WI: Axis Forces Are Not Allowed to Evacuate Sicily (1943)

Hello all, first time posting here so forgive any ignorance on my part. :)

Anyway,

I've been reading about the Italian Campaign, which kicked off with the invasion of Sicily. Towards the end of the fight for the island, not insignificant German and Italian forces were evacuated to the Italian mainland via the Strait of Messina (August 11-17).

As per Wikipedia:

In 2004, Tomlin wrote that the Italians evacuated 62,182 men, 41 guns and 227 vehicles with the loss of only one motor raft and the train ferry Carridi, which was scuttled when Allied troops entered Messina.[120] The Germans evacuated some 52,000 troops (including 4,444 wounded), 14,105 vehicles, 47 tanks, 94 guns, 1,100 tons of ammunition, and about 20,700 tons of gear and stores.[121]​

Watching documentaries and looking around the internet, I've come across 3 separate reasons for the Allies being unable to stop the withdrawal:

1) Allies didn't recognize the withdrawal for what it was. (lost/forgot my source for this particular claim)

2) Allies saw the withdrawal, but were unable to stop it due to the high concentration of AAA and unfavorable sea conditions precluding any naval blockade. Again, wiki:

The German and Italian evacuation schemes proved highly successful. The Allies were not able to prevent the orderly withdrawal nor effectively interfere with transports across the Strait of Messina. The narrow straits were protected by 120 heavy and 112 light anti-aircraft guns.[115] The resulting overlapping gunfire from both sides of the strait was described by Allied pilots as worse than the Ruhr, making daylight air attacks highly hazardous and generally unsuccessful.[104] Night attacks were less hazardous and there were times when air attack was able to delay and even suspend traffic across the straits but when daylight returned, the Axis were able to clear the backlog from the previous night.[116] Nor was naval interdiction any more practicable. The straits varied from 2–6 miles (3.2–9.7 km) wide and were covered by artillery up to 24 centimeters (9.4 in) in caliber. This, combined with the hazards of a 6 knots (11 km/h; 6.9 mph) current, made risking warships unjustifiable and fear that Italian warships were preparing to attack the Straits of Messina in a suicide run.[115][117][118]​

3) Monty and Patton could have 'been more daring' and stopped it but were too focused on seeing who had the biggest... military prowess.

https://youtu.be/KeeMBlC8RIk?t=42m33s


So my questions are

A.) Why did the allies fail to interdict the Axis evacuation in OTL

and

B.) If the Allies DO stop this evacuation, how does this affect the Italian campaign and the war in general?

B.1 With no place left to run, do the Axis forces on Sicily surrender or try to slog it out?​

B.2 With less Axis forces on the Italian mainland, do the Allies progress there faster and farther when they do invade? Does Hitler need to pull more troops from the East to plug Italy?​


Looking forward to hearing everyone's thoughts! :cool:
 
If the Eighth Army can take Messina quickly, while large number of Germans and Italians are engaged with Seventh Army at the other end around Salerno, then they can bag most of the Axis on the Island.

Historically the pressure from both armies pushed the Axis into a literal corner with convient access to the rest of Itally.

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Welcome to the board!!!

As to HOW trapping them can be achieved:

I did a thread somewhat related to this a while back:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=326451

Long story short - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Troina and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Centuripe are not launched. This keeps the Axis further west and limits allied supply consumption. With less supplies eaten up, more landing craft are available (ports only became operational in August). With landing craft available, the Allies can use two brigades (which OTL they tried to land behind German lines in Sicilly, only for the Germans to have retreated beforehand) as well as a number of airborne forces, and land in Calarbria. Axis forces are trapped on the island and probably run out of supplies in short order.

As for effects IMHO:

- Germans go for their initial plan and never try to hold southern Italy in the first place
- Allied forces advance to Salerno overland instead of landing there
- the planned landing at Rome takes place, which succeeds since most Germans are still up north
- with Rome taken, command and control in the Italian army doesn't break down, and the garrisons on Rhodes (and maybe Sardinia) disarm their German colleagues instead of the other way round; with Rhodes secured, the British pull off their Dodecanese campaign
- Allies reach the *Gothic Line months in advance (also means more shipping gets used up feeding the Italian civilian population)
 
2) Allies saw the withdrawal, but were unable to stop it due to the high concentration of AAA and unfavorable sea conditions precluding any naval blockade. Again, wiki:

I think the RN with aid of Allied navies could have stopped the evacuation just by being brutal enough. By this time the Italian and German surface navies were effectively finished - yes, both had ships but RN had clear superiority whether in battleships, cruisers or destroyers. By ordering enough ships to the straits and taking even heavy casualties they could have contributed to a major ground forces victory.

This may sound provocative, but overall it seems that due to exceptionally heavy losses in 1941-1942 the Admiralty lost it's guts of engaging the enemy more closely in 1943 when seapower could have made a major difference in Italian campaign and Dodecaneses. And this is, I have to point out, an armchair analysis in hindsight not made by someone stressed by years of war and bloodshed. Maybe the thinking behind this wariness was the fact that in some level they thought the Axis could rebound and then a powerful navy would be needed.
 
If the Germans and Italians can't get out of Messina they will surrender. As far as I know they never made a do or die last stand against the western allies. They did not do it Tunisia so I don't see them setting a precedent on Sicily.

Another Axis collapse in Sicily means for the third time in the first half of 1943 the Germans loose an Army (Stalingrad and Tunisia). It could leave Southern Italy wide open. The allies could reach Rome by winter but I think they will still hit a brick wall in the mountains. The Italian front will still be a stalemate in the beginning of 1944.
 
Watching documentaries and looking around the internet, I've come across 3 separate reasons for the Allies being unable to stop the withdrawal:

1) Allies didn't recognize the withdrawal for what it was. (lost/forgot my source for this particular claim)

2) Allies saw the withdrawal, but were unable to stop it due to the high concentration of AAA and unfavorable sea conditions precluding any naval blockade.

3) Monty and Patton could have 'been more daring' and stopped it but were too focused on seeing who had the biggest... military prowess.

or 4) Nobody really thought about it and put a plan in place.

The army on Sicily can do little to stop the evacuation. It either needs a landing on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina (in probably at least Corps strength) or a co-ordinated naval and air blockade in the Straits of Messina to sink anything that floats.

Unfortunately none of the service commanders (Alexander, Cunningham and Tedder) planned for it, and Eisenhower did not bang their heads together.
 
What about the future effects on the Eastern and Western Fronts? Would the Germans transfer troops from the west or Norway with the first opportunity or would the Soviets do better in the east?
 
2) Allies saw the withdrawal, but were unable to stop it due to the high concentration of AAA and unfavorable sea conditions precluding any naval blockade. Again, wiki:

Another concern of the naval commanders were the mine fields in the approaches to the Strait of Messina. However:
1) Allies didn't recognize the withdrawal for what it was. (lost/forgot my source for this particular claim)

This was another in assorted intel failures at the operational level. Previous to the evacuation the Allied intel service underestimated the number of Axis soldiers remaining. They thought a larger number had departed since the invasion than actually had. In part the intel failure was due to emphasis on many other intel targets. The Allied intel effort was robust, but the leaders demanded a lot from it.

This last leads to another factor. Neither Alexander nor Eisenhower really focused on the idea of trapping the Axis ground forces. This was really Alexanders call as Ike was also giving attention to the Admirals & the question of defeating the Italian navy, the air forces commanders and wining the assorted air campaigns. And the plannning of several follow on operations. A look at Jacksons 'The Battle for Italy' Shows six army or corps size amphibious ops being planned or studied while the Sicillian campaign was in the last two weeks.

Maybe if Ike had been paying more attention to the Sicillian campaign during the planning & execution he might have better grasped the opportunity. But, Ike was not one to micromanage subordinates & their ops. He figured since he had a Army Group commander he'd let him fight it & win. In that sense Alexander failed since he does not seem to have energetically pursued the idea of trapping the Axis army in Sicilly.
 
Thank you all for your responses! This has definitely given me a few things to think about.

@Legion

Thanks for the maps! Whenever I see anything pertaining to the Invasion of Sicily, I keep remembering the 'fog on mirror' maps that Monty drew in the loo in the film 'Patton'. That film did nothing for British-American relations :p


@Magnum

With less German forces committed to the Italian front, how does this affect German deployments for the rest of the war? I know that at this point in the war, they've already lost, but could more available units for deployment in either the western or eastern fronts delay the inevitable for just a little longer? (June 1945-ish?)


@viperjock

Yes, I suppose so. The Italians didn't like fighting much at all, and the Germans, fierce as they are, are not Japanese.


@Aber & Carl

Yes, that does seem to be in line with what I know of Eisenhower's management style.


I know that in post-war hindsight it was considered a mistake to let the Axis forces escape, but I wonder if the allies themselves realized at the time (say by September 43) what an opportunity they had let slip through their fingers?
 
....
I know that in post-war hindsight it was considered a mistake to let the Axis forces escape, but I wonder if the allies themselves realized at the time (say by September 43) what an opportunity they had let slip through their fingers?

Yes. To cite a recent work; Atkinson in 'Day of Battle' briefly discusses the post campaign analysis by the Allied leaders. Ikes biographers note this as well to various degrees. Eisenhower made a note to not make that mistake, or several again. Among other things it reinforced his decision not to insulate himself from local operations with extra command layers. & note Alexander was left behind in the Med when Ike made up his list of Generals to bring along to SHAEF. He also went up another notch in firmness when redirecting his subordinates from their favorite operations. -The Allied air commanders in the Med particularly Dolittle were a little slow in ramping up the air attacks on the evacuation sites.

There are some paralles between this & the remnants of the Japanese 17th Army escaping from Guadalcanal.
 
There is another consideration here that has just occurred to me - while I don't think it was possible to prevent the evacuation it did somewhat play into the allies hands regarding the campaign.

By not stopping the evacuation it meant that the island could be captured much faster without having to fight all of those troops that evacuated!

What is it Sun Zu says about always giving your enemy a path to retreat through other wise he will turn and fight you like a cornered animal?

How much longer would the campaign to take the Island have taken if the majority of those troops had dug in around Messina. How many more losses would the allies have taken. Would the Italian invasion and subsequent Capitulation have taken place later on as a result of this delay.

Maybe this was at the back of the allied commanders minds?
 
@Magnum

With less German forces committed to the Italian front, how does this affect German deployments for the rest of the war? I know that at this point in the war, they've already lost, but could more available units for deployment in either the western or eastern fronts delay the inevitable for just a little longer? (June 1945-ish?)

You can use the multi-quote button (right next to the one labeled quote) in order to quote multiple people in a single reply. I know it took me a while to figure it out... :)

On to the issue - if the Germans lose 4 crack divisions in Sicilly, they have less men, not more. Likewise, defending northern Italy still sucks up an approximately equal number of troops in the months to come. Moreover, if the British Dodecanese operation works on account of Italian troops turning over Rhodes to them, then Hitler will have to put even more troops into defending Greece, just in case.

So in no way does increased Allied succes in the Mediterranean lengthen the war by any means. On the contrary.
 
...
How much longer would the campaign to take the Island have taken if the majority of those troops had dug in around Messina. How many more losses would the allies have taken. Would the Italian invasion and subsequent Capitulation have taken place later on as a result of this delay.

Depends on how much ammunition was still on hand. I know the Axis support units had been either moving or destroying it as fast as possible, but have no idea what remained.

Maybe this was at the back of the allied commanders minds?

Never seen any evidence for this in the biographies, or histories ranging from Jackson in the 1960s to Atkinson post 2000.
 
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