CH33K1 N4ND0Z
Banned
So I was wondering what would happen if Austria defeated Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and went on to unify Germany.
The first point is the how.
Now, as it happens this may be easier than it first seems given the buzzsaw that the Prussians were - their military reforms as of 1866 were very new, only a few years old, and it's quite possible that they could have reformed different and wrong - or that the Austrians could have reformed different and right.
Or even that the allies of Austria (the components of the German Federation that sided with Austria) could have helped swing things.
As was OTL, the Prussians had a fairly competent army with good rifle training, good discipline, breechloading rifles and a flexible tactical doctrine. The Austrians had a doctrine based around the charge, which did not work well - but that was a doctrine less than a decade old for them, so is amenable to change.
Yes, and it was developed in the early 1860s.The new doctrine of the Prussian army was tested in the 2nd war of Schleswig-Holstein, and proved to be quite effective.
The Austrians in 1859 used a mainly fire based doctrine; they reverted to the charge after the French charge beat then.The "shock charge" (attacks with bayonet in battalion strength) was not a new development: it dates back to the Napoleonic wars, and was still used by both the French and The Austrians in 1859.
Plenty of good artillery though, and the western theatre of the war included some actual hard fights for the Prussians comparatively speaking.The minor German states did not have large or effective armies, and what they had it was jealously kept in defense in each single state.
As a matter of fact the infantry doctrine was mainly developed in the second half of the 1850s, after the Prussians started adopting the needle gun: it was a progressive change but by the time the 2nd Danish war started the troops were well trained. In parallel (and with more difficulty in making things stick) Moltke started to carry out his reform of the General Staff in the late 1850: by 1865 it was pretty well completed in theory, but its application in the field showed that there were still some improvements to make, in particular in making the field officers stick with the plans designed by the GS.Yes, and it was developed in the early 1860s.
Well they should have, since the Austrian infantry had better guns than the French. Unfortunately the Austrian troops were not very well trained in the use of the new guns, since ammunition was expensive, and anyway the Austrian fire doctrine was not evolved. Not a surprise that the French shock tactics worked (but the experience of 1859 and the lessons learned observing the war of 1866 convinced even the most conservative French generals to change their tactics in 1870)The Austrians in 1859 used a mainly fire based doctrine; they reverted to the charge after the French charge beat then.
I would say that the Prussians considered the Elbe theatre a secondary one, and the strategy was mainly based on avoiding that the army of Hanover could join the Bavarian troops and the Confederation troops in the south. Moltke took some risks (justified ones, mind: his main strategy called for a decisive battle in Bohemia against the Austrians) in drafting this aggressive strategy: it worked pretty well in the end, even if the commander of the Elbe army tried a couple of times to make a pig's ear of it. Still the Austrian allies were even less effective, and there was never a real risk that things might become too hot for the Prussians in the west. The only army among the minor states which played some role was the Saxon army which retired to Bohemia, but they were not decisive eitherPlenty of good artillery though, and the western theatre of the war included some actual hard fights for the Prussians comparatively speaking.
I think the key point here is the 1862 abdication crisis - this was the one where the Prussian army got a substantial funds increase and troops increase, and the Landwehr were sidelined. Without that the doctrine may be good but the number of troops with that doctrine is much lower (and the reserves less effective).As a matter of fact the infantry doctrine was mainly developed in the second half of the 1850s, after the Prussians started adopting the needle gun: it was a progressive change but by the time the 2nd Danish war started the troops were well trained.
A point: von Roon was on the verge of going for a coup, being incensed by the opposition of parliament to downsize the Landwehr and fund the additional regiments of the standing army. Still if there had not been the preparations of the 1855-1860 (and the appointment of Moltke as head of GS, which was not a given) even the political skills of Bismarck and the dedication of von Roon would not have been enoughI think the key point here is the 1862 abdication crisis - this was the one where the Prussian army got a substantial funds increase and troops increase, and the Landwehr were sidelined. Without that the doctrine may be good but the number of troops with that doctrine is much lower (and the reserves less effective).
A fair point. Prussia does rather have a tendency historically to let their army decay quite a lot, then build it up again just in time to re-earn their reputation.A point: von Roon was on the verge of going for a coup, being incensed by the opposition of parliament to downsize the Landwehr and fund the additional regiments of the standing army. Still if there had not been the preparations of the 1855-1860 (and the appointment of Moltke as head of GS, which was not a given) even the political skills of Bismarck and the dedication of von Roon would not have been enough
IMHO it would have been almost impossible to avoid the rot in the army given the long peace between 1815 and 1849 and the budget strictures to repay the debts incurred during the Napoleonic wars. Austria did not fare better, and they were not even capable of going for necessary reformsA fair point. Prussia does rather have a tendency historically to let their army decay quite a lot, then build it up again just in time to re-earn their reputation.
Actually, Nappie politics in Germany were about two things : first, taking some scraps whevenever possible as long as it didn't antagonized obviously too much people, and second to prevent the rise of a german hegemony especially along the Rhine.And with France possibly waiting in the wings...
A while back I started a thread about the Austrians getting the Southern Netherlands back from France after the Napoleonic Wars. The idea behind it was to see if they could be incorporated into the German Empire in 1871. However, the other side was that it might have made Austria strong enough to defeat Prussia in 1866.
Would it have helped? Or would some of the German states that supported Austria IOTL have been neutral or allied themselves with Prussia ITTL because a German Confederation that included OTL Belgium and Luxembourg under Hapsburg rule made the Prussians the lesser of evils?
A while back I started a thread about the Austrians getting the Southern Netherlands back from France after the Napoleonic Wars. The idea behind it was to see if they could be incorporated into the German Empire in 1871. However, the other side was that it might have made Austria strong enough to defeat Prussia in 1866.
Would it have helped? Or would some of the German states that supported Austria IOTL have been neutral or allied themselves with Prussia ITTL because a German Confederation that included OTL Belgium and Luxembourg under Hapsburg rule made the Prussians the lesser of evils?
That's not going to happen with a MORE powerful Austria. The rest of Germany (minus Prussia, of course) loved the idea of Austria in 'Germany', and wouldn't have minded an Austrian led Reich. HOWEVER, and it's big, they only wanted Austria - not the non-German bits of that Empire, and especially not Hungary.So I was wondering what would happen if Austria defeated Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and went on to unify Germany.
It's not just the French. The Russians aren't going to let Prussia be destroyed or for Austria to grow much.From what I've read before, I'm really not sure. I still think Austria would be seen as the lesser of two evils, since they were less "unificationist" then Prussia, and Prussia with all it's expansionism and militaristic tendencies scared a lot of the minor German states quite a bit, which was what drove so many Protestant German states into the Austrian alliance.
Bit late to reply to this, but what I mean is that Prussia has an uncanny ability to get the timing right on when to reform. The Prussian army of 1864-71 won three fairly major wars over that eight year timespan, and it didn't exist in anything like the same form three years beforehand.IMHO it would have been almost impossible to avoid the rot in the army given the long peace between 1815 and 1849 and the budget strictures to repay the debts incurred during the Napoleonic wars. Austria did not fare better, and they were not even capable of going for necessary reforms