have a copy of Glantz in front of me, it covers some of this, but not the complete details of 1940. The July 1940 Stratigc Plan is illustrated in Map 4.3 & shows the defense moved well forward to the new border. Neither Glantz not the others I've read address directly the condition of the old Polish border fortifications in mid 1940, however Glantz and others remark on difference in the number of fortified regions between 1939 & early 1941. What is described is not a continual fortified zone, but a few strategic points being fortified.
Yes, the plan was created in July 1940, at which point it was implemented. That is when the Red Army
began wholesale redeployment in order to fulfill the plan. Your claiming the Germans invade in May 1940, so that's two months before the new plan was finished and, by extension, the mass redeployment of forces.
I'll assume you mean officers vs NCO. Unlike the western armies the Red Army did not have a strong career NCO corps,
Seeing as I did not mention officers at all, I'm not sure what your on about here.
How many veterans of the Finnish war survived? The numbers look like a very small precent of the Red Army.
650,000 men, plus the Polish veterans which clocks in at around another 500,000. There is the question of overlap, of course.
Of course that assumes the Finnish War happens at all, which probably isn't the case if there is a lack of a war in the west...
Also I am unsure the idea the that the bulk of the conscription class due to be discharged in the spring of 1941 was not retained. Expansion had been accelerating & mobilization of reserve units started before the German attack June 1941. My understanding is cadre, technicians, and reservists assigned to forward forces were not released in the spring of 1941.
Glantz says pretty categorically they were in
Stumbling Colossus.
This assumes the depots & associated support echelon were still intact in the 1939 positions and were not completely or partially deployed forward. There are enough small remarks in Glantz, or other sources like Pleshakov to indicate this may have been the case. I'd really want some solid evidence on this.
You claim to have Glantz in front of you yet you say he says the opposite of what he actually says? That's odd, given that he devotes entire paragraphs saying basically what I said...
"Lack of required transport was a particularly vexing problem. If norms were to be met at all, field operating forces required more than 60 percent of total ammunition supply. Much of this ammunition, however, was located in warehouses in the inernal military districts and required transport over long distances to operating forces. In addition, about one-third of the ammunition in the western military districts (the less vulnerable was located up to 700 kilometers to the rear. This also needed to be transported forward. The problem was that the same shortage of vehicles and tractors that existed in combat units existed to an even greater extent in the rear services. In the end, this lack of transport paralyzed the resupply effort and deprived operating forces of ammunition when they most needed it." -Stumbling Colossus, Pg 177
"Although fuel and oil stocks almost reached required norms in June 1941, the same fuel storage patterns and transport problems that plagued ammunition supply also affected fuel supply. Moreover, unlike ammunition, 40 to 60 percent of the precious fuel was kept in warehouses in the Moscow, Orel, and Khar'kov Military Districts and at fuel production facilities. Efforts to move this fuel to more forward bases in 1941 came to naught. As a result, on 22 June 1941, operating forces in the Baltic, Western, and Kiev Special Military Districts had 6, 8, and 15 days of fuel supplies, respectively, rather than the required norm of two months." 0 Page 178.
This assumes a far higher level of training than existed in 1940. The effect of the purges was greater, but more important was the dilution of the cadre in the deployed forces to stand up the mass of new formations. That stripping of cadres was well underway in 1940.
Yes, but not as far underway as it would be in 1941.
The dependance on this infrastructure in the rapid six weeks in the west was thin.
So the German tanks and vehicles just floated across the Ardennes and the French countryside, eh? It wasn't from a lack of dependence that the Germans had relatively little trouble with French infrastructure in those weeks. Quite the opposite really. The impact of good infrastructure is something you really only notice when it isn't there. As the Germans found out on the Eastern Front where the problematic infrastructure had already started to strangle their rate of advance and supply throughput by the time they reached Minsk. It was only the absence of serious Soviet resistance until Smolensk that allowed them to keep going... and when they did run into the Soviet armies at Smolensk around mud-July, their already declining RoA positively fell off a cliff. And that was a German Army with far superior logistical assets then what was available in May if 1940.
A look at the French deployment 10 May 1940 suggests this was not the case. The 16+ combat ready divisions of the "Stratigic Reserve" were uncommitted to the forward armies. & deployed to cover ruptures in the forward armys.
Strategic reserve =! strategic echelon.
More important is the French reserve had the ability to move and join the battle
Except they didn't. The French reserves which were deployed forward to Sedan never reached the breakthrough in a battle-ready state. They were still, in fact, trying to get themselves together when the Germans rolled right over them.
& little good it did them in 1940. Commanders & their staff could not cope with the demands of making the system work. The division, corps, and army staff did not have the training.
They didn't in 1941 either. In fact, by mid-'41 it was even worse as the continued expansion of the military had further diluted the supply of trained officers and the release of skilled enlisted and NCOs increased the demand upon the staffs.
Well, they were desperately going flat out with their mobilization in 1941, which had started before the attack.
The description of Soviet pre-war measures have commonly been referred too as a policy of "creeping up to war", which does not at all sound like a flat out mobilization. Flat out mobilization would be what the Soviets were doing after the German attack on June 22nd and can be seen by the sheer number of forces they drew up and threw into combat afterwards.
& in far greater numbers on paper. From Glantz. Table 4.1
.................December 1940........June 41
Army HQ...........20.........................20
Rifle Corps HQ...30.........................62
Rifle Div..........152........................196
Motor Rifle/Mech Div..10..................31
Cav Corps..........4............................4
Cav Div............26..........................13
Rifle Brigades.....5............................3
Tank Div...........18...........................61
Fortified Regions 21........................120
Abn brigades......12.........................16
Abn Corps HQ......0...........................5
Strength......4,207,000.........5,373,000
This 20% increase was largely reflected in the western defense fronts.
And in the same period of time after the German attack, the Soviets mobilized 5 times that number of men and forces. From June 22nd to July 10th alone, the Soviets raised 56 new divisions... about as many as they had raised in the six months you listed!
Those two cities are far behind either battle zone, and Since there were late failures in supply in 1941 on or east of the 1939 Polish border defense zones it seems weak to reflect that example on hypothetical fighting in the older defense zone.
If you ignore that the reasons for Soviet supply difficulties in late-'41 stemmed from an absolute lack of supplies following the German capture of those depots, then sure it seems weak. Looking at the period of combat around the D'niepr river line, though, from mid-July through to September 1941, though, the Soviets experienced relatively few difficulties with supplies such as ammunition and fuel as they were indeed operating close to those depots. Problems only manifested with the exhaustion of those stocks in December, as the destruction and dislocation of industry in the autumn meant there wasn't very much new munitions coming in to replace expenditures.