WI Bragg destroyed the Army of the Cumberland?

Jokerang

Banned
Confederate general Braxton Bragg had a good chance at the battle of Chickamauga to wipe out the Army of the Cumberland, but he was overconfident and decided instead to lay seige to Chattanooga. what if he had followed up on the battle with an attack on Chattanooga?
 
He'd get a bloody repulse. Bragg laid siege because he wasn't confident in his army's ability to smash the Army of the Cumberland.

Now it is possible he could have done better at Chickamauga, but that wasn't a matter of overconfidence - again, Bragg if anything lacked confidence in his army (and subordinates).

Best case scenario is that the Army of the Cumberland regroups badly beaten instead of merely shaken - possibly including gutting Thomas's corps+ force, and killing/incapacitating/capturing (any would do) him.
 
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Confederate general Braxton Bragg had a good chance at the battle of Chickamauga to wipe out the Army of the Cumberland, but he was overconfident and decided instead to lay seige to Chattanooga. what if he had followed up on the battle with an attack on Chattanooga?

That's not actually what happened. He did try to wipe out the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga. He ran into severe resistance on Snodgrass Hill where Thomas made a last-ditch stand. He didn't just suddenly decide, "Oh, instead of taking Thomas's position and destroying the Army of the Cumberland, I think I'll go lay siege to Chattanooga instead." Thomas put up a very competent defense and held off the Confederates long enough to get away, and allow the rest of the army to get away too. And in point of fact, Bragg DID follow up the battle with an attack on Chattanooga. That's how the siege happened.

He'd get a bloody repulse. Bragg laid siege because he wasn't confident in his army's ability to smash the Army of the Cumberland.

Since the POD is that Bragg destroys the Army of the Cumberland, and since there was no significant force holding Chattanooga until the Army of the Cumberland retreated into Chattanooga following the defeat at Chickamauga, pray tell who is going to be repulsing him and why would he need to lay siege at all? He could have walked into the place once the Army of the Cumberland is removed from the equation.
 
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Since the POD is that Bragg destroys the Army of the Cumberland, and since there was no significant force holding Chattanooga until the Army of the Cumberland retreated into Chattanooga following the defeat at Chickamauga, pray tell who is going to be repulsing him and why would he need to lay siege at all?

My point is that Bragg almost certainly can't destroy it at Chickamauga, and if he attacks what is regrouped at Chattanooga...do I have to repeat myself?
 
My point is that Bragg almost certainly can't destroy it at Chickamauga, and if he attacks what is regrouped at Chattanooga...do I have to repeat myself?

If a discussion begins with "Let's assume X happens, what happens afterward as a result," then the basis of discussion is "what if X happens," not "why X can't happen." ANYTHING that doesn't involve magic can happen, when we're talking about warfare. History is replete with examples of the most absurd defeats and improbable victories to ever say otherwise.
 
Ol' rob has a very important point here. Too many people here say "I personally think X happening isn't very likely, so I'll keep telling everyone trying to discuss it that it's impossible". That's not how it works, not the most likely chance does not translate into no chance at all.
 
If a discussion begins with "Let's assume X happens, what happens afterward as a result," then the basis of discussion is "what if X happens," not "why X can't happen." ANYTHING that doesn't involve magic can happen, when we're talking about warfare. History is replete with examples of the most absurd defeats and improbable victories to ever say otherwise.

It may be theoretically possible that in some universe in a universe of infinite possibilities Bragg's overconfidence got in the way of beating the Army of the Cumberland. It may be possible that in some other universe a lack of said overconfidence somehow leads him to destroy said army.

Or it may be so implausible as to need to be pointed out as essentially impossible to achieve the desired POD to begin with.

If and when someone can come up with a scenario for how Bragg is even able to bag a sizeable portion of the Army of the Cumberland, I'm all ears.

I wouldn't specifically say it would require magic, but it might as well. Armies being destroyed is something that only happens very rarely for very good reason, and none of the circumstances that would make this one of those battles are present for Bragg.

Ol' rob has a very important point here. Too many people here say "I personally think X happening isn't very likely, so I'll keep telling everyone trying to discuss it that it's impossible". That's not how it works, not the most likely chance does not translate into no chance at all.

And not enough people here think "is this an outcome that could actually happen?" before posting certain what ifs.

I refuse to accept the idea that anything that can be imagined can happen when discussing threads outside the ASB forum.

And I sympathize with Bragg (like is too strong a word). Having him win big would be a lot cooler and more interesting to me, but I don't see how he's going to succeed at even sizeable destruction of the Army of the Cumberland given the issues cheerfully overlooked by those who want to discuss flights of fantasy.

There are unlikely events that could still happen if certain things happen. But there has to be a cause for the effect.

So how on earth is Bragg destroying the Army of the Cumberland short of summoning demons from the underworld or something similarly ridiculous?

Do you honestly think that an army as uncooperative and incapable (with no offense to the fighting men intended) as the Army of Tennessee can pull off something that has rarely been achieved in warfare and do so versus a well lead, mostly operating in unison, well positioned, and hard fighting opponent?
 
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Ol' rob has a very important point here. Too many people here say "I personally think X happening isn't very likely, so I'll keep telling everyone trying to discuss it that it's impossible". That's not how it works, not the most likely chance does not translate into no chance at all.

And, another, follow-on point...the "POD Killers," by piling onto an unlikely POD and hijacking the discussion, derail threads into pissing contests between the "could not" and "could so" people, and thus kill what could be an interesting discussion about the possible ramifications of the POD.

The whole idea of alternate history is to consider possibilities we haven't thought of before. Those whose sole purpose is to "rain on parades," so to speak, just don't get that point.
 
A POD that cannot realistically occur in some cases, which is something that really should be considered rather than just dismissed as some pendantic detail.

How dare we analyze a situation. How dare the viability of a given outcome be discussed with the intent of exploring what could actually have been rather than what never had a chance of being.

Yeah, a lot of people have rather impossible and ASB pod's, but I wouldn't group "Army of Tennessee gets lucky and crushes the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga" with "Nazis win WWII".

It would take a lot more than luck for the Army of Tennessee to do so. It already had a convenient stroke of miraculous luck in what happened OTL, anything more than that would be virtually impossible.

That's the problem. There is exactly one example of an army in the Civil War being destroyed as an army in the field - and even if by some freakish twist to events Bragg does equal harm to the Army of the Cumberland as Thomas did to Hood at Nashville, the Army of the Cumberland can and will still regroup at Chattanooga.

Destroying it in the sense of wiping it out is like "Nazis win WWII".

And the original poster's idea that Bragg had a good chance of doing so is...misguided seems to be an accurate enough word. Even ignoring the general issues with doing so, Bragg was never even close OTL.

A more decisive victory at Chickamauga? Sure. Have Wheeler and/or Polk actually pull their weight (though how given their incompetence that happens might be tricky). That ought to leave the Army of the Cumberland gutted as an effective force for a while, which will have important consequences on Bragg's next moves.
 
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Anaxagoras

Banned
I consider the destruction of the Army of ther Cumberland to be very unlikely. The nearest the Civil War had to a "battle of annihilation" was the effective destruction of the Army of Tennessee at Nashville in December of 1864, but even there a semblance of a fighting force was reassembled.

But assuming a military miracle takes place and Bragg destroys (captures, more likely) the Army of the Cumberland. . . a massive POD, indeed.

The Confederates won't be able to mount a quick offensive into central Tennessee, as they would undoubtedly have suffered very heavy casualties themselves, and would be logistically burdened with large numbers of Yankee prisoners. Given the ability of the Federal forces to transfer large numbers of troops relatively quickly via river, we would certainly see the bulk of the Army of the Tennessee sent back up the Mississippi and then down the Cumberland to protect Nashville from Rebel attack. The Rebels would probably reoccupy their old positions at Tullahooma, though.

IOTL, July of 1863 is seen as the turning point of the war due to the Confederate defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Such a massive Confederate victory at Chickamauga/Chattanooga would go a long way to counteracting those defeats. Union forces would have to be transferred from Virginia to Tennessee to shore up the Union position there, perhaps delaying major fighting in Virginia.

Singificant impact would also be seen in the all-important areas of civilian morale and financial creditworthiness. Assuming that the campaign season of 1863 ends on such a high note, Southern troops would go into the campaign season of 1864 with much greater heart than they did IOTL. Furthermore, confidence in "graybacks" would be much stronger than it was IOTL, helping delay or butterfly away much of the logistical trouble the Confederates had in 1864 IOTL.

Atlanta is probably safe, as the Yankees would have to overcome Confederate positions around Chattanooga all over again. Grant would probably stay in the West ITTL, and it would wouldn't surprise me if he attempts to launch his spring campaign against Mobile and Montgomery, coming from the direction of Vicksburg.
 
Do you honestly think that an army as uncooperative and incapable (with no offense to the fighting men intended) as the Army of Tennessee can pull off something that has rarely been achieved in warfare and do so versus a well lead, mostly operating in unison, well positioned, and hard fighting opponent?

The Army of Tennessee was neither "uncooperative" nor "incapable." And the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans was not "well lead, mostly operating in unison, and well positioned" at Chickamauga. If it had been the battle would not have been a huge defeat for them, as it was in OTL.

The Confederate Army was better positioned to pull off a battle of annihilation at Chickamauga...one of the few battles where the Confederates actually outnumbered the Yankees by a significant margin...than possibly any other Confederate army was during the course of the war. A battle of annihilation would surely have been difficult to do, but as you point out, it was done at Nashville, so such a thing is certainly not impossible (your comment about the Army of Tennessee surviving as a fighting force after Nashville is laughable. The Army of Tennessee came out of that battle having lost about two thirds of its men. If a defeat of that magnitude had been dealt to the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga, they wouldn't have been able to hold Chattanooga).
 
The Army of Tennessee was neither "uncooperative" nor "incapable." And the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans was not "well lead, mostly operating in unison, and well positioned" at Chickamauga. If it had been the battle would not have been a huge defeat for them, as it was in OTL.

We're looking at different armies than the one with subordinates like Polk which failed at most of the actions during the battle and the one which was holding its ground until one subordinate decided to throw a hissy fit and mindlessly obey an order that made no sense in the context he received it, aren't we?

Sorry, the Army of Tennessee was the most dysfunctional army of the war, and it shows here as well as in every other battle since Kentucky.

That Bragg was able to win a victory here does not mean that he was operating with a smoothly functioning army or facing an army that was likely to lose.

Even Cleburne didn't exactly shine at Chickamauga, to name one of the AoT's few good generals. Longstreet and his men do not count as part of the AoT.

The Confederate Army was better positioned to pull off a battle of annihilation at Chickamauga...one of the few battles where the Confederates actually outnumbered the Yankees by a significant margin...than possibly any other Confederate army was during the course of the war.
Had it been an army capable of acting as an army instead of an army where half of Bragg's subordinates were somewhere between uncooperative and mutinous, sure.

A battle of annihilation would surely have been difficult to do, but as you point out, it was done at Nashville, so such a thing is certainly not impossible (your comment about the Army of Tennessee surviving as a fighting force after Nashville is laughable. The Army of Tennessee came out of that battle having lost about two thirds of its men. If a defeat of that magnitude had been dealt to the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga, they wouldn't have been able to hold Chattanooga).
"There is exactly one example of an army in the Civil War being destroyed as an army in the field..." and describing the post-Nashville AoT as a fighting force don't really match up. Either way, losing "only" two thirds of its men is not utter destruction - it managed to get away to fight another day.

Even at only a third of its starting strength, the Army of the Cumberland still has a strong position to retreat back to and can call for help more easily than Bragg can take that position.

Nashville was in an extremely different situation than Chickamauga, partially because, again, the Army of Tennessee had leadership issues coming out of its personified butt.

OTL's outcome was already fortune smiling on the AoT beyond the deserts of its leaders. For something better to happen requires either a much earlier POD (which probably means this battle doesn't happen) to fix the AoT's issues, the Army of the Cumberland to conveniently cooperate - most of the AotC running away actually made it less likely for it to be destroyed, even if it is what cost the Union the battle, or something that might as well be magic.

As stated earlier in this thread, I'd love to see a big win for Bragg, but he lacks the army and circumstances to inflict a total knock out win even if we assume the worst of the Army of the Cumberland and the best of the Army of Tennessee.
 
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YES, the question is reasonable. Stop arguing. Proof follows.

Alright, you want a POD that gives the AoT a....*significant* victory at Chickamauga? I can provide. ("Wipe out" may in fact be impossible, but it is easy enough to have them do better - perhaps even a 2/3rds wipe).

POD: John Bell Hood is not wounded at the height of his breakthrough.

With his presence, the Confederate battle plan for the right wing is something more than "go ahead and keep ahead of everything". In particular Hood sees a very definite choice around 12:00 - whether to turn right or left.

The majority of the Federal forces in his front are retreating right - northward - and an ever-growing artillery body is menacing that flank. On the other hand a seemingly large body of troops is still holding on to his left. Plus his original orders were to wheel left if a breakthrough occurred.

Hood turns left. It takes a while - by the time word reaches the lead division, Johnson's, they are already atop the Dry Valley Road. But they turn left.

Ergo, the majority of the retreating Northern troops get away cleanly - that is, Van Cleve's routed division and elements of Davis' and Wood's, though Harker's brigade of the latter also buys time for a stand to be made on Snodgrass Hill. Here, such a stand is less necessary since they aren't being pressed. But then again, one brigade is not enough to make a successful counterattack, and Harker stays where he is.

So instead Hood turns south. That is, his own division, McLaws', Johnson's, and Preston's turn south to fight Union troops that are already being faced frontally by Hindman's division. These Union troops are the divisions of Jefferson C. Davis (no relation...) and Phillip Sheridan. The latter is fighting a brilliant defensive battle, aided by support from Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry with Spencer repeater carbines, but now they are majorly outflanked.

Sheridan would love to retreat north, or failing that west, but Hood's men have control of the road. Their best hope is to fall back south and then try to cut west as soon as possible.

But this fails when Wheeler's entire cavalry corps comes riding up from the south. They had crossed Chickamauga Creek also at noon, five miles to the south, and had turned north, plundering as they came. An order had been sent (from undetermined sources, as in OTL) to halt the move, but Wheeler was very successful as the small force of Union cavalry in his path had been withdrawn to help the infantry (small butterly going on here...).

Having much more mobility, Wheeler quickly gets his men to Sheridan's west. Being pressed now from all four sides, and almost out of ammunition, Sheidan has no choice but to surrender his command, which has been swelled with elements of Davis' and other divisions, plus Wilder's men, to over 10,000 men (no comment on their level of organization).

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The immediate processing of prisoners takes until mid-afternoon. By now Hood has informed Longstreet of his great success. Longstreet congratulates him, but then calls on him to quickly turn back north to fight the main Union body. Meanwhile he passes the message on to Bragg, who for the first time in the battle seems pleased. "At least *one* wing of this army is capable of doing something right" he is reported as saying. Longstreet promises to continue the attack by 4:30 PM. Bragg is satisfied, and even determines to try to prod the right wing into concerted action at that time as well. He holds out little hope for this idea - his feelings towards Polk are very negative - but he will try.

On the Union side, meanwhile, affairs are surprisingly upbeat until now. Thomas, after pushing back the morning and early afternoon attacks on his left wing at the Kelly Field line, now runs over to Snodgrass Hill. He was very gratified to see Harker's brigade fight their delaying action, and helps put together a scratch line on Snodgrass Hill. The line eventually swells to over 5,000 men. There is little practical organization of the line, but the men are inspired by Thomas' presence, and are self-selected as being the steadiest of the troops earlier routed by Hood's breakthrough.

But no major attack comes for the next few hours. Thomas stays at the Snodgrass line, making occassional touches, but also in the dark about the larger picture. He is surprised but relieved when a mystery column approaching from the north proves to be Gordon Granger and a division of a reserve corps. Since at this time - 1:30 PM - no part of his line is being attacked, Thomas puts Granger's men into the half-mile hole separating his Kelly Field eastward-facing line and Snodgrass Hill southward-facing line (in OTL he wanted to do this, but just then Johnson's division attacks and Granger is needed on the far western flank).

The battlefield is relatively quiet for the next three hours. Sounds of fighting can be heard to the south and dustclouds from retreating columns are seen to the west, but Thomas is a pillar of stability in the chaos. Around 3:30 a message arrives from Rosecrans, who by now is back in Chattanooga. He instructs Thomas to hold the line until nightfall, and then command the retreat to Chattanooga via an overnight stop at Rossville. At the moment that seems very doable.

But then the sounds to the south stop. A little after 4, long columns of Confederate butternut and grey march up from the south. Hood and Longstreet do not have ample time until nightfall, but they do have a couple hours, and Longstreet especially wants to make one coordinated attack rather than several disparate ones. Johnson's provisional division is tasked with prisoner-handling, and the cavalry has now ridden far west to protect the Confederate flank. Perhaps Wheeler could have accomplished even more than he did, but the chain of command at Chickamauga was very tenuous for the Confederates.

As it stood, the new line of attack for Longsreet had A. P. Stewart's division on the right, now fronting Granger's men, then McLaw's and Hood's divisions facing the main line on Snodgrass Hill. Preston's division extends entirely beyond Thomas' line, although neither he nor Preston nor Longstreet know this. Hindman is Longstreet's strategic reserve. It is 4:30 on the dot, and Longstreet gives the orders to go ahead.

Hood is especially determined. "One more push and we'll bag the entire goddamned bunch!" After his earlier success that brag seems very doable. Through no particular direction Longstreet's attack comes roughly en echelon from right to left. It was not planned, rather a consequence of the uneven ground and angle of attack breaking up the Confederate line into brigade sized pieces. It is much less organized than Longstreet would like - but compared to most of the fighting for the past 2 days it is the very epitome of parade-ground.

Stewart's men are determined, but they are raked from artillery fire from Snodgrass Hill, plus they have to cross half a mile of open ground to reach Granger's men. Granger is commanding Steedman's division (more accurately, Steedman is commanding while Granger is off playing with cannons), and they are green troops. But they have both flanks protected, a clear field of fire, and great determination. They pour devastating fire into Stewart's lines. His men fall back, re-form and try again. His second line brigades take over and the fighting comes to close quarters. Even then the sheer determination of the defenders may be enough to force Stewart back.

McLaw's attack comes up the steep front of the Snodgrass Hill, and was not particularly determined to begin with. After the initial assault fails, McLaws keeps up a long range firefight but is effectively out of the battle.

Not so with Hood's division. He is in the thick of things ascending the slightly lesser slope of Horseshoe Ridge. Here the Union line has little in the way of organization...or ammunition...but they are as determined as Granger's men to hold the line. They are helped by the flank regiment, the 21st Ohio, being armed with 5-shot colt rifle-pistol hybrids. An interesting experiment, while finding ammunition for the weapon is hard, their rate of fire makes it worth it. While parts of the line waver, the 21st stays firm. Hood rallies his men and commits his second-line brigades, calling on Longstreet to call on Hindman. But before the message has time to travel Hood is back to the attack, and it is fierce......

...and very brief. Preston's division did not realize for quite some time that they were beyond the Union right flank. But when they did Preston's next move was obvious. A quick and decisive turn to the right.

Thomas had very few reserves in the first place, and those that he does have are at the Kelly Field salient. The Horseshoe Ridge line is strong but only a single line thick. If it does fall it will fall quickly - especially since having not been tested at all until now, Thomas had no reason to prepare upon the reserves in advance for a lateral march.

The 21st Ohio finds itself outflanked to both the right and rear, and retreats very quickly. From there the line caves in like a row of dominoes. Preston's eastward advance is only 2 brigades wide at the most, and this quickly compresses through disorganization. But Hood picks up immediately where Preston left off and wheels right. Within minutes the entire line is retreating northeastward.

Meanwhile, also at 4:30 Polk launches his attacks on the Kelly Field line. Given direct orders by Bragg, his assault is general, along the entire line. He does modify the orders to prevent any close combat, given the Union breastworks and the Confederate failure to come close to success on this front except via outflanking. He holds out little hope for success and wants to conserve the lives of his men. But his attack does serve to keep all the main line Union units in line facing east.

Thus the Northerners are very surprised when thousands of panicked men run right into their lines from the west. It is almost twilight by now and Hood is pressing his men - and any other Confederates he encouters, his command or not - as hard as possible.

At almost the same time Bragg, oblivious to events to the west, finds out about Polk's discretion with orders and explodes. After some epic cursing, he orders the first division commander he finds, Cleburne, to make an all out attack on the Union line no matter what. Cleburne obeys, of course, but he knows of the Yankee breastworks. He orders his men, therefore, to assault to close quarters as quickly as possible, with muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, and only stop to fight once they are on top of the Union line. He also orders the advance to be made quietly, attempting to use the heavy forest as concealment.

A practical idea, under normal circumstances, it would have a solid chance of working but would take heavy casualties.

Here at Chickamauga, the men in the Kelly Field line are thrown greatly for a loop when they observe a seemingly massive Confederate column approaching from the west. Thomas, acting quickly, takes his only 2 reserve brigades out from the Kelly field line and immediately face this new threat. They should front, if at all possible, southwest, thus keeping open the Lafayette Road.

He also tries to push the routed right wing to retreat up said Road, and gives orders to the Kelly Field commanders to pull out, from right to left, via that road as well. By now he knows the battle is lost, and is planning to fight a strong rear-guard action against the aggressive Confederate line to buy time.

He had counted without Cleburne. The combination of panicked troops in their rear and a standing order to fall back made the main Union line very inattentive to their front. Cleburne's attack was......well, not a complete surprise, but quite effective.

Pretty much any semblance of order in the Northern ranks evaporated when they were attacked from two sides at once. Commanded by the fiery Russian Turchin, and overseen personally by Thomas, the two brigades of the rear-guard do manage to hold open the Lafayette Road against final desperate Confederate attacks, but it is a close run thing. Elements of the Kelly Field line retreat with some semblance of order, more are routed entirely and run north as fast as possible.

Of course, this was only for those north of Cleburne's breakthrough. For those south, they found themselves caught in another ring of Confederate lines, once Cleburne's and Hood's spearheads met each other (and fired on each other for a few minutes).

Those troops, elements of the divisions of Brannan, Reynolds, and Palmer (though none in their entirety), and plus the southern half of the earlier routees from the Snodgrass Hill line - those being primarily Granger's men - are effectively trapped. A few manage to escape in the gathering darkness, though no-one maintains unit cohesion. The majority, possibly 15,000 men, surrender en masse.

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There is no *immediate* pursuit of Thomas' men. What is left of the army reaches Rossville in relative safety, and the rear-guard entrenches in the hills. But when morning comes, it is seen that the Confederates are approaching again, and Thomas withdraws quickly back to Chattanooga. Even if his men still have no unit cohesion, after a night spent in relative safety the raw panic is gone.

Bragg was at first stunned by the thousands of prisoners. He gives orders for an immediate pursuit on the morrow. Longstreet is agreeable, but Polk, commanding the troops in question, points out his very heavy casualties. Longstreet concurs with the numbers but argues for a pursuit anyway. Bragg does launch a limited pursuit, forcing Thomas back to Chattanooga, but there he stalls upon seeing seemingly strong fortifications.

In the Confederate Army, casualties varied among units, but the overall rate was perhaps 1 in 4. So out of 68,000 men starting the battle, only 51,000 finished it.

For the Union calculations are harder. Straight losses from killed, wounded, and arguably "missing" men did not much exceed 15,000 if that. However, that applies only to certain units. Minus battlefield losses, only the divisions of Baird, Johnson, and Negley escaped the wholescale surrenders. Wood, Van Cleve, Palmer, Brannan, and Davis lost varying portions of their commands as POWs - Davis was captured with his men - while Sheridan, Reynolds, and Steedman's divisions ceased to exist as units, all three commanders being captured as well. The total number of prisoners of war exceeded 20,000 men. Different sources report this number differently, depending on how they distinguish it from "normal" battlefield losses.

What is not in dispute is the final tally - only 22,000 men answered the call when they were reorganized in Chattanooga. The Army of the Cumberland had lost to various sources 2 out of every 3 men that entered the campaign.

Total losses to both sides numbered 55,000 men, thus making Chickamauga the costliest battle of war, displacing Gettysburg.

Bragg finally had his victory. A bloody but glorious victory. Could fortune finally be favoring the South after the disastrous first week of July?

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Well there you go. I hope you are all now satisfied that asking the question is not ASB. Because I am much more interested as to what would happen next, and would love for people to talk about that given that they know the TL is viable.

(PS: my personal favorite POD for this is have Bragg wounded in August. Lee comes west to command AoT and takes Ewell with him instead of Longstreet. The problem is that this has more and earlier butterflies plus does not technically fit the question. Also I have 2 dead TLs regarding the issue and don't want to bring it up again.)
 
Hm, I'm not sure if things would work this well, but a lot of that is a general matter of how well the Confederates can pull things off and how Thomas will react to things.

But I can't think of any specific area to say "No. No way." other than wondering why none of the surrounded-and-forced-to-surrender groups attempt to cut their way out first.

Nice to see Polk not being worse than useless. Bragg has finally had a lucky break from his subordinates.
 
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