WI: Austria wins the Austro-Prussian War

Saphroneth

Banned
The first point is the how.

Now, as it happens this may be easier than it first seems given the buzzsaw that the Prussians were - their military reforms as of 1866 were very new, only a few years old, and it's quite possible that they could have reformed different and wrong - or that the Austrians could have reformed different and right.
Or even that the allies of Austria (the components of the German Federation that sided with Austria) could have helped swing things.


As was OTL, the Prussians had a fairly competent army with good rifle training, good discipline, breechloading rifles and a flexible tactical doctrine. The Austrians had a doctrine based around the charge, which did not work well - but that was a doctrine less than a decade old for them, so is amenable to change.
 
The first point is the how.

Now, as it happens this may be easier than it first seems given the buzzsaw that the Prussians were - their military reforms as of 1866 were very new, only a few years old, and it's quite possible that they could have reformed different and wrong - or that the Austrians could have reformed different and right.
Or even that the allies of Austria (the components of the German Federation that sided with Austria) could have helped swing things.


As was OTL, the Prussians had a fairly competent army with good rifle training, good discipline, breechloading rifles and a flexible tactical doctrine. The Austrians had a doctrine based around the charge, which did not work well - but that was a doctrine less than a decade old for them, so is amenable to change.

The new doctrine of the Prussian army was tested in the 2nd war of Schleswig-Holstein, and proved to be quite effective. Even more effective was the planning required to move quickly large amounts of troops across Germany by relying on railways and telegraph. Another major advantage was that all subalterns and a large majority of non-coms were educated persons, and obviously that all the Prussian troops spoke the same language.

On the opposite side, the Austrians did not learn much from the war of 1859 (except the adoption of the French system of gun batteries) and nothing at all from the war against Denmark. The lack of funding for the army was obviously a major issue, but what money there was was mostly spent on fortresses rather than on the army itself.
The "shock charge" (attacks with bayonet in battalion strength) was not a new development: it dates back to the Napoleonic wars, and was still used by both the French and The Austrians in 1859. Obviously it was a suicidal tactic against the needle guns and the new infantry doctrine developed by Prussians, but the Austrians were handicapped by the much lower education level of their subalterns and non-coms and by the number of languages spoken in the empire. It was much easier to sound charge rather than rely on individual platoons and squads to act independently within the framework of orders issued at division and battalion level.

The minor German states did not have large or effective armies, and what they had it was jealously kept in defense in each single state. The Confederation army was a bit of a joke, and had practically never trained or maneuvered together: no hope to find a game changer there.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The new doctrine of the Prussian army was tested in the 2nd war of Schleswig-Holstein, and proved to be quite effective.
Yes, and it was developed in the early 1860s.

The "shock charge" (attacks with bayonet in battalion strength) was not a new development: it dates back to the Napoleonic wars, and was still used by both the French and The Austrians in 1859.
The Austrians in 1859 used a mainly fire based doctrine; they reverted to the charge after the French charge beat then.

The minor German states did not have large or effective armies, and what they had it was jealously kept in defense in each single state.
Plenty of good artillery though, and the western theatre of the war included some actual hard fights for the Prussians comparatively speaking.
 
Yes, and it was developed in the early 1860s.
As a matter of fact the infantry doctrine was mainly developed in the second half of the 1850s, after the Prussians started adopting the needle gun: it was a progressive change but by the time the 2nd Danish war started the troops were well trained. In parallel (and with more difficulty in making things stick) Moltke started to carry out his reform of the General Staff in the late 1850: by 1865 it was pretty well completed in theory, but its application in the field showed that there were still some improvements to make, in particular in making the field officers stick with the plans designed by the GS.

The Austrians in 1859 used a mainly fire based doctrine; they reverted to the charge after the French charge beat then.
Well they should have, since the Austrian infantry had better guns than the French. Unfortunately the Austrian troops were not very well trained in the use of the new guns, since ammunition was expensive, and anyway the Austrian fire doctrine was not evolved. Not a surprise that the French shock tactics worked (but the experience of 1859 and the lessons learned observing the war of 1866 convinced even the most conservative French generals to change their tactics in 1870)


Plenty of good artillery though, and the western theatre of the war included some actual hard fights for the Prussians comparatively speaking.
I would say that the Prussians considered the Elbe theatre a secondary one, and the strategy was mainly based on avoiding that the army of Hanover could join the Bavarian troops and the Confederation troops in the south. Moltke took some risks (justified ones, mind: his main strategy called for a decisive battle in Bohemia against the Austrians) in drafting this aggressive strategy: it worked pretty well in the end, even if the commander of the Elbe army tried a couple of times to make a pig's ear of it. Still the Austrian allies were even less effective, and there was never a real risk that things might become too hot for the Prussians in the west. The only army among the minor states which played some role was the Saxon army which retired to Bohemia, but they were not decisive either

Check The Road to Koniggratz: it is a boring book,the author looks incapable of writing in a way that keeps the readers concentrated, but it is also a treasure trove of information on the life of Moltke, the reforms of the Prussian army and the war of 1866
 

Saphroneth

Banned
As a matter of fact the infantry doctrine was mainly developed in the second half of the 1850s, after the Prussians started adopting the needle gun: it was a progressive change but by the time the 2nd Danish war started the troops were well trained.
I think the key point here is the 1862 abdication crisis - this was the one where the Prussian army got a substantial funds increase and troops increase, and the Landwehr were sidelined. Without that the doctrine may be good but the number of troops with that doctrine is much lower (and the reserves less effective).
 
I think the key point here is the 1862 abdication crisis - this was the one where the Prussian army got a substantial funds increase and troops increase, and the Landwehr were sidelined. Without that the doctrine may be good but the number of troops with that doctrine is much lower (and the reserves less effective).
A point: von Roon was on the verge of going for a coup, being incensed by the opposition of parliament to downsize the Landwehr and fund the additional regiments of the standing army. Still if there had not been the preparations of the 1855-1860 (and the appointment of Moltke as head of GS, which was not a given) even the political skills of Bismarck and the dedication of von Roon would not have been enough
 

Saphroneth

Banned
A point: von Roon was on the verge of going for a coup, being incensed by the opposition of parliament to downsize the Landwehr and fund the additional regiments of the standing army. Still if there had not been the preparations of the 1855-1860 (and the appointment of Moltke as head of GS, which was not a given) even the political skills of Bismarck and the dedication of von Roon would not have been enough
A fair point. Prussia does rather have a tendency historically to let their army decay quite a lot, then build it up again just in time to re-earn their reputation.
 
A fair point. Prussia does rather have a tendency historically to let their army decay quite a lot, then build it up again just in time to re-earn their reputation.
IMHO it would have been almost impossible to avoid the rot in the army given the long peace between 1815 and 1849 and the budget strictures to repay the debts incurred during the Napoleonic wars. Austria did not fare better, and they were not even capable of going for necessary reforms
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The Battle of Koniggratz was touch-and-go for awhile. Despite all of the acknowledged Prussian advantages in the war, history often does produce freak events. If the Austrians had gotten lucky and won a decisive victory at Koniggratz, sending the Prussians reeling back towards their own territory in disarray, if could have swung things in Austria's direction. And with France possibly waiting in the wings...
 
German AH author Carl Amery suggested that the Bavarians buy some ACW "rifles" before the war begins; turns out they not only get the guns but also the men, experienced veterans; they win the battle and turn over all of Europe, making it an anarcho-syndicalist union.
 
And with France possibly waiting in the wings...
Actually, Nappie politics in Germany were about two things : first, taking some scraps whevenever possible as long as it didn't antagonized obviously too much people, and second to prevent the rise of a german hegemony especially along the Rhine.

It was why French état-major actually discussed, in the eventuality of an Austria victory, if supporting Prussia wouldn't be the best choice. That said, I don't see this support being a military one, except if the politique des pourboires* pays up this time but I'm not sure if Prussia can afford, politically-wise, a french support on the price of loosing territories along the Rhine : maybe if it's done at the expense of Bavaria, or possibly a support for redrawning borders in Belgium and Luxembourg (but that will probably antagonize Britain a lot and certainly weights a lot on a Prussian victory, so...that's not really that likely to happen).

If Bismarck agrees, a reasonable offer may be a rough return to 1814 borders, with several adjustments, especially in Bavarian held territories and aqcuisition of Luxembourg (not directly, but with Bismarck not opposing the territory being sold to Nappie III was it was planned in 1867 IOTL)

French intervention is not only not bound to happen (unless gains are certains, which may not be the case) but if it happens, I doubt it would be to support Austria, mostly because Napoléon would both want to avoid an Austrian hegemony in Germany, and could gain more negociating with Prussia for some territories.

*Basically what Napoleon III did in Italy (military support in exchange of territories) and attempted to do in Germany in the late 1860's
 
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In order to illustrate the above post

gsTw7IR.jpg


Black : French border in 1866
Dark blue : French borders in 1814 (First treaty of Paris)
Blue : Luxembourg
Light blue : Regions french état-major and/or diplomatic corps presented interest controlling or annexing

If France intervenes in the war, I think that it would be accordingly the aformentioned policy of compensations. 1814 borders may likely be asked for, but not much more. Politically, it would be suicide for Bismarck to give up German territories, and he already IOTL rebuffed several demands or queries from French diplomats about compensations in Rhineland or Palatinate as the price for an alliance or agreement.

On the other hand, Bismarck was ready (mostly in words, true) to support French interests in Luxembourg or Belgium. While I could see Prussia changing its policy when it comes to a French annexation of Luxemburg (IOTL, in 1867, Bismarck tried to raise hell about the prospect) for a non-intervention policy; Bismarck would have very little possibility to allow France going further in Belgium, even if he would want to (which is unlikely).

That said, while Napoleonic interests in Palatinate (once extending up to Mainz/Mayence before Bismarck went "lolno" about the whole thing) and Belgium aren't going anywhere to realization, you could have small compensations in these regions (probably more economical than territorial, even if some token annexation in Bavarian Palatinate is still technically possible)
 
A while back I started a thread about the Austrians getting the Southern Netherlands back from France after the Napoleonic Wars. The idea behind it was to see if they could be incorporated into the German Empire in 1871. However, the other side was that it might have made Austria strong enough to defeat Prussia in 1866.

Would it have helped? Or would some of the German states that supported Austria IOTL have been neutral or allied themselves with Prussia ITTL because a German Confederation that included OTL Belgium and Luxembourg under Hapsburg rule made the Prussians the lesser of evils?
 
A while back I started a thread about the Austrians getting the Southern Netherlands back from France after the Napoleonic Wars. The idea behind it was to see if they could be incorporated into the German Empire in 1871. However, the other side was that it might have made Austria strong enough to defeat Prussia in 1866.

Would it have helped? Or would some of the German states that supported Austria IOTL have been neutral or allied themselves with Prussia ITTL because a German Confederation that included OTL Belgium and Luxembourg under Hapsburg rule made the Prussians the lesser of evils?
A while back I started a thread about the Austrians getting the Southern Netherlands back from France after the Napoleonic Wars. The idea behind it was to see if they could be incorporated into the German Empire in 1871. However, the other side was that it might have made Austria strong enough to defeat Prussia in 1866.

Would it have helped? Or would some of the German states that supported Austria IOTL have been neutral or allied themselves with Prussia ITTL because a German Confederation that included OTL Belgium and Luxembourg under Hapsburg rule made the Prussians the lesser of evils?


From what I've read before, I'm really not sure. I still think Austria would be seen as the lesser of two evils, since they were less "unificationist" then Prussia, and Prussia with all it's expansionism and militaristic tendencies scared a lot of the minor German states quite a bit, which was what drove so many Protestant German states into the Austrian alliance.
 
So I was wondering what would happen if Austria defeated Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and went on to unify Germany.
That's not going to happen with a MORE powerful Austria. The rest of Germany (minus Prussia, of course) loved the idea of Austria in 'Germany', and wouldn't have minded an Austrian led Reich. HOWEVER, and it's big, they only wanted Austria - not the non-German bits of that Empire, and especially not Hungary.

Whereas, the Hapsburg empire was happy to lead a united Reich - but only if they could keep Hungary and all their other possessions.

So....
For Austria to unite Germany, they have to have Hungary stripped from them first. And that's only going to happen by violence.

The rest of Germany would be fine with Czechs in the Reich (Bohemia was sent an invitation to the Frankfurt Assembly, even), as it was perceived (by the Germans) as being essentially German. They might have swallowed the Slovenes as part of a rump Austria, being a smallish population, and 'western'. The Italians in northern Italy would be a bigger problem.

Actually, your best bet for an Austrian led Reich is for Austria to do much WORSE in '48, have Hungary split off, and the Italians join a nascent Italian state (which OTL didn't happen until later).
 
From what I've read before, I'm really not sure. I still think Austria would be seen as the lesser of two evils, since they were less "unificationist" then Prussia, and Prussia with all it's expansionism and militaristic tendencies scared a lot of the minor German states quite a bit, which was what drove so many Protestant German states into the Austrian alliance.
It's not just the French. The Russians aren't going to let Prussia be destroyed or for Austria to grow much.
The minor German powers aren't going to want to be swallowed up either. Most ally with Austria to keep the loose confederation
 
I don't think it's that hard to engineer an Austrian victory in 1866; an aide remarked to Bismarck that he was a great man, but if the Crown Prince's army had arrived too late, there would be no greater villain in all of Germany. Citino claims that even an hour delay in 2nd Army's deployment onto the field could have resulted in the defeat of 1st Army at least.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
IMHO it would have been almost impossible to avoid the rot in the army given the long peace between 1815 and 1849 and the budget strictures to repay the debts incurred during the Napoleonic wars. Austria did not fare better, and they were not even capable of going for necessary reforms
Bit late to reply to this, but what I mean is that Prussia has an uncanny ability to get the timing right on when to reform. The Prussian army of 1864-71 won three fairly major wars over that eight year timespan, and it didn't exist in anything like the same form three years beforehand.
 
I don't know, Prussian (then German) état-major really went by the fantasy of "new Cannae" that led them to a top quality tactical mindset, and relatively poor strategical one. It wouldn't astonish me that, being so led by the search of the pure, mechanical decisive battle, in spite of their technical advances, it wouldn't backfire as soon as 1866.
 
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