WI Battle of Peachtree Creek is Decisive Confederate Victory

Anaxagoras

Banned
I've been rereading Albert Castel's "Decision in the West", which is the best history of the Atlanta Campaign of 1864, for my money. The section on the Battle of Peachtree Creek got me thinking about the possibility that a decisive Confederate victory there could have had incredibly significant consequences.

Suppose the the Confederate attack against the Army of the Cumberland had been a bit better managed, with Stewart's corps doing slightly better (they almost broke though IOTL, after all). Suppose also that Hardee's corps (which outnumbered the Union troops immediately opposing them by 15,000 to 4,000) had done more effective reconnissance and coodinated better.

IOTL, the attack took the Yankees by surprise, and it was largely due to luck and poor Confederate coordination that they were able to hold their ground. If they had been routed (i.e. suffered the fate of I and XI corps on the 1st day at Gettysburg), they faced the pliht on being on the south side of Peachtree Creek, which has high banks and presents a significant physical obstacle. Conceivably, Union unit cohesion could have broken entirely while attempting to retreat from a victorious Southern attack. The possibility of a major haul of Yankee prisoners is obvious. Indeed, it isn't out of the question that the Army of the Cumberland could have been wrecked as a fighting force.

Strategically, such a Confederate victory would have had immense significance. Sherman's two other armies were moving to the east side of Atlanta, away from the crossing of the Chattahooche River. If the Army of Tennessee had achieved a decisive victory at Peachtree Creek, they would have been closer to the Chattahochee fords than Sherman's main force, presenting the clear possibility of trapping most of Sherman's army on the south bank of the river and cutting them off from their supplies.

Thoughts?
 
Well the problem with getting Peechtree Creek to be a Confederate victory really comes from the change in command right before it. Hood took over a strong, viable army but one that didn't want him as commander, it wanted Joe Johnston, so morale was down. Hood couldn't deploy as quickly as Johnston would have been able to because he had to first deal with the problems changes in command brought and try to win the confidence of his subordinates - something he never really managed.

Because of the problem Hood had to deal with that came from the change of command in the middle of a campaign he was hampered when he had to deploy and fight his first battle. He arrived too late to get the high ground and attacked but was repulsed with heavy casualties.

Had they been able to win even despite the problems Hood faced and despite the late deployment they would have suffered heavy casualties and been unable to exploit his victory. He would have checked the Federal advance but he would still have had to conceed the crossing as the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio threatened his flank.

A Confederate Victory at Peechtree Creek could only really be a brief reprieve from the inevitable seige that was to come.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Well the problem with getting Peechtree Creek to be a Confederate victory really comes from the change in command right before it. Hood took over a strong, viable army but one that didn't want him as commander, it wanted Joe Johnston, so morale was down. Hood couldn't deploy as quickly as Johnston would have been able to because he had to first deal with the problems changes in command brought and try to win the confidence of his subordinates - something he never really managed.

Because of the problem Hood had to deal with that came from the change of command in the middle of a campaign he was hampered when he had to deploy and fight his first battle. He arrived too late to get the high ground and attacked but was repulsed with heavy casualties.

Had they been able to win even despite the problems Hood faced and despite the late deployment they would have suffered heavy casualties and been unable to exploit his victory. He would have checked the Federal advance but he would still have had to conceed the crossing as the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio threatened his flank.

A Confederate Victory at Peechtree Creek could only really be a brief reprieve from the inevitable seige that was to come.

Very good points. Suppose the POD is that Johnston remains in command and launches the Peachtree attack himself. It was his idea, after all.
 
Very good points. Suppose the POD is that Johnston remains in command and launches the Peachtree attack himself. It was his idea, after all.

Then the Confederates might - assuming everyone does as Johnston wants them too (unlike Cassville and Hood) - win a victory that would badly maul the Army of the Cumberland and check the federal advance but would still be forced to deploy against the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio to prevent his flank being turned.

Even if Johnston loses the battle of Peechtree Creek he will have deployed earlier than Hood did and have been able to fall on the Army of the Cumberland as it crossed the creek. He would thus have inflicted heavy casaulties on that Army and delivered a sever blow to the federals even though he would have been forced to give up the crossing. Even so the Federals might feel gaining the crossing and forcing Johnston to withdraw worth the casaulties but still it would be proof of Johnston's willingness to fight and his job would be saved at least until the fate of Atlanta had been decided.

The advantage in manpower that served Sherman so well during the Atlanta Campaign would continue to serve his purposes at Peechtree Creek. While Johnston should be able to deliver a sever blow to Sherman's largest Army, even if he failed to check it's advance, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio were already moving and if Johnston does nothing to counter them then his position would become untenable in short order.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The advantage in manpower that served Sherman so well during the Atlanta Campaign would continue to serve his purposes at Peechtree Creek. While Johnston should be able to deliver a sever blow to Sherman's largest Army, even if he failed to check it's advance, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio were already moving and if Johnston does nothing to counter them then his position would become untenable in short order.

Well, IOTL, even Hood was able to hold Atlanta for more than a month after Peachtree Creek. If Johnston remained in command and won a decisive victory at Peachtree Creek (as well as not losing thousands of men in the battles of July 22 and 26), he could possibily have held it for considerably longer.
 
Well, IOTL, even Hood was able to hold Atlanta for more than a month after Peachtree Creek. If Johnston remained in command and won a decisive victory at Peachtree Creek (as well as not losing thousands of men in the battles of July 22 and 26), he could possibily have held it for considerably longer.

That's very true. For one thing, he might have had enough men to hold the vital rail junction at Jonesboro, which was captured by Sherman on September 1 in OTL. And Atlanta will hold out as long as that rail line can be kept open.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
That's very true. For one thing, he might have had enough men to hold the vital rail junction at Jonesboro, which was captured by Sherman on September 1 in OTL. And Atlanta will hold out as long as that rail line can be kept open.

Indeed. Now, could this have had a serious impact on the outcome of the war, either by affecting the Northern presidential election or giving the Confederates the chance to attack Sherman's supply lines, as Johnston's proponents usually assert?
 
Indeed. Now, could this have had a serious impact on the outcome of the war, either by affecting the Northern presidential election or giving the Confederates the chance to attack Sherman's supply lines, as Johnston's proponents usually assert?

It depends on whether Atlanta can be held through November...which is still by no means certain. The rail junction at Jonesboro might not fall in September, but it's still 2 months until the election.

But, assuming Atlanta can be held until the election has passed, I think it probably would affect the election. It was the victory at Atlanta which served as the counterpoint to the seemingly pointless slaughter in Virginia and which the Northern people could look at and think...we can win this thing. Lincoln himself was convinced, prior to the fall of Atlanta, that he would not be re-elected. If election day comes and both of the major Union armies are embroiled in prolonged sieges that seem to be going nowhere, Lincoln probably loses.
 
Indeed. Now, could this have had a serious impact on the outcome of the war, either by affecting the Northern presidential election or giving the Confederates the chance to attack Sherman's supply lines, as Johnston's proponents usually assert?

During the Atlanta Campaign Johnston requested no fewer than six times in writing that all Cavalry/Mounted Units out West not assigned to the Army of Tennessee be assaigned to the command of Nathan Bedford Forrest and released on Sherman's line of supply and communications. Four of these were routed through Braxton Bragg which, him being in full blown vendetta mode, can be assumed never reached Davis and the last two written requested were sent directly to Davis.

He did not release Wheeler Cavalry Corps - the Cavalry of the Army of Tennessee - for two reason. One, Wheelers Cavalry was needed to help him block the advance of Sherman's Armies (it could block one Army while Hardee's, Hood's, Polk's and later Stewart's Corps could block another Army and attempt to block the last) and two, Wheeler had shown no ability to assume effective command of a force independent from the Army and Johnston doubted his abilities to be effective on his own (he didn't trust Wheeler because Wheeler had refused to scout around Dalton and Resaca because he wanted to find a Federal force to fight and Johnston was sure that Wheeler would simply go off looking for a fight if left to his own devises).

Johnston may have released one of his infantry Corps had he been able to reorganise the Army of Tennessee into a three Corps system at Dalton before Polk joined him (back before Davis picked Hood to command the second Corps) and sent it to threaten the Federal lines of supply and communication but its unlikely. A three and later Four Corps Army of Tennessee would have made Johnston's Army more flexible and the defense more fluid but he failed to convince Davis of this when he took over command from Hardee.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
During the Atlanta Campaign Johnston requested no fewer than six times in writing that all Cavalry/Mounted Units out West not assigned to the Army of Tennessee be assaigned to the command of Nathan Bedford Forrest and released on Sherman's line of supply and communications. Four of these were routed through Braxton Bragg which, him being in full blown vendetta mode, can be assumed never reached Davis and the last two written requested were sent directly to Davis.

Bragg and Davis both hated Johnston. The question is whether their personal animosity towards him impacted their decision-making during the campaign. Are we to assume that, if Lee or some other general whom Davis/Bragg liked (or at least didn't dislike) were in Johnston's place and had requested that Forrest be sent to attack Sherman's supply line, the order would have been given?
 
Bragg and Davis both hated Johnston. The question is whether their personal animosity towards him impacted their decision-making during the campaign. Are we to assume that, if Lee or some other general whom Davis/Bragg liked (or at least didn't dislike) were in Johnston's place and had requested that Forrest be sent to attack Sherman's supply line, the order would have been given?

It's possible but another reason is that Davis may have been more interested in defending Mississippi and Alabama.

Leonidas Polk bringing 20,000 men into Georgia had helped Johnston but left Mississippi and Alabama defended by only about 10,000 men under S.D. Lee and whatever Cavalry Forrest could muster which, before he went into Tennessee, was about 3,500 men.

Davis may have seen Forrest and his men as indispensible for the defense of Alabama and Mississippi but his mutual animosity with Johnston does make you wonder whether hewas motivated by that animosity.
 
Top