WI Battle of Franklin Not Botched?

[Elfwine]

The army with which Thomas fought the Battle of Nashville two weeks after Franklin was about 50,000 strong. Of these, about 20,000 were Schofield's men who had fought at Franklin and two divisions (IIRC) of about 10,000 men were from Missouri and did not arrive at Nashville until after Franklin. The remaining 20,000 were generally inexperienced and not well trained and the cavalry lacked horses.

Good enough to hold fortifications, though.

So, assuming that Hood somehow pulls off a magical victory at Spring Hill and captures Schofield's entire force without much loss to himself, his 35,000 hardened veterans would be faced with 20,000 less experienced men at Nashville. But the defenses of Nashville were probably stronger than any other city in Federal hands aside from Washington itself and reinforcements were on their way. Even if he had a best-case-scenario that allowed him to deploy superior numbers and better troops against Thomas, I don't see Hood gaining control of Nashville. Its fortifications were just too strong.

And Thomas too good a commander - even in the miracle scenario, the AoT is going to be facing at best 3 to 2ish odds in its favor, which would take either troops or commanders or both that would be easily stampeded to be confident of beating even if we're talking no fortifications at all.

I can only assume Hood operated on the principle that he would do all he could, and God would supply the rest - because otherwise him being high as a kite at Franklin and/or raging mad are less insulting to his character than the idea that he was lucid and tried the 1% chance of success tactic (possibly the best if Franklin had to be fought, but it only had to be fought because Hood launched this loony campaign in the first place) anyway.

And let's say - somehow - Hood manages to bag Nashville's garrison, with his army still at 30,000 strong.

Somehow. Angels come down and fight for the Confederacy. A handful of a-bombs land on Nashville. Thomas gets replaced by a resurrected Dixon Miles. Whatever it is, Hood gets his miracle.


That's almost entirely meaningless in accomplishing anything with any impact on the war. Hood is far out in left field so far as even temporally interfering with any major Federal operations, and that's the good news for the poor AoT.

 

[Anaxagoras]

And Thomas too good a commander - even in the miracle scenario, the AoT is going to be facing at best 3 to 2ish odds in its favor, which would take either troops or commanders or both that would be easily stampeded to be confident of beating even if we're talking no fortifications at all.

Agreed. Thomas was literally the best general the Union had.

And let's say - somehow - Hood manages to bag Nashville's garrison, with his army still at 30,000 strong.

Somehow. Angels come down and fight for the Confederacy. A handful of a-bombs land on Nashville. Thomas gets replaced by a resurrected Dixon Miles. Whatever it is, Hood gets his miracle.


That's almost entirely meaningless in accomplishing anything with any impact on the war. Hood is far out in left field so far as even temporally interfering with any major Federal operations, and that's the good news for the poor AoT.

Again agreed. Once Lincoln won reelection, there was no hope for the Confederacy at all. Even the best case scenario would only prolong resistance for a few months longer than OTL.

 

[Elfwine]

Agreed. Thomas was literally the best general the Union had.

I have trouble comparing him to Grant - the Vicksburg Campaign was a splendid performance once Grant got over the river, and I'm not entirely sure how Thomas would do there - but I won't argue the point.

Sufficient to say, Thomas never let his superiors or his men down. That's an unequaled record in the ACW.

Again agreed. Once Lincoln won reelection, there was no hope for the Confederacy at all. Even the best case scenario would only prolong resistance for a few months longer than OTL.

Yeah. But to make things worse, even if Lincoln wasn't reelected, anyone willing to carry on the war can render it meaningless what the AoT does in its namesake state.


Hood would actually be more likely to cause problems if he tried to get his army to Texas than in Tennessee. And that's just terrible.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Hood would actually be more likely to cause problems if he tried to get his army to Texas than in Tennessee. And that's just terrible.

I think the Army of Tennessee would fall apart long before they even got to the Mississippi River. Desertion really became a problem after the Northern election (before which the Southern troops still had some hopes of victory). When it became obvious that the army was trying to get to the Trans-Mississippi, huge numbers of troops from Georgia, Tennessee, and other states east of the river would simply disappear in the night. And even if they somehow got to the river, how would they get across in the face of Union gunboat patrols? After all, the Yankees can use the river to move troops back and forth far more quickly and easily than the Confederates can march. And even if the Army of Tennessee somehow got across the river and made it to Texas, how could it be be properly supplied with weapons and ammunition?

 

[Elfwine]

I think the Army of Tennessee would fall apart long before they even got to the Mississippi River. Desertion really became a problem after the Northern election (before which the Southern troops still had some hopes of victory). When it became obvious that the army was trying to get to the Trans-Mississippi, huge numbers of troops from Georgia, Tennessee, and other states east of the river would simply disappear in the night. And even if they somehow got to the river, how would they get across in the face of Union gunboat patrols? After all, the Yankees can use the river to move troops back and forth far more quickly and easily than the Confederates can march. And even if the Army of Tennessee somehow got across the river and made it to Texas, how could it be be properly supplied with weapons and ammunition?

I'm not arguing with any of this, but do you really think OTL was have been any better?

 

[Anaxagoras]

I'm not arguing with any of this, but do you really think OTL was have been any better?

Actually, your scenario would be better because it would cost far fewer lives.

 

[usertron2020]

Agreed. Thomas was literally the best general the Union had.

Defensively, yes. And the ACW was a defensive war. Offensively? Not if you add the time element. He wasn't cautious per se, but in some ways very comparable to Bernard Law Montgomery, the best Allied general in WWII IMHO. Thomas generally took forever to attack (and why Grant held him in disfavor), but when he finally did attack, he did so with the fury of lightening and the roar of thunder.

And Thomas did have the honor of being the only general in the ACW to destroy an enemy army in the field of battle.

I have trouble comparing him to Grant - the Vicksburg Campaign was a splendid performance once Grant got over the river, and I'm not entirely sure how Thomas would do there - but I won't argue the point. (1)

Sufficient to say, Thomas never let his superiors or his men down. That's an unequaled record in the ACW. (2)

1) I will. Thomas was a magnificent army commander, but it was Grant who became one of the only two generals in the ACW to master the art of commanding army groups. Sherman being the other.

2) True. Sad that his career suffered for so long due to being both a Virginian and stuck under poor commanders

 

[Elfwine]

Defensively, yes. And the ACW was a defensive war. Offensively? Not if you add the time element. He wasn't cautious per se, but in some ways very comparable to Bernard Law Montgomery, the best Allied general in WWII IMHO. Thomas generally took forever to attack (and why Grant held him in disfavor), but when he finally did attack, he did so with the fury of lightening and the roar of thunder.

And Thomas did have the honor of being the only general in the ACW to destroy an enemy army in the field of battle.

This is true. Thomas wasn't the kind of cautious of You Know Who or even Buell IMO, but while a Grant might do something just "to do something" (I forget his exact words), Thomas would never do that.

But once he got moving - as you said. Thomas's through preparations paved the way for mighty blows.

1) I will. Thomas was a magnificent army commander, but it was Grant who became one of the only two generals in the ACW to master the art of commanding army groups. Sherman being the other.

Thomas never had a chance to command an army group, though. But I will give Grant major kudos for being able to do so - that took skills he's still rarely given sufficient credit for.

Sherman had the good fortune, IMO, to have a good #2 (in effect) in Thomas who could handle the fighting (although his preference for McPherson seems to have limited how much this showed) - but army group command played to his strengths.

And poor battlefield general or not, Sherman was no slouch at the rest of high command.

2) True. Sad that his career suffered for so long due to being both a Virginian and stuck under poor commanders

Yeah. His uncharacteristically bitter comment about his late promotion major general in the regular army comes to mind.

I don't think it would have mattered a whole lot to the war for him to be promoted faster, but Thomas was the very best army commander of the war (if we count Grant for 'best army group commander").

Slow or not, he was (to quote Sherman) "true as steel".

That Hood seriously thought he could beat someone like that speaks volumes of his ignorance - or madness.

 

[Anaxagoras]

This is true. Thomas wasn't the kind of cautious of You Know Who or even Buell IMO, but while a Grant might do something just "to do something" (I forget his exact words), Thomas would never do that.

You'd never get a Cold Harbor or a Chickasaw Bluffs with Thomas in command, clearly.

And poor battlefield general or not, Sherman was no slouch at the rest of high command.

He was a master of logistics, true enough. But he's overrated as a strategist. On two occasions, Sherman made unforgivably critical mistakes. In July, while approaching Atlanta, Sherman dvidided his forces in two - the Army of the Cumberland moving south directly towards Atlanta while the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio moved eastwards to cut the railroad to Augusta. In doing so, in gave the Confederates an opportunity to defeat the Union forces in detail by concentrating almost all their forces against only a portion of his own, as the two forces were so far apart that they could not support one another. Only Hood's poor execution of the attack at Peachtree Creek allowed the Union to escape a potential disaster. You can argue that Sherman could trust Thomas to handle himself, but it was still a terrible risk given the strategic and political situation.

The second error was even more unforgivable. When Atlanta fell, the Army of Tennessee was split into different parts, demoralized, and two corps had just been badly beaten up at Jonesboro. Sherman had his forces concentrated with the exception of a single corps near Atlanta. All Sherman had to do was move forward with his forces and he would have crushed the Army of Tennessee like a pea under a sledgehammer. Instead, he inexplicably broke off the campaign and retired with all his troops into Atlanta. The war in the West could have ended in the summer of 1864, which possibly could have ended the war altogether before the end of the year.

 

[Elfwine]

He was a master of logistics, true enough. But he's overrated as a strategist. On two occasions, Sherman made unforgivably critical mistakes. In July, while approaching Atlanta, Sherman dvidided his forces in two - the Army of the Cumberland moving south directly towards Atlanta while the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio moved eastwards to cut the railroad to Augusta. In doing so, in gave the Confederates an opportunity to defeat the Union forces in detail by concentrating almost all their forces against only a portion of his own, as the two forces were so far apart that they could not support one another. Only Hood's poor execution of the attack at Peachtree Creek allowed the Union to escape a potential disaster. You can argue that Sherman could trust Thomas to handle himself, but it was still a terrible risk given the strategic and political situation.

I'm not going to defend the second, but given the size of the Army of the Cumberland (at least two thirds the AoT, possibly more), it would have been difficult even for a better general than Hood to deal any disaster to it.

The AoT has a terrible record of losses on the attack from Shiloh on no matter what the odds it had.

I think if Sherman was going to do this he should have had the other half of the army more effectively employed - but I think counting this as a blunder is like counting Lee splitting his army (at Chancellosrville) more than say, Rosecrans pre Chattanooga (where no one part was equal to a substantial part of the Confederate army).

Still. This is not great strategy, I won't deny that.

And neither was his failure to take advantage of Joe Johnston's mistakes earlier in the year to do more than outflank him - a Grant would have tried for a kill in movements that Sherman was content just to push him back.

 

[usertron2020]

In terms of leadership, winning record, and morale, the AoT was the AotP of the west. Without a Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, Spotsylvania Courthouse, or race for Petersburg to their credit.