WI - Barbarossa repelled

Deleted member 1487

No, I don't. To start with, the portion of German generals who were willing to oppose Hitler even when things got to that level of catastrophe historically proved to be a fringe minority: the vast majority were happy to continue marching behind their fuhrer as they had been since they assisted him in driving out the people with the actual legal power to oppose his warmongering decisions in 1938.
Because the military had been ideologically purged of people who were explicitly anti-Hitler starting in 1932 when von Hindenburg appointed von Blomberg. Blomberg was pro-Hitler until the Hossbach conference, but since he had been firing officers and soldiers who were anti-Hitler or even just not supportive enough when his turn came for purging he had eliminated pretty much anyone with the will to fight for him against Hitler. Then when Hitler took over the War Minister position it just reinforced his supremacy in terms of military and national command. By that point largely the generals were handpicked for their regime loyalty or at least willingness to take bribes to support him. Everything after that was just enhancing Hitler's control over the command apparatus, which is why there was so little pushback when he took over OKH too.

Its a very similar reason to how the purges kept Stalin in power no matter how bad things got at the front IOTL.
 
Because the military had been ideologically purged of people who were explicitly anti-Hitler starting in 1932 when von Hindenburg appointed von Blomberg.

Much of the same command staff who existed as 1938 began were already in significant positions in 1932. Rather, what really happened is Hitler politically bought off the German military's loyalty, who already sympathized with his authoritarian and ultranationalist ideals even if they had suspicions of the more populist aspects of Nazis ideology, with the Night of the Long Knives and rearmament. Once established, that loyalty proved remarkably robust.

Blomberg was pro-Hitler until the Hossbach conference, but since he had been firing officers and soldiers who were anti-Hitler or even just not supportive enough when his turn came for purging he had eliminated pretty much anyone with the will to fight for him against Hitler.

Many of the appointments Blomberg made after the Hossbach Conference were done in attempts to get soldiers who were thought to be both willing and able to oppose Hitler's schemes in positions of power and were done in close consultation with other figures in senior positions who also opposed Hitler's scehemes, like Fritsch and Beck. The problem was they proved really bad at it, repeatedly misjudging how well Hitler had gained the rest of the military's support and hence the willingness and/or ability of these appointees to oppose Hitler. That's how Keitel (who outdid his predeceesor in terms of loyalty to Hitler) and Brautitsch (who proved unwilling to muster any opposition) got their positions (Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," pg 34-42). After Blomberg and Fritsch were ultimately fired on trumped up charges, Beck all the way into the summer of 1938 when he made repeated presentations and direct appeals to other fellow officers, but while they never outright denounced him, they also refused to back him up and instead stated that Blomberg should work with Hitler's designs instead of opposing him because they did not believe Hitler's plans would result in the war Beck (quite correctly) feared they were. In the end, Beck was not purged: instead he resigned in the hopes of provoking others to follow him. Nobody did.

The army did not become supportive of Hitler because the anti-Hitler figures were purged in 1932. Really, what happened was that it was the other way around: the army became supportive of Hitler and thus assisted him in the purging of anti-Hitler figures in 1938.

Its a very similar reason to how the purges kept Stalin in power no matter how bad things got at the front IOTL.

Similar, yes. But not quite the same for the reasons I've highlighted above. Regardless, it doesn't really matter when it comes to the core point: by '41, Hitler's position is pretty well solidified and Barbarossa going even worse then OTL is a bit late to truly undermine it without serious consequences vis-à-vis the Eastern Front.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Much of the same command staff who existed as 1938 began were already in significant positions in 1932. Rather, what really happened is Hitler politically bought off the German military's loyalty, who already sympathized with his authoritarian and ultranationalist ideals even if they had suspicions of the more populist aspects of Nazis ideology, with the Night of the Long Knives and rearmament. Once established, that loyalty proved remarkably robust.
They were subsequently promoted to higher command positions because of their willingness to work with the regime. Since people in significant positions in 1932 were the pool to be drawn from for higher positions, it would make sense that they would be men off the street, especially as Hitler wasn't willing to explicitly politicize the army for fear of alienating them. Certainly many if not most of the older school conservative military types were sympathetic to Hitler's anti-communism, willingness to purge the SA, desire to expand the military and go after Versailles, as well as bribe them, while those that were too politically problematic were purged by von Blomberg from 1932-37. So much so that Hitler had to get him to cut back on it in 1934 given the military expansion. The loyalty was generally robust because of the ongoing bribes, careers owed to Hitler, and of course knowing that they already sold their souls, so backing out late in the process was only something a few could apparently muster and only when Hitler was a confirmed loser.

Many of the appointments Blomberg made after the Hossbach Conference were done in attempts to get soldiers who were thought to be both willing and able to oppose Hitler's schemes in positions of power and were done in close consultation with other figures in senior positions who also opposed Hitler's scehemes, like Fritsch and Beck. The problem was they proved really bad at it, repeatedly misjudging how well Hitler had gained the rest of the military's support and hence the willingness and/or ability of these appointees to oppose Hitler. That's how Keitel (who outdid his predeceesor in terms of loyalty to Hitler) and Brautitsch (who proved unwilling to muster any opposition) got their positions (Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Inside Hitler's High Command," pg 34-42). After Blomberg and Fritsch were ultimately fired on trumped up charges, Beck all the way into the summer of 1938 when he made repeated presentations and direct appeals to other fellow officers, but while they never outright denounced him, they also refused to back him up and instead stated that Blomberg should work with Hitler's designs instead of opposing him because they did not believe Hitler's plans would result in the war Beck (quite correctly) feared they were. In the end, Beck was not purged: instead he resigned in the hopes of provoking others to follow him. Nobody did.
Too little too late. Little did they realize just how much they screwed themselves during 'Gleichschaltung'.

The army did not become supportive of Hitler because the anti-Hitler figures were purged in 1932. Really, what happened was that it was the other way around: the army became supportive of Hitler and thus assisted him in the purging of anti-Hitler figures in 1938.
The army became support of Hitler because it was groomed ahead of time to be prepared to work with him by the appointment of von Blomberg and then after all the things Hitler did to buy their loyalty (promotions, bribes, overturning Versailles) and von Blomberg did from 1933 and on in terms of purging officers that were considered 'problematic' meant that by 1938 von Blomberg had left himself without anyone within the military willing to stand with him when he tried to oppose Hitler and of course scandalized the 'proper gentleman' of the officer corps by marrying a woman 'with a past'; things like public image did actually matter in that age and place to such a socially conservative organization and culture.

Similar, yes. But not quite the same for the reasons I've highlighted above. Regardless, it doesn't really matter when it comes to the core point: by '41, Hitler's position is pretty well solidified and Barbarossa going even worse then OTL is a bit late to truly undermine it without serious consequences vis-à-vis the Eastern Front.
True and agreed. To even get the relatively anemic resistance movement within the military as of 1944 required multiple major military disasters over years...though to be fair that resistance was somewhat hampered by the Allies demanding unconditional surrender even privately (in 1943) when they clandestinely inquired about a negotiated deal if they removed Hitler first.
 
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