WI Britain and France start rearming earlier?

During the 1930's that is. They still try to avoid a war at all costs but they start preparing for one earlier.
 
The question is rearmament is not simply cut and dried. I've examined it particularly from a naval viewpoint, but have looked into the land and air components of the matter for Britain. France is not my main area, so someone else would have to provide input there.

On one hand, with another 6 months, we are looking at several hundred tanks and a dozen further divisions; much more than that in 12 months. So viewed in isolation, it is seemingly a major Allied benefit.

On the other hand:

There were constricting factors on rearmament, however - industrial bottlenecks in armour plate and heavy and medium calibre gun manufacturing impact upon naval rearmament, and a general shortage of skilled labour and to some extent of machine tools overall - this is not to say there was an overall labour shortage, but specific jobs struggled to be filled. The damage done to the British armaments industry in the early-mid 1920s was not so easily repaired as to allow production rates of the Great War to simply ease back into being.

Then there is the opportunity cost of rearmament - for every resource turned towards dedicated military production (as compared to readying the network of shadow factories etc), there is less devoted towards export of civilian goods that aid with the balance of payments and strength of the British economy. It is off this strength, as well as South American assets and gold reserves, that Britain lives on during the days of Cash and Carry prior to Lend Lease. It has been argued that deciding when to fully enter into war mobilization of the economy was a very careful decision, rather than the traditional interpretation of weakness.

Therefore: It is possible to accelerate rearmament, but it will carry opportunity costs and be limited by structural factors within British industry.

There is also the question of what sort of equipment you are getting, and whether it will simply be lost in the same mistakes as Dunkirk et al, or actually used to some effect.
 
There is also the question of what sort of equipment you are getting, and whether it will simply be lost in the same mistakes as Dunkirk et al, or actually used to some effect.

My thoughts as well. There is also the additional question of tactics involved too. I tend to think that the major changes to OTL would be seen later in the war after the Fall of France. France and Britain actually had numerically superiority in armor and men if I'm not mistaken and seems like in numbers they held about the same although the Luftwaffe probably had much more experience and quality in most respects in 1940. Now, the argument to be made is that perhaps if the rearmament started earlier then you are in a sense saying the Western powers realized the threat and acted sooner. Thus, you probably have no sacrificing of the Czech's and thus an entirely different war. Which turns the topic into basically the often asked 'What if the Allies didn't appease' with the added twist of perhaps being better prepared militarily.
 
Assuming it is maintained then early rearmament isn't going to be a bad thing. So many weapons were very scarce in the early years that desperate makeshifts were used, which underperformed in battle conditions. Things like the Flower class corvettes may be drastically reduced if the RN had more of the good interwar escorts available in 1939. The O, P & R subs may not be mis-deployed to the Nth Sea and Med if more S, T & U subs were available in 1939. The 6 pdr may have entered production before Dunkirk, so the desert battles may take on a very different complexion.
 
There isn't particularly an operational need for the 6pdr in early 1940, with the 2pdr being sufficient for some time to come against the initial German tank types; however, having it in the desert would be very useful if combined with proper doctrine as compared to cavalry charges.

The point that stop-gap and emergency measures, particularly in regards to ASW, can be avoided with earlier rearmament is correct; the major factors in this calculation are German U-Boat construction numbers and much more significantly, the Fall of France. Without the use of French Atlantic ports, certain aspects of the U-Boat menace are reduced.

A salient point to keep in mind in discussions of rearmament is that we cannot allow our judgements to be clouded by rose coloured hindsight - simply beginning rearmament 1-2 years earlier in earnest does not solve production bottlenecks, faulty assumptions of the time, inefficient procurement or substantially change the operational thinking of what to do with the equipment acquired. As mentioned earlier, there is also the opportunity cost of moving to earlier war mobilization of the economy to take into account.

It does depend on when the decision is made, and how it is applied, rather than simply blanket rearmament. If the decision is made prior to 1934, then a lot more can be done regarding rebuilding the armaments industry after the collapse of the 20s:
- Palmers can possibly avoid closure
- Gunpits and armour plants can be ordered, allowing greater capacity when they come online in 2-3 years time
- Ship design can be altered
It would take some time to undo the decisions made in 22-24.

British defence expenditures 1930 to 1940 do indicate when a firm move was made, with defence expenditure and the proportion of GDP:

1930: 100 million (2.6%)
1931: 100 million (2.69%)
1932: 100 million (2.63%)
1933: 100 million (2.65%)
1934: 100 million (2.66%)
1935: 125 million (3.01%)
1936: 250 million (3.71%)
1937: 375 million (4.82%)
1938: 500 million (8.72%)
1939: 875 million (15.19%)
1940: 2500 million (37.78%)

(Figures based on material from Uk public spending, so may be off a little in terms of precision)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarProduction/UK-Civil-WarProduction-2.html
Salient materials can be found here to expand on some of these points

If things move into flow in 1934 as compared to 1936, then there will be some butterflies, both for good and ill. Whether there was the political will and support to justify such a move then is different.
 
The point about the 6pdr entering production was that it was seen to be needed in 1938 but didn't enter service until May 1942, mainly due to Dunkirk. If it entered production prior to Dunkirk it would be available for when Rommel went to Africa.

Anyway, early rearmament is no panacea, but several decisions were made early in the war because rearmament hadn't progressed far enough when war broke out.
 
Had aircraft and engine development been advanced by two or three years then the Hurricane would have been replaced by Tornado or Typhoon and later marks of Spitfire in service minus carburetters that cut out in a dive. All armed with 20mm cannon.
 
I can't see rearmament, by which is meant further investment and all that comes from it, having a decisive impact on British aerial engine development too much earlier than historical. The 'dollar hose' doth not beat reality. Yes, there would be an affect, but without combat and circumstances, there would not be the immediate driver for the 20mm.

The 6pdr could be accelerated, but as said, without changes in doctrine for use of armoured forces in the Western Desert, it would not have a decisive impact.

As many have said, the early course of the war disrupts rearmament heavily.
 
They were already planning on using the 20mm in '39 so why shouldn't it be pulled forward. Tornado and Typhoon first flew in '39 and '40 respectively in OTL so once again why should that not happen earlier if rearmament is earlier.
 
Less than the best doctrine was only part of the problem why the British didn't do so well in the early days. Weapons performance plays an important role in doctrinal execution, all the doctrine in the world isn't going to get the 2pdr to penetrate the Germans tanks deployed in Africa at greater than 200m.
 
A well constructed doctrine should never be prevented by the weapons available.Instead it should be constructed to negotiate around these problems.

The German Tactics that served them so well in the early years were designed around tank battalions that were mostly Panzer -I and Panzer II with only a handfull of Panzer III & IV. Thats why German tactical training didn't have to change until after 1942.
 
Wouldn't the UK and France then try to act on Austria and see Czechoslovakia as one nation too far?

I think this would end with Chamberlain reluctantly leaving Munich with a warning, not a deal. Hitler will send in the Troops, the Czechs will fight, and then Germany gets its head handed to it.
 
Have Austin Chamberlain as PM in 1931, with Churchill in the Cabinet. They would have been re-arming from the outset. They would probably respond strongly to the German re-militarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and force Hitler to be more cautious.
 
They were already planning on using the 20mm in '39 so why shouldn't it be pulled forward. Tornado and Typhoon first flew in '39 and '40 respectively in OTL so once again why should that not happen earlier if rearmament is earlier.

If more money is made available earlier - then the RAF would already have a single engined cannon aircraft in production.
To the spec F.37/35 Westland design what became the Whirlwind, when prototypes were ordered - the Air ministry wanted prototypes of the Boulton Paul P.88A (Hercules) & P.88B (Vulture) single-engined 4 x 20 mm cannon fighter aircraft, and the Supermarine 313 twin.
But the Treasury only allocated for the Westland aircraft!
 
...

British defence expenditures 1930 to 1940 do indicate when a firm move was made, with defence expenditure and the proportion of GDP:

1930: 100 million (2.6%)
1931: 100 million (2.69%)
1932: 100 million (2.63%)
1933: 100 million (2.65%)
1934: 100 million (2.66%)
1935: 125 million (3.01%)
1936: 250 million (3.71%)
1937: 375 million (4.82%)
1938: 500 million (8.72%)
1939: 875 million (15.19%)
1940: 2500 million (37.78%)

(Figures based on material from Uk public spending, so may be off a little in terms of precision)
...
A little off?

The percentages and numbers don't add up...
 
6 lb gun development started in 1938 about the same time as the German PAK 38. That model didn't achieve quantity production until 1941, so its reasonable to expect the 6lb to duplicate this. Why did this not happen disruption in the war effort?
 

burmafrd

Banned
The real problem was doctrine and leadership. Neither was in place to help out in France. More tanks and guns would have just been lost. Now as regards the RAF switching over to full production of the Spitfire a year earlier certainly would have helped out, but not a great difference in what happened. More escorts would have meant less somewhere else and there is no way the BBs are canceled. As it turned out canceling the BBs and building more escorts would have made a substantial difference, but only hindsight tell us this. Geting on a war footing sooner would have certainly made things easier, but I do not see anything that could have reasonably been changed that would have not led to France falling.
 
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