastal batteries is very weak, then the flying columns prevail. German guns are destroyed in the end of the operation, then the cyclist quickly retreat inside the beachhead and join the efforts of the infantry. In three hours, the XV Corps breaks the disorganized German forces and reaches the beachhead.

8 AM – 8 PM: when all the German strategic reserve and their artillery reach the Ostende area, the main German counter-attack begins. But marshy ground and the intense British naval fire are formidable obstacles. After 12 hours of furious charges, the Germans call off the action with heavy losses. In the meantime, British brings their heaviest guns in the newly occupied town of Westende. Then begin to open fire against Ostende, Bruges and Zeebrugge. Telephone wires are brought to the new positions, contacts established, the new line consolidated.

9th August and after

British don’t need further advances. Once the new line is consolidated, Germans try to break it with very few chances of success, given the British overwhelming fire-power. Ostende is under light, medium and heavy batteries fire and simply untenable. Germans are obliged to abandon the town after one week or two of bombardment. They can keep Zeebrugge and Bruges, but after the fall of Ostende, their role as “safe heavens” for submarines is compromised. British heavy and medium artillery, deployed at Ostende, can keep them under constant fire.

Possible tactical consequences of a British victory
A stunning British victory at Middelkerke is very similar to those of Vimy Ridge and Messines: a very limited objective, pursued by limited but high trained forces, can achieve stunning results. In this case, the whole German-occupied Belgian coast is put under the control of British artillery. German navy have lost one of its best advanced bases. After a possible fall of Ostende, also the German positions North to Ypres become untenable and have to be retreated to a second line of resistance from North to Ostende to Roulers and Menin.

Possible theatre consequences of a British victory
This battle could revert the OTL history of the Western Front in the last months of 1917: after a tactical victory on the Belgian coast, Haig doesn’t need to continue the Third Ypres Campaign and he can put its forces to the defensive. But Ludendorff is forced to launch an all-out offensive in order to reoccupy the precious lost terrain, using the Rupprecht Army Group. This decision can provoke a Fourth Ypres Campaign, with the German in the role of the attackers. All the natural and tactical factors which plagued the British during the OTL Third Ypres Campaign (heavy rain, muddy terrain, impossible supply lines, ecc…) can plague Germans during the ATL Fourth Ypres Campaign. The battle could end with few gains and very heavy losses for the Germans, less losses and more gains (the Belgian coast) for the British.

Possible strategic consequences of a British victory
A British successful landing at Middelkerke have no impact on other fronts. But an eventual German big counter-offensive to re-occupy the lost ground can have huge consequences on the other theaters of war. Ludendorff has to drain many resources from the Eastern front and possibly deny the necessary help to the Austro-Hungarian ally on the Italian front. In case of British victory a High Seas Fleet sortie is really possible, during or immediately after the British operations along the coast, in order to save Ostende and vindicate the honor of the navy’s Maritime Division. A German massive naval sortie can cause a great battle with the Grand Fleet.

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