WI: Athens HAD Captured Syracuse In The Peloponnesian War?

What the title says. Would this have rever-
sed the whole outcome of the war? Or was a
Spartan victory inevitable in any case? And if
Athens had won the Peloponnesian War, could it have become the overlord of Greece,
maybe even managing(by force of course)to
unite the whole Greek peninsula?(Personally
I think an even victorious-over-Sparta Athens could not have done this- they simply
did not have THAT many men & beside, the
Greek world was simply too fractious- but
that’s just my opinion).
 

RousseauX

Donor
What the title says. Would this have rever-
sed the whole outcome of the war? Or was a
Spartan victory inevitable in any case? And if
Athens had won the Peloponnesian War, could it have become the overlord of Greece,
maybe even managing(by force of course)to
unite the whole Greek peninsula?(Personally
I think an even victorious-over-Sparta Athens could not have done this- they simply
did not have THAT many men & beside, the
Greek world was simply too fractious- but
that’s just my opinion).
Sparta and Athens were actually at peace at the start of the Sicilian expedition, it was only when Athens looked to be faltering on Sicily that Sparta re-entered the war and sent aid to Syracause.

If the Athenians straight up win then there's a pretty good chance the Peleponesian War never re-starts and Athens achieves temporary Greek hegemony. On the long run though the balance of power where Sparta, Thebes and most importantly Persia are against Athens means that Athenian hegemony was rather fragile.
 
That would honestly depend on Alcibiades. Is he still exiled in this ATL? If so, he would still incite Spartans to fortify Decela so to cut off Athens from its silver mines, and he would still attempt to spur the Ionians to rebellion, aided by the active interest of Tissaphernes and the King, who certainly in case of an Athenian victory he’d have more reason than ever to curtail Athens’ power.

If, however, Alcibiades himself conquered Syracuse, then we’d see Athens still fighting against Sparta and her allies from a position of higher prestige and strenght. The Peace of Nicia was respected just as much as The Thirty Year Peace, the Peace of Theramenes and the Peace of the King were. Greek city states liked to call peaces signed between them what in reality were only temporary truces. A year or two, and Athens and Sparta would be back at it. Athens would have good chances of winning the Peloponnesian war, and we would have probably seen the first real attempt to unite Greece under one single hegemony. It would have failed almost certainly, Greeks were way too attached to their citizenships for it to work, but perhaps Athenians would have handled things more graciously than Spartans did, at least they knew that beating free people around with staffs was not the right way to rule them.
 

RousseauX

Donor
That would honestly depend on Alcibiades. Is he still exiled in this ATL? If so, he would still incite Spartans to fortify Decela so to cut off Athens from its silver mines, and he would still attempt to spur the Ionians to rebellion, aided by the active interest of Tissaphernes and the King, who certainly in case of an Athenian victory he’d have more reason than ever to curtail Athens’ power.

If, however, Alcibiades himself conquered Syracuse, then we’d see Athens still fighting against Sparta and her allies from a position of higher prestige and strenght. The Peace of Nicia was respected just as much as The Thirty Year Peace, the Peace of Theramenes and the Peace of the King were. Greek city states liked to call peaces signed between them what in reality were only temporary truces. A year or two, and Athens and Sparta would be back at it. Athens would have good chances of winning the Peloponnesian war, and we would have probably seen the first real attempt to unite Greece under one single hegemony. It would have failed almost certainly, Greeks were way too attached to their citizenships for it to work, but perhaps Athenians would have handled things more graciously than Spartans did, at least they knew that beating free people around with staffs was not the right way to rule them.
the easiest way for the Athenians to win Syracause is for Alcibiades not to be brought up on charges and for him to mount swift attack on Syracause with both land and sea and gamble the entire expedition on it before Syracause could prepare itself physically and psychologically for the Athenian attack
 
the easiest way for the Athenians to win Syracause is for Alcibiades not to be brought up on charges and for him to mount swift attack on Syracause with both land and sea and gamble the entire expedition on it before Syracause could prepare itself physically and psychologically for the Athenian attack

Which is actually what Lamachus wanted to do. Alcibiades first planned to win over other Sicilian cities on the Eastern coast and then advance. Thucydides thought this was a mistake, but perhaps Alcibiades had reasons to be confident about his plan succeeding, besides his enormous ego that is. To his credit, he could charm pretty much everyone whenever given the chance. He also had more ambitious plans for Athens then merely conquering Syracuse, he probably aimed at doing what Dionysius I did as tyrant of Syracuse, only in the role of stategos autokrator of Athens, so I can see why he would delay the campaign’s end and use it to lay the groundwork for his projects.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
Taking Syracuse by no means wins the war for Athens. It doesn't even win them control of Sicily. It probably does manage to swing a few wavering cities in Sicily and Magna Graecia more firmly into the Athenian camp, but the effect on the war against Sparta will not be significant. There would be the obvious bonus of not losing so many men and ships in a single siege, but they could well be frittered away anyway if Athens atempts the conquest of more of the island.

A reasonable best case scenario for Athens is a quick victory which is decisive enough to keep Syracuse down for a while, and to persuade a decent number of other Sicilian cities to back Athens financially. If they can achieve that, they're best off heading back to Greece without getting any more entangled.
 
Taking Syracuse by no means wins the war for Athens. It doesn't even win them control of Sicily. It probably does manage to swing a few wavering cities in Sicily and Magna Graecia more firmly into the Athenian camp, but the effect on the war against Sparta will not be significant. There would be the obvious bonus of not losing so many men and ships in a single siege, but they could well be frittered away anyway if Athens atempts the conquest of more of the island.

A reasonable best case scenario for Athens is a quick victory which is decisive enough to keep Syracuse down for a while, and to persuade a decent number of other Sicilian cities to back Athens financially. If they can achieve that, they're best off heading back to Greece without getting any more entangled.
Simply not having the Sicilian Expedition end in disaster win the war for Athens. During the Wars of the Delian League Athens had been able to give Persia allot of trouble by herself, without the disaster ods are the Kings of Kings won't take the rest to get involved, even directly, and they're will be no mass revolts of the athenian allies.

Without those two things Sparta remain powerless to truly touch the base of athenian power (the mines of Laurion where fortified and had a port) while Athens has Pylos and can continue to have its annual cruse raiding the Peloponesus and simply has way more ressources then Sparta.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
Simply not having the Sicilian Expedition end in disaster win the war for Athens. During the Wars of the Delian League Athens had been able to give Persia allot of trouble by herself, without the disaster ods are the Kings of Kings won't take the rest to get involved, even directly, and they're will be no mass revolts of the athenian allies.

Without those two things Sparta remain powerless to truly touch the base of athenian power (the mines of Laurion where fortified and had a port) while Athens has Pylos and can continue to have its annual cruse raiding the Peloponesus and simply has way more ressources then Sparta.
Even with the silver mines, Athens doesn't have limitless cash reserves and will have to call upon its allies/subjects for support if it wants the raids to be substantial enough to be effective. And can those raids ever really break Spartan power on land? I'm not sure of it.
 
If, however, Alcibiades himself conquered Syracuse, then we’d see Athens still fighting against Sparta and her allies from a position of higher prestige and strenght. The Peace of Nicia was respected just as much as The Thirty Year Peace, the Peace of Theramenes and the Peace of the King were. Greek city states liked to call peaces signed between them what in reality were only temporary truces. A year or two, and Athens and Sparta would be back at it. Athens would have good chances of winning the Peloponnesian war, and we would have probably seen the first real attempt to unite Greece under one single hegemony. It would have failed almost certainly, Greeks were way too attached to their citizenships for it to work, but perhaps Athenians would have handled things more graciously than Spartans did, at least they knew that beating free people around with staffs was not the right way to rule them.


Maybe not. Remember, that a victory in Sicily would strengthen Nicias' prestige and the Peace Party. Nicias actually wanted the peace with Sparta to work! He accepted the alliance with Sparta after the Peace of Nicias. He did not protest when Ampopholis was not returned despite it being stipulated in the Peace. He returned the greatest assets the Athens had, the captured Spartiates, purely as a gesture of goodwill, without anything in exchange.

He opposed Alcibiades plans to ally with Argos and only sent the minimum contingent in Mantinea. Simply put, I don't think war with Sparta is possible unless you remove Nicias and friends from power. And Nicias, unlike Alcibiades, was a very good Athenian politician who no one hated, and who was beloved by the Athenians, and will not fall from power.

And if he is in charge of Athenian policy, which he pretty much was since the death of Cleon, despite the success of Alcibiades, there would be no war with Sparta. And without the disaster of Sicily, the peace party of Sparta would remain in ascendant since by nature, Spartans are reluctant to get involved in the affairs outside of the Peloponesse due to the Helot threat.
 
Even with the silver mines, Athens doesn't have limitless cash reserves and will have to call upon its allies/subjects for support if it wants the raids to be substantial enough to be effective. And can those raids ever really break Spartan power on land? I'm not sure of it.
Athens doesn't need too. In peace time her power is naturally growing while Sparta is, at best, stagnating and at worst declining due to her demographic issues. A periclean peace is essentially an athenian victory in thos conditions.

While those raids aren't war enders they do actually hit the core of Spartan power, while Sparta can't do the same to Athens, essentially giving more assets to the latter in a war of attrition. Furthermore, the presence of an athenian fort at Pylos ensure a slow hemoragy of Hilotes, the very source of Sparta's power.

Its also worth remember that Sparta barely avoided disaster a few years before at Mantinea and that while her victory there did stabilise things in the short run it definitely didn't cancel the effects of her defeat of Sphacteria and that she remained vulnerable.
 
Without those two things Sparta remain powerless to truly touch the base of athenian power (the mines of Laurion where fortified and had a port) while Athens has Pylos and can continue to have its annual cruse raiding the Peloponesus and simply has way more ressources then Sparta.

I disagree with this. The fort at Decelea actually shut down the silver mines, since it led to the escape of 20,000 slaves in the mines, and also disrupted a vital part of Athenian Agriculture, which was the olive trees and wine vines, which Athens also used to export to pay for her grain imports.

And The Archidamian War hurt Athens really badly, even without the plague. There was a reason Athens were so eager to sign the peace of Nicias in 421 despite the many advantages Athens theoretically had.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
Athens doesn't need too. In peace time her power is naturally growing while Sparta is, at best, stagnating and at worst declining due to her demographic issues. A periclean peace is essentially an athenian victory in thos conditions.

While those raids aren't war enders they do actually hit the core of Spartan power, while Sparta can't do the same to Athens, essentially giving more assets to the latter in a war of attrition. Furthermore, the presence of an athenian fort at Pylos ensure a slow hemoragy of Hilotes, the very source of Sparta's power.
Even if Athenian power was "naturally growing" in peacetime, this is basically wartime if they are running a raiding campaign against Sparta. In the meantime Sparta will (as it did many times) strike back at Athens by ravaging its farmland, forcing it to rely on imports. Athens can't do the same to Sparta with mere hit-and-runs, but if you scale them up to a full naval landing, then you just end up with a land battle against the Spartans, which is most likely to go Sparta's way.

Also wasn't Pylos back in Spartan hands by the time of the Sicilian Expedition?
 
I disagree with this. The fort at Decelea actually shut down the silver mines, since it led to the escape of 20,000 slaves in the mines, and also disrupted a vital part of Athenian Agriculture, which was the olive trees and wine vines, which Athens also used to export to pay for her grain imports.

And The Archidamian War hurt Athens really badly, even without the plague. There was a reason Athens were so eager to sign the peace of Nicias in 421 despite the many advantages Athens theoretically had.
I'd question the number but in any case said escape can easily be butterflied by Athenian power not nearly been as stretched without the Sicily disaster. Athenian agriculture itself wasn't a vital part of the athenian economy and Athens grain could be more then easily paid by allied tributes, as it was. Athens only became eager to sign the Peace of Nicias after their defeats at Amphipolis and Delion, and even then it had probably as much to do with Nicias personal character then the military situation as a whole. In any case, Athens had more then the manpower to recover from the looses by the point the Sicilian Expedition and the peace saw the return of Chalcidique.

And all that was WITH the plague. Assuming something similar to Sphacteria would have happened in a no plague TL Sparta would have been a big trouble. Hell, it was on the verge of total disaster in Mantinea as it is, a mere few years before the POD.
Even if Athenian power was "naturally growing" in peacetime, this is basically wartime if they are running a raiding campaign against Sparta. In the meantime Sparta will (as it did many times) strike back at Athens by ravaging its farmland, forcing it to rely on imports. Athens can't do the same to Sparta with mere hit-and-runs, but if you scale them up to a full naval landing, then you just end up with a land battle against the Spartans, which is most likely to go Sparta's way.

Also wasn't Pylos back in Spartan hands by the time of the Sicilian Expedition?
Nope, it was only recovered late during the last phase of the Peloponesian War. Should the Peace Nicias hold in this ATL things are gonna better for Athens since her power was, indeed, naturally growing (Thucydides is our main source on the war and he say it himself: the main cause of the war was that Sparta feared Athens growing power, and none of the root causes for that situation had really changed by the Peace of Nicias).

As for the idea that the fact that athenian agriculture was hurt more then the Spartan one also meant that Athens was affected more then Sparta, it fail to take into account how profoundly different the two states where. Athens relied on its control of commercial routes and tributes from its allies way more then any land based economic assets (Laurion was something of an exception but it could be operated from Athens by sea and was fortified aniway). Damage to athenian agriculture was obviously unfortunate from an athenian perspective but it was far from cripling, as showed by the fact that Periclès essentially planned for and accepted it in his strategy.

In contrast, Spartan agriculture and its hilotes where Sparta's actual economic bases and hitting them, even in a limited fashion, really hited her at her core. Especially her Hilotes.

Overall, Sparta margins of error was also far smaller then Athens too. The latter recovered easily enough from her defeat at Delion and Amphipolis while the former was almost brought to her knees by Sphacteria and despite her victory at Mantinea only truly recovered when the Siege of Syracuse began to turn sour.
 
I'd question the number but in any case said escape can easily be butterflied by Athenian power not nearly been as stretched without the Sicily disaster. Athenian agriculture itself wasn't a vital part of the athenian economy and Athens grain could be more then easily paid by allied tributes, as it was. Athens only became eager to sign the Peace of Nicias after their defeats at Amphipolis and Delion, and even then it had probably as much to do with Nicias personal character then the military situation as a whole. In any case, Athens had more then the manpower to recover from the looses by the point the Sicilian Expedition and the peace saw the return of Chalcidique.

And all that was WITH the plague. Assuming something similar to Sphacteria would have happened in a no plague TL Sparta would have been a big trouble. Hell, it was on the verge of total disaster in Mantinea as it is, a mere few years before the POD.

And the Laurion mines were vulnerable to Spartan power. The mere fact that establishing a fort at Decelea could shut down the mines by causing a mass escape of slaves working the mines shows that.

Athenian agriculture was vital. It led to a severe contraction of revenues. It forced the farmers off Attica to within the walls, which made them suceptible to plague. Sure, there was the tribute from the Empire, but it was never enough.

And Allied tribute is not enough. In 425, the treasury was nearly empty, so Cleon had to raise the assessments, which caused discontentment.

And the Peace of Nicias shows that Athens was war weary in 421, shows that the voters of Athens wanted to return to their farms. The fact that the capture of Amphipolis and the Battle of Dellium was enough for the Peace party to gain power.

As for the idea that the fact that athenian agriculture was hurt more then the Spartan one also meant that Athens was affected more then Sparta, it fail to take into account how profoundly different the two states where. Athens relied on its control of commercial routes and tributes from its allies way more then any land based economic assets (Laurion was something of an exception but it could be operated from Athens by sea and was fortified aniway). Damage to athenian agriculture was obviously unfortunate from an athenian perspective but it was far from cripling, as showed by the fact that Periclès essentially planned for and accepted it in his strategy.

Yes, Pericles made that strategy based on his experiences in the First Peloponessian War. Yet his strategy failed. He expected the Spartans to give up within three years after the Spartans saw the futility of making Athens surrender by forcing a hoplite battle and offer peace

Only when the Athenians abandoned Periclean strategy did they have success, and that was only by a fluke. If there was no storm on the way to Corcyra, Demosthenes would not be driven towards Sphacteria, he would not build the fort at Pylos, and Sparta would not make a blunder that would cause then to lose valuable Spartiates. And Sparta would not be desperate for peace in 425.

It must be understood that prior to 425, Athens was far more damaged by the war than Sparta. The damage caused by the raids on the Peloponesse were mere pinpricks, and did not cause any long term harm. Compare that with the devastation caused in Attica.

All that without even considering the impact of the Plague.

So I disagree that Sparta has a narrower window in the Archidamian War. It was Athens who had no way of winning the war until chance intervened.

However, I would say that even without Sphacteria, Sparta would seek peace in 421 due to the expiration of its truce with Argos. And Athens would surely agree. But that would be a clear loss for Athens.

In contrast, Spartan agriculture and its hilotes where Sparta's actual economic bases and hitting them, even in a limited fashion, really hited her at her core. Especially her Hilotes.

Overall, Sparta margins of error was also far smaller then Athens too. The latter recovered easily enough from her defeat at Delion and Amphipolis while the former was almost brought to her knees by Sphacteria and despite her victory at Mantinea only truly recovered when the Siege of Syracuse began to turn sour.

Considering that Athens did not even come close to even disrupting Spartan agriculture, and did not even challenge Sparta at the Pelopponese during the entire time they were at war with Sparta, I don't think Athens had any chance at all at defeating Sparta. (I don't count Mantinea since Athens was at peace with Sparta at the time. It was primarly a war between Sparta and Argos and Elis.)


Athens should have contributed a larger force at Mantinea, but they did not since they were formally at peace with Sparta.

In contrast, during the entire war, the Spartans kept on trying to challenge Athens at sea and trying to forment revolt among the Athenian Empire. Despite it being a land power, it kept trying to field a navy and try to defeat Athens that way. In contrast, Athens did not even try to defeat Sparta on land in a way that would win the war.

So I disagree that Athens had a bigger margin of error than Sparta. The war showed that it was not easy to defeat Sparta or Athens. To win, Athens must defeat Sparta on land, or Sparta must defeat Athens on sea.

Anyway, it's all moot anyway if Syracuse was captured. Sparta would not declare war if the Athenians were victorious in Sicily.

As for Athens, it would strengthen Nicias, and he was determined to make the Peace of Nicias work. He would not declare war at all.

In both cities, friends of peace would be in the ascendant, and the Second Peloponessian War would be considered to have ended in 421 BC.
 
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As stated before, without the disaster of Sicily the mines of Laurion would be far less vulnerable and Athens would have far more manpower to put toward controlling its slave population there. That's also not even going into how Decelia was Alciabiades strategic conception and that depending on the POD his ralliement to Sparta might very well not happen too.

Pericles strategy didn't fail, before the plague it was successfull and by all accounts Athens was able to keep paying for its war effort without too many problems until it started to have its allies revolting, which they didn't dare to do except in isolated cases until the Sicily disaster. The plague was bad luck, nothing more. After the Athenian population continued to be boxed in the city and no other large scale epidemic happened and Nicias being in charge had as much to do with Cleon death then the military situation. In any case, the voters would turn back toward a more agressive stance pretty soon afterward...

To say that Sparta kept challenging Athens at sea is also really pushing things: until Sicily it only did so once, and its fleet was soundly defeated by Phormion, putting the matter to rest. That Athens didn't invade the Peloponesus all the time also didn't mean they where inactive on land: campaigns where pursued in the north east and a large scale invasion of Boetia was launched. Not counting Mantinea is also problematic: even while Athens didn't contribute a massive force, which she should have done and didn't do because of Nicias obstruction, the coalition was still built and kept together by Alcibiades politicking, it also would never have happened without the blow Sparta took at Sphacteria. Similarly, saying that only chance made Pylos possible is also oversimplifying matters. Desmosthenes had the strategic conceptions behind it beforehand and was ascendant in Athens political horizons, he would have had excellent chance to carry his idea out at some point even without the storm. While they didn't destroy it the raids and Pylos did very much took their tools on Spartan agriculture too.

All and all, by the very nature of its system Sparta was always very vulnerable, a significant defeat like Sphacteria was enough to cause a massive crisis and a big one, like Mantinea could have been and Leuctra eventually was, was bound to end Spartan power altoguether. In contrast, Athens was able to endure a series of cataclysm before its final defeat.

Moresso, the two cities still had two much conflicting interests for peace to reign and the reasons who pushed Sparta to war in the first place where still very much there. They would have gone for another round and without the Sicilian disaster, let alone with Syracuse taken, Athens would have entered the new phase of the war with the deck very much titled in her favour.
 
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As stated before, without the disaster of Sicily the mines of Laurion would be far less vulnerable and Athens would have far more manpower to put toward controlling its slave population there. Pericles strategy didn't fail, before the plague it was successfull and by all accounts Athens was able to keep paying for its war effort without too many problems until it started to have its allies revolting, which they didn't dare to do except in isolated cases until the Sicily disaster. The plague was bad luck, nothing more. After the Athenian population continued to be boxed in the city and no other large scale epidemic happened and Nicias being in charge had as much to do with Cleon death then the military situation. In any case, the voters would turn back toward a more agressive stance pretty soon afterward...

To say that Sparta kept challenging Athens at sea is also really pushing things: until Sicily it only did so once, and its fleet was soundly defeated by Phormion, putting the matter to rest. That Athens didn't invade the Peloponesus all the time also didn't mean they where inactive on land: campaigns where pursued in the north east and a large scale invasion of Boetia was launched. Not counting Mantinea is also problematic: even while Athens didn't contribute a massive force, which she should have done and didn't do because of Nicias obstruction, the coalition was still built and kept together by Alcibiades politicking, it also would never have happened without the blow Sparta took at Sphacteria. Similarly, saying that only chance made Pylos possible is also oversimplifying matters. Desmosthenes had the strategic conceptions behind it beforehand and was ascendant in Athens political horizons, he would have had excellent chance to carry his idea out at some point even without the storm. While they didn't destroy it the raids and Pylos did very much took their tools on Spartan agriculture too.

All and all, by the very nature of its system Sparta was always very vulnerable, a significant defeat like Sphacteria was enough to cause a massive crisis and a big one, like Mantinea could have been and Leuctra eventually was, was bound to end Spartan power altoguether. In contrast, Athens was able to endure a series of cataclysm before its final defeat.

Moresso, the two cities still had two much conflicting interests for peace to reign and the reasons who pushed Sparta to war in the first place where still very much there. They would have gone for another round and without the Sicilian disaster, let alone with Syracuse taken, Athens would have entered the new phase of the war with the deck very much titled in her favour.
Sure, Sparta was vulnerable. But even with Sphacteria, the Spartans were able to keep the war going for four more years and gain leverage to make a more equitable peace. It was more of a psychological blow, not a physical one, since it didn't lose Sparta the war.


Periclean strategy failed. It was designed to make Sparta seek peace within a short period of time by relying completely on the defensive except for minor raids that did no damage compare to the damage that was happening to Attica. It was designed to make Sparta seek peace within three years or so. Pericles had no plans on making a fort on the Peloponnese, or to capture Spartiates in an island. It did not involve invading Boetia. Notice that while Pericles was alive, he did none of those things.

Pericles wanted to force Sparta to peace within three years by a largely defensive strategy on land.

It failed in that. Sparta did not seek peace within three years. Therefore, it failed in its purpose. The Athenians abandoned his strategy.

Even without the plague, the Periclean strategy has failed.

And yes, it was a fluke. Demonsthenes had a plan, yet the Athenians did not approve it. Only when there was a storm that forced him to Pylos, and only when another storm caused him to delay departure and to make a fort, was that plan accepted.

Without the storm, Demosthenes would not go to Pylos but continue on to Corcyra. It was pure chance.

Yes, Sparta kept challenging Athens at sea. How many fleets did Sparta lose until they eventually won the war at sea? Many, many more. Yet they kept going at it until they won.

Contrast it to Athenian relative inactivity in the Peloponnese.

Even with the nature of the Spartan system, it was not challenged by Athens in a way that would win it the war. Even the fort at Pylos was not the war winning blow that sent Sparta to its knees.

Athens also was vulnerable. It must have a powerful fleet, or it would lose. Lose that, and Athens would surrender. Sparta could lose fleet after fleet and not be defeated, as OTL showed.

As it did in 404 B.C.

Mantinea was the best chance to defeat Sparta on land, I agree. But it the only time that Athens could do so. Any other time, Athens could not damage Spartan power.

While Sparta was eventually able to wear down Athens.

I disagree that the two cities could not live in peace. The idea of Thucydides that the Great Peloponessian War was inevitable was contradicted by his narrative. It only arose because of Corinth going to war with Corcyra, and Athens accepting the Corcyran alliance, but that was only because of the civil war in Epidamnus. Without it, the Peloponessian War would not happen at all. The reason Sparta went to war was because Athens interfered in the Peloponnese by imposing the Megarian Decree, and making an Alliance with Corcyra while that city was at war with Corinth, which was a member of the Peloponessian League.

And even then, without the prodding of Corinth, Sparta would not even have gone to war. And even with such prodding, Sparta would not have gone to war had Pericles rescinded the Megarian Decree.

Simply put, it was oversimplifying to say that it was fear of Athens that drove Sparta to war. It was not. It was a specific set of events that led to war, but such events were not inevitable. Keep in Mind that King Archidamus II was opposed to war, and only the events above caused the war party to gain power over him.

Keep in mind that there are peace parties in both AThens and Sparta, and normally, both parties were in the ascendant. It would take a very specific set of events that would lead to the war party gaining ascendancy. An Athenian victory at Syracuse would strengthen the peace parties of both cities.
 
Maybe not. Remember, that a victory in Sicily would strengthen Nicias' prestige and the Peace Party. Nicias actually wanted the peace with Sparta to work! He accepted the alliance with Sparta after the Peace of Nicias. He did not protest when Ampopholis was not returned despite it being stipulated in the Peace. He returned the greatest assets the Athens had, the captured Spartiates, purely as a gesture of goodwill, without anything in exchange.

He opposed Alcibiades plans to ally with Argos and only sent the minimum contingent in Mantinea. Simply put, I don't think war with Sparta is possible unless you remove Nicias and friends from power. And Nicias, unlike Alcibiades, was a very good Athenian politician who no one hated, and who was beloved by the Athenians, and will not fall from power.

And if he is in charge of Athenian policy, which he pretty much was since the death of Cleon, despite the success of Alcibiades, there would be no war with Sparta. And without the disaster of Sicily, the peace party of Sparta would remain in ascendant since by nature, Spartans are reluctant to get involved in the affairs outside of the Peloponesse due to the Helot threat.

Alcibiades was the man who promoted the expedition, and, had he not been exiled, he would have been the man who would have brought it to success. A victory in Sicily would be an enormous prestige boost for him, not Nicias, who not only opposed the idea, but didn’t even want to conquer Syracuse in the first place. Alcibiades was both the most hated and most loved man in Athens, but that doesn’t mean he’s a bad politician. He was the guy who managed to form the coalition which fought Sparta at Mantinea, and Hyberbolus’ exile proves that he could strike effectively strike deals with Nicias and his clique if he needed to. After all, Nicias didn’t want absolute peace, he would have totally supported another expedition in the Chersonesus, in Thrace or at Chalkidiki, so both Alcibiades and Nicias would have agreed upon a policy of aggressive imperialism, especially after a resounding victory once Sicily, and I can’t see the likes of Thebes, Corinth and the Persian Empire sitting idly and letting her get more and more powerful. A new coalition would take place, financed by Persian money, and perhaps Sparta might eventually feel inclined to take part to it. Peace in Greece never lasted more than a couple years. The Corinthian war was essentially the third part of a conflict which started with the battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE, any peace in between those parts was ephemeral, I don’t see why that would change with Athens winning at Syracuse.
 
Alcibiades was the man who promoted the expedition, and, had he not been exiled, he would have been the man who would have brought it to success. A victory in Sicily would be an enormous prestige boost for him, not Nicias, who not only opposed the idea, but didn’t even want to conquer Syracuse in the first place. Alcibiades was both the most hated and most loved man in Athens, but that doesn’t mean he’s a bad politician. He was the guy who managed to form the coalition which fought Sparta at Mantinea, and Hyberbolus’ exile proves that he could strike effectively strike deals with Nicias and his clique if he needed to. After all, Nicias didn’t want absolute peace, he would have totally supported another expedition in the Chersonesus, in Thrace or at Chalkidiki, so both Alcibiades and Nicias would have agreed upon a policy of aggressive imperialism, especially after a resounding victory once Sicily, and I can’t see the likes of Thebes, Corinth and the Persian Empire sitting idly and letting her get more and more powerful. A new coalition would take place, financed by Persian money, and perhaps Sparta might eventually feel inclined to take part to it. Peace in Greece never lasted more than a couple years. The Corinthian war was essentially the third part of a conflict which started with the battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE, any peace in between those parts was ephemeral, I don’t see why that would change with Athens winning at Syracuse.
It depends of course, on how victory is won. If it was won after the recall and disgrace of Alcibiades (which is possible), then Nicias would be ascendant.

If before, both he and Nicias would be in the ascendant. Recall that in this scenario, people remembered that Nicias guaranteed victory by proposing an extraordinarily large force (they didn't realize it was just a ploy to discourage the AThenians to support the expedition), while Alcibiades only proposed a modest force, like the force sent to Sicily in 427-424 BC. They had such faith in Nicias, that even after he pleaded that he be recalled in Syracuse, the AThenians retained him as commander and even granted him reinforcements as large as the original force.

If Nicias was around, he would sabotage efforts by Alcibiades to do away with the Peace of Nicias. After all, his prestige and his pride would want to make that peace work. In fact, he did sabotage Alcibiades efforts to create the coalition that resulted in Mantinea by making sure that only a small Athenian force took part in the battle, rather than a larger force that Alcibiades wanted. He returned the Spartiates captured at Sphacteria in exchange for mere promises, even when Sparta failed to return Amphipolis to Athens! That was a man who did not want war with Sparta!

Besides, technically, during the peace of Nicias, Athens and Sparta were in an alliance!

War with other states does not mean war with Sparta. As long as they respected the boundaries of both the Athenian Empire and the Peloponessian League, then war between the two is not inevitable. After all, the war began when AThens meddled in the war between Corinth and Corcyra, and the Megarian Decree. Nicias would not do anything to sabotage the peace he crafted with Sparta.

So it's not inevitable. It's possible, but not inevitable. But Sparta would only join in if the odds are good, and after Syracusan victory, they might shrink from it, since they cannot be sure they would win, and war would threaten to upset the control of Sparta over the Helots.
 
It depends of course, on how victory is won. If it was won after the recall and disgrace of Alcibiades (which is possible), then Nicias would be ascendant.

If before, both he and Nicias would be in the ascendant. Recall that in this scenario, people remembered that Nicias guaranteed victory by proposing an extraordinarily large force (they didn't realize it was just a ploy to discourage the AThenians to support the expedition), while Alcibiades only proposed a modest force, like the force sent to Sicily in 427-424 BC. They had such faith in Nicias, that even after he pleaded that he be recalled in Syracuse, the AThenians retained him as commander and even granted him reinforcements as large as the original force.

If Nicias was around, he would sabotage efforts by Alcibiades to do away with the Peace of Nicias. After all, his prestige and his pride would want to make that peace work. In fact, he did sabotage Alcibiades efforts to create the coalition that resulted in Mantinea by making sure that only a small Athenian force took part in the battle, rather than a larger force that Alcibiades wanted. He returned the Spartiates captured at Sphacteria in exchange for mere promises, even when Sparta failed to return Amphipolis to Athens! That was a man who did not want war with Sparta!

Besides, technically, during the peace of Nicias, Athens and Sparta were in an alliance!

War with other states does not mean war with Sparta. As long as they respected the boundaries of both the Athenian Empire and the Peloponessian League, then war between the two is not inevitable. After all, the war began when AThens meddled in the war between Corinth and Corcyra, and the Megarian Decree. Nicias would not do anything to sabotage the peace he crafted with Sparta.

So it's not inevitable. It's possible, but not inevitable. But Sparta would only join in if the odds are good, and after Syracusan victory, they might shrink from it, since they cannot be sure they would win, and war would threaten to upset the control of Sparta over the Helots.

Yeah I agree with this, Sparta would feel inclined to join a coalition only with good prospects of victory. But, I think Nicias’ peace could significantly last only if Alcibiades had already been disgraced. If Alcibiades was not, given that he was autokrator during the expedition, victory would be credited to him, and Alcibiades would certainly seize the chance to at least attempt to break the peace. Alcibiades was vulnerable whenever our of Athens, but when he was in the city, he could easily sway people to his side, and I think he had a good chance of bringing Athens to war once again and attempt to do to Sparta what Epaminondas did after Leuktra.

If Alcibiades was disgraced, however, then the peace has good chances to last for some time, but Athens would certainly have to face Thebes and Corinth, aided by Persia, and, no doubt, Alcibiades himself.
 
Sure, Sparta was vulnerable. But even with Sphacteria, the Spartans were able to keep the war going for four more years and gain leverage to make a more equitable peace. It was more of a psychological blow, not a physical one, since it didn't lose Sparta the war.


Periclean strategy failed. It was designed to make Sparta seek peace within a short period of time by relying completely on the defensive except for minor raids that did no damage compare to the damage that was happening to Attica. It was designed to make Sparta seek peace within three years or so. Pericles had no plans on making a fort on the Peloponnese, or to capture Spartiates in an island. It did not involve invading Boetia. Notice that while Pericles was alive, he did none of those things.

Pericles wanted to force Sparta to peace within three years by a largely defensive strategy on land.

It failed in that. Sparta did not seek peace within three years. Therefore, it failed in its purpose. The Athenians abandoned his strategy.

Even without the plague, the Periclean strategy has failed.

And yes, it was a fluke. Demonsthenes had a plan, yet the Athenians did not approve it. Only when there was a storm that forced him to Pylos, and only when another storm caused him to delay departure and to make a fort, was that plan accepted.

Without the storm, Demosthenes would not go to Pylos but continue on to Corcyra. It was pure chance.

Yes, Sparta kept challenging Athens at sea. How many fleets did Sparta lose until they eventually won the war at sea? Many, many more. Yet they kept going at it until they won.

Contrast it to Athenian relative inactivity in the Peloponnese.

Even with the nature of the Spartan system, it was not challenged by Athens in a way that would win it the war. Even the fort at Pylos was not the war winning blow that sent Sparta to its knees.

Athens also was vulnerable. It must have a powerful fleet, or it would lose. Lose that, and Athens would surrender. Sparta could lose fleet after fleet and not be defeated, as OTL showed.

As it did in 404 B.C.

Mantinea was the best chance to defeat Sparta on land, I agree. But it the only time that Athens could do so. Any other time, Athens could not damage Spartan power.

While Sparta was eventually able to wear down Athens.

I disagree that the two cities could not live in peace. The idea of Thucydides that the Great Peloponessian War was inevitable was contradicted by his narrative. It only arose because of Corinth going to war with Corcyra, and Athens accepting the Corcyran alliance, but that was only because of the civil war in Epidamnus. Without it, the Peloponessian War would not happen at all. The reason Sparta went to war was because Athens interfered in the Peloponnese by imposing the Megarian Decree, and making an Alliance with Corcyra while that city was at war with Corinth, which was a member of the Peloponessian League.

And even then, without the prodding of Corinth, Sparta would not even have gone to war. And even with such prodding, Sparta would not have gone to war had Pericles rescinded the Megarian Decree.

Simply put, it was oversimplifying to say that it was fear of Athens that drove Sparta to war. It was not. It was a specific set of events that led to war, but such events were not inevitable. Keep in Mind that King Archidamus II was opposed to war, and only the events above caused the war party to gain power over him.

Keep in mind that there are peace parties in both AThens and Sparta, and normally, both parties were in the ascendant. It would take a very specific set of events that would lead to the war party gaining ascendancy. An Athenian victory at Syracuse would strengthen the peace parties of both cities.
Pericles strategy was working, even after the plague and before Sphacteria. It was aimed to force a peace based on the statu quo ante bellum by showing Sparta it couldn't touch the base of Athens power while Athens could gnag at hers. Sphacteria lead Athens to adopt a new, more offensive strategy, which failed but nearly succeded.

After Sphacteria Athens was able to made rather heavy handed demands which, had they come to pass they would have essentially brought the political map to where it was during the peak of Athens land power dominance during the First Peloponesian War and Sparta was essentially willing to accept them. Only when Athens tried to force them to negociate in public did the Spartan envoys refuse, as the territories where under the control of their allies and openly throwing them under the buse as opposed to simply privately abandoning would have left her completely isolated in Greece. Sparta fought on because she had to and it took two massive victory at Delion and Amphipolis to save her bacon, and even then not completely as Mantinea still occured afterward.

Sparta sea power, or apparent sea power since it wasn't really spartan, in the last phase of the war was based on two things: revolted athenian allies and Persian financial support. Without the Sicilian Disaster both are butterflied and Sparta has neither the seamans nor the funds needed to seriously sustain a war at sea for any significant amount of time, not in a way that can seriously threaten the existence of the athenian empire as a whole at any rate. In contrast, Athens had some serious chomps on lands and her hoplites where a serious threat to Sparta.

The fort at Pylos played a key role in bringing about Mantinea, where Sparta really stood on the brink of utter disaster, and the slow bleeding of its hilote population touched Spartan power at his core in a way Sparta didn't with Athenian until after the Sicilian Expedition.

Saying that if the Corcyrian hadn't happened the war wouldn't have happened is a bit like saying that WWI wouldn't have to come to pass if Franz Ferdinand had survived. Its confusing the root causes of the war for the spark that launching it. Ods are something else would have happened if not for Corcyra and Corinth having a feud that drew Athens and Sparta in. An Athens victorious at Syracuse would for herself with a massive boost in her ressources and that would probably gonna give more arguments to those saying that the time had come to go for unilateral hegemony over Greece while also strenghten the case of those in Sparta thinking that if things where allowed to continue the way they where going Athens would eventually be able overwhelm them.
 
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