WI: Barbarossa delayed, Soviets attack Germany in 1942

Deleted member 1487

Were the panzer do in Africa ?
Pardon? If you mean what do they do then they attack Egypt. I think the Germans would send 3rd and 7th Panzer divisions ITTL and later a motorized division. Rommel already knew 7th Panzer and 3rd Panzer contributed it's Panzer regiment IOTL to form 5th light division, but with no Barbarossa there is no reason not to send the division. Supporting them would probably be Kesselring's 2nd air fleet as they did in 1942, but ITTL without Barbarossa it isn't needed for Russia in 1941. The Balkans campaign and Greece can happen as per OTL. Except another air fleet would be based in the Aegean after Crete is seized instead of moving X. Fliegerkorps there away from Malta. Without moving Luftwaffe bombers off of Malta in May 1941 then Malta falls in June due to the supply situation; the Brits had written it off and refused to send any ships to supply it as it was too risky with the German anti-shipping air unit was in Sicily; once it left they could send more fighters and fix up the airfields and send modern fighters and radar. The Malta because a fortress and offensive base. Instead with full Luftwaffe commitment Malta surrenders in June due to unremitting bombing and Royal Navy refusal to send supply ships. That means Rommel doesn't start experiencing the supply famine from July 1941 on, so can assault Torbuk in August at the latest. Then they can rip up British forces on the Libyan-Egyptian border before they can build up for Operation Crusader.

Thanks to no Malta, plus Crete as an offensive base and a weaker British force with even less experience and no way for the Brits to risk a convoy through the Central Mediterranean to Egypt with AFV reinforcements as per OTL (Tiger Convoys) means that Rommel can take Egypt before the end of 1941 and threaten to open a Middle Eastern Front. The Aegean air bases can be used to really hurt the Brits, especially if Rommel is on the Nile Delta and canal, preventing British supplies from reaching Cyprus and Palestine via the Red Sea. That means an even longer detour to Basra in the Persian Gulf and then shipments by rail from Iraq to Palestine. The Mediterranean Fleet for the Royal Navy would base out of Cyprus if Alexandria fell (their OTL plan in 1942), which means it is trapped and can even be attacked by air from Rhodes and Crete. So come 1942 the Germans might well be deep in the Middle East with major forces so when a Soviet attack comes they can't pull Rommel out, they have to leave him and remove half of any Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean. Of course if Egypt falls only 1 German air fleet would be needed in the Eastern Mediterranean to support him, rather than one in Sicily and one in Greece. Italy could handle the Central Mediterranean once Malta fell. Britain might be on the edge of making peace if it had not already due to the loss of Egypt and threat to the Middle East.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Mrstrategy

Banned
Pardon? If you mean what do they do then they attack Egypt. I think the Germans would send 3rd and 7th Panzer divisions ITTL and later a motorized division. Rommel already knew 7th Panzer and 3rd Panzer contributed it's Panzer regiment IOTL to form 5th light division, but with no Barbarossa there is no reason not to send the division. Supporting them would probably be Kesselring's 2nd air fleet as they did in 1942, but ITTL without Barbarossa it isn't needed for Russia in 1941. The Balkans campaign and Greece can happen as per OTL. Except another air fleet would be based in the Aegean after Crete is seized instead of moving X. Fliegerkorps there away from Malta. Without moving Luftwaffe bombers off of Malta in May 1941 then Malta falls in June due to the supply situation; the Brits had written it off and refused to send any ships to supply it as it was too risky with the German anti-shipping air unit was in Sicily; once it left they could send more fighters and fix up the airfields and send modern fighters and radar. The Malta because a fortress and offensive base. Instead with full Luftwaffe commitment Malta surrenders in June due to unremitting bombing and Royal Navy refusal to send supply ships. That means Rommel doesn't start experiencing the supply famine from July 1941 on, so can assault Torbuk in August at the latest. Then they can rip up British forces on the Libyan-Egyptian border before they can build up for Operation Crusader.

Thanks to no Malta, plus Crete as an offensive base and a weaker British force with even less experience and no way for the Brits to risk a convoy through the Central Mediterranean to Egypt with AFV reinforcements as per OTL (Tiger Convoys) means that Rommel can take Egypt before the end of 1941 and threaten to open a Middle Eastern Front. The Aegean air bases can be used to really hurt the Brits, especially if Rommel is on the Nile Delta and canal, preventing British supplies from reaching Cyprus and Palestine via the Red Sea. That means an even longer detour to Basra in the Persian Gulf and then shipments by rail from Iraq to Palestine. The Mediterranean Fleet for the Royal Navy would base out of Cyprus if Alexandria fell (their OTL plan in 1942), which means it is trapped and can even be attacked by air from Rhodes and Crete. So come 1942 the Germans might well be deep in the Middle East with major forces so when a Soviet attack comes they can't pull Rommel out, they have to leave him and remove half of any Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean. Of course if Egypt falls only 1 German air fleet would be needed in the Eastern Mediterranean to support him, rather than one in Sicily and one in Greece. Italy could handle the Central Mediterranean once Malta fell. Britain might be on the edge of making peace if it had not already due to the loss of Egypt and threat to the Middle East.
Why did the British base on Cyprus instead of leaving mediaterranean and prevent being stuck in mediateranean
 

Deleted member 1487

Why did the British base on Cyprus instead of leaving mediaterranean and prevent being stuck in mediateranean
No idea, just what I've seen written in histories. I guess they were optimistic and wanted to continue to contest the mediterranean and felt they could keep up supply via Palestine and the rail line to Iraq.
 
I highly doubt the Soviets could effectively train millions of reservists to reasonable levels given how they effectively couldn't IOTL for the 800k reservists called up in May 1941.

Those 800K were called up only a month in advance of Barbarossa, took a month to reach their formations, and then Barbarossa immediately broke out. There was no time to do remedial training. ITTL, there will be about a month. More if Stalin decides for extra preparation time.

I don't know how well equipped they'd really be either in 11 months given how much effort needed to be put into reequipping a 5 million man standing army with modern equipment.

They'll certainly be better equipped then the OTL 1941 reservist formations. Even if their given the hand-me-downs of equipment being phased out of the standing army, that will still leave them better equipped then they were OTL '41 when all that equipment was largely destroyed along the border.

I didn't say air power alone would, just that air power would be a critical component to stopping the VVS and superior Soviet armor either by direct attack or interdiction of their supply lines.

Direct attack would be disruptive, but unless immediately followed up by ground assault would deal little damage against the better trained and psychologically prepared Soviet forces. Interdiction of supply lines would be more significant, but the Luftwaffe in that mission would be inhibited in that by the improved VVS and Soviet air defenses. They'll contribute, but the most critical aspect will be German ground forces.

Ground forces would also be a vital component and would be greatly aided by the Vistula and terrain of East Prussia.

In all likelihood, the Soviets won't make it to the Vistula. Their remaining tactical defaults and the fact they'll still be facing the bulk of German combat forces means the Germans will be able to effectively absorb the blow and halt the Soviet spearheads at a very shallow depth.

Would those be ready by May-June 1942?

Uncertain. A prototype had been completed and there were tentative plans to conduct, but I don't know.

I mean if anything they would just be what the Maus was for the Germans: a major aerial target and resource sink that takes away from viable projects.

More a cruder, premature King Tiger... I do agree that it probably wouldn't matter all that much.

The better question is how many T-34Ms and KV-1s/2s would be available by summer 1942?

I don't know about the T-34M, but I have seen Glantz give a figure of 5,000 T-34 Mod 1941s and KV-1/2s, although if he doesn't break that down. Since the T-34M was supposed to be in full production in October 1941, working off the T-34 Mod 1941s production figures pre-Barbarossa and not accounting for the impact of both model switch-overs and ramp-up, that would work out to ~1,400 T-34Ms by May 1942. I don't know how production ramp-up and switch-over would affect that, so eh... I'll throw a dart and say ~1,500. That's a total of ~6,500 T-34s and KV-1/2s. The remaining gaps in the TO&E would probably be filled in by BT-7Ms and T-50s until more T-34Ms coming off the assembly line. The T-26s, early-series BTs, T-28s, A-30/32s, and so-on likely get shoved into reservist and training formations.

If you mean what do they do then they attack Egypt. I think the Germans would send 3rd and 7th Panzer divisions ITTL and later a motorized division.

And fail, because the logistical infrastructure in North Africa to support an advance into Egypt from Libya even with the OTL Afrika Korps doesn't exist. Adding the 3rd and 7th Panzer means the German offensive chokes out faster, regardless of what happens in regards to Malta and the sea lanes and British Med convoys (the convoys around the Cape of Good Hope were, IIRC, the primary means with which the British kept their forces in North Africa supplied). The idea of Rommel taking Alexandria, much less Egypt, out of Libya remains in the realm of fantasy.
 

Deleted member 1487

Those 800K were called up only a month in advance of Barbarossa, took a month to reach their formations, and then Barbarossa immediately broke out. There was no time to do remedial training. ITTL, there will be about a month. More if Stalin decides for extra preparation time.

They'll certainly be better equipped then the OTL 1941 reservist formations. Even if their given the hand-me-downs of equipment being phased out of the standing army, that will still leave them better equipped then they were OTL '41 when all that equipment was largely destroyed along the border.
Its a minor point not really worth quibbling over, those reserves would have a combat value much less than standing troops built up over 1941, with worse equipment and be used for flank guards and replacements for existing units.

Direct attack would be disruptive, but unless immediately followed up by ground assault would deal little damage against the better trained and psychologically prepared Soviet forces. Interdiction of supply lines would be more significant, but the Luftwaffe in that mission would be inhibited in that by the improved VVS and Soviet air defenses. They'll contribute, but the most critical aspect will be German ground forces.
The Soviet 1942 offensive would be like a bigger, bloodier 2nd Kharkov with worse results for the Soviets. The Luftwaffe was a critical element of shattering that and with the fight on German turf they will have a massive advantage in the air thanks to pre-war German airbases, excellent supply lines, FLAK and radar networks, and poor Soviet power projection abilities.

In all likelihood, the Soviets won't make it to the Vistula. Their remaining tactical defaults and the fact they'll still be facing the bulk of German combat forces means the Germans will be able to effectively absorb the blow and halt the Soviet spearheads at a very shallow depth.
Agreed, but perhaps the Germans will draw them in to deepen the pockets and make the riposte more damaging.

I don't know about the T-34M, but I have seen Glantz give a figure of 5,000 T-34 Mod 1941s and KV-1/2s, although if he doesn't break that down. Since the T-34M was supposed to be in full production in October 1941, working off the T-34 Mod 1941s production figures pre-Barbarossa and not accounting for the impact of both model switch-overs and ramp-up, that would work out to ~1,400 T-34Ms by May 1942. I don't know how production ramp-up and switch-over would affect that, so eh... I'll throw a dart and say ~1,500. That's a total of ~6,500 T-34s and KV-1/2s. The remaining gaps in the TO&E would probably be filled in by BT-7Ms and T-50s until more T-34Ms coming off the assembly line. The T-26s, early-series BTs, T-28s, A-30/32s, and so-on likely get shoved into reservist and training formations.
Seems reasonable.

And fail, because the logistical infrastructure in North Africa to support an advance into Egypt from Libya even with the OTL Afrika Korps doesn't exist. Adding the 3rd and 7th Panzer means the German offensive chokes out faster, regardless of what happens in regards to Malta and the sea lanes and British Med convoys (the convoys around the Cape of Good Hope were, IIRC, the primary means with which the British kept their forces in North Africa supplied). The idea of Rommel taking Alexandria, much less Egypt, out of Libya remains in the realm of fantasy.
We've already been over the major problems in van Creweld's 'analysis' of the logistics of north africa. It isn't worth the paper it is printed on because he gets very basic facts wrong about Axis port capacity and how much damage Malta had done to Axis shipping. He states maximum capacities for Axis port in Libya and totally ignored the month of June 1941 when those very ports took in double what he said was their absolute maximum.
This book even specifically calls out his errors and provided numbers refuting a number of his claims:
https://www.amazon.com/British-Strategic-1925-43-Military-History/dp/0415649862

Also in 1942 Egypt was invaded by a larger force than Rommel had in 1941 based on the equipment and supplies he captured at Tobruk in 1942; when he takes Toburk in 1941, which is a given once Malta falls without X. Fliegerkorps diverting to Greece, then he gets a huge bonanza of supplies and vehicles. Neither the Italians in early 1941 nor the Brits in 1942 managed to destroy the port or their supplies and British defenses in Egypt are much weaker in 1941 than in 1942, they have less effective AFVs, and far less experience against Rommel. Egypt falling in 1941 is much more likely and in fact probable in 1941 if Malta wasn't a problem.
 
Its a minor point not really worth quibbling over, those reserves would have a combat value much less than standing troops built up over 1941,

But higher then they did OTL 1941, which is all they need to halt the Germans when they move into the USSR.

with worse equipment and be used for flank guards and replacements for existing units.

They'd be used as a reserve. They'd be slotted in behind the frontline armies.

The Soviet 1942 offensive would be like a bigger, bloodier 2nd Kharkov with worse results for the Soviets.

Not likely. The improvements to the Red Army and shallow penetrations means that when the Germans move onto the counter-attack, many of them will likely escape. They'll rout the Soviets, but a "bigger, bloodier 2nd Kharkov" is a gross underestimation of the ITTL Red Army.

The Luftwaffe was a critical element of shattering that and with the fight on German turf they will have a massive advantage in the air thanks to pre-war German airbases, excellent supply lines, FLAK and radar networks, and poor Soviet power projection abilities.

Which is nice, except in order to interdict Soviet supply lines they have to go over Soviet territory and fight the VVS there.

Agreed, but perhaps the Germans will draw them in to deepen the pockets and make the riposte more damaging.

Unlikely. The Germans weren't ever very inclined to let the Soviets in.

We've already been over the major problems in van Creweld's 'analysis' of the logistics of north africa. It isn't worth the paper it is printed on because he gets very basic facts wrong about Axis port capacity and how much damage Malta had done to Axis shipping. He states maximum capacities for Axis port in Libya and totally ignored the month of June 1941 when those very ports took in double what he said was their absolute maximum.

Except no? As I pointed out the last time we went over it and the last time you cited that book:

Ah, so it either did not comprehend Crewalds statements or is misrepresenting them: Crewald does state that the expansion of the Axis army in Africa from 7 to 10 divisions over the course of 1941-42 caused the supply requirements to go up to 100,000 tons. I have already quoted those parts where he says so on this very thread.

"Even without an offensive, however, Rommel's demand for a second division had already jeopardized his supplies. Together with the Italians, the Axis force in Libya now totalled seven divisions which, when air force and naval units were added, required 70,000 tons per month." - Page 185.

He then notes that the addition of a third German division in 1942 and the attendant logistical support then jacked up the requirements to around a monthly of 100,000 tons (page 194). Given that according to the Germans (specifically, Rommel's) own estimates, they would have needed a further two-to-four panzer divisions to successfully take Alexandria (page 195) that actually gives us a good basis for supposing what the minimum demand would have been (a minimum which ignores that the logistical requirements scaled more exponentially then linearly due to the poor infrastructure of the region): 160,000-220,000 tons of supplies. Or 10,000-60,000 tons more then what you yourself have been saying the Italians ever managed to even embark.

Which is mostly in line with Crewald's statement of an "average of 72,000 tons" monthly for the July to October period.

Oh, so your saying that Crewald actually underestimated Axis demand? I hardly see how this helps your position given that it increases the numbers above.

Not to mention this is all still about the number of supplies getting from ports in Italy to ports in North Africa and doesn't address at all the issue of getting those supplies from the ports in North Africa to the frontline along the Libyan-Egyptian border.

Also in 1942 Egypt was invaded by a larger force than Rommel had in 1941 based on the equipment and supplies he captured at Tobruk in 1942;

And stalled out too far from it's objective. Rommel was never actually close to capturing Alexandria, the equipment and supplies from Tobruk simply were not enough nor would they be. In fact, with having to support a larger force, they'd be even more inadequate.[/quote]
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

No, they'd be used as a reserve. They'd be slotted in behind
Reserve units yes, reserve manpower gets used for all sorts of roles, including replacements, which is effectively how the Soviets used them during the war once they had enough units created.

Not likely. The improvements to the Red Army and shallow penetrations means that when the Germans move onto the counter-attack, they'll still face all the problems.
Depends on how shallow the penetration, but the mess of the Soviet CiC system on the attack out of the poor logistics of East Poland, improper doctrine and structure (especially the lack of trucks in the MC), the rail gauge change over, etc. will make them highly vulnerable on the attack. Plus unlike OTL May 1942 that Soviets lack a wealth of experience attacking German forces and none had ever attacked the Germans on their own pre-war turf at that stage in the war.

Unlikely. The Germans weren't very inclined to let the Soviets in.
Up to the Vistula there was nothing worth holding except East Prussia, which will be held tooth and nail, but Zhukov's thrust will mainly be in South Poland where terrain highly favors the defenders, especially the more west you let them. Plus at this point Hitler has no experience with 'Stand Fast' orders for him to base his plan on not giving ground.

Except no? As I pointed out the last time we went over it and the last time you cited that book:
Yes and your reply was and is still rubbish and contradicted by the information in the book. In June 1941 IOTL all the ports in Libya in Axis hands, pretty much just Benghazi and Tripoli, took in over 125k tons. Malta cut that down in July and bottomed it out in late 1941 at something like 30k tons. Malta would fall in June 1941 without the Luftwaffe moving their support to Greece (unnecessary in this scenario due to the entire Luftwaffe being available to the Mediterranean), which means the July offensive against Axis shipping doesn't happen. Plus Crete would be an offensive air base against Egypt by June-July and the Eastern Mediterranean become 'bomb alley' as it was in 1942. So historically nearly double the 70k ton needs you mention would be available. The book I cited specifically breaks down needs for civilians in Africa too, stating that June 1941 import totals actually exceeded total needs in Libya (military and civilian) by 25k tons and gave Rommel the surplus he needed to build up to attack Tobruk in August. Taking Tobruk and it's supply bonanza (as per OTL in 1942) would then open up yet another port for Rommel close to the front, which means Bardia and Derna also become options. ITTL the USAAF and RAF don't have heavy bombers operating out of Egypt and Palestine against Rommel's ports either, so his supply situation is infinitely better than in 1942 and of course 1941 with Malta out of the way, while he is further aided by Crete becoming an offensive air base and allow the staging of convoys via Greece as per OTL in 1942.

In 1941 Rommel didn't need an additional 2-4 Panzer divisions, the Rommel Papers specifically said that would be the requirement for an effort in 1943! In 1941 the Italian units, 2 panzer divisions, and 1 motorized infantry division were enough to attack and take Egypt once Tobruk had fallen, as he had smashed up British relief offensives in June-July and left them weakened enough that he had the room to take Tobruk, take those supplies and open that port and then turn on Egypt where a passive Western Desert Force stood waiting for reinforcements that didn't come until October. They were extremely vulnerable to attack between August-October, but Malta destroyed Rommel's supply lines IOTL, so he was never able to accumulate supplies enough to make the effort and burned through his stockpiles started in June to maintain his position until Crusader kicked him back to Tripoli in December. Rolling over the British forces on the Egyptian-Libyan border would yield even more supplies, as it did in 1942 when he rolled over them at Mersa Matruh after taking Tobruk and using those supplies to invade Egypt. The thing is there are no reserves left in Egypt for the Brits to bring up at El Alamein in 1941, reinforcements weren't there until October thanks to the delayed trip around South Africa to the Red Sea. So Rommel had a golden opportunity to seize Egypt in 1941 if he invaded in August-September after seizing Tobruk.

Not to mention this is all still about the number of supplies getting from ports in Italy to ports in North Africa and doesn't address at all the issue of getting those supplies from the ports in North Africa to the frontline along the Libyan-Egyptian border.
IOTL in 1941 they did, Rommel had a surplus in June that was being built up and if supplies didn't increase after Malta fell, just stayed near June numbers, then he'd have more than enough to attack Tobruk and take it in early August. OTL supply system to Torbuk worked just fine before Malta killed what was actually coming into Libya; the problem in 1941 was getting it to port, not from the port to the front.

And stalled out too far from it's objective. Rommel was never actually close to capturing Alexandria, the equipment and supplies from Tobruk simply were not enough nor would they be. In fact, with having to support a larger force, they'd be even more inadequate.
[/QUOTE]
IOTL in 1942 he was 60 miles away at El Alamein. In 1941 the Brits are weaker and don't have a reserve once he rolls over the forces left the Egyptian-Libyan border. Those didn't arrive until October. He had inflicted such damage in the border fighting in July that they were passive until those reinforcements came. In combat the British were even more inept in 1941 than they were in 1942 and had weaker tanks and other weapons, so Rommel had a much better chance in 1941 than in 1942 after taking Tobruk. It wasn't just captured stuff from Tobruk, it was also the stuff he got IOTL in 1942 when he rolled over British forces at Mersa Matruh on the way to Alamein, but ITTL that fight will happen to the West at the border, which is easier for Rommel actually. Then convoys, without Malta to worry about and covered by the Luftwaffe out of Crete, can stage out of Greece and Italy to drop supplies at Torbruk, Bardia, and Mersa Matruh when he gets there (it had a port), plus air lift supplies out of Crete (also done in 1942). He also can capture them from British units he'd overrun on the way as he did historically in 1942. He doesn't have to source supplies from Tripoli or Benghazi (though both would have a lot more intake without the 1942 heavy bomber offensive from Palestine).

Logistically his best chance was in 1941 and the Brits were far less prepared to stop him then than in 1942.
 
Huh, didn't even see the message saying you had replied. Forgot this

Depends on how shallow the penetration,

Probably no more then what Operation Mars achieved. German defensive techniques were quite good at stopping the Germans when concentrated as they would be along the border.

(especially the lack of trucks in the MC),

Probably won't be there. Between the extra production of '41-'42 and the mobilization of vehicles from the civilian economy as part of the preparation to attack, the Red Army will have somewhere in the range of 500-600,000 vehicles depending on how what proportion of vehicles in the 1941-42 period is devoted to them.

the rail gauge change over,

Would be completed by '42.

Plus unlike OTL May 1942 that Soviets lack a wealth of experience

They actually didn't have such experience OTL May '42. Or, more specifically,

Up to the Vistula there was nothing worth holding except East Prussia, which will be held tooth and nail,

Not to mention that if the Germans fall back behind the Vistula, then when it comes time to attack their going to have to conduct an opposed river crossing against dug-in Soviet forces, which increases the difficulty of their assault.

but Zhukov's thrust will mainly be in South Poland where terrain highly favors the defenders,

Eh? The border region around southwestern Poland is mostly open plains. There are some forests and hilly spots, but no more then is found in western Ukraine.

Yes and your reply was and is still rubbish and contradicted by the information in the book. In June 1941 IOTL all the ports in Libya in Axis hands, pretty much just Benghazi and Tripoli, took in over 125k tons.

Except it isn't. I explicitly stated that a figure of 125K in June of 1941 to Libya is also the number that Martin Van Crewald states. He then goes on to say that the supply situation that month at the frontlines was "in great danger every day and Rommel was forced to live from hand to mouth." He also observes that practically all the in-put was coming in at Tripoli, as Benghazi during 1941, damaged by the British retreat and subjected to RAF bombardment afterwards, never reached more then 700-800 tons a day and those were the exceptional days. (Pages 186-187)

The reasons the 125K didn't make much impact at the front isn't hard to find: it was far too much for Tripoli to handle. Indeed, any amount over 45K caused huge troubles in the off-loading of vessels as that was the limit the port could handle efficiently. Then there was the great difficulty in transporting across 700 kilometers of roadless desert, which consumed most of what was loaded. As a result the amount of supplies that actually reached Afrika Korps was quite horrendous. On May 6, for example, only a few tons of AT rounds were able to reach the frontlines.

bottomed it out in late 1941 at something like 30k tons.

Which certainly forced Rommel to retreat, but his stalling out was something that had already happened.

Malta would fall in June 1941 without the Luftwaffe moving their support to Greece

Quite a presumption. Do the Paras get sent to Malta?

So historically nearly double the 70k ton needs you mention would be available.

According to the Italian Navy itself, even 20,000 tons more was impossible given port capacity. (Crewald, Page 187)

Taking Tobruk and it's supply bonanza (as per OTL in 1942) would then open up yet another port for Rommel close to the front, which means Bardia and Derna also become options.

Except Tobruk wasn't much of a supply bonanza. The port proved to be utterly incapable of taking large ships and vessels sent there were horribly vulnerable to British naval and air forces operating out of Egypt.

ITTL the USAAF and RAF don't have heavy bombers operating out of Egypt and Palestine against Rommel's ports either,

By magic, I guess.

so his supply situation is infinitely better than in 1942 and of course 1941 with Malta out of the way, while he is further aided by Crete becoming an offensive air base and allow the staging of convoys via Greece as per OTL in 1942.

In 1941 Rommel didn't need an additional 2-4 Panzer divisions, the Rommel Papers specifically said that would be the requirement for an effort in 1943!

Yes, yes he did. In late 1940, the Wehrmacht sent General Ritter Von Thoma to North Africa and he went along with the Italians in their initial invasion into Egypt. He reported back that October flat estimate that a minimum of 4 panzer divisions would be needed to ensure success. He also observed that in order for it to become possible to even supply this amount, it would be necessary to pull out much of the Italian forces... something Mussolini would never permit. (Crewald, Page 183) Then, in June of 1941, "Rommel had to concede that his requirements for such an operation would be no less than four German armoured divisions - precisely the number originally envisaged by Von Thoma." (Page 187)

IOTL in 1941 they did, Rommel had a surplus in June that was being built up

At the ports. At the frontline, he was consuming as fast as he was getting.

IOTL in 1942 he was 60 miles away at El Alamein.

In purely geographical terms, yes. In actual military terms though, he might as well have been on the far-side of the moon.

In 1941 the Brits are weaker and

And so are the Germans, as with Benghazi still being repaired and Tobruk still a deathtrap to RAF and RN units stationed out of Egypt.

don't have a reserve once he rolls over the forces left the Egyptian-Libyan border.

Too bad the British forces as it was were enough to halt him.

He also can capture them from British units he'd overrun on the way as he did historically in 1942.

Which never proved to be adequate.

He doesn't have to source supplies from Tripoli or Benghazi

Yes he does. He did OTL and it was the distance from those ports which dictated his fighting capabilities.

Logistically his best chance was in 1941.

Logistically, he never had a chance. The distances were too far and the infrastructure too terrible.
 
Top