WI: Better STS Space Shuttle

[Uli_Stoiber]

What if / Better Space Shuttle


E of pi and Truth is life, in their excellent timeline observed the possibilities of a continuing Apollo program, which, as it seems the whole board to agree, would have been probably one of the best possible alternative courses of space policy.

Nevertheless, I ask the question whether even after the decision for the Space Shuttle program, an alternative course would have been possible, and would it have avoided at least some of the disadvantages of the Space Shuttle.

Certainly, if you look for a reusable program a pure "crew taxi" would have been the most appropriate solution. Certainly the targeted launch rates that were brought in retrospectively to justify the program, unrealistic from the outset. The attempt to create an "all-purpose animal" in order to complete even all commercial launches was doomed to failure from the outset. The requirements of the Air Force, in calling for a massive cross range finally crippled the program. The immense financial burden of a technically immature experimental program with low launch rate and inherent safety problems have been discussed again and again. It seems, no one would choose the Space Shuttle again by hindsight

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Nevertheless, I would like in particular to take advantage of the space shuttle. The emphasis will be placed on the concept of a true Space Transportation System. However, the requirements of the space shuttle remain the same as in reality. I These requirements are:

- Maximize reusability

- High launch rate as the sole carrier for commercial use

- Ability to offer a large crew up to 6 people and habitat for these

- Large cross range for the Air Force, that is very big wings

- High load capacity and very large payload space for military payloads (about 25 tons)

- Ability to carry out construction work in space

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During this, the restrictions are the same as in OTL. In particular, there is no more money and the military requirements stay in. This results in:

Basically the same vehicle, no fundamentally different concepts. No SSTO, no true reusability, no winged first stage. I tried to make my proposal without too much hindsight, so there will be no Liquid Fuel Boosters, no ejectable crew compartment (preventing Challenger type accident) , no better TPS (lower maintenance cost), no internal titanium structure, no internal isolation of the external tank or upper mount of the orbiter (preventing Columbia type accident). The shuttle proposal is build in the same mindset as OTL, with all its errors.

In particular, the partial reusability remains, the main tank is thrown away. Same goes for the Solid Rocket Boosters, which were chosen for financial and industrial policy reasons. The TPS stays unfortunately the same, which is bad for maintenance, cost and the probability of a Columbia type disaster.My proposal includes the well-known principle shuttle concept. An orbiter with 3 SSME, a non-reusable tank with side-mounted Solid Rocket Boosters.


Let us see how far we can get with these conditions. The goals are:

- Significantly increased security

- Increased launch rate

- Increased flexibility and integration into an overall concept

- Increased ability to remain in orbit.

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Now for the differences:

- The orbiter has a slightly increased length but with a shorter nose cone. There is no second deck below the cockpit. In the cockpit, there are only two pilots. These sit on ejection seats, or ejection capsules, which are derived from the B70 program and provide the opportunity to eject at high speeds and up to medium altitudes. This would give the opportunity to save the crew until the Solid Boosters are separated. After that, there would be the distant possibility of the RTLS maneuver or bail out at lower altitude. Behind the cockpit there is a tiny living space with kitchen, toilet and airlock. Directly and then follows the cargo space. The cargo doors edge is located over the airlock right behind the cockpit.

- Optional in cargo space behind the cockpit, a larger cabin module can be installed, which provides habitat for up to four more persons. This applies especially to long-term missions. The four people are sitting on ejection capsules, the cargo doors can be blasted. Even when the larger cabin module is used, there is sufficient space for more payload, such as the European Spacelab or other payload.

- In the hold, it is possible to install a solar panel providing electric energy during longer stays. Also, a manipulator system can be installed, which is served by a control panel at the air lock.

- Optionally any shuttle can fly unmanned. Here at the outset at least two orbiters built without cockpit and life support system that execute the commercial launches. By this, cost would be much reduced for a higher launch rate of up to 24 a year (which is still very much away from the predicted 55 launches a year rate NASA ridiculously envisioned) and higher production rate of components. Also the more risky flights with a Centaur Liquid Fuel Upper Stage for heavy planetary missions would fly unmanned. The unmanned orbiters have an increased payload of at least 35 tons. Later on, decreased performance SSME (commercial) with lower engine pressure could be installed for lower launch and maintenance cost at commercial flights, when less payload mass is needed.

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With my proposal, I hope to get a better shuttle. The Air Force still gets the possibility for their once around missions, as well as their cross-range. As well as the commercial launches are carried out with the shuttle. These increase the start rate and number of satellites each carry with them. Here at the unmanned missions a part of the high cost is avoided.

The Space Shuttle has a higher security because of the ejection seats. Thus at least a Challenger disaster would have been survivable. Furthermore, it is hoped that the other errors provided by the mismanagement would have occurred in an unmanned mission. Same goes for a Columbia type disaster.

The Space Transportation System becomes just that. A flexible system. It allows for short missions with two pilots. It enables long stays or a large crew. It allows unmanned commercial flying large payload and at least some increased launch rate and at least slightly lower costs. IMHO, even also in TTL most payloads would be launched on EELV-type launcher systems, this Space Shuttle could be still alive and happy with a Shuttle derived HLV for Constellation equivalent on the way.

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Notes:
The Shuttle of TTL is going to run in much of the same issues it ran into OTL. Also my Shuttle too will never achieve the planned launch rates or become cost effective in any way.

So my TL is far away from the best of all worlds (if I wanted that, I would go the way of eyes turned skywards, except a little Shuttle fanboyism, because it was so much more striking to watch on TV and of course because of the mess of today's space program - which is pretty much the worst of all worlds thinkable, I guess ). My goal is only to keep the Shuttle alive (maybe only longer) by making it a little more safe (because no program would survive two loss of crew disasters) and to provide a little more flexibility to the program.

Thoughts?

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

I plan to do a little timeline around this proposal of a different Space Shuttle. In this timeline, there will be accidents and disasters, which were too probable for the STS. However I'm not sure, which scenario I should choose.

1. Challenger type accident on unmanned launch. - With the much raised flight rate for commercial flights, the inherent problems of mismanagement would occur even more probable and maybe even sooner. Maybe not enough drama and not sufficient to change the management boards attitude?

2. Challenger type accident on unmanned flight with a spectacular blow up on the pad. - My goal is to let the Shuttle survive until today, but make it also a better shuttle. The gross mismanagement during the early days of the shuttle program may need a spectacular accident to get their lessons learned but my aim is on the other hand not to make the shuttle unbearable expensive.

3. Challenger type disaster on manned flight with partial or total loss of crew. - In TTL, the shuttle has a crew escape system. On the other hand, an ejection seat or capsule is only a substitute for a real LAS. So, I'm not sure, whether there was a possibility for all of the crew to escape at a quite substantial high altitude and velocity short before SRB separation. In OTL, the events, that led to the destruction of Challenger occurred very rapid and nearly without warning. On the other hand, the crew compartment was able to sustain even the destruction of the orbiter and the crew was alive until impact in the ocean. So, what if some of the crew can be ejected from the debris, or would they be fatally wounded from the g-forces?

4. Columbia type accident on unmanned flight. - Since there would be, even after a Challenger type accident and the hopefully learned lessons of it, a much higher rate of launches of commercial flights, the probability for a Columbia type accident raises. What would be the consequences of a loss during unmanned mission?

5. Columbia type disaster on manned flight. - I fear, the Columbia type disaster had to occur one day and since my shuttle is basically the same vehicle, there is not much, that can be done against. This type of disaster is one of the inherent risks of the side mount, the external isolation of the tank and the aluminum structure of the STS. On the other hand, I want the shuttle to survive, and two fatal losses of crew would be too much for the program to survive, so this scenario is only bearable when the first accident was unmanned.

6. Are there other inherent safety problems in the Shuttle System, which I have not thought of? Were there more time bombs in the Shuttle System waiting to explode?

 

[Archibald]

Some advices

- Save the space station in 1970, and that gives the shuttle a place to go
- no need to launch all satellites, thus no need for the Air Force aboard
- result: smaller, nimbler, less vulnerable shuttle
- 4 crew, 20 000 pound payload
It should help somewhat !

As for time bombs in the shuttle system - yes, plenty of them, some of them surprising.

case 1: the shuttle landing strip at the cape is very long... but also quite "narrow". The brakes goes mad and the shuttle veers to a side at landing, ending in the mud at 200 miles per hour... bad.

case 2: the external tank is gone, just before orbit... and then, the doors that close the pipping holes on the belly (how do you feed the orbiter SSMEs with an under belly tank ? holes in the belly...) don't close properly. The crew never see it... and you have a STS-107 accident

case 3: a SSME turbopump explodes, ruining the hydraulic system during ascent

case 4: the hypergolic APU catch fire at landing, ruining the hydraulic system

And there was plenty other flaws like this...

 

[Michel Van]

in the begin the Space shuttle was full reusable concept with two stage

But then politic in form of senator Walter Mondale and Representative Joseph Karth show up and try to Kill the STS program in 1970.
like budget cuts on R&D let to Join venture NASA with USAF and Shuttle mutated horribly big.
in the end they take the cheapest R&D the SRB-ET-Shuttle design, but with highest launch cost in 1973

in autumn 1971, Boeing proposed NASA to modified the Saturn V first stage S-IC into reusable first stage of Shuttle
called Flyback F-1 used S-IC with big delta wings and parts from B-1 bomber program like engines
sadly, this was ONLY 12 million Today Usdollar over Shuttle budget !

Why NASA came not up with 12 million dollar ?
they were not Happy with use of Saturn V hardware on Shuttle, specially the F-1 or J-2 engine consider inferior to SSME.
i wonder how this story had unfold, if Werner von Braun stay center director of MSFC
Not become NASA's Deputy Associate Administrator for Planning at NASA Headquarters on March 1, 1970.

in that case, i think Von Braun had push true the Flyback F-1 as first stage of the Shuttle
much easier to refit for next launch thanks to Lox/Kerosine fuel and simplified hardware with use of F-1A engines

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

@ Archibald and Michael Van

Some advices

- Save the space station in 1970, and that gives the shuttle a place to go
- no need to launch all satellites, thus no need for the Air Force aboard
- result: smaller, nimbler, less vulnerable shuttle
- 4 crew, 20 000 pound payload
It should help somewhat !

As I said, a smaller Shuttle as a crew taxi with lower payload would have been the best way to go.
There will be no be Skylab rescue, so there will be no Space Station around until the 90ies. The European Spacelab will be used as a substitute, more so with the longer endurance capability because of the solar panels. Politically there will be no difference to OTL.

in the begin the Space shuttle was full reusable concept with two stage

But then politic in form of senator Walter Mondale and Representative Joseph Karth show up and try to Kill the STS program in 1970.
like budget cuts on R&D let to Join venture NASA with USAF and Shuttle mutated horribly big.
in the end they take the cheapest R&D the SRB-ET-Shuttle design, but with highest launch cost in 1973

in autumn 1971, Boeing proposed NASA to modified the Saturn V first stage S-IC into reusable first stage of Shuttle
called Flyback F-1 used S-IC with big delta wings and parts from B-1 bomber program like engines
sadly, this was ONLY 12 million Today Usdollar over Shuttle budget !

Why NASA came not up with 12 million dollar ?
they were not Happy with use of Saturn V hardware on Shuttle, specially the F-1 or J-2 engine consider inferior to SSME.
i wonder how this story had unfold, if Werner von Braun stay center director of MSFC

in that case, i think Von Braun had push true the Flyback F-1 as first stage of the Shuttle
much easier to refit for next launch thanks to Lox/Kerosine fuel and simplified hardware with use of F-1A engines

I am aware of the Space Shuttle desing process. A F1 flyback Booster or the two stage reusable would have been the dream come true. Still, I don't believe, its R&D costs would be only 12 millions more in reality.

Nevertheless, in my TL I try to keep the basic Shuttle vehicle, the mindset and the concept of a vehicle one size fits to all, the medium payload, crew transport space truck the same as OTL. I will not change the Shuttle, just make it slightly better and more adjustable.

As for time bombs in the shuttle system - yes, plenty of them, some of them surprising.

case 1: the shuttle landing strip at the cape is very long... but also quite "narrow". The brakes goes mad and the shuttle veers to a side at landing, ending in the mud at 200 miles per hour... bad.

case 2: the external tank is gone, just before orbit... and then, the doors that close the pipping holes on the belly (how do you feed the orbiter SSMEs with an under belly tank ? holes in the belly...) don't close properly. The crew never see it... and you have a STS-107 accident

case 3: a SSME turbopump explodes, ruining the hydraulic system during ascent

case 4: the hypergolic APU catch fire at landing, ruining the hydraulic system

And there was plenty other flaws like this...

Thank you a lot. I have found the report of the Rogers commission, which identifies the same problems. Still I have the question, which of these problems was most likely to occur. The Challenger disaster was pretty much inevitable in its time. But which of the other failure sources would be the most problematic and would lead most likely to loss of vehicle and/or mission?

With my proposition, I tried only to lower the possibility of loss of crew, since during landing or in the event of SSME failure, ejection would be a pretty good solution. Regarding the problem with the piping holes, there would be at least sensor data when they are not closed, and it is debatable, whether such small leaks would lead to a sudden disintegration of the vehicle. TPS tiles have been lost and the Shuttle still made it back. The area of impact of the foam during STS 107 was at the worst place you can think of. Of course, it is likely, that the orbiter wouldn't have made it to land, but it would be possible to eject from the damaged vehicle.

I think, one has to understand, that space flights, manned or unmanned is and ever will be a risky business, losses of vehicle will happen, with a higher launch rate even more so.

Regarding the crew ejection, I have found some discussion about in the Rogers commission report too. As they said, only a escape module would have made it possible to rescue the crew during all stages of launch and flight. That would of course mean, that the escape capsule is a Shuttle for itself strapped on a Shuttle.

They say, ejection seats would wave been only feasible still on the pad and during descent and landing. Ejection seats would bring the crew in danger to collide with the structure of the Shuttle or the crew would come into contact with the exhaust plumes of the SRB or the SSME.

Rogers commission report:
Although the [ejection] seats were originally intended for use during first-stage ascent or during gliding flight below 100,000 feet, analysis showed that the crew would be exposed to the Solid Rocket Booster and main engine exhaust plumes if they ejected during ascent. During descent, the seats provided good protection from about 100,000 feet to landing.

After the Space Shuttle completed the four test flights it was certified for"operational" flights. But missions for the "operational" flights required more crew members, and there were no known ejection systems, other than an entire cabin escape module, that could remove the entire crew within the necessary time. The Orbiter configuration allowed room for only two ejection seats on the flight deck. With alternative ejection concepts and redesign of the flight deck, this number might have been increased slightly, but not to the full crew size. Thus, because of' limited utility during first- stage ascent and inability to accommodate a full crew, the ejection seats were eliminated for operational flights.

The present Shuttle has no means for crew escape, either during first-stage ascent or during gliding flight. Conventional ejection seats do not appear to be viable Space Shuttle options because they severely limit the crew size and, therefore, prevent the Space Shuttle from accomplishing its mission objectives. The remaining options fall into three categories:

1. Escape Module. The entire crew compartment would be separated from the Orbiter and descend by parachute.

2. Rocket-assisted Extraction. Many military aircraft employ a system using a variety of small rocket-assisted devices to boost occupants from the plane. Such a system could be used in the Orbiter.

3. Bail-Out System. The crew can exit unassisted through a hatch during controlled, gliding flight.

Only one of these, the escape module, offers the possibility of escape during first-stage ascent.

Its use would probably be practical only after thrust termination. It should be noted that in all cases of crew escape, the Orbiter would be lost, but in cases of Solid Rocket Booster failure or Orbiter ditching the vehicle would be lost anyway. The utility and feasibility of each method are described below.

An escape module can offer an opportunity for crew escape at all altitudes during a first-stage time-critical emergency if the escape system itself is not damaged to the point that it cannot function. The module must be sufficiently far from the vehicle at the time of catastrophe that neither it nor its descent system is destroyed. Incorporation of an escape module would require significant redesign of the Orbiter: some structural reinforcement, pyrotechnic devices to sever the escape module from the rest of the Orbiter, modifications to sever connections that supply power and fluids, separation rockets and a parachute system. An additional weight penalty would result from the requirement to add mass in the rear of the Orbiter to compensate for the forward shift in the c enter of gravity. Recent estimates indicate this could add as much as 30,000 pounds to the weight of' the Orbiter.4 This increase in weight would reduce payload capacity considerably, perhaps unacceptably. There is no current estimate of the attendant cost.

An escape module does theoretically offer the widest range of' crew escape options. The other two options, rocket extraction and bail-out, arc only practical during gliding flight. Both methods would be useful when the Orbiter could not reach a prepared runway, for they would allow the crew to escape before a very hazardous landing or a water ditching. Aerodynamic model tests showed that a crew member bailing out through either the side or overhead hatch would subsequently contact the wing, tail or orbital maneuvering system pod unless he or she could exit with sufficient velocity (> 5 to 10 feet per second) to avoid these obstacles. Slides and pendant rocket systems were evaluated as means of' providing this velocity, but all concepts of bail-out and rocket extraction that were studied require many minutes to get the entire crew out and would be practical only during controlled gliding flight. The results of these studies were presented at the Program Requirements Change Board session held on May 12, 1983, and subsequently to the NASA administrator, but none of the alternatives was [184] implemented because of limited capability and resulting program impacts.

There is much discussion and disagreement over which escape systems are feasible, or whether any provide protection against a significant number of failure modes.

The astronauts testifying before the Commission on April 3, 1986, agreed that it does not appear practical to modify the Orbiter to incorporate an escape module. The astronauts disagreed, however, about which of the other two systems would be preferable. As Astronaut Weitz testified:

"John [Astronaut John Young] likes the rocket extraction system because it does cover a wider flight regime and allows you to get out perhaps with the vehicle only under partial control as opposed to complete control; however, any system that adds more parts like rockets gets more complex.... The only kind of a system that I think is even somehow feasible would be maybe some kind of a bail-out system that could be used subsonic."

I tend to agree with John Young, an ejection system would be better than nothing at all. Also, since the ejection sequence would have to be quite fast, I don't believe, the acceleration of a whole escape module could be faster than the ejection of a capsuled seat, which would provide also at least some protection against the exhaust plumes.

 

[Michel Van]

A F1 flyback Booster or the two stage reusable would have been the dream come true. Still, I don't believe, its R&D costs would be only 12 millions more in reality.

like i say NASA had other ideas and don't like idea of Saturn V hardware in Shuttle
some of then had even megalomaniac ideas, like payload bay not only to fit a NRO Spysat, but also a 6 m x 12 m semicircular Module !
for assembly a 12 meter ø space station module in orbit
or transport NERVA nuclear engine from earth and bring used back to Earth

but with F1 flyback Booster had give NASA, a unique opportunity to launch also unmanned heavy payload into orbit, by replacing the Orbiter with a rocket stage...

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

like i say NASA had other ideas and don't like idea of Saturn V hardware in Shuttle
some of then had even megalomaniac ideas, like payload bay not only to fit a NRO Spysat, but also a 6 m x 12 m semicircular Module !
for assembly a 12 meter ø space station module in orbit
or transport NERVA nuclear engine from earth and bring used back to Earth

but with F1 flyback Booster had give NASA, a unique opportunity to launch also unmanned heavy payload into orbit, by replacing the Orbiter with a rocket stage...

Off Topic:
NERVA is actually a great idea for the Shuttle derived HLV (unmanned, enlarged payload bay, 4 SRB, about 80 tons capacity) Nuclear Space Tug for Missions to Mars or Moon.

Environmentally, Nuclear Thermal Rockets are not that dangerous, until they are actually activated in orbit. The fuel elements in the reactor are composed of Uranium 235 and zirconium hydride, which is not that radioactive or poisonous. Unless the reactor has been run for an extended period, the radioactivity of these elements is quite low and would pose a minimal hazard. A completely different thing would be if the Nerva engine is actually uses as a third stage during ascent.

On Topic:
Ideas for the accident scenarios anyone?

 

[Michel Van]

NERVA is save, except if the launch rocket explode...

Ideas for the accident scenarios anyone?

case 5: a Terrorist attack during launch is one?
case 6: lost on hydraulics system on reentry, make shuttle lost controllability for landing.
case 7: a Shuttle window is hit by space debris.
case 8: Error in sensors let the flight computer shut down the Shuttle engines (happen in OTL with one SSME).
case 9: Accident during Shuttle refit, as they drill hole in Payload bay and hit wires of electronics (happen in OTL, was discovered before launch)
case 10: Short-circuit in old wires of electronics, they replace 380 km on compromised wires on each Space shuttle in end 1990s.
case 11: during one of Space probe launch out the Shuttle Payload bay, the pyrotech cutter produce shrapnel that hit the Payload bay

by the way, Uli_Stoiber
what for Shuttle design you wanna use ?

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

NERVA is save, except if the launch rocket explode...

by the way, Uli_Stoiber
what for Shuttle design you wanna use ?

No, explosion on launch wouldn't be that problematic, because the nuclear fuel
elements are not that radioactive until the reactor is activated, which would only happen in orbit. You could also launch the fuel rods in heavily armored casings with other rockets and deploy them to the reactor in orbit.

To the accident scenarios: I'm not so much in need for additional scenarios, just for the most likely ones. I have pointed out some possibilities in the second post. I'm interested, also story wise, which events were most likely and what consequences each would have.

To the shuttle design: Like I said in the first post, pretty much the Shuttle of OTL, just longer payload bay, smaller cockpit, no second deck.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Longer orbiter? Why?

Otl the payload bay was sized for particular payloads, iirc. That set the minimum diameter. So making the bay longer makes the shuttle more massive which reduces payload or requires bigger boosters or...

Also it gives more tps area to cause problems.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Ooo... ive just had an idea. If you have some manned and some unmanned, why not have the unmanned version be a shuttle C equivalent. If you can get rid of most of the 100 tonne mass of the orbiter, its a loteasier to get 30 tonnes into orbit. This means the whole system could be scaled down and cheaper.

Yes, i know the orbiter was nore than 100 tonnes. I dont remember what the exact number was.

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

Longer payload bay: I chose to lengthen the orbiter a bit for the crew cabin module to be included as an option for longer endurance flights and the ability to still fit a Spacelab or other payload (about 20-22 tons) in. Without the cabin, the payload is slightly over 30 tons.

Shuttle C: I tried to stay in the mindset of the R&D era of the Shuttle, so the unmanned version has to be reusable too. Its just a Shuttle without Cockpit and life support systems, so the payload is not that much increased (conservative estimate about slightly over 35-40 tons). Maintenance costs can be lowered by using lower pressure SSME if less payload is needed for commercial flights.

The Shuttle C concept is reserved for a potential later Shuttle derived HLV, which is expendable and uses 4 SRB and maybe 4 SSME (over 100 tons estimate).

 

[e of pi]

Yes, i know the orbiter was nore than 100 tonnes. I dont remember what the exact number was.

Nah, the Orbiter was roughly 65 tons, with 10 being the SSMEs. With the 25 ton design payload, that comes to a total of about 80 tons if the engines were on the core where they belong and the Orbiter was replaced with a proper payload fairing. With a 4th SSME and an upper stage, that could be 100-110 mT, which may be where you're getting that 100 tons.

Anyway, Uli, you appear to be missing the point Dathi was making about length: the USAF requirements not only included payload, they also included a minimum bay diameter--so you're not going to be narrowing the Shuttle, you'd be unable to fit in that bay. Thus, by lengthening the Orbiter enough to put the cabin forward of the SRBs (which requires adding another nearly 10m of length), you're just adding tons and tons of mass--and recall the Orbiter's already 55 tons! That means a bigger LV, and that means longer SRBs to lift off--and now another stretch of the Orbiter to get it in front of those again--and there's still that cabin to add! It's going to be really hard to close that design.

I wonder about so many different sets of ejection seats. What would almost be better would be a mini-escape vehicle, something like a detachable Dreamchaser with seating for the maximum crew. Of course, at that point, the rest of the Orbiter's just a reusable payload fairing, but you can see the idea in the JSC Shuttle II concepts of the late 80s.

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

@e of pi
Alright, no real need to stretch the orbiter that much. Of course it would have been beneficial for safety reasons to put the crew cabin more in front of the SRB, but i can live with that. On the other hand, by abandoning the middle deck I should get some weight advantages too. The crew module is just a cabin providing living space, so it should not weight too much, the life support systems and avionics are located below the cockpit, and the vehicle should have a shorter nose cone.

I know the concept of the JSC Shuttle II, but as I have stated, an ejectable crew rescue module would have problems at reaching the needed acceleration rates to get away fast enough and it would be like strapping a little Shuttle on a Shuttle, which should cause much more weight problems.

 

[Michel Van]

Paradoxically there were in OTL proposal for Longer payload bay of 80ft or longer in Phase A/B.
even a combi payload bay in form of a + with 15 ft by 60 ft and semicircular 20 ft by 40th (4.6 m by 18.3 m and semicircular 6 m by 12,2 m)

Also proposed Rockwell a lengthened space shuttle with longer payload bay of 76.33ft or 23,26 meters
the only problem was that Rockwell STS hardware was build to carry max 25 tons of Payload.

there is interesting proposal for STS
on March 1972, McDonnell Douglas proposed not to use large SRB but 5x UA1205 from Titan IIIC.

source: http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=11688

now this would 40% cheaper on launch cost.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Nah, the Orbiter was roughly 65 tons, with 10 being the SSMEs. With the 25 ton design payload, that comes to a total of about 80 tons...

Astronautix says the orbiter is 99.1 tonnes, which is over 100 tons, dry weight.

 

[Michel Van]

Orbiter weight after book "Grenzenlosen dimension der Raumfahrt Band 1 " by Harry o Ruppe

dry weight 68718 kg
launch weight 114837 kg (include crew & supply, max payload, fuels and liquids etc.)

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Orbiter weight after book "Grenzenlosen dimension der Raumfahrt Band 1 " by Harry o Ruppe

dry weight 68718 kg
launch weight 114837 kg (include crew & supply, max payload, fuels and liquids etc.)

Danke schön / merci

 

[Uli_Stoiber]

Timeline is going to start tomorrow.

Not sure about the vehicle data, because I'm not able to do the maths on my own or know any programs to calculate, but I hope I got reliable sources on data.

 

[Pesterfield]

5. Columbia type disaster on manned flight. - I fear, the Columbia type disaster had to occur one day and since my shuttle is basically the same vehicle, there is not much, that can be done against.

If the frequency of launches is up would they have the option of just staying in orbit until a rescue mission could be sent up?