WI Athens surrendered to Xerxes

When reading 'The Histories', one of the things that really strikes you is just how fractious the Greeks were back then. It seems as if half the Greek city-states sided with the Persians, and various individuals from all over the place made a beeline for Xerxes to betray their countrymen for gold (Ephialtes, the one who betrayed the Greeks at Thermopylae, did just that). One of the stranger attempts to split the Greeks was made after Xerxes left Greece after the naval disaster at Salamis, by Xerxes' general Mardonius, who commanded those forces still in Greece. He sent an envoy (ironically, a Macedonian named Alexander) to the Athenians (who had been driven out of their homes, had their city burnt, and lost two harvests). Actually, there were two attempts... the first one, soon after Salamis. Alexander offered them not only their own lands back, but more as well. The Athenians dawdled on the negotiations, waiting for the Spartans to show up, which they promptly did. Sparta was frantically building a wall to close off the Pelopennese, but hadn't completed it yet, and offered Athens support for her non-combatants who were homeless. The Athenians declined the Persian offer. A second attempt was made later on, but after the Spartans had completed their wall. This time, it was the Spartans who dawdled, and they might have left the Athenians to their fate, except that apparently the Ephors decided it would be better to keep Athens in the alliance, since her siding with Persia would leave the Pelopennese wide open for invasion. Thus, the Spartans and Athenians and their allies eventually made their way to battle at Plataea, where the Persians were beaten thoroughly.

So, let us suppose that Athens accepts either of these offers. What happens next?
 
All over red rover.

Athens had the largest and best navy. If it sided with Persia (why would it after the city had been burnt to the ground?) then the Pelopennese is, as you say, open to invasion at any point. The Spartans and their allies would not be able to effectively defend it.

I seriously doubt however, that the Persians would do a deal that the Athenians would find acceptable.
 

Rockingham

Banned
All over red rover.

Athens had the largest and best navy. If it sided with Persia (why would it after the city had been burnt to the ground?) then the Pelopennese is, as you say, open to invasion at any point. The Spartans and their allies would not be able to effectively defend it.

I seriously doubt however, that the Persians would do a deal that the Athenians would find acceptable.
Who said the Persians have to be honest? Divide and conquer. Thats the strategy thay should have used.
 

Hendryk

Banned
It seems as if half the Greek city-states sided with the Persians, and various individuals from all over the place made a beeline for Xerxes to betray their countrymen for gold (Ephialtes, the one who betrayed the Greeks at Thermopylae, did just that).
Not to mention Themistocles, victor of Salamis, who went over to the Persians a while later and became governor of Magnesia.
 
1) After Salamis, there's not really a political faction in Athens who will benefit from a separate peace with Persia: Themistocles, who probably led a faction with support from the lower classes, aimed for Athenian supremacy whenever he could. The aristocrats who might have been amenable to a peace had just backed Themistocles' plans for war at Salamis: there's a famous episode with Cimon taking a bridle from the temples on the Acropolis and urging the Athenians to flee to Salamis and fight the Persians. They are also paying to support the destitute Athenians, which might be considered a drain on their resources, but is also about to win them substantial political influence. For much of the war, Persia wanted to re-install the Peisistratid tyranny; the Athenian Demos will not accept this under any circumstance.

2) The Perisans would not have accepted a treaty without forcing the Athenians to make at least ritual offers of submissions, i.e. offering earth and water. Even if it's just a token gesture, it's quite simply ASB for the Athenians of the 480s: they have just won a great victory against the greatest empire on Earth and they credit their unique political institutions for the acheivement. They're fiercely proud of their independence.

3) Aside from ideological/patriotic considerations, Themistocles has little reason to think that an alliance with Perisa will help the cause of Athenian supremacy. A defeated Sparta will help, true, but Persia will not take lightly to her erstwhile ally taking control of the Aegean, which is what Athens will need to do if she is to gain power. Also, Athens will have destroyed all the pan-Hellenic sympathy she gained from fighting; she will be despised, as the Thebans were for some time, as a traitor.

4) At the first offer, more likely than not, Themistocles used the peace initiative as a chance to ensure that the Spartans live up to their leadership of the alliance and fight the battle of Plataea. He has no real intentions of giving in. By the time of the second, Spartan honor is too invested in the campaign against Persia to make peace before Spartan hoplites have had a chance to avenge Thermopylae. Athens does not at this point seem enough of a threat to Spartan interests to countenance abadoning them to barbarians.

5) While the Ancient Greeks were incredibly wilely and prone to change alleigiances with they wind, the were also very much influenced by concepts of honor and prestige (just as most states are, up to and including the present). Furthermore, there's little reason to expect that making peace with Perisa will allow Athens any real advantage.
 
it's unlikely that Athens would surrender, but not impossible... the second attempt might well have succeeded if the Spartans had done nothing to indicate to the Athenians that they were coming to help. Once they had walled off the Isthmus, many of the Spartans were all for sitting behind it and keeping themselves safe. If the Spartans had bluntly told the Athenians this, then the latter might well have been tempted to accept the Persian offer... it would restore their lands (and give them more), and give them the ruins of their city back, as well as their fields (they'd already lost two harvests). IIRC, it was one man (whose name I don't recall) who convinced the Ephors to support Athens. Have that man fall ill or die, and Sparta might well abandon the Athenians...
 
it's unlikely that Athens would surrender, but not impossible... the second attempt might well have succeeded if the Spartans had done nothing to indicate to the Athenians that they were coming to help. Once they had walled off the Isthmus, many of the Spartans were all for sitting behind it and keeping themselves safe. If the Spartans had bluntly told the Athenians this, then the latter might well have been tempted to accept the Persian offer... it would restore their lands (and give them more), and give them the ruins of their city back, as well as their fields (they'd already lost two harvests). IIRC, it was one man (whose name I don't recall) who convinced the Ephors to support Athens. Have that man fall ill or die, and Sparta might well abandon the Athenians...

Could you by chance share the citation from Herodotus for the peace offereings by the Persians? You've awakened my curiosity.
 
Could you by chance share the citation from Herodotus for the peace offereings by the Persians? You've awakened my curiosity.

sure, make me look through the book, grumble grumble...

okay, the first attempt was in book 8, sections 135 to 144 (the end of book 8)
The second attempt wasn't so detailed, but it's in book 9, sections 4 to 11. I'm using the version that was translated by Aubrey de Selincourt, published by Penguin Classics.

Of course, Herodotus claims that the Athenians never considered such vile proposals, they were too good and honest, yadda yadda yadda... but with Athens captured for the second time, most of Attica captured, and two successive harvests lost, the Athenians might just have given in if the Spartans had left them in the lurch....
 
sure, make me look through the book, grumble grumble...

okay, the first attempt was in book 8, sections 135 to 144 (the end of book 8)
The second attempt wasn't so detailed, but it's in book 9, sections 4 to 11. I'm using the version that was translated by Aubrey de Selincourt, published by Penguin Classics.

Of course, Herodotus claims that the Athenians never considered such vile proposals, they were too good and honest, yadda yadda yadda... but with Athens captured for the second time, most of Attica captured, and two successive harvests lost, the Athenians might just have given in if the Spartans had left them in the lurch....

First, thanks for the citation. I've read the relevant sections on Perseus (www.perseus.tufs.edu). The first offer seems bound to be refused because of Athenian sentiment and Spartan wishes. You are right to be skeptical of Herodotus, but at times skepticism of the ancient sources can be taken too far. In any case, the second offer may include a possibility for a WI, given careful review. Here is the text of that offer:

Herodotus said:
I. When Alexander returned and told him what he had heard from the Athenians, Mardonius set forth from Thessaly and led his army with all zeal against Athens; he also took with him all the people to whose countries he came along the way. The rulers of Thessaly did not repent of what they had already done and were readier than before to further his march. Thorax of Larissa, who had given Xerxes safe-conduct in his flight, now, without any attempt of concealment, opened a passage for Mardonius into Hellas.

II. But when, in the course of its march, the army had come into Boeotia, the Thebans attempted to stay Mardonius, advising him that he could find no country better fitted than theirs for encampment; he should not (they begged) go further, but rather halt there and subdue all Hellas without fighting. [2] As long as the Greeks who were previously in accord remained so, it would be difficult even for the whole world to overcome them by force of arms; “but if you do as we advise,” said the Thebans, “you will without trouble be master of all their battle plans. [3] Send money to the men who have power in their cities, and thereby you will divide Hellas against itself; after that, with your partisans to aid you, you will easily subdue those who are your adversaries.”

III. Such was their counsel, but he would not follow it. What he desired was to take Athens once more; this was partly out of mere perversity, and partly because he intended to signify to the king at Sardis by a line of beacons across the islands that he held Athens. [2] When he came to Attica, however, he found the city as unpopulated as before, for, as he learned, the majority of them were on shipboard at Salamis. So he took the city, but without any of its men. There were ten months between the kings taking of the place and the later invasion of Mardonius.

IV. When Mardonius came to Athens, he sent to Salamis a certain Murychides, a man from Hellespont, bearing the same offer as Alexander the Macedonian had ferried across to the Athenians. [2] He sent this for the second time because although he already knew the Athenians' unfriendly purpose, he expected that they would abandon their stubbornness now that Attica was the captive of his spear and lay at his mercy.

V. For this reason he sent Murychides to Salamis who came before the council and conveyed to them Mardonius message. Then Lycidas, one of the councillors, said that it seemed best to him to receive the offer brought to them by Murychides and lay it before the people. [2] This was the opinion which he declared, either because he had been bribed by Mardonius, or because the plan pleased him. The Athenians in the council were, however, very angry; so too were those outside when they heard of it. They made a ring round Lycidas and stoned him to death. Murychides the Hellespontian, however, they permitted to depart unharmed. [3] There was much noise at Salamis over the business of Lycidas; and when the Athenian women learned what was afoot, one calling to another and bidding her follow, they went on their own impetus to the house of Lycidas and stoned to death his wife and his children

VI. Now this was how the Athenians had crossed over to Salamis. As long as they expected that the Peloponnesian army would come to their aid, they remained in Attica. But when the Peloponnesians took longer and longer to act and the invader was said to be in Boeotia already, they then conveyed all their goods out of harms way and themselves crossed over to Salamis. They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon, who were to upbraid the Lacedaemonians for permitting the barbarian to invade Attica and not helping the Athenians to meet him in Boeotia; and who were to remind the Lacedaemonians of the promises which the Persian had made to Athens if she would change sides, and warn them that the Athenians would devise some means of salvation for themselves if the Lacedaemonians sent them no help.

VII. The Lacedaemonians were at this time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, and their chief concern was to give the god his due; moreover, the wall which they were building on the Isthmus was by now getting its battlements. When the Athenian envoys arrived in Lacedaemon, bringing with them envoys from Megara and Plataea, they came before the ephors and said: “The Athenians have sent us with this message: the king of the Medes is ready to give us back our country, and to make us his confederates, equal in right and standing, in all honor and honesty, and to give us whatever land we ourselves may choose besides our own. [2] But we, since we do not want to sin against Zeus the god of Hellas and think it shameful to betray Hellas, have not consented. This we have done despite the fact that the Greeks are dealing with us wrongfully and betraying us to our hurt; furthermore, we know that it is more to our advantage to make terms with the Persians than to wage war with him, yet we will not make terms with him of our own free will. For our part, we act honestly by the Greeks;but what of you, who once were in great dread lest we should make terms with the Persian? Now that you have a clear idea of our sentiments and are sure that we will never betray Hellas, and now that the wall which you are building across the Isthmus is nearly finished, you take no account of the Athenians, but have deserted us despite all your promises that you would withstand the Persian in Boeotia, and have permitted the barbarian to march into Attica. [2] For the present, then, the Athenians are angry with you since you have acted in a manner unworthy of you. Now they ask you to send with us an army with all speed, so that we may await the foreigner's onset in Attica; since we have lost Boeotia, in our own territory the most suitable place for a battle is the Thriasian plain.”

VIII. When the ephors heard that, they delayed answering till the next day, and again till the day after. This they did for ten days, putting it off from day to day. In the meantime all the Peloponnesians were doing all they could to fortify the Isthmus, and they had nearly completed the task. [2] I cannot say for certain why it was that when Alexander the Macedonian came to Athens the Lacedaemonians insisted that the Athenians should not join the side of the Persian, yet now took no account of that; it may be that with the Isthmus fortified, they thought they had no more need of the Athenians, whereas when Alexander came to Attica, their wall was not yet built and they were working at this in great fear of the Persians.

IX. The nature of their response was as follows: on the day before the final hearing of the Athenian delegation, Chileus, a man of Tegea, who had more authority with the Lacedaemonians than any other of their guests, learned from the ephors all that the Athenians had said. [2] Upon hearing this he, as the tale goes, said to the ephors, “Sirs, if the Athenians are our enemies and the barbarians allies, then although you push a strong wall across the Isthmus, a means of access into the Peloponnese lies wide open for the Persian. No, give heed to what they say before the Athenians take some new resolve which will bring calamity to Hellas.”

X. This was the counsel he gave the ephors, who straightway took it to heart. Without saying a word to the envoys who had come from the cities, they ordered five thousand Spartans to march before dawn. Seven helots were appointed to attend each of them, and they gave the command to Pausanias son of Cleombrotus. [2] The leader's place rightfully belonged to Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, but he was still a boy, and Pausanias his guardian and cousin. Cleombrotus, Pausanias' father and Anaxandrides' son, was no longer living.

My read on this incident:

1) Note that Mardonius is recorded as discounting the Thebans' advice to send gold to certain people in the cities of Greece in order to play the Greeks off each other. Artaxerxes successfully pursued a similar strategy in 396 to spark the Corinthian War by forming a League between Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos back by Persian gold. Is Herodotus mistaken about this refusal? Perhaps, but if so an methodical review of his evidence is out of the question and we can't know anything about the period for sure. Mardonius' refusal indicates a few things: that there were people in Greek states who would collaborate with the Persians and that Mardonius thinks their aid will not help him take Athens. This is perhaps reason to surmise that very few collaborators exist in Athens, if any. There may be some in other cities, like Sparta, Corinth, etc. This refusal is doubly difficult to understand in light of Mardonius second envoy to Athens: more on this later, however.

2) When Mardonius takes Attica he finds it without any of the men. Earlier, it is suggested that the entire non-fighting population of Athens has been evacuated to Salamis. This probably does not include every single Athenian in Attica, but it is enough of the population that the Athenian council (Boule) is meeting on Salamis. Herodotus represents the move as taking place because the Athenians doubt a Spartan army will march out to confront the Persians in Boeotia.

3) Crucially, when the Athenians receive the offer from Mardonius' messenger, they never hear it in the Assembly. Herodotus says that it is only presented to the Boule (a smaller body which referred matters to the full Assembly). Only one member of that body suggests referring the matter to an open vote and he is killed for making the suggestion! Hence, the Athenians never really consider the proposal, unlike the first which they seem to have heard in open Assembly, since Herodotus records speeches being given.

4) Nevertheless, the Athenians still need the Spartans to act if they are to do something about the Persians. The Athenian speech to the Spartans does make it seem that Athens is threatening to make peace unless Sparta acts. To this the Spartans respond by waiting. Herodotus confesses ignorance of the reason for the disparate Spartan responses to the two peace offers, but suggests it may be that the Isthmian Wall afforded them a sense of security. There is good reason to be cautious of this suggestion: the Spartans have built the wall in a very short amount of time and they weren't renowned for their architectural expertise. Athens built the Long Walls in similarly short amount of time, true, but these walls did not extend to the entire Isthmus of Corinth, a larger area to control and fence off.

Herodotus suggests that it is only when a delegate from Tegea agrees with the Athenians that the ephors refer the matter for discussion (probably first the Gerousia and then to the Assembly for ratification). The fact that the Spartans are so quick to respond to the delegate from Tegea is easy to understand: the Tegeans were one of the most influential members of the Peleponnesian League (and its first) because the controlled the only road linking Laconia to Messenia (mountians prevented easy access in Spartan territory).

Once the Tegeans have spoken, the ephors seem to take instant action. Herodotus is probably slighlty incorrect in suggesting they possessed the authority to command the sending of the expedition; more likely they present the matter to the Gerousia which then makes the near instantaneous decision for war. The Ephors, remember, are not in any way elected, they are chosen by lot, so their sentiments do not reflect all of Sparta's. There may well have been those who counselled against fighting, but the decision of Sparta seems fairly unanimous: the sheer size of the force they send seems to attest. 5,000 men was at least half of all the Spartiates, if not significantly more. Hence, why are the Ephors stalling? Perhaps some (there were 5) are Medizing doves/reluctant to fight. Herodotus also tells us that the Spartans were observing a religious fesitival: this may have been a pretext, a frequent Spartan practice. It may aslo have been true and may have genuinely prevented Spartan action, given the cumbersome nature of the Spartan polity.

It is intructive that Herodotus mentions that Pausanias commands the expedition, even though the right should have fallen to the Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas. Spartan politics usually line up around factions centered on one of the two kings: it's fairly clear that before Thermopylae, Leonidas led a war faction against a substantial dovish/Medizing party. After Leonidas' death, however, politics at Sparta are probably very, very unclear: the hawkish party is leaderless, but the doves are now Medizers and are going to default on the legacy of Leonidas' sacrifice. A chaotic environment at Sparta goes a long way to explaining the Ephors' delay. Remember too that previously the Spartans have had ample time to organize themselves when replying to the first peace offer, since Mardonius' envoy had farther to travel. Now, there's less time and they actually have to decide about sending troops out, which they're always slow to do. The fact that the non-Leonidan king, Pausanias, likely at least a tacit supporter of those who opposed Leoniadas, is placed in command suggests a renewed anti-Persian faction at Sparta.

In summary, it seems unlikely that the Spartans are truly considering abadoning the Athenians: the expedition they send suggests they are fully committed to meet the Persians in battle (not just defend Attica) and are willing to risk a substantial number of Spartiates in battle. The sentiment of the Tegean ambassador suggests that Sparta will face rebellious allies if she shirks her responsibility, which may if unchecked threaten the Spartan social system by allowing Messenian helots to revolt (if the Tegeans deny the Spartans access). Remember, too, that Herodotus' work is as patently pro-Athenian as it is anti-Spartan (when possible), since it's written in the build-up to the Great Peloponnesian War (431-404). Spartan hesitance makes a nice story about Spartan perfidy.

Now, Dave is still right that there is some possibility that the Spartans refuse. They may however only refuse in this instance, for they will still have to fight the Persians.

If the Spartans do end up saying no, then it's still strange if the Athenians choose to accept the peace offer. Remember, they never actually come to a vote on accept the offer, but on whether to hear it, and the person who suggests that they kill. If they are later to accept the offer, they will have to approach Mardonius to see if the offer is still good, which is may not be. Furthermore, the offer is supposed to be the same as that offered by Alexander of Macedon, but that offer seems to me like an implicit recognition of Persian suzerainty over Athens; it also seems that the Athenians took it that way as well, given their statements in that debate.

Even if the Athenians do not make peace with the Persians and a battle still occurs which drives Persian forces out of Greece, increased Spartan hesitance still has substantial impact in changing the pace of Athenian-Spartan enmity.

Again however the whole thing has to be taken with a grain of salt, given its source.
 
I agree with you that it's unlikely... but it's hardly ASB... we're talking about one city state surrendering... and yes, the Spartans (actually, the whole Peleponnese) would still have to fight the Persians... considering the things we talk about on this site every day, the surrender of a single city state isn't all that wild a POD, even if it is Athens...

I'm not totally skeptical about Herodotus; he's actually a pretty good historian for the time, and he makes clear the things he's not sure about... but I am skeptical about his claims as to the Athenians' supposed implacable resistance to Persia... considering that they were hungry and homeless, there had to be some support for giving in to the Persians. I really doubt they said, "Never! Hell no!" right away, although they did later. If Sparta had hunkered down behind their wall and left the Athenians in the lurch, the Athenians could have accepted the proposal (unlikely, but not impossible)....
 
I agree with you that it's unlikely... but it's hardly ASB... we're talking about one city state surrendering... and yes, the Spartans (actually, the whole Peleponnese) would still have to fight the Persians... considering the things we talk about on this site every day, the surrender of a single city state isn't all that wild a POD, even if it is Athens...

I didn't mean to say it was ASB, but only very, very unlikely. Somebody is going to have die (Themistocles, certainly).

I'm not totally skeptical about Herodotus; he's actually a pretty good historian for the time, and he makes clear the things he's not sure about... but I am skeptical about his claims as to the Athenians' supposed implacable resistance to Persia... considering that they were hungry and homeless, there had to be some support for giving in to the Persians. I really doubt they said, "Never! Hell no!" right away, although they did later. If Sparta had hunkered down behind their wall and left the Athenians in the lurch, the Athenians could have accepted the proposal (unlikely, but not impossible)....

Herodotus does get a bad wrap, particularly if one considers that unlike Thucydides, he often gives more than one version of a story and cites sources (he says, X person told me this). However, what details he chooses to report are sometime unreliable: he reports the existence of a palace in Egypt no evidence of which has ever been found. Presumably, his evidence on Greek affairs is better, hence why I based my argument on a close reading of his account.

Some amount of Athenian impalacablity may be over the top, considering Herodotus' biases. But some of it was probably true. Furtermore, the Athenians, though desperate, seem to have thought themselves well taken care of. Far more important than Spartan aid was the fact that the aristocrats of Athens paid to support the poor folk on Salamis. This is a telling example of the remarkable unity and resolve in the face of adversity characteristic of Athens at the time. However, it's also the path for the possibility of your WI: if they're forced to hold out on Salamis long enough, the Athenians may have little choice. Most likely some kind of civil war breaks out and sees the population fragment; some significant portion leaving for parts unknown (as Themistocles threatened if the Spartans abandoned the Athenians before Salamis) may occur.

However, in the time it would take to force the die-hard democrats to aquiese, Sparta and the Peloponnesians would have fought some kind of battle against Persian forces and odds are they win. The Spartans will continue the war for a while, but the Athenians will not have the prestige to organize their own league.

I've always wondered if the Athenians might really take up and move elsewhere. This may be a way to get at least some of them, probably the aggressive democrats who OTL founded the Athenian Empire, found a colony in the Western Mediterranean.
 
do you think the Spartans would win on their own? IIRC, the Athenians supplied about 1/3 of the force at Plataea... without them, it seems the Spartans and the handful of allies they had really have an uphill job ahead of them... particularly if the Athenian fleet wasn't in operation either...
 
do you think the Spartans would win on their own? IIRC, the Athenians supplied about 1/3 of the force at Plataea... without them, it seems the Spartans and the handful of allies they had really have an uphill job ahead of them... particularly if the Athenian fleet wasn't in operation either...


Depends on how you measure the force. At Plataea, the Spartans supplied 5,000 Spartiates, 5,000 perioikoi and 35,000 helots (as servants, attendants, but sometimes as archers, scouts, etc., depending on the loyalty of the helot in question). The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites. Total hoplite forces included 38,000 troops.

To this number we must add 70,000 or so light troops who also fought, bringing the total Greek Army to 100,000 or so. Athenian forces do narrow the army somewhat, but Herodotus' history of the battle is rather implausible: that very few of the troops actually came to grips because of manuevers and feinted cowardice.

A Spartan defence of the Isthmus will probably also lose contingents from Plataea, but that's only 600. In all, the Spartan army probably still has roughly 30,000 hoplites and maybe 60,000 light troops. The Persian army at Plataea was said to have 300,000 men, but Herodotus' numbers for the Persians always seem inflated, though we have no way to cross-check his numbers. Some amount of Persian forces will be need to garrison Attica, Plataea, and perhaps Megara. Though the Persians may force the states to fight for them, Greek allies (apart from the Thebans) do not seem to have added much to the OTL Battle. Indeed, the Macedonians defected just before the armies came to blows. Combined with a more intense battle with the Spartans defending their very homes, I'd say they win, though they may suffer heavy casualties.
 
Top