In the evening on 4 July, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.216 The OIC received good news at about 1900: that the code “break-in” had been accomplished, so the decrypts for the twenty-four hours that had ended at noon that day could be expected very shortly.217 At 1918, Bletchley sent a message to Tovey that the German “CINC of the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta(fjord) 0900/4. Destroyers and torpedo boats complete with fuel at once. (Admiral) Scheer was already present at Alta(fjord) [so were Hipper and Lützow]. At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their main task was to shadow convoy.”218 Commander Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to add to this message regarding Tirpitz’s arrival in Altafjord that morning and the directive to the destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel that the evidence indicated that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, after some discussion with Admiral Pound, Denning’s added text was deleted from the message before it was sent at 1918.219
1. This is sort of mud. But what is stated above is that Tirpitz was guessed to be located at the vicinity of ALTA.
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It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although expected, receipt of the information about the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord further reinforced the view that a move against the convoy, in accordance with the original plan, was imminent, if not already under way.220 But Denning was not convinced the German ships had sailed out of Altafjord. He was supported in his view by his superior, Jock Clayton, the deputy director of the Intelligence Centre. (Clayton was a rear admiral on the retired list, but had been brought back onto active service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the German traffic analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, the absence of any signal from Naval Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships were still at Altafjord. The comparison was to Tirpitz’s foray against Convoy PQ12 in March. There also were no reports from the British submarines. However, Pound gave Denning no opportunity to explain his reasons; he instead asked direct questions, and expected to receive short, factual answers. Among several other questions, Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not out to sea.221 Denning responded that, on the basis of the experience of the German sortie against Convoy PQ12, the Germans would not risk Tirpitz if it might be in danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly its aircraft carriers.”222 He also tried to reassure Pound that “if Tirpitz has put out to sea you can be sure that we should have known very shortly afterward within four to six hours.”223
Hence my observations;
1. That Denning gave a wishy-washy answer to a direct question.
2. That no-one tried to lay eyes on to track the German SAG presence via a recon flyover.
3. But the distance? 1,100 nautical miles. Within range from RAF Shetland. Flyout and back? 8 hours by fuel extended Spitfire.
4. Sub recon in those waters was hit or miss. The only certain way was via air, but based on RAF performance in the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea to that date, one should have ZERO confidence in the RAF.
a. One cannot plan on guesses on these scraps of radio-intel information and WAGs. What one can do is plan on what the enemy could do.
b. Refuel his destroyers in 6 hours or less. If you can... he can.
c. Co-ord between U-boats and the SAG as was attempted during Operation Rhine and PQ-12. He tried it before, so he might try again.
121 Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators that Tirpitz was not at sea. For example, Bletchley Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but had reported erroneously that it included a battleship. That would indicate a larger force, and therefore the Germans would decide not to send Tirpitz to sea. Bletchley had found no evidence the Germans had detected the heavy covering force. Another piece of evidence that Tirpitz was not out to sea was that the Germans did not warn their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy. Neither had the German wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic since noon shown any extraordinary activity. The British and Russian submarines off North Cape had reported no sightings. Collectively, all these “negatives” were a good indication that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord.224
5. That is backwards thinking. The German message was garbled and partially decrypted after a full 24 blackout of the U-boat code. The U-boat code break-in for that date was less than 4 hours old when this message was decrypted. Whether or not Denning was a mind-reader, what one could say with certainty and SHOULD HAVE, was that the Germans had not detected the covering force, as the message traffic indicated: that Tirpitz and company were near the Tromso / Alta area and that
therefore there was a good chance presented to ambush Tirpitz and the German SAG with the covering force as long as it stayed on flank guard station as assigned; since the Germans were apparently unaware of it and were fixated on Hamilton's cruisers, which they erroneously thought had a battleship in company.
The Germans were looking NORTH towards Bear Island and not to the northwest to the near (to them) flank of the convoy track. This was an opportunity, not a cause for panic.
Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that Tirpitz is still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning responded, “No. I shall have information only after the Tirpitz has left.”225 On this question, in fact, hung the entire future of Convoy PQ17. Yet Denning was not in a position to give the desired assurance.226 Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to go to sea?” To this Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort would have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been reported by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”227
6.
And here we see the difference between Pound and Nimitz; and
Denning and Rocheforte. Americans would have poked at it, the issue, to provoke a response. "AF has no fresh water." Instead of "What will they do?" "I don't know, but they have to run a sweep... maybe. Got to decide, sir?" Run a submarine into there to take a look... Sheesh.
A stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC at 2000. However, they provided no new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. By then, Clayton was due to attend a staff meeting at 2030 convened by Pound.228 (Coincidentally, that meeting was held just when Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy air attacks.)229 At 2031, a decrypt timed 1130 on 4 July was received at the OIC. It confirmed that Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon on 4 July. This signal was included in the summarized ULTRA message timed 2110. It had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were then in their operating area, and that the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be their main targets. However, this information did not change the situation, because an assumption had already been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying Tirpitz would not have completed refueling until about noon on 4 July.230
7. So what changed? Nothing apparently. The British could have assumed this message traffic to the U-boats referred to Hamilton and the op-area near Bear Island and that the Germans were still unaware of Tovey and the Home Fleet on flank guard, or they could have goofed (Both likely, and given this level of incompetence at reading a plot, why not?), and assumed the Germans were now aware of Tovey.
8. Also the timing estimate on refueling a 1934-class destroyer was wrong. 6 hours should have been 4 hours.
At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy attack could occur any time after 0200 on 5 July; if that happened, Admiral Hamilton’s cruisers would be destroyed. They also (falsely) believed that the more widely merchant ships were dispersed, the better their chance of escape; once the alarm was given, the enemy would wish to spend no more time than necessary in the vicinity to pick off some ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require a lot of time to disperse over a large area. The air and U-boat attacks had already started and were certain to continue.231
9. And why should Hamilton be destroyed? Let me note a few things about RN shortcomings here.
a. There was no destroyer refuel capability or PLAN for it, when these Arctic convoys started, Iceland to the Kola peninsula is about 2,000 nautical miles following the PQ-17 track. Hamilton picked up trail astern of the convoy just to the north of the Faeros. I presume his fuel state was down to about 80% in his destroyers at that merge and he had about 4,000 nautical miles cruise left in them at that point, hence his orders to turn back east of Bear Island. This is what Pound meant. Hamilton had to RTB before he went bingo. If the Germans caught him at below 50% and he had to offer battle at battle speeds, even if the Germans lost, he would never see home again. The Germans had the endurance on him and were closer to their fuel and sortie points. Was this bad British planning? They had tankers. They HAD the USS Washington and she COULD REFUEL destroyers at sea if they had taken the time to quick modify their own destroyers and cruisers.
10. PQ-17 was being nibbled, but that should have been expected. The attacks beaten off were no worse than what happened to prior PQs. In fact, one LW air attack on the Hamilton cruiser group cover group had been routinely massacred by a US destroyer, USS Wainwright (Which was doing the USN thing and REFUELING from another USN ship.) and that should have been a bellwether as to "stick together boys, and most of us will make it."
When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his staff of Admiral Pound’s view that the convoy had to be dispersed because Tirpitz had sailed and could reach the convoy by 0200 on 5 July. However, his staff disagreed with that assessment. They persuaded Clayton to go back to Admiral Pound and make the case that Admiral Tovey should be advised instead that Tirpitz had not sailed, and would not sail until the Germans obtained information on the strength of the Allied heavy covering force.232 The naval section at Bletchley Park agreed with Denning’s assessment that the weight of negative evidence suggested that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, Clayton was unable to convince Admiral Pound, who had already made up his mind.233
11. I am sure that the information and confused manner in which it had been presented would have befuddled Pound. I might add that he was in ill health (known) and should have have been sacked earlier for incompetence (No excuses for Singapore and his performance that led to the Indian Ocean and ABDA disasters.), because of substandard performance in the past.
Denning and the other members providing intelligence and analysis judged (rightly) that Tirpitz had not sailed. They did their best to convince Pound of that, in spite of him not giving them the ability to add context. In many ways this situation seems reminiscent of the famous screw-up in communication between Room 40 and the Admiralty before Jutland. A naval officer asking intelligence officers for direct answers to questions without allowing for context, and making bad decisions in spite of good intelligence.
12. But the intelligence was not that well presented or well organized. This scattered presentation of information and timing errors seems so reminiscent of Savo Island, where the information was fragmented, not presented or charted clearly and the idiots in charge just could not collate or anticipate from it and meet Mikawa to send him to the bottom..
McPherson said:
That was USN doctrine, naval common sense, and that is MAHAN.
13. Here, I will develop where Corbett is wrong and Mahan is right.
Also RN doctrine and official Orders of the time:
The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the “Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders” issued by Admiral Tovey in March 1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts should remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, even to attack enemy surface ships. Tovey in his report noted that Convoy PQ17 had already completed more than half its voyage (when the decision to scatter was issued, PQ17 was some eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk) yet had lost only three ships. In his view, the decision to scatter was premature—and disastrous.245
14. Insofar as Corbett is present in the thinking behind the PQ-17 disaster, we have to get inside Sir Dudley's head. Remember "Force Z"? When that "landlubber" Churchill suggested to Sir Dudley that he should intervene and hold up that cretin, Sir Tom Phillips, at Sri Lanka and not allow him to push forward to Singapore, Sir Dudley responded that "The man on the spot should be allowed to make the decision." How did that turn out? Never mind that Admiral Phillips was an idiot, it was Sir Dudley's copy of Backhouse's original Corbett-influenced Singapore Bastion Defense plan, so reminiscent of the WWI power projection nonsense into the Helgoland Bight thinking that resulted in so much RN idiocy in WWI, being repeated in this specific case. Sir Tom lost the whole force doing the Singapore Bastion Defense 2.0. Now understand that Sir Dudley and Sir Tom were fingers aligned in that Tom thought he was executing a reduced version of the Singapore Bastion Defense when he went into the Gulf of Siam and got RIKKOED. This had to have blowback professionally and personally for Sir Dudley. He must have felt responsible and he must have reflected upon it; "If only..."
15. Now we get PQ-17 and Sir Dudley might think he is caught between Churchill and the Germans this time. He has "fear" that if he lets local control happen, that he will have another disaster from a naval battle with the Germans up where the RN is unsupported and not close to AIR COVER as happened to Force Z. What to do? He yellows out. I wrote that. He does not grit his teeth and Mahan through. He Corbetts.
As for Tovey...
Yeah. IOW, he put his finger on the key error. Hamilton and HE should have stayed close to PQ-17 and pushed on those last 800 nautical miles. And been allowed to decide. They had eyes on and it was their call.
In a personal letter to Admiral Sir Percy Noble of the Western Approaches Command on 12 July 1942, Admiral Tovey placed responsibility for the destruction of Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for “scattering of convoy unnecessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the signals they made.” He also sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make clear to them what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out and to those three signals in particular.” Tovey also told the Admiralty on the phone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders to the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all means and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on the spot to decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty’s response was that it “consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s rank.”246 However, this did not absolve Admiral Pound from bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton.
16. See previous remarks. National policy (Avoid disasters, but supply Russia.) and naval theory are not mutually exclusive as long as one understands that sea use and denial IS national policy and not "support the [nebulous and contradictory] national policy by not risking
when risking is not only justified but necessary.
McPherson said:
Damn Julian Corbett and his "support of national policy objectives".
17. You have to trust your navy. Pound had lost faith.
National policy objective was to keep the Russians supplied and avoid having entire convoys sunk. So Corbett is very much in agreement here. This also fits just fine with Corbett's description of command of the sea. To attribute the loss of PQ17 to Corbett seems to be a misunderstanding of both the situation and Corbett.
18. This is one time I counter with "decisive battle". This is the one time that specific small part of Mahan is right. Lose the whole convoy, as long as you GET THE GERMAN SAG and remove it from the plots. Such a rubout would be worth it. It makes pushing PQ-18 after PQ-17 a breeze.
There are still several volumes of Mahan's work I have not yet read, but I have been working my way through them since this first came up on this forum, to try and get the context. Mahan and Corbett disagree in detail, not in general substance, so I have never quite understood the dichotomy you hold them as. Additionally, neither is a panacea and not every action falls neatly into the camp of one or the other. Most assuredly not every successful action can be attributed to Mahanian thinking and not every disaster to Corbettists. It seems to me that such an artificial divide does more to obscure the lessons to be learned than to enhance them?
19. Fisher's follies are Corbett pure and simple. Four Stackers, and the emergency merchant ship programs of WWI and WWII are Mahan. Note the differences?
Regardless, the disaster of PQ17 is, IMO, one of those rare instances when blame can be put almost exclusively on one man. In this case, Pound. He should not have been micromanaging the operation, he should not have been going around the men on the spot and he should not have been ignoring his intelligence officers. If he was going to be involved he should have been considering the context of the situation, he should have been checking his assumptions. And in the end, he should not have ordered the convoy to scatter. Pound would suffer debilitating strokes connected to a brain tumor a year after this. He already suffered from insomnia due to pain in his hip. It is not clear if these things affected his judgement in this case or whether the error was entirely his own, but it was a disastrous error, and it was his error.
20. I think he carried the memory and souvenir of Force Z. He was the Royal Navy's Villeneuve. The ONLY allied admiral as incompetent as he was... was Harold Stark.
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