WI Britain doesn't share?

I was wondering what would be the implications of the UK not sending British made goods to the USSR in 1941 would be.

Raw materials are still shipped so long as they don't unduly damage the British war effort. The British still escort American goods for Russia but try very hard not to send American goods originally destined for the UK.

My particular interest is to compare the detrimental effect (if any) on the Russian front in 1941 and 1942 without British lend lease compared to the potential positive effect on the British war effort in general and in the Far East in particular.
 
Whatever the practical efect the goods (assume tanks, planes, etc?) had, the political cost of not sending would be extreme. Raw materials are a medium/long term solution, guns&tanks are used imediatly. The UK had to, at the very least, be seen to support the new ally, and such equipment was the only way.
 
Whatever the practical efect the goods (assume tanks, planes, etc?) had, the political cost of not sending would be extreme. Raw materials are a medium/long term solution, guns&tanks are used imediatly. The UK had to, at the very least, be seen to support the new ally, and such equipment was the only way.

Was the political cost of not sending supplies greater than loosing Singapore, Burma and the respect of the Australian's? Or the losses and perceived poor leadership from the top created by the painfully slow North African campaign.

The idea of this thread is more to look at the ramifications of a change in policy by the rather anti communist British leadership instead of debating how likely it would be.
 
At the ultimate extreme while damaging to the British Empire losing in Singapore and the loss of Hong Kong to the Japanese the defeat of the USSR by the Axis would have been worse as it would allow the Germans to focus their attentions on the UK!

So it is my opinion that while its arguable if the early British LL actually made a difference in 1941/42 it was the sensible choice at the time to provide as much equipment etc as possible to Russia

Also had the 'stuff' sent to Russia not been - would it have ended up in the Far East?

The British Emprie at the time was after all heavily engaged in war with Italy, Germany as well as Vichy France and those Imperial forces thus engaged never ahd enough equipment as it was - especially with losses taken in Greece, Crete and vs Sonnonbaum in early 41 (about 5 Divisions worth of kit was lost) so much as I would love to see hundreds of Matilda II tanks and Hurricanes suddenly swanning around in the Jungles off and in the air above Malaya where they were not fighting anyone at the time - I dont see it - its more likely that the bulk of this kit would be sent to the Middle East and it is here that it would have made a difference.

So I do not think that it would have made as big a diference in Malaya as we might have hoped.
 
Was the political cost of not sending supplies greater than loosing Singapore, Burma and the respect of the Australian's? Or the losses and perceived poor leadership from the top created by the painfully slow North African campaign.

Singapore is a possible future, in 1941. The invasion of the USSR was a reality that had to be faced with now. The USSR had to be kept in the fight; if it signed an armistice (as the disasters of 1941 made that a possbility, at least in the eyes of the world), then the UK would be alone again. So, even further problems in North Africa seemed less risky than this.

And the far east needed better trained (and led!) troops as much as equipment.
 
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