WI: Bismarck Assassinated in 1866

According to Wikipedia, Ferdinand Cohen-Blind (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Cohen-Blind) was a jewish-german student who made an attempt at assassinating Prussian Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck with the apparent intent of preventing a war between Austria and Prussia. He failed, as the bullets he fired either missed or ricocheted off Otto's ribs. He commited suicide shortly after the assassination attempt.
But what if he decided to aim a little higher, managing to hit Bismarck in the head and causing the death of a professional diplomat and important historical figure? How would the Austro-Prussian war or possibly the Franco-Prussian war play out differently, had they still happened? How would Germany's unification process differ from OTL, if it, too, happens? What would happen to german politics after the incident?
 
Without Bismark to restrain the King (who wanted to annex Bohemia IIRC), isn't possible that the Prussians could batter the Austrians enough that they collapse? If the Hungarians smell blood, they might bolt.
 
Without Bismark to restrain the King (who wanted to annex Bohemia IIRC), isn't possible that the Prussians could batter the Austrians enough that they collapse? If the Hungarians smell blood, they might bolt.
Possibly, but i'm unsure if the prussian kaiser is going to be a more competent supreme military commander than Napoleon III. If Asutria isn't dismembered after the Austro-Prussian War, it could perhaps be possible that Germany won't be able to face France (maybe alongside revanchist Austria) afterwards.
Just a thought, i'm not a specialist in this time period.
 
Possibly, but i'm unsure if the prussian kaiser is going to be a more competent supreme military commander than Napoleon III. If Asutria isn't dismembered after the Austro-Prussian War, it could perhaps be possible that Germany won't be able to face France (maybe alongside revanchist Austria) afterwards.
Just a thought, i'm not a specialist in this time period.

We discussed this in the "What if Prussia annexes Bohemia" thread a few months ago, and determined that it would had been imposible for Austria to partake in the Franco-Prussian war because by the time the Austrian army had finished movilization, which took them six to eight weeks (!!!), France had already been (or was just about to be) efectivelly defeated at the battle of Sedan (6 weeks plus 3-4 days after the beggining of the war). Here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-prussia-annexed-bohemia.390911/

It is also extremelly important to take into acount the part that Bismarck played in making the war happen in the first place: it was his response to a French official (or his response's reception by the French public) that moved France to declare war, triggering the secret mutual defense treaty with the southern German states.
 
It is also extremelly important to take into acount the part that Bismarck played in making the war happen in the first place: it was his response to a French official (or his response's reception by the French public) that moved France to declare war, triggering the secret mutual defense treaty with the southern German states.


Actually that is far from clear. In all probability France would still have demanded a promise that the Hohenzollern candidature would never be renewed, and Wilhelm I would still have refused. So France most likely still declares war (and still gets creamed) even without the Ems Telegram.
 
Actually that is far from clear. In all probability France would still have demanded a promise that the Hohenzollern candidature would never be renewed, and Wilhelm I would still have refused. So France most likely still declares war (and still gets creamed) even without the Ems Telegram.

Oh, I agree that the diplomatic exchange about the Hohenzollern candidature would go pretty much like OTL, but I don't believe that France declaring war is at all certain. The multiple misinterpretations of the Prussian's tone, as well as the hillarious series of slight mistranslations that followed (I find the whole "Bismark maneuvered the dummy Frenchies into war cuz he was dat smart!" argument to be too fanboyish) not only had an inflamatory effect in French public opinion, but it was also an extreamly polarizing issue among the political classes. The conservative factions in Parliament were more than content with having the moral highground in front of the international community, but this stance was throughoutly gutted by their opposition, and massive demonstrations demanding war started occuring among the lower clases of Paris.
As for Napoleon III, contrary to what I've seen argued before, he wasn't facing any serious domestic troubles. Actually, just a few months before the war, public support for his program was very favorable, winning a national pleisbicite by a supermayority, so this was not a political "war for glory". One needs to take into account the sheer stupidity of the (alleged) causes for this war to see that: diplomacy is never short of percieved, accidental, and malicious offenses; if Napoleon both wanted war and thought something like this was good enough of an excuse to stage one, he would had waited for a time when he was less diplomaticly isolated. Finally, Geoffrey Wawro's argument (and others around the same vein) that he was disapointed by the terms he obtained from the Austrians a few years back, and thus was eager for a new war (with anyone!) and somehow felt that the Prussians were somewhat of an "easy target" (despite them having trashed the Austrians with much more ease than he did himself), to be shaky at best.

In short, the elites most definitely did NOT want a war and the emperor had NO reason to pursue one. It was the demands for war from the public what made them feel like their seats and throne were in jeopardy if they allowed France to be insulted in such a way, and that reaction is never going to arise from the "insult" of "I'm in no position to demand such a thing from my cousins, sowy, xoxo", which is what you would had gotten if Bismarck had not intervened and edited the telegram, whatever his intentions.
 
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According to Wikipedia, Ferdinand Cohen-Blind (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Cohen-Blind) was a jewish-german student who made an attempt at assassinating Prussian Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck with the apparent intent of preventing a war between Austria and Prussia. He failed, as the bullets he fired either missed or ricocheted off Otto's ribs. He commited suicide shortly after the assassination attempt.
But what if he decided to aim a little higher, managing to hit Bismarck in the head and causing the death of a professional diplomat and important historical figure? How would the Austro-Prussian war or possibly the Franco-Prussian war play out differently, had they still happened? How would Germany's unification process differ from OTL, if it, too, happens? What would happen to german politics after the incident?


Possible butterfly. The vote in the Federal Diet to mobilise against Prussia passed 9-6 with one abstention. With Bismarck (who was widely feared and disliked) removed from the scene, might the motion have lost - or indeed might Austria not have introduced it in anticipation of losing it?

That removes Prussia's immediate pretext for war, and leaves an opening for French mediation or other peace moves. Any chance that even at this late hour war may not break out at all?
 
I hear it depends on the prussian drive for unification. Perhaps Bismarck had already coaxed the Kaiser or the german people into an atmosphere of unification before the war, the Kaiser was convinced, and maybe he could annex even more territories after the war ends in such a scenario. Not sure about a war on France, though- maybe they can still capitalize on Napoleon III's gullibility and estabilish an uneasy peace.
Just a thought.
 
I hear it depends on the prussian drive for unification. Perhaps Bismarck had already coaxed the Kaiser or the german people into an atmosphere of unification before the war, the Kaiser was convinced, and maybe he could annex even more territories after the war ends in such a scenario. Not sure about a war on France, though- maybe they can still capitalize on Napoleon III's gullibility and estabilish an uneasy peace.
Just a thought.

I think King Wilhelm (not Kaiser yet, btw) was just about convinced by May - though the death of the minister on whom he had come to rely might have shaken his resolve.

Bismarck certainly hadn't coaxed the German people - or even the Prussian people - into supporting war with Austria. Iirc there were demos and even riots against the war in many Prussian cities, and the antiwar mood didn't change until the reports of Prussian victories started coming in. As for the rest of Germany, every state that wasn't totally at Prussia's mercy (even some that were) voted, and as far as they were able, fought, against Prussia in 1866. In the first instance, obviously, this was the decision of their Princes, but seems to have reflected the view of their middle-class Parliaments as well. It is surely significant that even the GD of Baden, Wilhelm I's son in law, dared not come out on the Prussian side.

As AJP Taylor put it, Germany was conquered, not united - though most Germans acquiesced in the conquest once it was clearly a success.
 
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