Wi:Britain holds on to Singapore in 42

[CaptainCalvert]

As I understand it, Singapore was quite a close call OTL, with the Japanese almost out of resources when the surrender came.
There are other examples of Japanese soldiers holding out in terrible conditions, so it seems credible that if held off they would either keep trying or to effectively besiege Singapore if they are driven back rather than held off.
Either option would result in a delay of at least a few days, but maybe a few weeks if Singapore is besieged but the water supplies are back under British control. So what does this mean, assuming every other operation goes as OTL?
How quickly does Singapore become untenable due to other Japanese successes?
How many days or weeks does it have to hold out to make a real difference to Burma etc?
Is there a chance of a withdrawal by sea?

 

[Riain]

The problem was even deeper then lack of training. The question has to be asked train for what? The doctrine was wrong. The Commonwealth forces trained in conventional European tactics. In the Malayan Campaign the defenders were continuously wrong footed by Japanese tactics. Their lines were constantly infiltrated, and their flanks turned by an enemy on bicycles. The Japanese were able to maneuver and supply themselves across terrain the British thought was impassable. The Commonwealth army was too road bound, and as the Japanese got into their rear, and cut the roads they had to fall back, over, and over again until they reached Singapore, and had nowhere left to go.

The Commonwealth forces were out fought, by an enemy that was too fast and aggressive for them to cope with. Adding air superiority, and naval dominance made the defense of Malaya untenable. The racist attitude of superiority over the Japanese lead them to grossly underestimating their capabilities, and the Allies paid for their mistakes. Throwing the 18th Division into Singapore after the battle was already lost was one of the most senseless decisions of the war.

It took the Commonwealth Army well into 1943 to gain the experience they needed to cope with the Japanese in the jungles of Burma. They simply were not prepared to do it at the end of 1941 in the jungles of Malaya. They had no idea what they would be dealing with, so how could they be ready for it?

They had an idea of what the threat was. They made plans like Op Matador, formulated a wish list of equipment and forces which iirc had something like 560 aircraft and expected the forces to hold out until the fleet arrived in something like 4 months.

The problem was the malaise that existed in the leadup to the war which meant that troops were stuck in the Straits Settlements rather than exercising out in the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. The governor could have paved the way for such training, which would have given the forces familiarity with the terrain which they were going to defend. However Shenton Thomas was a peacetime administrator, he negotiated the non aggression pact with Thailand which made Op Matador so politically fraught and was obsessed with not alarming the population by overt preparation for war. This is why I suggest Brooke Popham going from Kenya to Malaya as governor in 1939 would make a world of difference.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What would it take for the UK to hold Singapore and what changes are needed. Would Monty be a good ground commander. Would having indomitable be part of force Z with sea hurricanes and a different commander than Phillips?

It would take more than a change of leadership IMO

More troops, better trained, led and equipped ones at that

An earlier British rearmament and military expansion for one thing resulting in more Divisions, Squadrons, tanks, guns, boots and tins of bully beef available in 1941

There was not enough troops or aircraft to defend Malaya in Dec 1941 and the ones they had were relatively poor - the good units and equipment were where there was actual fighting.

Note that the defence of Singapore has to be made at the Kra Isthmus in Thailand and the South China Sea (using air and Naval power)

And in addition the Barrier locations have to be held (i.e. Ambon, Timor, Rabaul etc) with greater strength than OTL.

Otherwise the Japanese can isolate the Peninsular and effectively besiege it had they not been able to capture it by a land invasion

So perhaps have a spat between Britain and Germany over the AGNA and other things in early 1938

It gets so bad that HMG enacts limited conscription in mid 38 (otl it was May 39) and begins to place increased orders for aircraft, tanks, guns, boots and tins of bully beef about a year earlier

The issue we have with any scenario is in order for Japan to invade France has to fall (allowing French Indo China to be invaded) and Britain to be stretched.

Anything that allows enough forces to defend Malaya and the region from Japanese adventurism would likely result in the Japanese not attempting to invade Malaya (and therefore not invading Philippines or attacking Pearl Harbour) and likely turtling.

But for the interests of story telling lets say it goes more or less as OTL

The raider Atlantis is intercepted and sunk by allied cruisers in May 1940

Have a more aggressive Op Judgement - with all 5 Italian BBs sunk / Crippled as well as some of the Heavy Cruisers

Malta is equipped more than OTL and earlier

The med becomes for the next 6 months at least - a British lake

The British do not send forces to Greece - instead they occupy Crete (which they did OTL) with the NZ Division freeing up Greek/Creten forces to fight on the mainland

Plans to send British/Australian and NZ forces fall foul of the Aussie and Kiwi commanders smelling a rat and calling their bosses - this delays W force and its never sent before the Germans invade mainland Greece.

The vessels intended to send and then used to evacuate W force are instead used to recover as many Greek forces as possible back to Egypt

Operation Mercury results in the leading waves of the Fallshirmjeager being decimated (the NZ Division has its full allocation of artillery - thats 72 guns folks - and motor Transport having not abandoned it all in Greece allowing it to better react to the landings and conduct a mobile defence) and the operation is called off on the 2nd day with complete losses of the assaulting units and the effective destruction of the 4 Regiments/Brigades involved (1 glider and 3 parachute) - there is no mass losses to RN forces (no need to try and find invasion forces at sea and then cover the evacuation - although it robs us of a great quote).

Rommel's invasion of Cyrenaica while initially successful runs into stronger than OTL Desert Army and runs out of steam after investing Benghazi (no Trobruk siege ITTL)

Having not lost massive amounts of men and equipment (and the British army being a year ahead of its OTL expansion) the Desert army recovers faster and counter attacks in the late summer reliving the 'desert rats' of the Benghazi pocket and pushing the Axis forces back to El Agheila where they had started at the beginning of Op Sonnenblume.

This allows air cover for Malta convoys from Alexandria negating the need for 'club runs' and the like taking the pressure off the Carriers (aircraft can fly directly from North Africa to Malta).

With the British army better able to provide fresh divisions ITTL pressure to send Australian forces back to the Far East and Australia in the face of increased Japanese aggression is bowed to and the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions are sent back to Australia / Far East

By Nov 1941 the 2nd Australian Imperial Force has effectively stood up an entire 3 Division Corps in Malaya with entire Reinforced Brigades in the 3 main barrier locations

Having started rearmament earlier the production of tanks etc is more advanced and the Australians get 300 early marks of the Valentine tank along with a few 100 other tanks - allowing the 1st Australian Armoured Division to be created - its first Brigade (with 200 odd AFVs) and support group are in Malaya working up when the Japanese invade.

The 2nd Armour Brigade is split up to provide smaller formations of tanks to the barrier locations as well as providing replacements to the 1st Amour Brigade in Malaya

Australia is also like Canada standing up Valentine production - although too late to send tanks to allied forces before Nov 41 it will provide several 100 tanks during 1942 and over a 600 in 1943 before production is scaled back (the need to make steam engines and rolling stock greater than the need for tanks by this stage in the war).

The RN is effectively up several carriers and battleships either not sunk or damaged in 1941 as well as a number of Cruisers and the Italian surface fleet much reduced

This allows them to send a far more powerful force to the Far East based around Illustrious, Formidable, Ark Royal, Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Repulse

In addition with the pressure lifted from the Silent service many of the surviving T class submarines are sent to Singapore (and not suffering heavy losses in Italian minefield and against the very good Italian ASW forces.

With the situation much better in North Africa the RAF having released several Wings of Spitfires for service in Malta, Crete and North Africa all P40s are sent to the Far East equipping 6 British and Imperial fighter Squadrons (with a large theatre reserve) along with a number of bomber and recon squadrons.

There that should do it!

 

[Riain]

There was not enough troops or aircraft to defend Malaya in Dec 1941 and the ones they had were relatively poor - the good units and equipment were where there was actual fighting.

Since when does fighting on the defensive in close country require superiority in troop numbers and equipment accross the board?

I believe that the attitude of half a dozen key personnel, starting with the governor, could have transformed the defense of Malaya with a single extra man or bullet. Train, plan, prepare as much as practical and surely the available forces could mount an adequate defensive campaign.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Working up a carrier group, and ship's company doesn't work that way. You can do some operational training while in transit, but not the type needed to qualify engineering, flight, and gun crews. Indomitable was a new ship, that needed time to do a real shakedown cruise to work out her kinks. No one should want to send a none fully qualified crew, and untested ship directly in action. What happened with Prince of Wales should be a warning to any navy. She was not battle worthy when she was sent after the Bismarck.

An extremely concise and accurate synopsis of the problem. Another good example is 16 December 1941 when HMS Illustrious rammed HMS Formidable in poor visibility and high seas in the North Atlantic. Unlike HMS Indomitable, whose officers and ratings had never functioned as a crew, both of her half-sisters had significant portions of their pre-refit crews still on board, who were "merely" lacking recent sea time and in "need" of breaking in the new drafts. Not a good time for both to require two more months each in the yards.
As a side note, although many sources and authors have claimed HMS Indomitable was intended for Force Z, there is no indication of that in the Admiralty records. The 29 November 1941 Admiralty War Diary states upon completion of work up she was intended for Force H as a replacement for the sunken HMS Ark Royal. My opinion is she was always intended for Force H, as at the time of her loss, HMS Ark Royal was in desperate need of a refit.

 

[BlueTrousers]

The British do not send forces to Greece - instead they occupy Crete (which they did OTL) with the NZ Division freeing up Greek/Creten forces to fight on the mainland

That on its own is a massively significant PoD, IMO - as well as making 'W' Force available for North Africa, it would impact the preparations for BARBAROSSA and Anglo-Greek relations would very likely deteriorate.

 

[Belisarius II]

An extremely concise and accurate synopsis of the problem. Another good example is 16 December 1941 when HMS Illustrious rammed HMS Formidable in poor visibility and high seas in the North Atlantic. Unlike HMS Indomitable, whose officers and ratings had never functioned as a crew, both of her half-sisters had significant portions of their pre-refit crews still on board, who were "merely" lacking recent sea time and in "need" of breaking in the new drafts. Not a good time for both to require two more months each in the yards.
As a side note, although many sources and authors have claimed HMS Indomitable was intended for Force Z, there is no indication of that in the Admiralty records. The 29 November 1941 Admiralty War Diary states upon completion of work up she was intended for Force H as a replacement for the sunken HMS Ark Royal. My opinion is she was always intended for Force H, as at the time of her loss, HMS Ark Royal was in desperate need of a refit.

Thank you. The reason people say Indomitable was for Force Z is because she was the only possible carrier that might have been available. It would only seem to make sense that they would've sent a carrier, so it's easier to explain it away by Indomitable running aground. The alternative is the top leadership at the Admiralty made a big mistake. No one in their memoirs wanted to take responsibility, and admit they screwed up. Since Admiral Phillips heroically was killed in action it was easier to say he made the decision to risk his ships in an offensive operation without aircover and leave it at that.

Sending Force Z out without aircover was as unwise as it would have been to send Scharnhorst & Gneisenau on the Chennel Dash without an elaborate air cover plan.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Thank you. The reason people say Indomitable was for Force Z is because she was the only possible carrier that might have been available. It would only seem to make sense that they would've sent a carrier, so it's easier to explain it away by Indomitable running aground. The alternative is the top leadership at the Admiralty made a big mistake. No one in their memoirs wanted to take responsibility, and admit they screwed up. Since Admiral Phillips heroically was killed in action it was easier to say he made the decision to risk his ships in an offensive operation without aircover and leave it at that.

Sending Force Z out without aircover was as unwise as it would have been to send Scharnhorst & Gneisenau on the Chennel Dash without an elaborate air cover plan.

Once Japan did attack, HMS Indomitable went to the Indian Ocean. From that angle it is easy to assume she was intended to go there all along. Blunt truth is there was no carrier to send at all, so that option was not available. The historian Ned Willmott, whom I greatly respect, notes the fundamental assumption by both Malaya Command and in London was the Japanese would not attack during the monsoon (which ends in February) and Malaya still had time. It is less known, but similar to MacArthur's stubborn belief that for similar reasons a Japanese invasion of the Philippines was not possible until April. It all goes back to facts and assumptions, the basis of military planning. Get those wrong, and it is tough to recover.
Opinion only, the belief Malaya had time extended to ADM Andrew Cunningham in the Med. He sent two destroyers, HMS Jupiter and Encounter that were desperately in need of refit on the assumption HMD Singapore had time to do the work. I do not believe Cunningham would have sent these two if he believed war was imminent. Likewise, HMS Mauritius was in dockyard hands there. As Jan Smuts put it - "there's an opening for a first class disaster if the Japs get nippy."

 

[BlueTrousers]

Since Admiral Phillips heroically was killed in action it was easier to say he made the decision to risk his ships in an offensive operation without aircover and leave it at that.

Ironically, there is evidence to suggest that the exact opposite was the case. Phillips was acutely aware of the need for air cover. But, none was available, and the Royal Navy could not just stay in port whilst Malaya was being invaded from the sea, so he sailed anyway. Which all comes back to MATADOR and readiness for the invasion. With an estimated 4 months needed to build up a defensive stature, preparations really needed to be enacted in about August 1941. Not impossible, given that the buildup of Japanese forces began in July 1941, but not straightforward either.

Being massively controversial, the materiel sent to the USSR in late 1941 could conceivably have been prioritiesd for Malaya instead. A UK which prioritised North Africa over Greece, and Malaya over the USSR, might have entered 1942 in a considerably stronger position. But relations with Greece would become strained, and the USSR would probably have struggled in 1941 without British military aid. Sitting in 2022, from a British (and American) grand strategic perspective it's not necessarily a bad thing to let the USSR suffer more from German aggression. But in 1941, that would probably have been a very tough sell indeed.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Since when does fighting on the defensive in close country require superiority in troop numbers and equipment accross the board?

I believe that the attitude of half a dozen key personnel, starting with the governor, could have transformed the defense of Malaya with a single extra man or bullet. Train, plan, prepare as much as practical and surely the available forces could mount an adequate defensive campaign.

While you are not wrong the problem the British Empire had was that it was sending anyone who was good with the best equipment to where there was actual fighting going on.

The army’s of the Commonwealth were undergoing rapid expansion at this stage of the war and this often resulted in a given unit being split into 2 and both new units provided with fresh recruits and then often this process repeated.

This meant that units in ‘peaceful’ areas of the Empire such as Malaya where stripped of offices and men, these being sent to and had those replaced with green officers and men.

1 of the Gurkha battalions was almost totally comprised of 18 year old recruits.

And many of the units had men who had not fully completed their basic training let alone the unit capable of larger battalion and brigade size taskings.

I cannot imagine the very best officers and men of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force being sent to the 8th Division.

They would have gone to the 3 divisions fighting in North Africa.

Same with the Indian Army any experienced soldiers were also sent.

That being said had all the battalions trained to the same standard as the Argyle and Sutherland highlanders then yes the Japanese would have had their heads kicked in.

However that Commanding officer and that unit were exceptional.

Also the forces in Malaya where effectively 7 infantry Brigades verses verses 7 later 10 Japanese ‘Regiments’ (effectively infantry Brigades) with tank support and all the trimmings.

Many of those Japanese formations were combat experienced from the war in China and the Japanese Army ‘tribe’ had a far greater pool of experienced staff and field officers than the Imperial forces in Malaya.

Unlike the British Empire the Japanese could send their best troops and had the advantage of knowing where and when they were attacking.

The Only way around this is for the British Empire to send their own experienced troops to Malaya and the region with enough tanks, guns and aircraft as well as enough RN assets.

With regards to experienced troops these can only really come from North Africa or the better units in the British Garrison such as the 3rd Division.

So sending the 3 Australian Divisions (6th,7th and 9th) back to Australia to fight as a single corps makes sense.

I don’t think the problem can be addressed with ‘more training’ because this takes time.

Time they did not have.

 

[HMS St.Lawrence]

Obviously there's more than one school of thought on this question, I'm from the one considering the Allied defeat was far from an inevitability. The ressources available to the defenders were not enough to launch offensive operations or to fight a prolonged campaign, but I think they were sufficient to repel the initial Japanese invasion attempt. They were misused.

Considering how much a a close run thing the Malayan campaign was in reality, not a lot of things need to change to at least delay, or cancel altogether the fall of the colony.
We need to keep in mind however, that Singapore alone is useless, if Malaya falls, better evacuate and improve the infrastructures in Ceylon ASAP to counterattack from there.

Lots of folks have already spoken in lenght about the details of the land and naval-air campaign so instead I'll point to something that I haven't seen mentionned so far:

It is often forgotten that Malayan civil administration bears a lot of responsability in the catastrophe. They kept impeding Percival's work and were constantly putting pressure on the Army for defend everything, everwhere. As Commander, it was Percival's job to tell those fools to shut up and carry-on with the preparations that needed to be done, but he failed doing that. Maybe another officer would've handled this better, maybe we should go back to 1934 and replace Shenton Thomas as governor and put someone else in the seat, ideally someone with a military background.
In any case, during the run-up to the invasion the military preparations should have taken priority over any civilian concerns, and it did not. I think this is the largest possible POD: with a resolved and competent field commander who's prepared for the worse and has prepared his men for it too, the campaign would have taken a completely different path. The Japanese we stretched to the extreme limit of their capacities, the British were literally sitting on their supply lines, this shouldn't have happened.

 

[Belisarius II]

Obviously there's more than one school of thought on this question, I'm from the one considering the Allied defeat was far from an inevitability. The ressources available to the defenders were not enough to launch offensive operations or to fight a prolonged campaign, but I think they were sufficient to repel the initial Japanese invasion attempt. They were misused.

Considering how much a a close run thing the Malayan campaign was in reality, not a lot of things need to change to at least delay, or cancel altogether the fall of the colony.
We need to keep in mind however, that Singapore alone is useless, if Malaya falls, better evacuate and improve the infrastructures in Ceylon ASAP to counterattack from there.

Lots of folks have already spoken in lenght about the details of the land and naval-air campaign so instead I'll point to something that I haven't seen mentionned so far:

It is often forgotten that Malayan civil administration bears a lot of responsability in the catastrophe. They kept impeding Percival's work and were constantly putting pressure on the Army for defend everything, everwhere. As Commander, it was Percival's job to tell those fools to shut up and carry-on with the preparations that needed to be done, but he failed doing that. Maybe another officer would've handled this better, maybe we should go back to 1934 and replace Shenton Thomas as governor and put someone else in the seat, ideally someone with a military background.
In any case, during the run-up to the invasion the military preparations should have taken priority over any civilian concerns, and it did not. I think this is the largest possible POD: with a resolved and competent field commander who's prepared for the worse and has prepared his men for it too, the campaign would have taken a completely different path. The Japanese we stretched to the extreme limit of their capacities, the British were literally sitting on their supply lines, this shouldn't have happened.

So, who was going to change British military doctrine, and how would they know they needed to do that before the fact? Having better leaders is always a good thing, but if you're fighting the wrong kind of battle, it won't really change the outcome. The larger problem for the Allies in both Europe, and Asia was they had to learn new ways to fight. Without the experience of being defeated by the Japanese in the period 1941-43 they wouldn't know they needed to rethink what they were doing. Failure usually teaches us more than success does.

 

[marathag]

The larger problem for the Allies in both Europe, and Asia was they had to learn new ways to fight. Without the experience of being defeated by the Japanese in the period 1941-43 they wouldn't know they needed to rethink what they were doing. Failure usually teaches us more than success does.

Though with what the Marines learned with the Banana Wars was enough to deal with even elite Japanese units on Island Garrisons.

 

[HMS St.Lawrence]

So, who was going to change British military doctrine, and how would they know they needed to do that before the fact? Having better leaders is always a good thing, but if you're fighting the wrong kind of battle, it won't really change the outcome. The larger problem for the Allies in both Europe, and Asia was they had to learn new ways to fight. Without the experience of being defeated by the Japanese in the period 1941-43 they wouldn't know they needed to rethink what they were doing. Failure usually teaches us more than success does.

You raise a fair point. Lessons in war are often better taught by defeat than victory. Although I honestly do not believe the British Army needed the kind of disaster that was their OTL defeat in Malaya to eventually learn how to defeat the Japan. If the landings are prevented, or repelled, the war would take another course and such lessons would be learned elsewhere.
Then there's also experience gained before. By 1942, the British had more than two years of fighting behind them, they had already learned a lot and indeed would also teach a lot to their new American allies in anti-submarine warfare, radar interception and CAP fighter direction, to name only a few.

A prolonged Allied presence in Malaya can only harm the Japanese, wheter or not the British learn a lesson from this specific campaign. If the initial attack fails, the Japanese will probably try again, yes, but at what cost? In my opinion the more they waste ressources trying to tie down or re-invade Malaya, the better.

 

[Belisarius II]

Though with what the Marines learned with the Banana Wars was enough to deal with even elite Japanese units on Island Garrisons.

Your right, the USMC was probable the best prepared Allied ground force to deal with the Japanese in the early war period.

You raise a fair point. Lessons in war are often better taught by defeat than victory. Although I honestly do not believe the British Army needed the kind of disaster that was their OTL defeat in Malaya to eventually learn how to defeat the Japan. If the landings are prevented, or repelled, the war would take another course and such lessons would be learned elsewhere.
Then there's also experience gained before. By 1942, the British had more than two years of fighting behind them, they had already learned a lot and indeed would also teach a lot to their new American allies in anti-submarine warfare, radar interception and CAP fighter direction, to name only a few.

A prolonged Allied presence in Malaya can only harm the Japanese, wheter or not the British learn a lesson from this specific campaign. If the initial attack fails, the Japanese will probably try again, yes, but at what cost? In my opinion the more they waste ressources trying to tie down or re-invade Malaya, the better.

You make some legitimate points. Assuming the Commonwealth forces move into northern Malaya, and are in a position to quickly attack the Japanese landing why would they land there? The Japanese had an excellent intelligence network in Malaya and wouldn't be so obliging. There were any number of locations on the east coast of Malaya they could choose from, anyone of which would force the British to abandon the north or be cut off. In fact, they may be cut off anyway, which would start the same stamped to Singapore that happened in the OTL, if they can even get there.

No matter what battle plan the British use the basic problems with their doctrine are still in play. Their too road bound, have a poor understanding of jungle warfare, and have no appreciation of the mobility, speed, and aggression of the IJA. They still think the Japanese are funny little men who are too shortsighted to be good pilots. If the British are forced into a battle of mobility, rather than position the odds start stacking up against them.

True the British had learned valuable lessons in Europe, and NA, but in late 1941 were still far behind the curve vs. the Germans in maneuver warfare. Besides the experiences in desert warfare Commonwealth forces were learning weren't really applicable to the jungles of SEA. The British suffered from a huge failure in intelligence. They no had almost no understanding of Japanese tactics, capabilities, or psychology. In Malaya the Japanese had almost all the advantages. Sea, and air control, superior leadership, training, doctrine, mobility, morale, and a more aggressive spirit. So many factors have to change for the Allies to win in Malaya that it's very hard to imagine them happening. The best way to save Malaya is for the war in Europe to not be happening, in which case the Japanese wouldn't have started the war.

 

[Riain]

While you are not wrong the problem the British Empire had was that it was sending anyone who was good with the best equipment to where there was actual fighting going on.

The army’s of the Commonwealth were undergoing rapid expansion at this stage of the war and this often resulted in a given unit being split into 2 and both new units provided with fresh recruits and then often this process repeated.

This meant that units in ‘peaceful’ areas of the Empire such as Malaya where stripped of offices and men, these being sent to and had those replaced with green officers and men.

1 of the Gurkha battalions was almost totally comprised of 18 year old recruits.

And many of the units had men who had not fully completed their basic training let alone the unit capable of larger battalion and brigade size taskings.

I cannot imagine the very best officers and men of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force being sent to the 8th Division.

They would have gone to the 3 divisions fighting in North Africa.

Same with the Indian Army any experienced soldiers were also sent.

That being said had all the battalions trained to the same standard as the Argyle and Sutherland highlanders then yes the Japanese would have had their heads kicked in.

However that Commanding officer and that unit were exceptional.

Also the forces in Malaya where effectively 7 infantry Brigades verses verses 7 later 10 Japanese ‘Regiments’ (effectively infantry Brigades) with tank support and all the trimmings.

Many of those Japanese formations were combat experienced from the war in China and the Japanese Army ‘tribe’ had a far greater pool of experienced staff and field officers than the Imperial forces in Malaya.

Unlike the British Empire the Japanese could send their best troops and had the advantage of knowing where and when they were attacking.

The Only way around this is for the British Empire to send their own experienced troops to Malaya and the region with enough tanks, guns and aircraft as well as enough RN assets.

With regards to experienced troops these can only really come from North Africa or the better units in the British Garrison such as the 3rd Division.

So sending the 3 Australian Divisions (6th,7th and 9th) back to Australia to fight as a single corps makes sense.

I don’t think the problem can be addressed with ‘more training’ because this takes time.

Time they did not have.

I don't really buy the time argument. Sure the 2 brigades that arrived in August 41 can be excused, although 3 months hard training would be very beneficial. However 3 brigades arrived Feb-Apr so had 7-9 months to prepare, 2 more arrived in Oct-Nov 40 so had over a year to prepare and the first brigade had been in place for over 2 years. The commanders balanced out the experience by putting the early 41 brigades in division with the late 40 brigades, bringing the average Indian division experience close to a year in theatre.

With regards to quality, the biggest problem would have been experienced officers and NCOs to lead the large number of undertrained men. However that's no excuse for the inactivity that pervaded the Malaya command, even mediocre officers and NCOs know about training and exercises.