WI: Britain and France Don't Declare War On Germany After Poland Invasion

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Hitler, smelling Russian weakness, invades Russia roughly around the start date of the OTL invasion of France. ITTL, things are tougher going for Germany, simply because Romania and Hungary will remain neutral and the Baltic states will simply sit idly by. The opening phases of the war will be through a weakly defended Polish frontier and then a tough to crack Stalin Line properly manned in the forests of Belarus. The battle will turn attritional and defensive, which actually plays to whatever strength the Soviet Union will have (as their mindless counter-attacks were what sunk them in 41-42.)

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I'd give the Germans more territory with this 1940 attack. The Red army was not effectively as large as in 1941. Most of the new units were paper formations, lacking even then 25% or 40% training of June 1941. Also the movement forward to the new border was well towards completion, with the former border defense largely abandoned and partially dismantled. Neither do I see a lack of German Allies, or the Baltic states not being included. Rumania was in the midst of making the political switch from France & Italy to Germany as its protector. The Baltic states are a attractive target for the early portion of the German attack.

A potential Soviet defeat would be a incentive for France & the UK to finally take action in 1941. At the least I'd see them taking severe economic sanctions against Germany by early 1941, or even in 1940. Both will have maturing military improvements in mid 1941. Why risk the Soviet Union being further ground down by delaying war until 1943?
 

Archibald

Banned
I mentionned 9500 aircrafts but in total honesty (and after a quick check) the number may be wrong.
Between 1938 and April 1940 the French Air Ministry launched successive equipment plans - Plan V, Plan V "de guerre" and finally Plan VI. The numbers are misleading because the ministry was way out in the blue vis a vis the French aircraft industry. In fact a case could be made that the late 3rd Republic (and the french armies as a whole, minus Darland Navy) was disconnected from the realities of modern warfare.

French aircrafts were plagued by a myriad of issues, all the way from operational requirements to combat missions.

There was enormous difference between total numbers of aircraft build, number of aircrafts in service, and what was near the frontline. I've seen numbers variying from 1500 to 9500 !
By June 1940 there were hundreds of combat aircrafts sitting in depots all across France, that were never used. Aircrafts like Caudron 714s but also failed subtypes such as Potez 637, Breguet 691, MB-151s.
In FFO we got every single of these aircrafts out of the depots and to combat. What was obsolete was expended to slow down the German onslaught. Everything else was evacuated to Algiers.

http://fandavion.free.fr/bataille_de_france.htm
https://translate.google.com/transl...lle_de_france.htm&&hl=fr&ie=UTF-8&sl=fr&tl=en

(Note: Guy The House is Guy La Chambre. Stupid translator)
 
I'd give the Germans more territory with this 1940 attack.

Not remotely likely. German combat and, most importantly, logistical strength is also grossly weaker in 1940 without the conquest of Western Europe and the Soviet formations aren't concentrated along the border where the Germans could easily reach them without any logistical problems. The Germans are liable to be stopped around the D'niepr river line which leaves the Soviets with plenty of resources to crush the Germans, with or without WAllied assistance.

Also the movement forward to the new border was well towards completion, with the former border defense largely abandoned and partially dismantled.

No they weren't. They hadn't even begun. Redeployment of troops and dismantlement of the Stalin line didn't start until after the Baltic and Romanian annexations, in July.
 
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In 1940 the vast majority of the German Armoured force was either light training tanks or tanks looted from the Czechs. The handful Panzer IIIs were lightly armoured and had an indifferent gun, and much the same applies to the Panzer IV. None of them were all that reliable. Outside of the Armoured force the rest of the German Army was little better armed and equipped than their fathers had been in 1914. They'll have some spectacular initial success but advance nowhere near as far as the did in 1941.
 
Not remotely likely. German combat and, most importantly, logistical strength is also grossly weaker in 1940 without the conquest of Western Europe and the Soviet formations aren't concentrated along the border where the Germans could easily reach them without any logistical problems. The Germans are liable to be stopped around the D'niepr river line which leaves the Soviets with plenty of resources to crush the Germans, with or without WAllied assistance.



No they weren't. They hadn't even begun. Redeployment of troops and dismantlement of the Stalin line didn't start until after the Baltic and Romanian annexations, in July.

My take is they Red Army was strung out between the two locations & relatively disorganized. The border armies had advanced a portion of their corps long before the HQ & support echelon moved west.

In any case training was far less along than a year later & the mass of new reserve units were shadow formations, under equipped and untrained. The army groups or Fronts fighting the first 60 - 90 days were far weaker in combat power & less in numbers. The reinforcements far less in combat power than July-December of 1941. I just cant see the Germans being stopped on the Dnieper River in the first months, whatever their logistics problems. Looking at my old National Geographic map of Europe the initial advance of the German Army Group B from the Rhineland to the Channel was a bit over 300km, accomplished in barely two weeks. The second round in France saw AG B advance south near 400km in another fours weeks, including a multi week rest stop. 600km is the rough distance from the 1940 German/Soviet border to Smolensk. Why the same army could not reproduce a similar attack against a arguablly weaker foe I cant see.
 
My take is they Red Army was strung out between the two locations & relatively disorganized. The border armies had advanced a portion of their corps long before the HQ & support echelon moved west.

From what I've read, a portion of one corps had been advanced up to the border regions. But keeping in mind that the Red Army averaged three corps per army, that still leaves the bulk of the Soviet forces further back, along the Stalin line. And many of the support echelons in fact never managed to make the move west, as they could not be supported which was a major factor in the Red Armies poor performance in mid-1941. Nevertheless, the Stalin line quite clearly remained the Soviets first MLR, with the D'niepr river line the second, until after the annexation of the Baltics and Romanian territories.

In any case training was far less along than a year later & the mass of new reserve units were shadow formations, under equipped and untrained.

While that may be case with the reserve formations, it was also still the case in 1941 so that really isn't any different. But when we look at the standing Soviet formations, they are actually =better off in several ways. First, the experienced enlisted and NCOs who fought in Poland and Finland are still in service (OTL they were released in Spring of 1941 as they finished up their service time). Second, the bulk of them are placed further back from the border. This not only grossly worsens the German logistical situation, but greatly improves the Red Army's own as they are much closer to their supply depots. That not only means that Soviet formations would not only have much more of their equipment actually up and running to fight the Germans, but also that Soviet forces by-passed by the armored spearheads would be able to operate against the German rear-areas for greatly extended periods of time, up too months, wrecking havoc on the infantry following in their wake and the supply columns for the tanks much more effectively then they did OTL June-July 1941. The aggressive Soviet counter-attacks, which stand in stark contrast to the relative passivity of French forces in mid-1940 caught in similar situations, would actually be much more effective under such circumstances then they were OTL.

And in any case, under the circumstances of total mobilization as would be the case of a German assault, as opposed to the strange sort of pre-mobilization the Soviets conducted OTL, those Soviet reserve formations are going to fill out a lot more rapidly then they did OTL 1940-41.

I just cant see the Germans being stopped on the Dnieper River in the first months, whatever their logistics problems. Looking at my old National Geographic map of Europe the initial advance of the German Army Group B from the Rhineland to the Channel was a bit over 300km, accomplished in barely two weeks. The second round in France saw AG B advance south near 400km in another fours weeks, including a multi week rest stop. 600km is the rough distance from the 1940 German/Soviet border to Smolensk. Why the same army could not reproduce a similar attack against a arguablly weaker foe I cant see.

I can. The German advance in Western Europe was achieved over much more favorable infrastructure and terrain then what the Germans would be facing against the Soviets. Additionally, the Anglo-French only ever deployed their forces in a single strategic echelon whereas Soviet forces were deployed in two (although technically, in mid-1940 that would be three). The infrastructure in Eastern Poland is (and was so bad) that the Germans would be (and were) seriously weakened just moving up to the Stalin line, never mind having to fight through it against the intense Red Army resistance to the D'niepr while the Soviets desperately go flat-out with their military mobilization and are constantly deploying fresh formations both in front of the Germans and digging in on a new defensive line along the D'niepr. In fact, historically moving from the Stalin line to the new border in the latter part of 1940 also grossly weakened the Red Army for the same reason and was a key reason behind the easy destruction of so many Soviet forces. Entire Soviet mechanized divisions were destroyed by simply running out of fuel without ever seeing the enemy, as they simply weren't getting enough fuel through the roads from the depots back around Smolensk and Kiev.
 
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& Where does war with the USSR lie in the German record, such as it is? I'm fairly sure Hitler himself was not thinking 1946 or something. If the third hand info I've heard is accurate then 1940 or 41 was the nominal window.

Definitely! That target was the reason why he wanted war, so it certainly came before a final settling of the scores with Britain.
 
Definitely! That target was the reason why he wanted war, ....

You have run across this too? have a reliable source for it? Wish I had the time to dig out all of Hitlers memos and meeting minutes to see where his ramblings led 1934-1941 in terms of actual goals and strategy.
 
You have run across this too? have a reliable source for it? Wish I had the time to dig out all of Hitlers memos and meeting minutes to see where his ramblings led 1934-1941 in terms of actual goals and strategy.

As to a specific year, no, I'd have to dig out the references. As to the point of it all (war) being the attack on the Soviet Union, I'd say chapter XIV of Mein Kampf, aptly titled "Eastern orientation or Eastern policy".
 
From what I've read, a portion of one corps had been advanced up to the border regions. But keeping in mind that the Red Army averaged three corps per army, that still leaves the bulk of the Soviet forces further back, along the Stalin line. And many of the support echelons in fact never managed to make the move west, as they could not be supported which was a major factor in the Red Armies poor performance in mid-1941. Nevertheless, the Stalin line quite clearly remained the Soviets first MLR, with the D'niepr river line the second, until after the annexation of the Baltics and Romanian territories.

have a copy of Glantz in front of me, it covers some of this, but not the complete details of 1940. The July 1940 Stratigc Plan is illustrated in Map 4.3 & shows the defense moved well forward to the new border. Neither Glantz not the others I've read address directly the condition of the old Polish border fortifications in mid 1940, however Glantz and others remark on difference in the number of fortified regions between 1939 & early 1941. What is described is not a continual fortified zone, but a few strategic points being fortified.

While that may be case with the reserve formations, it was also still the case in 1941 so that really isn't any different. But when we look at the standing Soviet formations, they are actually =better off in several ways. First, the experienced enlisted and NCOs who fought in Poland and Finland are still in service (OTL they were released in Spring of 1941 as they finished up their service time).

I'll assume you mean officers vs NCO. Unlike the western armies the Red Army did not have a strong career NCO corps, using officers for tasks the US or German army would have used enlisted men. How many veterans of the Finnish war survived? The numbers look like a very small precent of the Red Army. Also I am unsure the idea the that the bulk of the conscription class due to be discharged in the spring of 1941 was not retained. Expansion had been accelerating & mobilization of reserve units started before the German attack June 1941. My understanding is cadre, technicians, and reservists assigned to forward forces were not released in the spring of 1941.

Second, the bulk of them are placed further back from the border. This not only grossly worsens the German logistical situation, but greatly improves the Red Army's own as they are much closer to their supply depots.

This assumes the depots & associated support echelon were still intact in the 1939 positions and were not completely or partially deployed forward. There are enough small remarks in Glantz, or other sources like Pleshakov to indicate this may have been the case. I'd really want some solid evidence on this.

That not only means that Soviet formations would not only have much more of their equipment actually up and running to fight the Germans, but also that Soviet forces by-passed by the armored spearheads would be able to operate against the German rear-areas for greatly extended periods of time, up too months, wrecking havoc on the infantry following in their wake and the supply columns for the tanks much more effectively then they did OTL June-July 1941. The aggressive Soviet counter-attacks, which stand in stark contrast to the relative passivity of French forces in mid-1940 caught in similar situations, would actually be much more effective under such circumstances then they were OTL.

This assumes a far higher level of training than existed in 1940. The effect of the purges was greater, but more important was the dilution of the cadre in the deployed forces to stand up the mass of new formations. That stripping of cadres was well underway in 1940.

And in any case, under the circumstances of total mobilization as would be the case of a German assault, as opposed to the strange sort of pre-mobilization the Soviets conducted OTL, those Soviet reserve formations are going to fill out a lot more rapidly then they did OTL 1940-41.



I can. The German advance in Western Europe was achieved over much more favorable infrastructure and terrain then what the Germans would be facing against the Soviets.[/quote]

The dependance on this infrastructure in the rapid six weeks in the west was thin. Despite everything the French and Belgians were fairly through in demolition of bridges, evacuation of railway stock, and automotive transport. Neither were the Germans prepared for the 300km+ jump forward in the first two weeks of the battle. Even after a two week halt they had significant logistics problems in the second advance. Still the managed vs a Army better armed and trained that the Red Army of 1940.

Additionally, the Anglo-French only ever deployed their forces in a single strategic echelon

A look at the French deployment 10 May 1940 suggests this was not the case. The 16+ combat ready divisions of the "Stratigic Reserve" were uncommitted to the forward armies. & deployed to cover ruptures in the forward armys. More important is the French reserve had the ability to move and join the battle unlike the the ill trained Red Army of 1940 which was in 1941 usually stuck being overwhelmed by the battle coming to them. The formations of 1940 would have the same problem with training no better or worse.

whereas Soviet forces were deployed in two (although technically, in mid-1940 that would be three).

& little good it did them in 1940. Commanders & their staff could not cope with the demands of making the system work. The division, corps, and army staff did not have the training.

The infrastructure in Eastern Poland is (and was so bad) that the Germans would be (and were) seriously weakened just moving up to the Stalin line, never mind having to fight through it against the intense Red Army resistance to the D'niepr while the Soviets desperately go flat-out with their military mobilization and are constantly deploying fresh formations both in front of the Germans and digging in on a new defensive line along the D'niepr.

Well, they were desperately going flat out with their mobilization in 1941, which had started before the attack. & in far greater numbers on paper. From Glantz. Table 4.1

.................December 1940........June 41
Army HQ...........20.........................20
Rifle Corps HQ...30.........................62
Rifle Div..........152........................196
Motor Rifle/Mech Div..10..................31
Cav Corps..........4............................4
Cav Div............26..........................13
Rifle Brigades.....5............................3
Tank Div...........18...........................61
Fortified Regions 21........................120
Abn brigades......12.........................16
Abn Corps HQ......0...........................5

Strength......4,207,000.........5,373,000

This 20% increase was largely reflected in the western defense fronts.

In fact, historically moving from the Stalin line to the new border in the latter part of 1940 also grossly weakened the Red Army for the same reason and was a key reason behind the easy destruction of so many Soviet forces. Entire

But that movement seems to have been already underway, & had its disruptive effect in 1940.

Soviet mechanized divisions were destroyed by simply running out of fuel without ever seeing the enemy, as they simply weren't getting enough fuel through the roads from the depots back around Smolensk and Kiev.

Those two cities are far behind either battle zone, and Since there were late failures in supply in 1941 on or east of the 1939 Polish border defense zones it seems weak to reflect that example on hypothetical fighting in the older defense zone.
 
As to a specific year, no, I'd have to dig out the references. As to the point of it all (war) being the attack on the Soviet Union, I'd say chapter XIV of Mein Kampf, aptly titled "Eastern orientation or Eastern policy".

MK is earlier than what I'd use. More solid would be guidance to the armed forces circa 1934-38, or maybe to 1940. I have Halders war diary, but don't recall anything in it, and not got very far in reviewing it.
 
have a copy of Glantz in front of me, it covers some of this, but not the complete details of 1940. The July 1940 Stratigc Plan is illustrated in Map 4.3 & shows the defense moved well forward to the new border. Neither Glantz not the others I've read address directly the condition of the old Polish border fortifications in mid 1940, however Glantz and others remark on difference in the number of fortified regions between 1939 & early 1941. What is described is not a continual fortified zone, but a few strategic points being fortified.

Yes, the plan was created in July 1940, at which point it was implemented. That is when the Red Army began wholesale redeployment in order to fulfill the plan. Your claiming the Germans invade in May 1940, so that's two months before the new plan was finished and, by extension, the mass redeployment of forces.

I'll assume you mean officers vs NCO. Unlike the western armies the Red Army did not have a strong career NCO corps,

Seeing as I did not mention officers at all, I'm not sure what your on about here.

How many veterans of the Finnish war survived? The numbers look like a very small precent of the Red Army.

650,000 men, plus the Polish veterans which clocks in at around another 500,000. There is the question of overlap, of course.

Of course that assumes the Finnish War happens at all, which probably isn't the case if there is a lack of a war in the west...

Also I am unsure the idea the that the bulk of the conscription class due to be discharged in the spring of 1941 was not retained. Expansion had been accelerating & mobilization of reserve units started before the German attack June 1941. My understanding is cadre, technicians, and reservists assigned to forward forces were not released in the spring of 1941.

Glantz says pretty categorically they were in Stumbling Colossus.

This assumes the depots & associated support echelon were still intact in the 1939 positions and were not completely or partially deployed forward. There are enough small remarks in Glantz, or other sources like Pleshakov to indicate this may have been the case. I'd really want some solid evidence on this.

You claim to have Glantz in front of you yet you say he says the opposite of what he actually says? That's odd, given that he devotes entire paragraphs saying basically what I said...

"Lack of required transport was a particularly vexing problem. If norms were to be met at all, field operating forces required more than 60 percent of total ammunition supply. Much of this ammunition, however, was located in warehouses in the inernal military districts and required transport over long distances to operating forces. In addition, about one-third of the ammunition in the western military districts (the less vulnerable was located up to 700 kilometers to the rear. This also needed to be transported forward. The problem was that the same shortage of vehicles and tractors that existed in combat units existed to an even greater extent in the rear services. In the end, this lack of transport paralyzed the resupply effort and deprived operating forces of ammunition when they most needed it." -Stumbling Colossus, Pg 177

"Although fuel and oil stocks almost reached required norms in June 1941, the same fuel storage patterns and transport problems that plagued ammunition supply also affected fuel supply. Moreover, unlike ammunition, 40 to 60 percent of the precious fuel was kept in warehouses in the Moscow, Orel, and Khar'kov Military Districts and at fuel production facilities. Efforts to move this fuel to more forward bases in 1941 came to naught. As a result, on 22 June 1941, operating forces in the Baltic, Western, and Kiev Special Military Districts had 6, 8, and 15 days of fuel supplies, respectively, rather than the required norm of two months." 0 Page 178.

This assumes a far higher level of training than existed in 1940. The effect of the purges was greater, but more important was the dilution of the cadre in the deployed forces to stand up the mass of new formations. That stripping of cadres was well underway in 1940.

Yes, but not as far underway as it would be in 1941.

The dependance on this infrastructure in the rapid six weeks in the west was thin.

So the German tanks and vehicles just floated across the Ardennes and the French countryside, eh? It wasn't from a lack of dependence that the Germans had relatively little trouble with French infrastructure in those weeks. Quite the opposite really. The impact of good infrastructure is something you really only notice when it isn't there. As the Germans found out on the Eastern Front where the problematic infrastructure had already started to strangle their rate of advance and supply throughput by the time they reached Minsk. It was only the absence of serious Soviet resistance until Smolensk that allowed them to keep going... and when they did run into the Soviet armies at Smolensk around mud-July, their already declining RoA positively fell off a cliff. And that was a German Army with far superior logistical assets then what was available in May if 1940.

A look at the French deployment 10 May 1940 suggests this was not the case. The 16+ combat ready divisions of the "Stratigic Reserve" were uncommitted to the forward armies. & deployed to cover ruptures in the forward armys.

Strategic reserve =! strategic echelon.

More important is the French reserve had the ability to move and join the battle

Except they didn't. The French reserves which were deployed forward to Sedan never reached the breakthrough in a battle-ready state. They were still, in fact, trying to get themselves together when the Germans rolled right over them.

& little good it did them in 1940. Commanders & their staff could not cope with the demands of making the system work. The division, corps, and army staff did not have the training.

They didn't in 1941 either. In fact, by mid-'41 it was even worse as the continued expansion of the military had further diluted the supply of trained officers and the release of skilled enlisted and NCOs increased the demand upon the staffs.

Well, they were desperately going flat out with their mobilization in 1941, which had started before the attack.

The description of Soviet pre-war measures have commonly been referred too as a policy of "creeping up to war", which does not at all sound like a flat out mobilization. Flat out mobilization would be what the Soviets were doing after the German attack on June 22nd and can be seen by the sheer number of forces they drew up and threw into combat afterwards.

& in far greater numbers on paper. From Glantz. Table 4.1

.................December 1940........June 41
Army HQ...........20.........................20
Rifle Corps HQ...30.........................62
Rifle Div..........152........................196
Motor Rifle/Mech Div..10..................31
Cav Corps..........4............................4
Cav Div............26..........................13
Rifle Brigades.....5............................3
Tank Div...........18...........................61
Fortified Regions 21........................120
Abn brigades......12.........................16
Abn Corps HQ......0...........................5

Strength......4,207,000.........5,373,000

This 20% increase was largely reflected in the western defense fronts.

And in the same period of time after the German attack, the Soviets mobilized 5 times that number of men and forces. From June 22nd to July 10th alone, the Soviets raised 56 new divisions... about as many as they had raised in the six months you listed!

Those two cities are far behind either battle zone, and Since there were late failures in supply in 1941 on or east of the 1939 Polish border defense zones it seems weak to reflect that example on hypothetical fighting in the older defense zone.

If you ignore that the reasons for Soviet supply difficulties in late-'41 stemmed from an absolute lack of supplies following the German capture of those depots, then sure it seems weak. Looking at the period of combat around the D'niepr river line, though, from mid-July through to September 1941, though, the Soviets experienced relatively few difficulties with supplies such as ammunition and fuel as they were indeed operating close to those depots. Problems only manifested with the exhaustion of those stocks in December, as the destruction and dislocation of industry in the autumn meant there wasn't very much new munitions coming in to replace expenditures.
 
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MK is earlier than what I'd use. More solid would be guidance to the armed forces circa 1934-38, or maybe to 1940. I have Halders war diary, but don't recall anything in it, and not got very far in reviewing it.

I am afraid you are asking for too much. I mentioned above that some of what Hitler said to generals in 1937-39 might well have been insincere and calculated to win them over. Likewise, what he did not say may well have been because he was afraid of frightening them.
Consider that the resignations of at least some of the top ones has been linked, in the interpretation of some, to their opposition to a war against Czechoslovakia.
Imagine Hitler telling them, in 1937 or 1938, that the long-term intention was to invade the Soviet Union and conquer a big slice of it. This at a time when the Heer had some 60 divisions, and Germany did not even boast a common border with the target country. Chances are that the generals would not resign, but would otherwise take care of the problem.
 
You may be right.

What happens is that Russia acts in Finland and then the weakness of the West's response gets manifested in sending troops to Finland's aid through Sweden. Without Germany at war with Sweden, the Wallies probably pressure Norway and Sweden into allowing their troops to pass through. Germany allows it, knowing that denying entry definitely starts was with the West, something Hitler would avoid if it did not cost him anything.

Russia's poor performance in Finland (which ITTL may turn into actual defeat) probably leads to a peace with the West before anything like bombing Baku.

Hitler, smelling Russian weakness, invades Russia roughly around the start date of the OTL invasion of France. ITTL, things are tougher going for Germany, simply because Romania and Hungary will remain neutral and the Baltic states will simply sit idly by. The opening phases of the war will be through a weakly defended Polish frontier and then a tough to crack Stalin Line properly manned in the forests of Belarus. The battle will turn attritional and defensive, which actually plays to whatever strength the Soviet Union will have (as their mindless counter-attacks were what sunk them in 41-42.)

By 43, the Russians will be in East Prussia and Silesia. I presume the Western Allies will then declare war for no better reason than preventing the Russian occupation of Germany. Ironically, we have a Germany split roughly as OTL but without US participation. Russia is much stronger, having never lost Kharkov (and maybe even Kiev.) Russia may then betray Japan and permanently occupy Manchuria and Korea, something the US will not be able to prevent as there is no true alliance between the two powers ITTL.
Germany would prepare for a slightly longer war with Russia since the feeling of invincibility of defeating France in six weeks would not occur. Also, the Luftwaffe would be a deal stronger (though less experienced) and the Russian T-34s and KV-1s would be less numerous, making the 38 mm "door knocker" useful in the first year if the campaign.

I still think Germany goes for broke hoping to end the war by the end of the year. I just have a hard time believing they take Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow without enveloping huge numbers of Soviet troops.
 
Pre 1940 the Red Army after the Great Purge has a lot of work to do. Germany will not do as well as OTL but the USSR lacks the T-34 and has much more political leadership of the military. Ultimately Russia is likely to lose but if the UK and France are smart they declare war just as the Germans are at the gates of Moscow with troops coming in via Belgium and Luxembourg. Get help from the Czechs and Poles and it might end by early 1943 under the wrong circumstances.
 
Germany would prepare for a slightly longer war with Russia since the feeling of invincibility of defeating France in six weeks would not occur. Also, the Luftwaffe would be a deal stronger (though less experienced) and the Russian T-34s and KV-1s would be less numerous, making the 38 mm "door knocker" useful in the first year if the campaign.

I still think Germany goes for broke hoping to end the war by the end of the year. I just have a hard time believing they take Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow without enveloping huge numbers of Soviet troops.
Good points but how can you envelop anyone attacking only through the Polish frontier? At most you surround 1/3 of Russia's western armies which, compared to half IOTL. This leaves plenty of reserves and men to man the Stalin Line in the forests of Belarus. IOTL, the Russians gave up easily defensible territory such as the forests of Belarus and the Carpathians because they collapsed like a house of cards so close to the frontier and simply did not have enough men to slot into the Stalin Line. This is not true ITTL.

Furthermore, German strategy would have to change. After the opening battle, Germany has two options. Either to fan out north, center, and south--but these are frontal assaults. Or go for Moscow, also a frontal assault. This plays against the historical German strategy of decisively defeating and surrounding the enemy all at once in the field.

If they get lucky, Stalin gets assasinated after Minsk falls in a week.
 
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