Wi:Britain holds on to Singapore in 42

[jsb]

Assuming the battle happened in the same place and time it would go something like this The Japanese attack force was spread out over a wide arc so when they found Force Z they attacked in small groups from different directions. The British CAP would first have been directed SE in the direction of the attack on the destroyer Tenedos, which would've been a waste of aircraft. Some of the CAP would be over each of the 3 big ships, and patrolling in different sectors, without all fighters in the air at the same time. They'd probably have about 1/3, or 8 fighters airborne at the time they spotted the first enemy aircraft.

Given enough time they might get all 20-21 fighters into the air, with some of the initial CAP having to land during the battle. Only a hand full of fighters would be able to attack any one group of bombers. That is not a very strong CAP, and Japanese pilots were fames for pressing home their attacks. I assume your referring to Butch O'Hare defending the Lexington from 9 Betty Bombers in close formation. He shootdown 3, and damaged several others, but again he was an exceptional pilot flying a fighter with 50 cals rather than 303's. It's possible some of the Fleet Air Arm pilots could have had some very good successes, but it's unlikely they would have broken up most of the attacks.

Also, Lexington was attacked by 20 aircraft, while Force Z was attacked by 88. The odds against Force Z would still be very heavy, and if any of the big ships survived the mid-day attack, the Japanese could launch a late day attack to finish them off. IJN surface forces could also try to finish off any big ships that were left, since they would now know where Force Z was, and what course it was taking.

I think you are missing that the attack is spread over more than an hour? RN force will have time to reform CAPs between attacks.

And the attackers are all small groups of 9/8 aircraft with the torpedo aircraft taking time trying to do cross dropping to make sure of hits with any fighters, this will be far worse. Even without intercepting over Tenedos taking it toll in the run in......

I think it's far more likely that with a radar directed CAP sent to and cycled over the main force all the torpedoes miss (most of the fighters will end up down fighting them after the first fights like at midway), and you only end up with a few level bomb hits that do no real critical damage (like OTL) to battleships or RN AD CVs?

That or a fight over Tenedos and intercepting scouts outside visual range and destroying them before reporting delays the scouting of the main force for sufficiently long that many of the bombers groups turn back and never arrive to strike due to fuel limits.....

 

[Riain]

The whole carrier thing is moot because even without the grounding it wasn't going to arrive in time.

 

[Belisarius II]

I think you are missing that the attack is spread over more than an hour? RN force will have time to reform CAPs between attacks.

And the attackers are all small groups of 9/8 aircraft with the torpedo aircraft taking time trying to do cross dropping to make sure of hits with any fighters, this will be far worse. Even without intercepting over Tenedos taking it toll in the run in......

I think it's far more likely that with a radar directed CAP sent to and cycled over the main force all the torpedoes miss (most of the fighters will end up down fighting them after the first fights like at midway), and you only end up with a few level bomb hits that do no real critical damage (like OTL) to battleships or RN AD CVs?

That or a fight over Tenedos and intercepting scouts outside visual range and destroying them before reporting delays the scouting of the main force for sufficiently long that many of the bombers groups turn back and never arrive to strike due to fuel limits.....

I didn't miss that the battle takes place over more than an hour, I specifically addressed it. You're talking about 20 fighters operating off of 1 carrier trying to fend off 88 attacking aircraft coming from different directions over an hour long period. A carrier can't land, and recover aircraft while maneuvering. WWII carriers couldn't launch and recover aircraft at the same time. The efficiency of fighter direction in 1941 was far lower than the 100% you rate it at. Indomitable was torpedoed later in the war by a JU-88. No single carrier could ever have provided the level of protection for a task force that your crediting to Indomitable.

British doctrine didn't depend on large fighter groups for defense. They thought the main threat was from bombs, so they traded smaller air groups for armored flight decks. The British thought their AA fire and maneuvering would protect them. One carrier trying to cover itself, and two capital ships spread out over several nautical miles was not an easy job and they had very little experience trying to do it in December 1941.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The whole carrier thing is moot because even without the grounding it wasn't going to arrive in time.

But it could have if the choice had been made to work up the ships crew on the Journey to Singapore instead of taking the time to do it in the Caribbean before heading east.

 

[jsb]

You're talking about 20 fighters operating off of 1 carrier trying to fend off 88 attacking aircraft coming from different directions over an hour long period. A carrier can't land, and recover aircraft while maneuvering. WWII carriers couldn't launch and recover aircraft at the same time. The efficiency of fighter direction in 1941 was far lower than the 100% you rate it at. Indomitable was torpedoed later in the war by a JU-88. No single carrier could ever have provided the level of protection for a task force that your crediting to Indomitable.

We are only talking 51 torpedo bombers in separate 6 waves of 8/9 each that are the main threat, the bomber did far less damage?

Note that even without air cover, they only scored 1 hit on Prince of Wales in first wave and then on the slowed much down PoW 3 and then 4 on Repulse at the end (using a slow methodical fully set up hammer and anvil attack that could not be done with any fighters in the area), even a slightly lower hit chance and having a third target with its extra AA will reduce this even more.....

Unless you get critical unlucky hits like the OTL shaft hit on PoW then it's very likely 1 or 2 air dropped hits are survivable, and the fleet simply escapes back south at the end?

IJN can't generate another attack that day, and the RN will escape into the darkness due to range south.

Some Bomber groups might not even make contact with Force Z if they can't hold a shadow with radio positioning reporting, then some of the last groups might even run out of fuel and have to not attack?

 

[Gillan1220]

Correct me if I'm wrong...

I was always under the impression that Britain's Far East colonies were too far to protect. Britain risk overstretch with just trying to protect Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore.

Distance and logistics, considering Britain had to focus on Germany.

 

[HJ Tulp]

"MAJOR! Due to your stupidity you are relieved.
Captain Jones! Congratulations! You are now a Acting Major. Do not fail me like your old Boss.

Well if you mean that the problem can be solved by just promoting the next in line, this is not always the case. For example during the War of Indonesian Independence the army commander Spoor knew that there were cases of severe corruption going on, but he couldn't sack those responsible because even without those sackings he was already short on officers. Same in the KNIL during WWII. Colonial armies also have the problem that racism precludes them from promoting native soldiers to higher positions.

 

[marathag]

The assumption that just a handful of fighters would inflict the kind of slaughter on the attacking torpedo bombers as happened at Midway isn't realistic. The Devastator's had to make slow long straight run attacks, with lossy torpedoes, and had almost no chance against elite IJN Zero pilots. The Fulmar's were no faster than the attacking bombers, and the Sea Hurricane's not much faster. The numbers, training, and efficiency, of the defenders was far below the Japanese standard at the time.

The Japanese were using unescorted G3M Nells G4M Bettys, both notorious for catching fire from huge, unprotected fuel tanks. Cruise speed of 170 and 196mph.
Even if they don't catch fire, fuel would drain and then not enough gas to get back to the airbase.

 

[Belisarius II]

The Japanese were using unescorted G3M Nells G4M Bettys, both notorious for catching fire from huge, unprotected fuel tanks. Cruise speed of 170 and 196mph.
Even if they don't catch fire, fuel would drain and then not enough gas to get back to the airbase.

This back and forth can go on forever. It's not that Nells & Bettys would unable to survive without escorts, because they did, and hit many ships. If Force Z had a carrier with them the Japanese could adjust their strategy and assign a squadron of Zero's to the force. The distances involved were less then 500 miles, which the Zero could handle. The issue was finding Force Z. If the RN had a carrier with them they would have acted differently, and so would the Japanese. The historical battle is just a baseline for what might have happened differently.

At the time the British didn't think battleships in the open ocean were so vulnerable, and their doctrine, and training for fighter interception was not well developed. The British thought the main threat to their carriers was from bombs, and their armored flight decks would protect them. The Japanese torpedo bomber pilots were the best in the world, and the British had no idea what they would be facing. British carriers in the Mediterranean were frequently unable to protect convoys, or task forces from unescorted bombers, and were often hit themselves. Thinking that Indomitable's fighters would have a high probability of success in breaking up all the air attacks on Force Z just isn't realistic.

 

[Derwent Water]

This back and forth can go on forever. It's not that Nells & Bettys would unable to survive without escorts, because they did, and hit many ships. If Force Z had a carrier with them the Japanese could adjust their strategy and assign a squadron of Zero's to the force. The distances involved were less then 500 miles, which the Zero could handle. The issue was finding Force Z. If the RN had a carrier with them they would have acted differently, and so would the Japanese. The historical battle is just a baseline for what might have happened differently.

At the time the British didn't think battleships in the open ocean were so vulnerable, and their doctrine, and training for fighter interception was not well developed. The British thought the main threat to their carriers was from bombs, and their armored flight decks would protect them. The Japanese torpedo bomber pilots were the best in the world, and the British had no idea what they would be facing. British carriers in the Mediterranean were frequently unable to protect convoys, or task forces from unescorted bombers, and were often hit themselves. Thinking that Indomitable's fighters would have a high probability of success in breaking up all the air attacks on Force Z just isn't realistic.

I agree that a carrier doesn't guarantee Force Z survives although I think it increases the chance of something different happening. This would either be by shooting down some of the bombers/disrupting the attacks and maybe saving some of the ships or perhaps by the Japanese deploying a carrier to counter the British equivalent which would likely affect Japanese plans elsewhere.

 

[Belisarius II]

I agree that a carrier doesn't guarantee Force Z survives although I think it increases the chance of something different happening. This would either be by shooting down some of the bombers/disrupting the attacks and maybe saving some of the ships or perhaps by the Japanese deploying a carrier to counter the British equivalent which would likely affect Japanese plans elsewhere.

I agree. Having Indomitable with them would change things, but the situation was still untenable for the RN. Sending them north into the Gulf of Siam to hunt for an invasion convoy was foolish. Once the war started, they should have been sent to Ceylon to join a forming Eastern Fleet. All of the Allied fleets in SEA were only fighting delaying actions. Everyone was lucky to have any of their ships survive. No capital ships should've been considered so expendable. Tossing in a modern carrier to burn in the fire to would've been doubling down on stupid. The Allies could only delay the Japanese, not stop them.

 

[Riain]

The biggest problem was the poor training of the Army, which was hindered by the overall complacency of Governor Shelton. By August there were 8 field Brigades in Malaya, 5 in the 2 division of the Indian Corps, 2 in the 8th Australian division and 1 as command reserve. Additionally there was a Malayan brigade from September 1939 which was split to form 2 in September 1940 as the Singapore fortress division.

There was plenty of time and plenty of large units to undertake brigade/division/corps scale training exercises out in the field. Such training, some units could have multiple exercises, would prove invaluable during the fighting on the Peninsula and would likely drag the Japanese into a campaign of attrition that they couldn't afford but the Commonwealth forces could.

 

[Riain]

Once the war started, they should have been sent to Ceylon to join a forming Eastern Fleet.

100%

 

[naraic]

With a carrier I might support force z lingering east of Singapore for a day or two. That said I would not be north of Anambas island or Natuna unless a clear opportunity became available to launch a carrier strike on something.

Interestingly that's within range for an attack by Nells but out of range for an attack by Betty's.

 

[jsb]

I was always under the impression that Britain's Far East colonies were too far to protect. Britain risk overstretch with just trying to protect Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore.

Distance and logistics, considering Britain had to focus on Germany.

HK is crazy foolishness and cost GB forces it could not afford to lose, but Malaya and Singapore were economically very important, as they produced massive amounts of the world's rubber supplies (and other things) before US created the artificial rubber industry to replace them.

 

[Belisarius II]

The biggest problem was the poor training of the Army, which was hindered by the overall complacency of Governor Shelton. By August there were 8 field Brigades in Malaya, 5 in the 2 division of the Indian Corps, 2 in the 8th Australian division and 1 as command reserve. Additionally there was a Malayan brigade from September 1939 which was split to form 2 in September 1940 as the Singapore fortress division.

There was plenty of time and plenty of large units to undertake brigade/division/corps scale training exercises out in the field. Such training, some units could have multiple exercises, would prove invaluable during the fighting on the Peninsula and would likely drag the Japanese into a campaign of attrition that they couldn't afford but the Commonwealth forces could.

The problem was even deeper then lack of training. The question has to be asked train for what? The doctrine was wrong. The Commonwealth forces trained in conventional European tactics. In the Malayan Campaign the defenders were continuously wrong footed by Japanese tactics. Their lines were constantly infiltrated, and their flanks turned by an enemy on bicycles. The Japanese were able to maneuver and supply themselves across terrain the British thought was impassable. The Commonwealth army was too road bound, and as the Japanese got into their rear, and cut the roads they had to fall back, over, and over again until they reached Singapore, and had nowhere left to go.

The Commonwealth forces were out fought, by an enemy that was too fast and aggressive for them to cope with. Adding air superiority, and naval dominance made the defense of Malaya untenable. The racist attitude of superiority over the Japanese lead them to grossly underestimating their capabilities, and the Allies paid for their mistakes. Throwing the 18th Division into Singapore after the battle was already lost was one of the most senseless decisions of the war.

It took the Commonwealth Army well into 1943 to gain the experience they needed to cope with the Japanese in the jungles of Burma. They simply were not prepared to do it at the end of 1941 in the jungles of Malaya. They had no idea what they would be dealing with, so how could they be ready for it?

 

[pjmidd]

This back and forth can go on forever. It's not that Nells & Bettys would unable to survive without escorts, because they did, and hit many ships. If Force Z had a carrier with them the Japanese could adjust their strategy and assign a squadron of Zero's to the force. The distances involved were less then 500 miles, which the Zero could handle. The issue was finding Force Z. If the RN had a carrier with them they would have acted differently, and so would the Japanese. The historical battle is just a baseline for what might have happened differently.

At the time the British didn't think battleships in the open ocean were so vulnerable, and their doctrine, and training for fighter interception was not well developed. The British thought the main threat to their carriers was from bombs, and their armored flight decks would protect them. The Japanese torpedo bomber pilots were the best in the world, and the British had no idea what they would be facing. British carriers in the Mediterranean were frequently unable to protect convoys, or task forces from unescorted bombers, and were often hit themselves. Thinking that Indomitable's fighters would have a high probability of success in breaking up all the air attacks on Force Z just isn't realistic.

Wow , the Japanese have psychic powers? Because not knowing where the British are , given their different speeds , bases etc that is the only way Zero's turn up in the right place and right time. They have to pick a spot and time, not travel with the bombers. The distances are a lot further than those used in any of the WW2 carrier battles.

 

[Belisarius II]

But it could have if the choice had been made to work up the ships crew on the Journey to Singapore instead of taking the time to do it in the Caribbean before heading east.

Working up a carrier group, and ship's company doesn't work that way. You can do some operational training while in transit, but not the type needed to qualify engineering, flight, and gun crews. Indomitable was a new ship, that needed time to do a real shakedown cruise to work out her kinks. No one should want to send a none fully qualified crew, and untested ship directly in action. What happened with Prince of Wales should be a warning to any navy. She was not battle worthy when she was sent after the Bismarck.

 

[Belisarius II]

Wow , the Japanese have psychic powers? Because not knowing where the British are , given their different speeds , bases etc that is the only way Zero's turn up in the right place and right time. They have to pick a spot and time, not travel with the bombers. The distances are a lot further than those used in any of the WW2 carrier battles.

No, the Japanese don't have to have psychic powers. If there was a carrier with Force Z the Japanese would send out more scouting groups, rather than using attack groups to scout for themselves. They had plenty of seaplanes from both surface ships, and land bases to do the job. In fact, Force Z was overflown by search planes on December 9, but they failed sight them, and report. Submarines were also searching for them and did make sighting reports. Once they received a good sighting report, a recon flight could confirm the contact, and a strike group with an escort sent off.

In the OTL the Japanese attack was rather disjointed because they didn't use standard methods to launch a more coordinated attack. The Japanese were too hot for battle, and everyone wanted to get in the first blow. If there was a carrier in the area, they probably would've acted with more due caution, and done a better job of it. If force Z had been found in the same location in this TL, the air attack might have started 3 hours later but ended the same way.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Throwing the 18th Division into Singapore after the battle was already lost was one of the most senseless decisions of the war.

Amen. Every other destination (Burma, Java, hell even Palembang) would have been a much, much better and more logical than what happened. The only good it did was presenting an fantastic example of the British tunnel vision regarding Singapore.