WI: Athens HAD Captured Syracuse In The Peloponnesian War?

Pericles strategy was working, even after the plague and before Sphacteria. It was aimed to force a peace based on the statu quo ante bellum by showing Sparta it couldn't touch the base of Athens power while Athens could gnag at hers. Sphacteria lead Athens to adopt a new, more offensive strategy, which failed but nearly succeded.

Oh it was failing. Periclean strategy damaged Athens without damaging Sparta much, and it failed in its goal to force Sparta to an early peace. Before Sphacteria, Sparta was not damaged much, while Athens was damaged immensely.

It failed even without the plague.

Attica was as much part of Athens power as the Empire, and losing it was a blow to Athens.

Spartan strategy also failed, in that it failed to force Athens to seek peace based on ravaging Attica, but that did not make the Periclean strategy any more of a success since both strategies aimed at an early peace.

Simply put, both Periclean and Archimadean strategies failed. That was why Athens abandoned it for a more aggressive strategy, and Sparta also abandoned it by taking to the sea.

After Sphacteria Athens was able to made rather heavy handed demands which, had they come to pass they would have essentially brought the political map to where it was during the peak of Athens land power dominance during the First Peloponesian War and Sparta was essentially willing to accept them. Only when Athens tried to force them to negociate in public did the Spartan envoys refuse, as the territories where under the control of their allies and openly throwing them under the buse as opposed to simply privately abandoning would have left her completely isolated in Greece. Sparta fought on because she had to and it took two massive victory at Delion and Amphipolis to save her bacon, and even then not completely as Mantinea still occured afterward.

Perhaps. That only meant that Sphacteria wasn't that a big a physical blow than a psychological blow. If it was that decisive, Sparta would have accepted even the dismantling of the Peloponessian League in order to have peace in 425. Sparta would have been compelled to accept even the most humiliating terms like AThens did in 404. It would accept being totally and publicly humiliated. And it would have meant that even if Sparta had to fight, it could not have done so. But Sparta had a choice, so Sphacteria was not that decisive in damaging Spartan war capability.

If Sphacteria was so decisive, the Spartans wouldn't even be capable of capturing Amphipolis!

Sparta sea power, or apparent sea power since it wasn't really spartan, in the last phase of the war was based on two things: revolted athenian allies and Persian financial support. Without the Sicilian Disaster both are butterflied and Sparta has neither the seamans nor the funds needed to seriously sustain a war at sea for any significant amount of time, not in a way that can seriously threaten the existence of the athenian empire as a whole at any rate. In contrast, Athens had some serious chomps on lands and her hoplites where a serious threat to Sparta.
It doesn't matter if the crews are not really Spartan. The Spartan fleet was commanded by Spartan officers, and served Spartan purposes. It's existence was commanded by Spartans by levying the maritime members of the League, like Corinth, by Spartans levying revolted cities, and by approaching the Persians. And the revolts was brought about by appearance of Spartan ships on the revolting cities. And of course, you cannot simply will the Persian gold to disappear even with Syracusan victory. The Persians wanted to recover the cities of Ionia, and would be willing to fund any power that would help it.

And the Athenian hoplites were not a serious threat to Sparta. If it was, it would not hide under its walls, and confront the Spartan Army in 431 BC when it invaded Attica. But it hid, and let Attica be ravaged. Even Pericles admitted that Spartan hoplites were the equal to all of Greece. When Spartans ravaged the land and cut off the vines and olive trees which was such a big part of the Athenian Economy, Athens merely hid and let the lands be ravaged. They did not even try to defeat the main Spartan army on land during the times when Athens and Sparta were actually at war.

That is a strategy of an city that knows that they are inferior in land to Sparta.


The fort at Pylos played a key role in bringing about Mantinea, where Sparta really stood on the brink of utter disaster, and the slow bleeding of its hilote population touched Spartan power at his core in a way Sparta didn't with Athenian until after the Sicilian Expedition.

During the Archidamian War, the fort at Pylos did not actually bring Sparta to its knees. During the war in 413 BC until its capture, it did not affect the war at all. Compare it to the effect of Decelea. Decelea actually hindered Athenian war effort and led to the exhaustion of the Athenian treasure, and thus contributed directly to Spartan victory. Pylos, not so much. Otherwise, Sparta would have accepted any humiliation in 425 just to have peace. It only had an effect during peace time, yet Athens could not do much to exploit it since they were formally at peace with Sparta, so they had to bring only a minimal contingent at Mantinea.

REmember, at Mantinea, Athens and Sparta are at peace, and are allies.



Saying that if the Corcyrian hadn't happened the war wouldn't have happened is a bit like saying that WWI wouldn't have to come to pass if Franz Ferdinand had survived. Its confusing the root causes of the war for the spark that launching it. Ods are something else would have happened if not for Corcyra and Corinth having a feud that drew Athens and Sparta in. An Athens victorious at Syracuse would for herself with a massive boost in her ressources and that would probably gonna give more arguments to those saying that the time had come to go for unilateral hegemony over Greece while also strenghten the case of those in Sparta thinking that if things where allowed to continue the way they where going Athens would eventually be able overwhelm them.

Well, without the Franz Ferdinand assassination, the odds are that there would not World War at all. There were very many crisis before the assassination, like the Morocco crisis, the Balkan Wars, the Bosnia Annexation crisis, with all the ingredients for war present, yet no World War occurred. It took a specific set of events in 1914, each of which was necessary, to ignite war. And if there was no war in 1914, Russia would grow stronger every year that Germany would not risk war in the future.

So yeah, the Corcyran affair is like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Without it, there would probably be no Great Peloponessian War. Sparta was satisfied with the way things were in 432 BC, yet had to deal with the complaints of League members like Corinth and Megara. And Sparta would not heed those complaints if AThens did not interfere in Corcyra or Megera.

Simply put, the Thirty Years Peace of 446 BC was a stable peace that both Athens and Sparta could live with. Sparta recognized the Athenian Empire and Athenian Supremacy at sea, while Athens gave up all pretensions on land and gave up Boetia and all its conquests in the mainland, and recognized Spartan supremacy at land. It was a basis of lasting peace, that was derailed by a specific set of events, that were not inevitable.

As for Syracusan victory, it depends. If it happens after the disgrace of Alcibiades, then Nicias would be unchallenged, and he would keep the peace of Nicias. Sparta would not go to war again without the defeat at Sicily. If Alcibiades was not disgraced, they could go to war against Sparta, but they could also not. And no, no Athenian actually had serious plans of Athens being total hegemon of Greece. Not even Pericles was that ambitious. All it wanted was that AThenian Empire to be recognized and that Sparta treat it as an equal.
 
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RousseauX

Donor
Come to think of it, if Athens had taken Syracuse, it might have ended up in a Vietnam-style quagmire

In most cases Athens takes a city they install democrats from among the city's citizens in power and depose the pro-Spartan oligarchs. The democrats tend to have the support of lower class citizens so Athens essentially plays domestic politics of city X to get a pliant government.

But Syracuse is already a democracy there's probably no major constituency for a pro-Athenian government, Syracuse would probably need to be occupied and Sicily is a pretty big place. You could see a vicious guirella war and maybe external intervention by either Sparta, Persia or even Carthage down the line if the Athenian position on the island look wobbly.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Yes, Sparta kept challenging Athens at sea. How many fleets did Sparta lose until they eventually won the war at sea? Many, many more. Yet they kept going at it until they won.
That's only because post-Sicily the Persians were subsidizing the Spartans with a lot of gold to keep building navies and hire sailors, without Persian subsidies it's dubious Sparta would have had the staying power to keep challenging Athens
 
Simply put, the Thirty Years Peace of 446 BC was a stable peace that both Athens and Sparta could live with. Sparta recognized the Athenian Empire and Athenian Supremacy at sea, while Athens gave up all pretensions on land and gave up Boetia and all its conquests in the mainland, and recognized Spartan supremacy at land. It was a basis of lasting peace, that was derailed by a specific set of events, that were not inevitable.

I think this would be most interesting to look at. Avoid the last Peloponnesian War and have both the Delian League and Peloponnesian League survive.
 
Oh it was failing. Periclean strategy damaged Athens without damaging Sparta much, and it failed in its goal to force Sparta to an early peace. Before Sphacteria, Sparta was not damaged much, while Athens was damaged immensely.

It failed even without the plague.

Attica was as much part of Athens power as the Empire, and losing it was a blow to Athens.

Spartan strategy also failed, in that it failed to force Athens to seek peace based on ravaging Attica, but that did not make the Periclean strategy any more of a success since both strategies aimed at an early peace.

Simply put, both Periclean and Archimadean strategies failed. That was why Athens abandoned it for a more aggressive strategy, and Sparta also abandoned it by taking to the sea.



Perhaps. That only meant that Sphacteria wasn't that a big a physical blow than a psychological blow. If it was that decisive, Sparta would have accepted even the dismantling of the Peloponessian League in order to have peace in 425. Sparta would have been compelled to accept even the most humiliating terms like AThens did in 404. It would accept being totally and publicly humiliated. And it would have meant that even if Sparta had to fight, it could not have done so. But Sparta had a choice, so Sphacteria was not that decisive in damaging Spartan war capability.

If Sphacteria was so decisive, the Spartans wouldn't even be capable of capturing Amphipolis!


It doesn't matter if the crews are not really Spartan. The Spartan fleet was commanded by Spartan officers, and served Spartan purposes. It's existence was commanded by Spartans by levying the maritime members of the League, like Corinth, by Spartans levying revolted cities, and by approaching the Persians. And the revolts was brought about by appearance of Spartan ships on the revolting cities. And of course, you cannot simply will the Persian gold to disappear even with Syracusan victory. The Persians wanted to recover the cities of Ionia, and would be willing to fund any power that would help it.

And the Athenian hoplites were not a serious threat to Sparta. If it was, it would not hide under its walls, and confront the Spartan Army in 431 BC when it invaded Attica. But it hid, and let Attica be ravaged. Even Pericles admitted that Spartan hoplites were the equal to all of Greece. When Spartans ravaged the land and cut off the vines and olive trees which was such a big part of the Athenian Economy, Athens merely hid and let the lands be ravaged. They did not even try to defeat the main Spartan army on land during the times when Athens and Sparta were actually at war.

That is a strategy of an city that knows that they are inferior in land to Sparta.




During the Archidamian War, the fort at Pylos did not actually bring Sparta to its knees. During the war in 413 BC until its capture, it did not affect the war at all. Compare it to the effect of Decelea. Decelea actually hindered Athenian war effort and led to the exhaustion of the Athenian treasure, and thus contributed directly to Spartan victory. Pylos, not so much. Otherwise, Sparta would have accepted any humiliation in 425 just to have peace. It only had an effect during peace time, yet Athens could not do much to exploit it since they were formally at peace with Sparta, so they had to bring only a minimal contingent at Mantinea.

REmember, at Mantinea, Athens and Sparta are at peace, and are allies.

Exactly. People often neglect that Sparta was so hasty to declare peace because the thirty years peace with Argos would have come to an end precisely at 421 BCE and because king Pleistoanax seized the chance to promote his policy of peace with Athens after Brasidas’ death. Sphacteria wasfar from bringing Sparta on her knees, their value rested upon the psychological effect of having captured several hundreds of Spartan citizens, whose numbers were getting progressively fewer by the day, its military value was questionable, especially because it wasn’t compounded by any significant victory on land, on the contrary, one year later Athens would get trounced at Delium, one of many severe defeats for her.
 
Oh it was failing. Periclean strategy damaged Athens without damaging Sparta much, and it failed in its goal to force Sparta to an early peace. Before Sphacteria, Sparta was not damaged much, while Athens was damaged immensely.

It failed even without the plague.

Attica was as much part of Athens power as the Empire, and losing it was a blow to Athens.

Spartan strategy also failed, in that it failed to force Athens to seek peace based on ravaging Attica, but that did not make the Periclean strategy any more of a success since both strategies aimed at an early peace.

Simply put, both Periclean and Archimadean strategies failed. That was why Athens abandoned it for a more aggressive strategy, and Sparta also abandoned it by taking to the sea.



Perhaps. That only meant that Sphacteria wasn't that a big a physical blow than a psychological blow. If it was that decisive, Sparta would have accepted even the dismantling of the Peloponessian League in order to have peace in 425. Sparta would have been compelled to accept even the most humiliating terms like AThens did in 404. It would accept being totally and publicly humiliated. And it would have meant that even if Sparta had to fight, it could not have done so. But Sparta had a choice, so Sphacteria was not that decisive in damaging Spartan war capability.

If Sphacteria was so decisive, the Spartans wouldn't even be capable of capturing Amphipolis!


It doesn't matter if the crews are not really Spartan. The Spartan fleet was commanded by Spartan officers, and served Spartan purposes. It's existence was commanded by Spartans by levying the maritime members of the League, like Corinth, by Spartans levying revolted cities, and by approaching the Persians. And the revolts was brought about by appearance of Spartan ships on the revolting cities. And of course, you cannot simply will the Persian gold to disappear even with Syracusan victory. The Persians wanted to recover the cities of Ionia, and would be willing to fund any power that would help it.

And the Athenian hoplites were not a serious threat to Sparta. If it was, it would not hide under its walls, and confront the Spartan Army in 431 BC when it invaded Attica. But it hid, and let Attica be ravaged. Even Pericles admitted that Spartan hoplites were the equal to all of Greece. When Spartans ravaged the land and cut off the vines and olive trees which was such a big part of the Athenian Economy, Athens merely hid and let the lands be ravaged. They did not even try to defeat the main Spartan army on land during the times when Athens and Sparta were actually at war.

That is a strategy of an city that knows that they are inferior in land to Sparta.




During the Archidamian War, the fort at Pylos did not actually bring Sparta to its knees. During the war in 413 BC until its capture, it did not affect the war at all. Compare it to the effect of Decelea. Decelea actually hindered Athenian war effort and led to the exhaustion of the Athenian treasure, and thus contributed directly to Spartan victory. Pylos, not so much. Otherwise, Sparta would have accepted any humiliation in 425 just to have peace. It only had an effect during peace time, yet Athens could not do much to exploit it since they were formally at peace with Sparta, so they had to bring only a minimal contingent at Mantinea.

REmember, at Mantinea, Athens and Sparta are at peace, and are allies.





Well, without the Franz Ferdinand assassination, the odds are that there would not World War at all. There were very many crisis before the assassination, like the Morocco crisis, the Balkan Wars, the Bosnia Annexation crisis, with all the ingredients for war present, yet no World War occurred. It took a specific set of events in 1914, each of which was necessary, to ignite war. And if there was no war in 1914, Russia would grow stronger every year that Germany would not risk war in the future.

So yeah, the Corcyran affair is like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Without it, there would probably be no Great Peloponessian War. Sparta was satisfied with the way things were in 432 BC, yet had to deal with the complaints of League members like Corinth and Megara. And Sparta would not heed those complaints if AThens did not interfere in Corcyra or Megera.

Simply put, the Thirty Years Peace of 446 BC was a stable peace that both Athens and Sparta could live with. Sparta recognized the Athenian Empire and Athenian Supremacy at sea, while Athens gave up all pretensions on land and gave up Boetia and all its conquests in the mainland, and recognized Spartan supremacy at land. It was a basis of lasting peace, that was derailed by a specific set of events, that were not inevitable.

As for Syracusan victory, it depends. If it happens after the disgrace of Alcibiades, then Nicias would be unchallenged, and he would keep the peace of Nicias. Sparta would not go to war again without the defeat at Sicily. If Alcibiades was not disgraced, they could go to war against Sparta, but they could also not. And no, no Athenian actually had serious plans of Athens being total hegemon of Greece. Not even Pericles was that ambitious. All it wanted was that AThenian Empire to be recognized and that Sparta treat it as an equal.
The plague damaged Athens, not Sparta, and it was over way before. The devastation of Attica didn't touch the base of athenian power as it wasn't an essential part of athenian power and economy by this point. If it was so Pericles wouldn't have been able to consider her devastation an unfortunate but acceptable sacrifice. On the other hand Athens was able to damage, even if not fataly, Sparta economic base. All and all, Sparta entered the war to dramatically alter the trend of Greek politics while Athens entered it to prevent such a thing from happening. As Sparta failed to damage Athens in a truly meaningfull way Athens was achieving its objectives under the Periclean strategy, simple as that.

Sphacteria wasn't Leuctra but Athens captured a large enough fraction of the Sparta's homoios that it was able to blackmail her into not making the raids you describe, erroneously, as so damaging without any other concessions then to not execute her prisoners. It also setted the stage for Mantinea (considering they're was a thousand athenian hoplites fighting Spartans there and that Alcibiades played a key role in building the rebel coalition I feel its fair to say that Athens and Sparta being allied at that point was a legal fiction) and made Athens able to take the looses of Delion without any consequences in the long run. Furthermore, the very existence of the expedition to Amphipolis show how shacken Sparta was: nothing was so unlike her usual behaviour then give Brasidas free rein to launch a long expedition with a force of affranchised Hilotes, the latter was a bit taboo in Sparta. It was the most eloquent demonstration of how backed against a wall she felt.

Nobody deny that Sparta was a greater power on land at the time but the fact remain Athens had still some quite significant ressources in that area. By herself and without Persian financial assistance and the support of revolted Athenian allies Sparta would have remained what she previously was at sea, unsignificant. Neither would have happened without the Sicilian disaster as neither did before it, both Persia and Athenian allies deeming it far too risky before Athens was massively weakened. Corinth had some ships but I would deem it closer to Thebes, i.e a defacto independant ally, then one of Sparta's vassal and in any case she failed to even challenge a small portion of the athenian fleet in the gulf of Corinth the only time Athens enemies dared to try challenging her in the open sea before the syracusan disaster.

Decelea hurted Athens but didn't prevent her from levying tributes on her vassals nor to control the agean commercial routes. Pylos, on the other hand, caused a slow bleeding of Sparta hilotes population, the most crucial element of her power, by giving them a possibility to flee too. In any case, a POD ensuring a victory at Syracuse probably butterfly Decelea as previously discussed.

And yes, Athens very much had plans of total hegemony. Pericles had been leader of the city during the First Peloponesian War, when that dream was almost reached, and had never abandonned it. Even Nicias wouldn't have been able to handle all the situations where Athenian and Spartan interests would have come into conflict. In both instance the situation was simply too explosive and crisis after crisis would have occured until one couldn't be resolved by diplomacy.

As for your take on both WWI and the Corcyrian Crisis, it would probably derail the thread to argue it in details but I would still say that, on both counts, you are very much going against the concensus among historians. That in both cases preceding crisis where resolved diplomaticaly doesn't mean that things where getting less heated in the long run, in fact I would argue that crisis still happening afterwards prove precisely the opposite. Basically, you fail in both instances to do precisely what Thucydides declared he would do in introduction to his book, and did: separate the events who marked the start of the war from its root causes.
 
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The plague damaged Athens, not Sparta, and it was over way before. The devastation of Attica didn't touch the base of athenian power as it wasn't an essential part of athenian power and economy by this point. If it was so Pericles wouldn't have been able to consider her devastation an unfortunate but acceptable sacrifice. On the other hand Athens was able to damage, even if not fataly, Sparta economic base. All and all, Sparta entered the war to dramatically alter the trend of Greek politics while Athens entered it to prevent such a thing from happening. As Sparta failed to damage Athens in a truly meaningfull way Athens was achieving its objectives under the Periclean strategy, simple as that.

Sphacteria wasn't Leuctra but Athens captured a large enough fraction of the Sparta's homoios that it was able to blackmail her into not making the raids you describe, erroneously, as so damaging without any other concessions then to not execute her prisoners. It also setted the stage for Mantinea (considering they're was a thousand athenian hoplites fighting Spartans there and that Alcibiades played a key role in building the rebel coalition I feel its fair to say that Athens and Sparta being allied at that point was a legal fiction) and made Athens able to take the looses of Delion without any consequences in the long run. Furthermore, the very existence of the expedition to Amphipolis show how shacken Sparta was: nothing was so unlike her usual behaviour then give Brasidas free rein to launch a long expedition with a force of affranchised Hilotes, the latter was a bit taboo in Sparta. It was the most eloquent demonstration of how backed against a wall she felt.

Nobody deny that Sparta was a greater power on land at the time but the fact remain Athens had still some quite significant ressources in that area. By herself and without Persian financial assistance and the support of revolted Athenian allies Sparta would have remained what she previously was at sea, unsignificant. Neither would have happened without the Sicilian disaster as neither did before it, both Persia and Athenian allies deeming it far too risky before Athens was massively weakened. Corinth had some ships but I would deem it closer to Thebes, i.e a defacto independant ally, then one of Sparta's vassal and in any case she failed to even challenge a small portion of the athenian fleet in the gulf of Corinth the only time Athens enemies dared to try challenging her in the open sea before the syracusan disaster.

Decelea hurted Athens but didn't prevent her from levying tributes on her vassals nor to control the agean commercial routes. Pylos, on the other hand, caused a slow bleeding of Sparta hilotes population, the most crucial element of her power, by giving them a possibility to flee too. In any case, a POD ensuring a victory at Syracuse probably butterfly Decelea as previously discussed.

And yes, Athens very much had plans of total hegemony. Pericles had been leader of the city during the First Peloponesian War, when that dream was almost reached, and had never abandonned it. Even Nicias wouldn't have been able to handle all the situations where Athenian and Spartan interests would have come into conflict. In both instance the situation was simply too explosive and crisis after crisis would have occured until one couldn't be resolved by diplomacy.

As for your take on both WWI and the Corcyrian Crisis, it would probably derail the thread to argue it in details but I would still say that, on both counts, you are very much going against the concensus among historians. That in both cases preceding crisis where resolved diplomaticaly doesn't mean that things where getting less heated in the long run, in fact I would argue that crisis still happening afterwards prove precisely the opposite. Basically, you fail in both instances to do precisely what Thucydides declared he would do in introduction to his book, and did: separate the events who marked the start of the war from its root causes.

I agree with you on one thing, the Peloponnesian war, like WW1, could have been delayed, but their causes were too deeply rooted to be avoided altogether. However, it’s doubtful whether Athens under Pericles ever had serious mainland ambitions. The first Peloponnesian war was actually very rarely fought in the Peloponnese, Pericles’ targets were the Isthmus, Beotia and control of the Amphictyonic league. Was it the prelude to some bigger project, or merely a way to make sure no serious threat could be used by Sparta to interfere with the Delian League? Perhaps Pericles would have better considered the situation once he had won, but he didn’t, so he decisively turned away from such policy and went back to founding colonies and establishing cleruchies in key places for Athens’ naval empire. Would a more victorious Athens have one day considered total hegemony over Greece? That’s likely, but Pericles was far from such projects in 460 BCE.

Athens wasn’t damaging Sparta’s economy, there was no economy to damage in the first place. There were no coins circling in Sparta and her citizens thought commerce and profit to be unworthy of them. Her economy rested all on her slaves, and Athens never really came to deprive Sparta of them in the course of the war, whether by making them revolt or by plundering Laconia or Messene. As long as the allies were willing to fight, and Sparta didn’t suffer a resounding defeat on land, she could keep going for years, as she did. Athens could do that too, even more so, following Pericles’ strategy, that way though, she could never hope to win, all she could have done that way was bring her enemies to a stalemate. You can’t win a war by never defeating an enemy with a powerful army on land, you can just bring him to exhaustion, at best, that’s not winning though.

Pylos and Sphacteria didn’t as much weaken Sparta as scare her. Amphipolis proves that Sparta had been indeed scared, but it also proves that her strenght and ability to hit back had not been waned at all. Attacking Amphipolis was a sound strategic decision made by a popular and capable commander who also made the wise decision to enlist helots in his army, which thing was part motivated by fear, part by simple convenience, to the point that it’s incredible so few other Spartan generals were ever smart enough to do so again.

Regarding Decelea, in case of an Athenian victory at Syracuse, Sparta wouldn’t fortify it, but Persia might feel inclined to aid her old pal Thebes and, by Alcibiades’ suggestion, in case he’s exiled, she might decide to keep up the war in Sparta’s place, alongside Corinth.
 
I agree with you on one thing, the Peloponnesian war, like WW1, could have been delayed, but their causes were too deeply rooted to be avoided altogether. However, it’s doubtful whether Athens under Pericles ever had serious mainland ambitions. The first Peloponnesian war was actually very rarely fought in the Peloponnese, Pericles’ targets were the Isthmus, Beotia and control of the Amphictyonic league. Was it the prelude to some bigger project, or merely a way to make sure no serious threat could be used by Sparta to interfere with the Delian League? Perhaps Pericles would have better considered the situation once he had won, but he didn’t, so he decisively turned away from such policy and went back to founding colonies and establishing cleruchies in key places for Athens’ naval empire. Would a more victorious Athens have one day considered total hegemony over Greece? That’s likely, but Pericles was far from such projects in 460 BCE.

Athens wasn’t damaging Sparta’s economy, there was no economy to damage in the first place. There were no coins circling in Sparta and her citizens thought commerce and profit to be unworthy of them. Her economy rested all on her slaves, and Athens never really came to deprive Sparta of them in the course of the war, whether by making them revolt or by plundering Laconia or Messene. As long as the allies were willing to fight, and Sparta didn’t suffer a resounding defeat on land, she could keep going for years, as she did. Athens could do that too, even more so, following Pericles’ strategy, that way though, she could never hope to win, all she could have done that way was bring her enemies to a stalemate. You can’t win a war by never defeating an enemy with a powerful army on land, you can just bring him to exhaustion, at best, that’s not winning though.

Pylos and Sphacteria didn’t as much weaken Sparta as scare her. Amphipolis proves that Sparta had been indeed scared, but it also proves that her strenght and ability to hit back had not been waned at all. Attacking Amphipolis was a sound strategic decision made by a popular and capable commander who also made the wise decision to enlist helots in his army, which thing was part motivated by fear, part by simple convenience, to the point that it’s incredible so few other Spartan generals were ever smart enough to do so again.

Regarding Decelea, in case of an Athenian victory at Syracuse, Sparta wouldn’t fortify it, but Persia might feel inclined to aid her old pal Thebes and, by Alcibiades’ suggestion, in case he’s exiled, she might decide to keep up the war in Sparta’s place, alongside Corinth.
Wheter Athens had plan, in the short run at least, to take over the Peloponesus can be debated but the fact she did allie with Argos during that period and was busy detaching Trozen and Achea from the Peloponesian League suggest that she was, at the very least, working at depriving Sparta of her great power status. Add that to her attacks upon Scyion, which don't make any sense if they weren't framing operations working toward an attempt against Corinth, and her ambitions against Beotia and it does sound very much like a concerted attempts at hegemony. The disaster in Egypt did force Pericles to put such ideas on the backburner but I don't see any reasons to not believe Thucydides and the others when they say he never truly lost sight of them and only made them a longer term project.

Sparta had an economy, even if it was only in the most basic senses and Athens cruise and those of her allies did very much disrupt it in a way that Sparta never could with the athenian one since it was mainly sea based. Such a strategy could never achieve a complete victory but it could achieve a relative one, i.e ensure that a defensive war end up in stalemate and the statu quo ante bellum. That was what Pericles wanted in the first place and it would have resulted in Athens continuing to flourish while Sparta demographic problems would have continued to weaken her.

Amphipolis was in many way a shot in the dark: Brasidas was on his one and had no line of communications with the homeland. That he succeded as much as he did was a testament to his abilities and that the Brasideis remained loyal despite the intense hatred the Hilotes felt for Sparta was a testament for his leadership. Emancipating more Hilotes, however, would have been increasingly dangerous as they likely wouldn't have somebody as capable leading them and would most likely have been engaged closer to home, with therefore more risk of turning against their masters... Moreover, Athens did took about a twentieth of Sparta citizens pool prisoner there and the very existence of Pylos lead to many Hilotes attempting to make a run for it, making for slow a bleeding of their main economic asset. On the top of all that, it setted the stage for the revolt who brought Mantinea about, a battle who came extremely close to be Leuctra before Leuctra for Sparta.

The idea of Persia becoming involved in case of victory at Syracuse also don't fit her OTL modus operandi. When Athens was ascendant, or even fighting Sparta to a standstill, Persia deemed involvement too risky. It was only after Athens power got seriously mauled in Sicily that the King of Kings reavaluated his options and saw an oportunity.
 
The plague damaged Athens, not Sparta, and it was over way before. The devastation of Attica didn't touch the base of athenian power as it wasn't an essential part of athenian power and economy by this point. If it was so Pericles wouldn't have been able to consider her devastation an unfortunate but acceptable sacrifice. On the other hand Athens was able to damage, even if not fataly, Sparta economic base. All and all, Sparta entered the war to dramatically alter the trend of Greek politics while Athens entered it to prevent such a thing from happening. As Sparta failed to damage Athens in a truly meaningfull way Athens was achieving its objectives under the Periclean strategy, simple as that.

If Periclean strategy worked, the Spartans would have been begging for peace by the 431, 430, 429, or 428. That didn't happen. So it did not work. Periclean strategy failed. Simple as that.

Pericles in 431 did not plan a 27 year or even a 10 year war. Like most leaders leading their states to war, he envisioned a quick painless war. He would get that by relying on the defensive and making Sparta awestruck by the defenses of Athens and making them quit. Obviously, it didn't work.

The plague only added to the miseries of the Athenians. But the blow was struck when Sparta devastated Attica even before the onslaught of the plague. You seem to think that Attica is nothing. It was very important to the Athenian economy. It as about half of the power of Athens in 431, the other half the Empire. And that empire was unstable, ready to revolt at the drop of a hat.

Sphacteria wasn't Leuctra but Athens captured a large enough fraction of the Sparta's homoios that it was able to blackmail her into not making the raids you describe, erroneously, as so damaging without any other concessions then to not execute her prisoners. It also setted the stage for Mantinea (considering they're was a thousand athenian hoplites fighting Spartans there and that Alcibiades played a key role in building the rebel coalition I feel its fair to say that Athens and Sparta being allied at that point was a legal fiction) and made Athens able to take the looses of Delion without any consequences in the long run. Furthermore, the very existence of the expedition to Amphipolis show how shacken Sparta was: nothing was so unlike her usual behaviour then give Brasidas free rein to launch a long expedition with a force of affranchised Hilotes, the latter was a bit taboo in Sparta. It was the most eloquent demonstration of how backed against a wall she felt.

Yes, Sparta stopped the raids, but did not surrender or give in the most humiliating demands, and fought on. It was psychological, not physical. And Mantinea is irrelevant since its after the War, and when the Spartiates were already returned by AThens.

Legal fiction or no, Sparta and Athens were at peace in 418 BC and allied. War only started in 413. If there was a war, it was only a Cold War. The thousand Athenian contingent were as relevant to the relations between the States as the Soviet pilots in the Korean War.

So Mantinea was irrelevant for any discussion on the Archidamian War or the later war. Thing is, Athens made peace when things are theoretically are in her favor, and gave much to Sparta in exchange for almost nothing. Then they allied with Sparta, and did not go to war with Sparta until Sparta declared war in 413.


If Sparta was so shackled, it would have made any peace and endure any humiliation in 425, and would not even be capable of launching the expedition to Brasidas. As I said, Sphacteria's blow was psychological, not physical. So yeah, Sparta has a hefty margin of error, about the same as Athens. It can make many mistakes, and not lose. I mean, Sparta lost at Sphacteria, but did not lose the war.


By herself and without Persian financial assistance and the support of revolted Athenian allies Sparta would have remained what she previously was at sea, unsignificant. Neither would have happened without the Sicilian disaster as neither did before it, both Persia and Athenian allies deeming it far too risky before Athens was massively weakened. Corinth had some ships but I would deem it closer to Thebes, i.e a defacto independant ally, then one of Sparta's vassal and in any case she failed to even challenge a small portion of the athenian fleet in the gulf of Corinth the only time Athens enemies dared to try challenging her in the open sea before the syracusan disaster.

And as long as Persia wanted the Ionian Cities, the Persians would always be receptive to anyone who wanted to weaken Athens. The source of Sparta's navy wasn't only Persian Gold and the the revolted Allies. It was also the members of the Peloponessian League. Corinth, for example, was the main source of the Spartan fleet. And so what if Corinth and Thebes were independent? They still provided soldiers and ships to Sparta, and hated Athens more than Sparta hated Athens. They were the prime movers of the war with Athens, not Sparta.

Sparta's strength since the beginning was not confined to Sparta alone. Her strength was because of the existence of the Peloponessian League. You cannot just discount how Corinth and Thebes contributed to Spartan Strength. When I speak of Sparta, I speak of the League. And yeah, the fact that Persian gold helped does not detract from Spartan strength. It, in fact, made Sparta stronger during the actual war.

Decelea hurted Athens but didn't prevent her from levying tributes on her vassals nor to control the agean commercial routes. Pylos, on the other hand, caused a slow bleeding of Sparta hilotes population, the most crucial element of her power, by giving them a possibility to flee too. In any case, a POD ensuring a victory at Syracuse probably butterfly Decelea as previously discussed.

What slow bleeding of Helot population? Sure, it attracted escaped slaves. But Spartan Agriculture did not suffer. I hear of no reports of Spartans starving because of escape helots. I hear nothing of the Spartans war capability being damaged because of escaped helots. Any damage it did to Spartan economy was nothing compared to the mass escape of Athenian slaves in the silver mines because of the fort at Decelea.

And yes, the victory in Syracuse would butterfly Decelea, because I don't think the war would start in 413 with a victorious Athens in Sicily.

Even if it started, I don't see why the Spartans won't establish a fort in Attica. The Athenians would still be afraid to face the League in open battle, and the site of Decelea is obvious. And the presence of the fort would still disrupt the mining operation, as it would give a place for the slaves to escape. And the Spartans have the example of Pylos to emulate. The advice of Alcibiades was very obvious. Sure, it's not inevitable, but it's impossible either.

And yes, Athens very much had plans of total hegemony. Pericles had been leader of the city during the First Peloponesian War, when that dream was almost reached, and had never abandonned it. Even Nicias wouldn't have been able to handle all the situations where Athenian and Spartan interests would have come into conflict. In both instance the situation was simply too explosive and crisis after crisis would have occured until one couldn't be resolved by diplomacy.

The purpose of Pericles in starting the Peloponessian War was to make Sparta respect Athens as an equal power by showing the Sparta cannot defeat Athens. Whatever grand ambitions that Pericles had in the first war was quenched by the disaster of the Egyptian Expedition and the defeat at Coronea. So he aimed at what was achieved in the 30 years Peace in 446--the Spartan recognition of the Athenian Empire at sea. Now, his goal was to make sure that Sparta would understand that Athens could not be dictated to, like being told to rescind the Megarian Decree, or that Athens could make allies with cities who were not members of either League, like Corcyra.

And as long as both states respected their spheres of interest, its not inevitable that they come to conflict. Just because something happened in OTL does not mean it always has to happen.


As for your take on both WWI and the Corcyrian Crisis, it would probably derail the thread to argue it in details but I would still say that, on both counts, you are very much going against the concensus among historians. That in both cases preceding crisis where resolved diplomaticaly doesn't mean that things where getting less heated in the long run, in fact I would argue that crisis still happening afterwards prove precisely the opposite. Basically, you fail in both instances to do precisely what Thucydides declared he would do in introduction to his book, and did: separate the events who marked the start of the war from its root causes.



There are many historians who argue that WWI was not inevitable even with all the root causes. Without the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, war is not inevitable. It may or may not happened, but it's plausible that it won't. And I would argue that even with the assassination, the First World War is still not inevitable, but only probably.

I mean root causes can exist but that does not mean that war has to result. That is just plain overdetermination. And I find such historians more persuasive than those who argue that it was inevitable. Same with the Peloponessian War. Thucydides own narrative contradicted his declaration that war was inevitable.

I recommend Donald Kagan's The Outbreak of the Peloponessian War. He argued the war was not inevitable despite Thucydides, and I find him persuasive.

He wrote: "
All these may be considered as remote or underlying causes of the war. They may be seen as contributing to the situation that made war possible, but all of them together did not make war necessary. For that, a complicated chain of circumstances and decisions was needed. If any of its links had not been present, the war would not have come.

It is customary to apply the metaphor of the powder keg or tinder-box to international situations that are deemed the inevitable forerunners of war. The usual way of putting it is that the conflicting interests and passions of the contending parties provided the inflammatory material, and the final crisis was only a spark that had sooner or later to fall and cause the inevitable conflagration or explosion. If we were to apply this metaphor to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, we should put it this way: The growth of the Athenian Empire and Sparta’s jealousy and fear of it provided the inflammable material that ignited into the First Peloponnesian War. The Thirty Years’ Peace poured water on that flame and extinguished it. What was left of the flammable material was continually cooled and dampened by the mutual restraint of Athens and Sparta in the decade 445–435. To start the war, the spark of the Epidamnian trouble needed to land on one of the rare bits of flammable stuff that had not been thoroughly drenched. Thereafter it needed to be continually and vigorously fanned by the Corinthians, soon assisted by the Megarians, Potidaeans, Aeginetans, and the Spartan war party. Even then the spark might have been extinguished had not the Athenians provided some additional fuel at the crucial moment."




 
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If Periclean strategy worked, the Spartans would have been begging for peace by the 431, 430, 429, or 428. That didn't happen. So it did not work. Periclean strategy failed. Simple as that.

Pericles in 431 did not plan a 27 year or even a 10 year war. Like most leaders leading their states to war, he envisioned a quick painless war. He would get that by relying on the defensive and making Sparta awestruck by the defenses of Athens and making them quit. Obviously, it didn't work.

The plague only added to the miseries of the Athenians. But the blow was struck when Sparta devastated Attica even before the onslaught of the plague. You seem to think that Attica is nothing. It was very important to the Athenian economy. It as about half of the power of Athens in 431, the other half the Empire. And that empire was unstable, ready to revolt at the drop of a hat.



Yes, Sparta stopped the raids, but did not surrender or give in the most humiliating demands, and fought on. It was psychological, not physical. And Mantinea is irrelevant since its after the War, and when the Spartiates were already returned by AThens.

Legal fiction or no, Sparta and Athens were at peace in 418 BC and allied. War only started in 413. If there was a war, it was only a Cold War. The thousand Athenian contingent were as relevant to the relations between the States as the Soviet pilots in the Korean War.

So Mantinea was irrelevant for any discussion on the Archidamian War or the later war. Thing is, Athens made peace when things are theoretically are in her favor, and gave much to Sparta in exchange for almost nothing. Then they allied with Sparta, and did not go to war with Sparta until Sparta declared war in 413.


If Sparta was so shackled, it would have made any peace and endure any humiliation in 425, and would not even be capable of launching the expedition to Brasidas. As I said, Sphacteria's blow was psychological, not physical. So yeah, Sparta has a hefty margin of error, about the same as Athens. It can make many mistakes, and not lose. I mean, Sparta lost at Sphacteria, but did not lose the war.




And as long as Persia wanted the Ionian Cities, the Persians would always be receptive to anyone who wanted to weaken Athens. The source of Sparta's navy wasn't only Persian Gold and the the revolted Allies. It was also the members of the Peloponessian League. Corinth, for example, was the main source of the Spartan fleet. And so what if Corinth and Thebes were independent? They still provided soldiers and ships to Sparta, and hated Athens more than Sparta hated Athens. They were the prime movers of the war with Athens, not Sparta.

Sparta's strength since the beginning was not confined to Sparta alone. Her strength was because of the existence of the Peloponessian League. You cannot just discount how Corinth and Thebes contributed to Spartan Strength. When I speak of Sparta, I speak of the League. And yeah, the fact that Persian gold helped does not detract from Spartan strength. It, in fact, made Sparta stronger during the actual war.



What slow bleeding of Helot population? Sure, it attracted escaped slaves. But Spartan Agriculture did not suffer. I hear of no reports of Spartans starving because of escape helots. I hear nothing of the Spartans war capability being damaged because of escaped helots. Any damage it did to Spartan economy was nothing compared to the mass escape of Athenian slaves in the silver mines because of the fort at Decelea.

And yes, the victory in Syracuse would butterfly Decelea, because I don't think the war would start in 413 with a victorious Athens in Sicily.

Even if it started, I don't see why the Spartans won't establish a fort in Attica. The Athenians would still be afraid to face the League in open battle, and the site of Decelea is obvious. And the presence of the fort would still disrupt the mining operation, as it would give a place for the slaves to escape. And the Spartans have the example of Pylos to emulate. The advice of Alcibiades was very obvious. Sure, it's not inevitable, but it's impossible either.



The purpose of Pericles in starting the Peloponessian War was to make Sparta respect Athens as an equal power by showing the Sparta cannot defeat Athens. Whatever grand ambitions that Pericles had in the first war was quenched by the disaster of the Egyptian Expedition and the defeat at Coronea. So he aimed at what was achieved in the 30 years Peace in 446--the Spartan recognition of the Athenian Empire at sea. Now, his goal was to make sure that Sparta would understand that Athens could not be dictated to, like being told to rescind the Megarian Decree, or that Athens could make allies with cities who were not members of either League, like Corcyra.

And as long as both states respected their spheres of interest, its not inevitable that they come to conflict. Just because something happened in OTL does not mean it always has to happen.






There are many historians who argue that WWI was not inevitable even with all the root causes. Without the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, war is not inevitable. It may or may not happened, but it's plausible that it won't. And I would argue that even with the assassination, the First World War is still not inevitable, but only probably.

I mean root causes can exist but that does not mean that war has to result. That is just plain overdetermination. And I find such historians more persuasive than those who argue that it was inevitable. Same with the Peloponessian War. Thucydides own narrative contradicted his declaration that war was inevitable.

I recommend Donald Kagan's The Outbreak of the Peloponessian War. He argued the war was not inevitable despite Thucydides, and I find him persuasive.

He wrote: "
All these may be considered as remote or underlying causes of the war. They may be seen as contributing to the situation that made war possible, but all of them together did not make war necessary. For that, a complicated chain of circumstances and decisions was needed. If any of its links had not been present, the war would not have come.

It is customary to apply the metaphor of the powder keg or tinder-box to international situations that are deemed the inevitable forerunners of war. The usual way of putting it is that the conflicting interests and passions of the contending parties provided the inflammatory material, and the final crisis was only a spark that had sooner or later to fall and cause the inevitable conflagration or explosion. If we were to apply this metaphor to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, we should put it this way: The growth of the Athenian Empire and Sparta’s jealousy and fear of it provided the inflammable material that ignited into the First Peloponnesian War. The Thirty Years’ Peace poured water on that flame and extinguished it. What was left of the flammable material was continually cooled and dampened by the mutual restraint of Athens and Sparta in the decade 445–435. To start the war, the spark of the Epidamnian trouble needed to land on one of the rare bits of flammable stuff that had not been thoroughly drenched. Thereafter it needed to be continually and vigorously fanned by the Corinthians, soon assisted by the Megarians, Potidaeans, Aeginetans, and the Spartan war party. Even then the spark might have been extinguished had not the Athenians provided some additional fuel at the crucial moment."
Attica wasn't a half of athens economy and power by this point, not by a long stretch. The very devastation you deem so damaging had been both accepted by Pericles and by the athenian assembly when he presented it. Such a thing would simply not have made sense had it been as important as you portray it to be. Attica was more important for psychological reasons (the home of most of Athens citizenry) then any practical considerations at this point. The revolts also remained isolated and rare events until the Sicily disaster despite the plague and the war, therefore contradicting your take on the empire.

Sparta was ready to let the Athenians make major territorial gains at the expense of her allies. Only when Athens asked her to essentially openly abandon them openly did she back down. That, alongside with how attypical Amphipolis was, showed how wounded Sparta was, if not mortally so. It took both Amphipolis and Delion to make Athens go for the very Periclean peace she was aiming for at the begining

Pericles didn't start the war, he merely refused Sparta ultimatum. His strategy was aiming at making the Sparta understand that they couldn't destroy Athens, or even really cowe her, with her hoplites and that a war would be more damaging to Sparta then Athens and therefore bring a Periclean peace, restoring the statu quo ante bellum where time favoured Athens, and would therefore eventually allow to revisit her old ambitions. His strategy definitely succeded in the first part and before and after the plague it was managing the second part well enough. If I understand you correctly you assume Pericles necessarely aimed for it to work in the very short run because it was how most warplans in their time and place worked, when said plan was already extremely athypical for his time and place. Refusing battle and striking where the ennemy wasn't as a matter of principle was already going against all of Greece military norms in and off itself, if he was already thinking out of the box in that matter they're is no reasons to believe he didn't in other ways.

Without the Sicily disaster they're would have been no Persian as it was the triger who made answer Sparta's pleas in OTL, deeming it a risk worth taking, just as they're would have been no fort at Decelea since it was Alcibiades strategic conceptions and most POD's we can get for a taking of Syracuse probably involve him not ending in Sparta or the Spartans not listening to him. If it was as obvious as you portray it to be I fail to see why Sparta didn't carry it through in the first phase of the war. Corinth, Thebes and Persia weren't Sparta, they where independent powers Sparta had to negociate with to get their help and she couldn't just snap her fingers to make them do her bidding like she could with her vassals in the Peloponese and Athens with hers in the Aegean. In any case, Sparta and co didn't have the means to carry an offensive strategy at sea until after the Sicily disaster, especially not on a large scale. Hell, even dealing with a small athenian squadron at Naupactus proved to be beyond Corinth strenght in the matter, and it was the only one of Sparta pre-Sicily allies with any naval strenght.

Mantinea wouldn't have happened without Sphacteria and Alcibiades building the coalition and the fact that Athens contingent was limited to a thousand hoplites, still a significant force at the time, had way more to do with Nicias influence then any strict adherence to the treaty. I have also yet to see any historian not put it in the continium of the wider Peloponesian War so deeming it as irrelevant strike as unwaranted.

Pylos ensured a slow bleeding, not an hemoragy, and encouraged many hilotes to actually try to make it. It wasn't enough to create a famine but it was certainly problematic to Sparta in a way anything done to Attica couldn't be to Athens economically. Even a fort at Decelea, which probably wouldn't have happened aniway, wouldn't be such a problem for Laurion without athenian ressources being stretched so thin.

I love Kagan (who would disagree with most of your points BTW) but on this one he is clearly in the wrong, both empires had areas of conflicts all over the place and its notewhorty he remain practically alone in his position among the most well know experts in his field, as he implicitly recognise himself in the extract you quoted. Just like the few historians who ascribe such an overly large important to Franz Ferdinand association thankfully continue to be a small majority outside of the overwhelming historiographical conscensus. All and all, both cities had rather powerfull war parties who remained active and you only need one of their numerous areas of frictions to lead the partisans of war to take over in one city at some point to get a war. That isn't overdetermination, its simply recognising that sometime passed a certain points you can't get certain developments out of a POD short of an ASB.
 
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Attica wasn't a half of athens economy and power by this point, not by a long stretch. The very devastation you deem so damaging had been both accepted by Pericles and by the athenian assembly when he presented it. Such a thing would simply not have made sense had it been as important as you portray it to be. Attica was more important for psychological reasons (the home of most of Athens citizenry) then any practical considerations at this point. The revolts also remained isolated and rare events until the Sicily disaster despite the plague and the war, therefore contradicting your take on the empire.

Sparta was ready to let the Athenians make major territorial gains at the expense of her allies. Only when Athens asked her to essentially openly abandon them openly did she back down. That, alongside with how attypical Amphipolis was, showed how wounded Sparta was, if not mortally so. It took both Amphipolis and Delion to make Athens go for the very Periclean peace she was aiming for at the begining

Pericles didn't start the war, he merely refused Sparta ultimatum. His strategy was aiming at making the Sparta understand that they couldn't destroy Athens, or even really cowe her, with her hoplites and that a war would be more damaging to Sparta then Athens and therefore bring a Periclean peace, restoring the statu quo ante bellum where time favoured Athens, and would therefore eventually allow to revisit her old ambitions. His strategy definitely succeded in the first part and before and after the plague it was managing the second part well enough. If I understand you correctly you assume Pericles necessarely aimed for it to work in the very short run because it was how most warplans in their time and place worked, when said plan was already extremely athypical for his time and place. Refusing battle and striking where the ennemy wasn't as a matter of principle was already going against all of Greece military norms in and off itself, if he was already thinking out of the box in that matter they're is no reasons to believe he didn't in other ways.

Without the Sicily disaster they're would have been no Persian as it was the triger who made answer Sparta's pleas in OTL, deeming it a risk worth taking, just as they're would have been no fort at Decelea since it was Alcibiades strategic conceptions and most POD's we can get for a taking of Syracuse probably involve him not ending in Sparta or the Spartans not listening to him. If it was as obvious as you portray it to be I fail to see why Sparta didn't carry it through in the first phase of the war. Corinth, Thebes and Persia weren't Sparta, they where independent powers Sparta had to negociate with to get their help and she couldn't just snap her fingers to make them do her bidding like she could with her vassals in the Peloponese and Athens with hers in the Aegean. In any case, Sparta and co didn't have the means to carry an offensive strategy at sea until after the Sicily disaster, especially not on a large scale. Hell, even dealing with a small athenian squadron at Naupactus proved to be beyond Corinth strenght in the matter, and it was the only one of Sparta pre-Sicily allies with any naval strenght.

Mantinea wouldn't have happened without Sphacteria and Alcibiades building the coalition and the fact that Athens contingent was limited to a thousand hoplites, still a significant force at the time, had way more to do with Nicias influence then any strict adherence to the treaty. I have also yet to see any historian not put it in the continium of the wider Peloponesian War so deeming it as irrelevant strike as unwaranted.

Pylos ensured a slow bleeding, not an hemoragy, and encouraged many hilotes to actually try to make it. It wasn't enough to create a famine but it was certainly problematic to Sparta in a way anything done to Attica couldn't be to Athens economically. Even a fort at Decelea, which probably wouldn't have happened aniway, wouldn't be such a problem for Laurion without athenian ressources being stretched so thin.

I love Kagan (who would disagree with most of your points BTW) but on this one he is clearly in the wrong, both empires had areas of conflicts all over the place and its notewhorty he remain practically alone in his position among the most well know experts in his field, as he implicitly recognise himself in the extract you quoted. Just like the few historians who ascribe such an overly large important to Franz Ferdinand association thankfully continue to be a small majority outside of the overwhelming historiographical conscensus. All and all, both cities had rather powerfull war parties who remained active and you only need one of their numerous areas of frictions to lead the partisans of war to take over in one city at some point to get a war. That isn't overdetermination, its simply recognising that sometime passed a certain points you can't get certain developments out of a POD short of an ASB.

Pericles’ strategy would have worked, if Sparta had kept following Archidamus’ strategy. But she didn’t. I highly doubt Sparta sent Brasidas to Chalkidike without any foresight or planning, desperately hoping that this “shot in the dark” would pay off. Brasida knew what he was doing, he knew that he was hitting where Athens was most vulnerable, where sentiments against Athenians already ran strong since 437, and especially in a place where Athens, willing or not, Pericles’ strategy or not, would have been forced to commit troops against Sparta. The very fact that Sparta could plan such an expedition was testimony to her strenght, not her weakness. She understood that Archidamus’ plan wouldn’t bring her anywhere, and thus she went for Brasidas’. And, his death aside, it damn worked. In the future Athens would spend little less than a century trying to recapture Amphipolis, and she’d never make it. Athens could afford raids in Attica, provided tributes kept coming, but a direct attack on her corn route? Nope, she would have been forced on the offensive in any case. And being forced on the offensive there would have forced her to be on the offensive in Beotia too, to fend off any invasion from Thebes.

Persia was very willing to support Sparta against Athens from the very beginning, but in their dealings Spartans were haughty, arrogant, and irresolute, so it came to nothing. After the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta was at the apex of her power and was threatening Anatolia itself, Persia gave gold to all the cities in the mainland that would take it, they prepared a fleet against Sparta and they called an Athenian to command it. Why would Persia behave any differently if Athens was at her most powerful instead of Sparta?

Decelea was the one most damaging loss for Athens in the whole war, Sparta managed to pull it off because they seized the opportunity both thanks to Alcibiades and Athens’ forces being particularly stretched thin. If Athens were to win at Syracuse, Sparta wouldn’t fortify Decelea in 413, but assuming that Persia would support another polis, and she would for her own sake, it’s entirely possible that Decelea could be seized if Athens were to experience losses in the subsequent conflict, after all the importance of the mines of Laurion couldn’t have been that big a secret of state.
 
Pericles’ strategy would have worked, if Sparta had kept following Archidamus’ strategy. But she didn’t. I highly doubt Sparta sent Brasidas to Chalkidike without any foresight or planning, desperately hoping that this “shot in the dark” would pay off. Brasida knew what he was doing, he knew that he was hitting where Athens was most vulnerable, where sentiments against Athenians already ran strong since 437, and especially in a place where Athens, willing or not, Pericles’ strategy or not, would have been forced to commit troops against Sparta. The very fact that Sparta could plan such an expedition was testimony to her strenght, not her weakness. She understood that Archidamus’ plan wouldn’t bring her anywhere, and thus she went for Brasidas’. And, his death aside, it damn worked. In the future Athens would spend little less than a century trying to recapture Amphipolis, and she’d never make it. Athens could afford raids in Attica, provided tributes kept coming, but a direct attack on her corn route? Nope, she would have been forced on the offensive in any case. And being forced on the offensive there would have forced her to be on the offensive in Beotia too, to fend off any invasion from Thebes.

Persia was very willing to support Sparta against Athens from the very beginning, but in their dealings Spartans were haughty, arrogant, and irresolute, so it came to nothing. After the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta was at the apex of her power and was threatening Anatolia itself, Persia gave gold to all the cities in the mainland that would take it, they prepared a fleet against Sparta and they called an Athenian to command it. Why would Persia behave any differently if Athens was at her most powerful instead of Sparta?

Decelea was the one most damaging loss for Athens in the whole war, Sparta managed to pull it off because they seized the opportunity both thanks to Alcibiades and Athens’ forces being particularly stretched thin. If Athens were to win at Syracuse, Sparta wouldn’t fortify Decelea in 413, but assuming that Persia would support another polis, and she would for her own sake, it’s entirely possible that Decelea could be seized if Athens were to experience losses in the subsequent conflict, after all the importance of the mines of Laurion couldn’t have been that big a secret of state.
Sparta would have never authorised the Chalkidike expedition without Sphacteria pushing her against the walls. Nothing was so unlike her usual behaviour then to free and arm a bunch of hilotes to launch them on adventurous expedition where one of their general would be almost completely autonomous from Sparta. To really threaten Athens corn route by land Brasidas would have needed to make it to Byzantium, which would have necessitated a long march through Thracian territory and Brasidas pulling it off despite having none of the local support he had in Chalkidike. An extremely tall order.

Some negociations between Persia and Sparta where ongoing from early on but, as you said, they didn't come to anything. It took the Sicilian expedition to make it happen. After the war Sparta was actively fighting Persia at any rate, as she refused to let her have the Ionian cities as previously agreed while Persia didn't want to let them go. Athens and Persia where at peace, a true peace. Those are two different sets of circumstances and in any case Athens fleet pre-Sicily was far more dangerous then what Sparta had on sea even at her apex, and fleets where bound to play a key role in any conflict between mainland Greece and Persia.
 
Sparta would have never authorised the Chalkidike expedition without Sphacteria pushing her against the walls. Nothing was so unlike her usual behaviour then to free and arm a bunch of hilotes to launch them on adventurous expedition where one of their general would be almost completely autonomous from Sparta. To really threaten Athens corn route by land Brasidas would have needed to make it to Byzantium, which would have necessitated a long march through Thracian territory and Brasidas pulling it off despite having none of the local support he had in Chalkidike. An extremely tall order.

Some negociations between Persia and Sparta where ongoing from early on but, as you said, they didn't come to anything. It took the Sicilian expedition to make it happen. After the war Sparta was actively fighting Persia at any rate, as she refused to let her have the Ionian cities as previously agreed while Persia didn't want to let them go. Athens and Persia where at peace, a true peace. Those are two different sets of circumstances and in any case Athens fleet pre-Sicily was far more dangerous then what Sparta had on sea even at her apex, and fleets where bound to play a key role in any conflict between mainland Greece and Persia.

Amphipolis was way more important than Byzantium at the time, since it gave access to precious gold mines deep within the Chersonese, and way easier to capture, considering its strong sentiments against Athens. It was also a good starting point where to threaten Athens’ corn route. It was the best decision Sparta could strategically take, and, at least personally, I think Brasidas’ acumen and influence had more to do with it than any desperation on Sparta’s part. Lysander campaigned close to the same area, with helots, after defeating Athens at Egospotami, when both he and Sparta were more powerful than ever. Sparta, whenever led by capable or overtly ambitious and influential commanders, could take military decisions normally unusual for her, she doesn’t need to be desperate to do so.

Yes, negotiations between Sparta and Persia didn’t go anywhere, because Sparta handled them poorly, not Persia. Persia could just turn to another city for a better reception. Athens and Persia were at peace, but if Athens were to win at Syracuse, would that peace truly last? Would Athens simply disregard revolts in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia? Would Persia really ignore the threat posed by Athens, and let the Ionian cities on the Anatolian mainland be under Athens’ power? Honestly, I think not. No matter how dangerous Athens could be, Persia would have done her best to dampen her forces, sooner or later.
 
Amphipolis was way more important than Byzantium at the time, since it gave access to precious gold mines deep within the Chersonese, and way easier to capture, considering its strong sentiments against Athens. It was also a good starting point where to threaten Athens’ corn route. It was the best decision Sparta could strategically take, and, at least personally, I think Brasidas’ acumen and influence had more to do with it than any desperation on Sparta’s part. Lysander campaigned close to the same area, with helots, after defeating Athens at Egospotami, when both he and Sparta were more powerful than ever. Sparta, whenever led by capable or overtly ambitious and influential commanders, could take military decisions normally unusual for her, she doesn’t need to be desperate to do so.

Yes, negotiations between Sparta and Persia didn’t go anywhere, because Sparta handled them poorly, not Persia. Persia could just turn to another city for a better reception. Athens and Persia were at peace, but if Athens were to win at Syracuse, would that peace truly last? Would Athens simply disregard revolts in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia? Would Persia really ignore the threat posed by Athens, and let the Ionian cities on the Anatolian mainland be under Athens’ power? Honestly, I think not. No matter how dangerous Athens could be, Persia would have done her best to dampen her forces, sooner or later.
Amphipolis was important but Byzantium held the Dardanelles and taking it was therefore the only way you could truly threaten Athens corn route by land. Brasidas was already a well regarded strategos before Sphacteria and yet he only got approval for his plan against Chalkidike a year after the aforementioned defeat. The sheer timing of things indicate they're is definitely a correlation between the two. Lysandros campaigns didn't break nearly as many Spartan taboo: he still had lines of communications with home so he wasn't in charge in the same way and he didn't free and arms Hilotes. Sparta was not the only one at fault, to make it worth was she considered the risk Persia was asking for the return of any territories north of the Isthmus of Corinth at first, only the sicilian disaster made her willing to do get her demands to something Sparta could accept by lowering the risk.

While your argument has merit on Persia not being able to stand by at some point it does contradict her OTL behaviours as she didn't move an inch when Athens seemed on a roll after Sphacteria and threatened to win a massive victory that would have put her back in the position she was before the Egyptian disaster and then some.
 
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Amphipolis was important but Byzantium held the Dardanelles and taking it was therefore the only way you could truly threaten Athens corn route by land. Brasidas was already a well regarded strategos before Sphacteria and yet he only got approval for his plan against Chalkidike a year after the aforementioned defeat. The sheer timing of things indicate they're is definitely a correlation between the two. Lysandros campaigns didn't break nearly as many Spartan taboo: he still had lines of communications with home so he wasn't in charge in the same way and he didn't free and arms Hilotes. Sparta was not the only one at fault, to make it worth was she considered the risk Persia was asking for the return of any territories north of the Isthmus of Corinth at first, only the sicilian disaster made her willing to do get her demands to something Sparta could accept by lowering the risk.

While your arguments has merit on Persia not being able to stand by at some point it does contradict her OTL behaviours as she didn't move an inch when Athens seemed on a roll after Sphacteria and threatened to win a massive victory that would have put her back in the position she was before the Egyptian disaster and then some.

The disasters at Pylos and Sphacteria did have an effect on Sparta, I’m not saying it didn’t, but I also think that it mustn’t have been necessarily desperation that drove Sparta to such unusual measures. Despite victories from her allies, Sparta could clearly see that the Archidamian policy wasn’t working, the only general who had positively distinguished himself since the beginning of the war was Brasidas, thus Sparta decides to listen to Brasidas’ and give her consent to his plans because it’s the smart thing to do. Did Sphacteria hurt them? Sure. Did it scare them? Yep. Did it, however, bring Sparta on her knees? No, not that. Also, freeing helots wasn’t really that rare an event, more unusual was freeing them en masse.

I think Persia would have contented herself with control over the Ionian cities, which is what she got in 386 BCE, but Sparta wasn’t even willing to concede that. With Sparta unwillingn to strike a deal, and all other potential candidates genuinely attached to her, since people still believed Sparta would actually bring “freedom”, all Persia could do was stay by and watch events unfold. If Sparta had been more accomodating early on, I think it’s likely that Persia would have intervened even in 425 BCE.
 
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