WI: Beria's Reforms Enacted

What if the reforms that Beria tried to implement before his downfall were actually enacted? It doesn't have to be by Beria himself, he can still die. Those reforms mainly being:
Increased autonomy for the constituent Soviet republics and possibly independence for the Baltic states
Greatly reduced defense spending
Withdrawal from the Eastern European satellite states
The establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Germany
The improvement of relations with the United States with the goal of receiving massive economic aid

I used to think these ideas were great and that they could have saved the Soviet Union, but I've become to strongly doubt that they could have even been achieved regardless of the willingness of the Soviet leadership to implement them.

In regards to the reunification of Germany, the western powers would be extremely reluctant to go along with it. Even as late as 1989 the British and French feared renewed German aggression if it was reunified, so in 1953 they would be even more afraid of that prospect, while the West German leadership didn't want a neutral Germany and preferred it to be integrated with the rest of Western Europe.

In regards to abandoning Eastern Europe, granting independence to the Baltic states and autonomy to the rest of the union republics I am becoming convinced that it would most likely result in the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union exactly like it did decades later. Still if it did happen it wouldn't be that terrible so long as it was as peaceful as the 1991 dissolution was.

Khrushchev actually tried to reduce defence spending but that was ultimately reversed under Brezhnev, if that was at least continued that certainly would have helped the Soviet Union's economic situation.

Finally, even if all these things were achieved and relations with the United States improved, I am almost certain that there would be no massive economic and like Beria hoped. There was no aid in 1991, and in 1953 during the height of McCarthyism there certainly would be no desire to help the Soviet Union no matter how submissive they became.

So am I correct in these suspicions or was there some way they could have been workable?
 
A unified Germany won't happen in a month of sundays at this point,
although the other concessions could be spun as a show of faith in exchange
for some aid I suppose.
 
What if the reforms that Beria tried to implement before his downfall were actually enacted? It doesn't have to be by Beria himself, he can still die. Those reforms mainly being:
Increased autonomy for the constituent Soviet republics and possibly independence for the Baltic states
Greatly reduced defense spending
Withdrawal from the Eastern European satellite states
The establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Germany
The improvement of relations with the United States with the goal of receiving massive economic aid

I used to think these ideas were great and that they could have saved the Soviet Union, but I've become to strongly doubt that they could have even been achieved regardless of the willingness of the Soviet leadership to implement them.

In regards to the reunification of Germany, the western powers would be extremely reluctant to go along with it. Even as late as 1989 the British and French feared renewed German aggression if it was reunified, so in 1953 they would be even more afraid of that prospect, while the West German leadership didn't want a neutral Germany and preferred it to be integrated with the rest of Western Europe.

In regards to abandoning Eastern Europe, granting independence to the Baltic states and autonomy to the rest of the union republics I am becoming convinced that it would most likely result in the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union exactly like it did decades later. Still if it did happen it wouldn't be that terrible so long as it was as peaceful as the 1991 dissolution was.

Khrushchev actually tried to reduce defence spending but that was ultimately reversed under Brezhnev, if that was at least continued that certainly would have helped the Soviet Union's economic situation.

Finally, even if all these things were achieved and relations with the United States improved, I am almost certain that there would be no massive economic and like Beria hoped. There was no aid in 1991, and in 1953 during the height of McCarthyism there certainly would be no desire to help the Soviet Union no matter how submissive they became.

So am I correct in these suspicions or was there some way they could have been workable?
The West would not go along with a unified but neutral Germany. In OTL the West did not respond positively to the Stalin Note (see the Wikipedia entry on this) for various reasons, not all of them benevolent. In any event, ensuring "free" elections is a fraught undertaking. Almost certainly Adenauer's election was "assisted" by the USA; the British Labour government favoured Schumacher.
 
I don't know if I'd base what's possible on the presence of McCarthyites, but if I was going to pick one figure most closely associated with Cold War escalation it would be the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

It's almost it's own sub-topic to imagine how he'd react to the Soviets suddenly backing off. In my head I'm picturing a tug-of-war match where one side suddenly lets go.

On the other hand, that's a LOT of goodies to bring to a negotiating table. Could any reasonable administration afford to be cavalier about this?
 
A unified Germany won't happen in a month of sundays at this point,
although the other concessions could be spun as a show of faith in exchange
for some aid I suppose.

The West would not go along with a unified but neutral Germany. In OTL the West did not respond positively to the Stalin Note (see the Wikipedia entry on this) for various reasons, not all of them benevolent. In any event, ensuring "free" elections is a fraught undertaking. Almost certainly Adenauer's election was "assisted" by the USA; the British Labour government favoured Schumacher.

So regardless of Soviet behavior there was no real solution to the German question, the Soviets would have had to stay in East Germany even if they wanted to let it go?
 
So regardless of Soviet behavior there was no real solution to the German question, the Soviets would have had to stay in East Germany even if they wanted to let it go?

People were that scared of a reunified Germany. Thatcher and Gorbachev tried to prevent reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
 
So regardless of Soviet behavior there was no real solution to the German question, the Soviets would have had to stay in East Germany even if they wanted to let it go?
I think that's about the size of it. The Soviets and the West did not trust each other.....and neither "trusted" a re-unified Germany or would risk it falling into the sphere of the other.
Germany has long been the European problem....and remains so.
 
People were that scared of a reunified Germany. Thatcher and Gorbachev tried to prevent reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

I think that's about the size of it. The Soviets and the West did not trust each other.....and neither "trusted" a re-unified Germany or would risk it falling into the sphere of the other.
Germany has long been the European problem....and remains so.
So when would the earliest chance for German reunification be? Also does anyone have any idea on how the domestic reforms would effect the USSR?
 
So when would the earliest chance for German reunification be? Also does anyone have any idea on how the domestic reforms would effect the USSR?
I think the earliest chance for German reunification is as in OTL. It required a weak/collapsing Soviet Union together with a reasonably non belligerent West. The promise, since broken of course, that NATO would not advance eastwards seems unlikely to have been given with Dulles as US Secretary of State.
 
I think the earliest chance for German reunification is as in OTL. It required a weak/collapsing Soviet Union together with a reasonably non belligerent West. The promise, since broken of course, that NATO would not advance eastwards seems unlikely to have been given with Dulles as US Secretary of State.
Dulles won't be Secretary of State forever. If the Cold War stays over there might be a reunification as early as the late 70s.
 
I think that's about the size of it. The Soviets and the West did not trust each other.....and neither "trusted" a re-unified Germany or would risk it falling into the sphere of the other.
Germany has long been the European problem....and remains so.
And remains so? Huh?
 
What if the reforms that Beria tried to implement before his downfall were actually enacted? It doesn't have to be by Beria himself, he can still die. Those reforms mainly being:
Increased autonomy for the constituent Soviet republics and possibly independence for the Baltic states
Greatly reduced defense spending
Withdrawal from the Eastern European satellite states
The establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Germany
The improvement of relations with the United States with the goal of receiving massive economic aid

In regards to the reunification of Germany, the western powers would be extremely reluctant to go along with it. Even as late as 1989 the British and French feared renewed German aggression if it was reunified, so in 1953 they would be even more afraid of that prospect, while the West German leadership didn't want a neutral Germany and preferred it to be integrated with the rest of Western Europe.

In regards to abandoning Eastern Europe, granting independence to the Baltic states and autonomy to the rest of the union republics I am becoming convinced that it would most likely result in the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union exactly like it did decades later. Still if it did happen it wouldn't be that terrible so long as it was as peaceful as the 1991 dissolution was.

Khrushchev actually tried to reduce defence spending but that was ultimately reversed under Brezhnev, if that was at least continued that certainly would have helped the Soviet Union's economic situation.

So am I correct in these suspicions or was there some way they could have been workable?

They may have given more autonomy to the Soviet republics, but they'd still have the central government in Moscow have at least a fair say in matters. Also, I doubt they would let the Baltic states get independence under non-communist regimes. They'd probably have been "independent" in the Eastern European sense. As for defense spending, they may reduce it, but not too much. When it come to withdrawal from the E Europe satellites, they'd probably not do it without guarantees that they'd still be in the Soviet sphere-it may not be a completer withdrawal, Moscow may still have some people there. As for Germany, many people, including, if not especially the Russians, were not terribly comfortable with the idea. Moscow would insist on a unified Germany not having much in the way of a military, also, they'd no doubt do their best to make sure the KPD (German Communist Party) has a decent amount of power and influence in the German government, with possibly brining it into Moscow's orbit sometime in the future.
 
And remains so? Huh?
Since unification in the 19th century, Germany has been a dynamic and powerful state; much more so than its many neighbouring states. This has brought it into conflict with them; twice catastrophically so.
During the Cold War and partition, West Germany was effectively absorbed into the EU and the threat of a possible hot war with the Warsaw Pact and Germany's membership of NATO dictated its foreign policy. Once the Cold War was finished, and Germany reunified it became by far the most powerful state in Europe. France, once its equal in the Franco-German axis, is now very much the junior partner and EU economic and foreign policy is German driven. Hence the impoverishment of southern Europe by EU economic policy; effectively Bundesbank policy.
Germany no longer feels the need to tread softly; it openly disagrees with US policy towards Russia (unthinkable thirty years ago) and ignores EU treaties when it wishes (Merkel's invitation to the Middle East to seek asylum in Europe contrary to the Dublin treaty). None of this shows much diplomacy; some sort of reaction is inevitable eventually. Probably that will be the break up of the EU into northern and southern groupings.
 
Since unification in the 19th century, Germany has been a dynamic and powerful state; much more so than its many neighbouring states. This has brought it into conflict with them; twice catastrophically so.
During the Cold War and partition, West Germany was effectively absorbed into the EU and the threat of a possible hot war with the Warsaw Pact and Germany's membership of NATO dictated its foreign policy. Once the Cold War was finished, and Germany reunified it became by far the most powerful state in Europe. France, once its equal in the Franco-German axis, is now very much the junior partner and EU economic and foreign policy is German driven. Hence the impoverishment of southern Europe by EU economic policy; effectively Bundesbank policy.
Germany no longer feels the need to tread softly; it openly disagrees with US policy towards Russia (unthinkable thirty years ago) and ignores EU treaties when it wishes (Merkel's invitation to the Middle East to seek asylum in Europe contrary to the Dublin treaty). None of this shows much diplomacy; some sort of reaction is inevitable eventually. Probably that will be the break up of the EU into northern and southern groupings.
Germany got the investment . France did too.. But drained by colonial fighting and trying to maintain some semblance of 1st tier power .

I don't see Germany as the issue In 1914..

All of Europe was in headlong stupid mode
Ww2. Different sorry as Germany left human realities behind for satan

Germany is the economic engine that drives the EU, also no nation should cow tow to the USA, or Russia. Germany is smart enough to know that for the EU to thrive it has to be an independent block, it also has to be fiscally smart. So to the southern tier who seem to be in Detroit mode; the northern tier is I think rightfully concerned

But Germany still a problem or some threat to world stability and peace . No
 
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The old canard about Britain supporting the 2nd strongest power on the continent against the 1st applies to every other European nation too.

Put another way. Would you rather your nation be independent or subservient to Germany? It is not about whether Germany is a direct autocratic threat. Just by being dominant it is a threat. For example, southern Europe suffers from an Euro overpriced compared their historic currencies while Germany benefits. Germany pushes for that state of affairs and generally gets it. If the nations of southern Europe were free from the Euro their citizens could vote for policies more in line with their needs. But the EU doesn't work that way.

At no point am I saying that this is due to evil Germany or anything like that. It is perfectly normal. You can see it in nations where say New York or London have an out sized influence in their respective nations. But for the smaller cities it makes New York or London a problem, and in the the case of the EU where nationalism gets involved... yeah Germany is a problem. But then so are those freeloading southern Europeans who coasted on loans based on that over priced Euro. ;)
 
Fi
Germany got the investment . France did too.. But drained by colonial fighting and trying to maintain some semblance of 1st tier power .

I don't see Germany as the issue In 1914..

All of Europe was in headlong stupid mode
Ww2. Different sorry as Germany left human realities behind for satan

Germany is the economic engine that drives the EU, also no nation should cow tow to the USA, or Russia. Germany is smart enough to know that for the EU to thrive it has to be an independent block, it also has to be fiscally smart. So to the southern tier who seem to be in Detroit mode; the northern tier is I think rightfully concerned

But Germany still a problem or some threat to world stability and peace . No
Fischer disagrees with your view on 1914.

I am not saying Germany is an intentional threat to stability; but it has the eternal difficulty of the wealthy (if I pay, I want things my way....). It is the unintended and unforeseen consequences which are the problem. Which, to get back to the topic, is why German reunification was unlikely to be accepted in the 1950s. Even as a neutral state it would be economically powerful and both sides in the Cold War would seek to pull it into their sphere of influence.
 
Fi

Fischer disagrees with your view on 1914.

I am not saying Germany is an intentional threat to stability; but it has the eternal difficulty of the wealthy (if I pay, I want things my way....). It is the unintended and unforeseen consequences which are the problem. Which, to get back to the topic, is why German reunification was unlikely to be accepted in the 1950s. Even as a neutral state it would be economically powerful and both sides in the Cold War would seek to pull it into their sphere of influence.
Now that I agree . And both sides did bring their sides in.

I also, agree that reunification in the 50s Was a no go.
 
The fundamental problems with the USSR
-Stagnating economic system with a growing defense spending

Something had to give either the economy had to be revitalized or the defence spending had to be reduced.

-Large parts of Eastern Europe wanted out

The other issue is that it is costing the USSR to keep this empire.

-Nationality problem in the USSR

Given a choice these people wanted out.

-Disenchantment with the communism on all levels of society

Communism ultimately fell in the USSR because no significant group wanted it. Interestingly I would say the same as the Tzar in 1917


A lower defence spending and presumably a lower amount of involvement in foreign affairs would give the USSR more time but the stagnating economy issue is still there. German economic growth will be the immediate problem. Eastern Europe economy will turn to the West and start its growth, NATO will move east. All this will have immediate problems in the Baltic states and Ukraine which have strong connections to Eastern Europe without force they will want to leave too. Jews and Russian Germans will want to leave too as in the OTL. As China starts her reforms as in the OTL, the USSR will fall further behind.

Without the enormity of the fear of the Soviet military in this POD compared to the OTL, I cannot see the USSR lasting as long as it did in the OTL.
 
On further consideration, in the highly unlikely Germany had been re-unified, it would probably pivot East in the medium term. It always wanted the resources and markets of Eastern Europe. Indeed it is currently pivoting East; for both the market (not yet very developed) and energy. It may well not comply with Trump's sanctions on Russia; and the EU is developing an alternative to SWIFT so it is independent of US control.
Re-unification in the 50s could form the basis of a German/Russia axis dominating the Mackinder "Heartland " and thus very dominant in geopolitics.
With regard to the effect on the USSR, some introduction of a market economy would presumably raise living standards. Thus although the centralised system probably would not survive there would be close confederation. Prosperity leads to co-operation, poverty to conflict (as the EU is re-discovering....).
The USA would become isolationist (early Trumpism?), presumably Britain would seek to develop the Commonwealth (markets and resources) and maintain more influence in the Middle East ( markets and energy).
 
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