WI: Argentina sent it's best troops to the Falklands?

After Argentina captured the Falklands, it sent the wrong kind of force to occupy the islands. It's best trained and equipped troops, who were also from the southern regions and thus accustomed to the South Atlantic weather were left to guard the border with Chile, while very young, poorly equipped and trained conscripts who were from the hotter regions of north and central Argentina were sent to occupy the islands. Leopoldo Galtieri didn't really believe the British would actually send a task force to take back the islands.

It goes without saying that these troops were totally inferior to the British infantrymen, which is a big reason why despite the fact that the number of British troops deployed was not even half the number of Argentine troops, and the Argentines were dug in, they still managed to win all major land battles.

Suppose, however, that Galtieri judged correctly that the British might send their task force from the start. Or, he ordered the conscripts off the islands immediately after it became clear Britain was going to respond and sent them to guard the Chile frontier instead, while sending the best to defend the islands against the British? What would have happened then?

In my opinion, British casualties would have been a lot greater than they were OTL, but they would still have retaken the islands in the end.
 
You might ask the Chileans what they would have done had they found that all the best Argentine troops and air support were suddenley sent to an island in the middle of the South Atlantic? As it was they allowed British forces to use Chilean territory and (allegedly) fly in Chilean markings.

Addressing the question directly; the decision was to send the task Force asap with whatever could be found in a couple of weeks or so. Had the best quality of Argentine military been sent in numbers to the Falklands then a Plan B had been considered. That was to launch the liberation the following summer by which time there would have been an extra carrier, possibly a further 2 improvised carriers, superior airborne radar and two 8" gun cruisers just for a start. The fleet could have operated with relative impunity right into the islands (even up to the Argentine coast) and reach everywhere with naval gun support using specially made HE shells.The war to liberate the Falklands would have been bigger, but with the same outcome.
 
You might ask the Chileans what they would have done had they found that all the best Argentine troops and air support were suddenley sent to an island in the middle of the South Atlantic? As it was they allowed British forces to use Chilean territory and (allegedly) fly in Chilean markings.
This is a very interesting thought. The Argentinians could have their very own "stab in the back" myth come out of this one...

Addressing the question directly; the decision was to send the task Force asap with whatever could be found in a couple of weeks or so. Had the best quality of Argentine military been sent in numbers to the Falklands then a Plan B had been considered. That was to launch the liberation the following summer by which time there would have been an extra carrier, possibly a further 2 improvised carriers, superior airborne radar and two 8" gun cruisers just for a start. The fleet could have operated with relative impunity right into the islands (even up to the Argentine coast) and reach everywhere with naval gun support using specially made HE shells.The war to liberate the Falklands would have been bigger, but with the same outcome.
Would they have until the summer? I know that there quite a bit of pressure to negotiate in the UN. If there's a whole winter without the task force coming in, does that pressure mount?
 

Sior

Banned
The Argentinian troops were only trained in internal security and killing civilians, crap when someone shot back!
 
The Argentinian troops were only trained in internal security and killing civilians, crap when someone shot back!

But they were far from crap when fighting the British, and actually put up a good fight on land. I'm wondering how it would have gone down if troops closer to the quality of British soldiers had been deployed instead of badly outmatched young, poorly trained conscripts.

Also, to all of you thinking that Chile would invade, why would they? They had no reason to start a war. I doubt they would do anything unless Argentina attacked.
 
How many wars had Argentina fought between 1900 and 1982? (throwing nuns out of helicopters doesn't really count)

How many had Britain?
 
This is a very interesting thought. The Argentinians could have their very own "stab in the back" myth come out of this one...(1)


Would they have until the summer? I know that there quite a bit of pressure to negotiate in the UN. If there's a whole winter without the task force coming in, does that pressure mount? (2)

1) Didn't Chile support Argentina in the UN? They may have been playing a double game.

2) The failure of Haig's shuttle diplomacy meant the diplomatic option was dead. Argentina started off with a naked act of military aggression against a nuclear power. The aggressor being a military dictatorship and the victim a democracy. It would have been a very bad precedent to allow a military dictatorship to get away with that. Basically, once Argentinian troops got their boots on the ground, it was going to be either Thatcher or Galtieri who had to go. The contrast between the two leaders was obvious.

But they were far from crap when fighting the British, and actually put up a good fight on land. (3) I'm wondering how it would have gone down if troops closer to the quality of British soldiers had been deployed instead of badly outmatched young, poorly trained conscripts.

Also, to all of you thinking that Chile would invade, why would they? (4) They had no reason to start a war. I doubt they would do anything unless Argentina attacked.

3) No, they didn't. The Argentine Air Force fought like lions, but not it's army. The exceptions were in cases of individual heroism, and the (3rd?, 5th?) Argentine Marine Battalion, who faced 5 Brigade in the fighting in the hills before the fall of Port Stanley. But even there, they lost at the hands of what was considered the "poorest troops":rolleyes: the British had in the Falklands.

4) Indeed correct. The Chilean military MIGHT have wanted to, but even in Pinochet's dictatorship he had to consider, at some level, the public opinion polls in Santiago. Which were heavily pro-Argentinian on this single issue. Doing a little dirty work to tweak Buenos Aires' nose was one thing. Launching an all out war with a country you were going to have to live with after the fighting was all over was another.

How many wars had Argentina fought between 1900 and 1982? (throwing nuns out of helicopters doesn't really count) (5)

How many had Britain? (6)

5) Yeah. The Apartheid South African Army got the shit kicked out of it (to their utter shock) at the hands of the Cuban Army in Angola. Because the Cubans had a real (by Soviet standards) first class army and the Apartheid South Africans were mostly trained and equipped for constabulary work, suppression of revolts, and defeating invasions by poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly led African armies crossing the dry arid open country on South Africa's borders.

6) Duh. The British Army is the best trained most combat capable army in the world for its size.:cool: The average British infantryman is better than his US Army counterpart all the way up until you get to the level of special forces and above. And the troops the British sent to the Falklands were anything but average.:p The Argentines could have sent the absolute best they had and it wouldn't have changed anything.

The Argentines sent far too many troops (elite, conscript, and otherwise) to the Falklands than could be supported logistically. So not only should they have sent better troops, they should have sent far less. Say, about a third. Which would have brought the British much closer to a reasonable troop ratio for invasion anyway, thereby negating the qualitative improvement of the Argentine garrison. Also, the inevitable defeat of the Argentine Navy and Air Force would mean that even the better Argentinian troops would have been facing the same morale problems as the draftees did. Only simply just on a strategic level only ("...they abandoned us...!"), not tactical. No frozen feet, no ration shortage, and so on. But the sense of hopelessness will still have an effect. Especially as the British close on Port Stanley.

The British still would not have needed to wait until summer. Their chosen invasion landing sites were indefensible. The Argentine commander would have needed to put nearly his entire force there to have a chance at victory, thereby uncovering all the other possible landing sites (except Port Stanley, where the beaches were too limited in size and had too much firepower in place). That would have enabled the British to basically outflank the Argentines and swoop right into Port Stanley from the sites in the south or north (unlikely in the north, as the waters there were rough and too open, plus there is a land isthmus making for a bottleneck).
 
Last edited:
I don't think it would have made any difference. And I doubt that even Argentina's "Best" troops would come close to a bog standard British Infantryman, and that is not even what they would have faced, since some of the most elite "regular" regiments are what British sent, The Para's, Royal Marines, Brigade of Guards.

You can train all you like, but experience will always kick the arse of training. And as pointed out, all the Argies, even their most elite only really had experience of murdering civilians and so on. The British Army on the other hand has effectively been at War since the 17th Century! And that is one hell of a training programme! (I did hear a rumour that there may have been 1 day of peace in the 1920's :p)

I imagine that South Africa got it's nose bloodied, because again, it was up against an enemy with actual combat and operational experience, not just strutting around looking mean and being glorified policemen. And that is not something that applies to the British Forces, they have centuries of almost non stop combat experience and military operations.

Argentina is of course again ratting the sabers, and opening their thick, braindead mouths quite a lot at the moment - I hope their Generals at least have half a wit between them, because imho attempting a war against the UK right now would be suicide, since the British Army has been Training at the Kabul Academy, after graduating from Bagdahd High the last decade!

Though it depends whether the Royal Navy actually have any boats left and is remotely capable of taking more than 10 soldiers anywhere of use! (thanks to government cuts)
 
You can train all you like, but experience will always kick the arse of training. And as pointed out, all the Argies, even their most elite only really had experience of murdering civilians and so on. The British Army on the other hand has effectively been at War since the 17th Century! And that is one hell of a training programme! (I did hear a rumour that there may have been 1 day of peace in the 1920's :p)


What kind of combat experience did the average British soldier sent to the Falklands have though ? Assuming they were 18 years old at the end of WW2, they would have been 55. Assuming they where one of the 35k sent to Malaya during the last year of fighting, they would have been 40 years old at the time of the Falklands War.

So, while British officers certainly had more experience (either direct or passed on), the infantryman on the ground saw, if I'm not mistaken, as much combat action as his Argie counterpart, i.e. none.


Here's a question for those more knowledgeable on the subject:

Assuming that the British still try and retake the islands despite a better Argie force holding them (including lots of extra hardware, supplies, a couple of tanks, minefields galore etc), and the landing at the beach somehow, someway fails and the next day Argentina's last exocet missile sinks the British carrier. What kind of repercussions (military, political and diplomatic) does this have, short and long term ?
 
Here's a question for those more knowledgeable on the subject:

Assuming that the British still try and retake the islands despite a better Argie force holding them (including lots of extra hardware, supplies, a couple of tanks, minefields galore etc), and the landing at the beach somehow, someway fails and the next day Argentina's last exocet missile sinks the British carrier. What kind of repercussions (military, political and diplomatic) does this have, short and long term ?
I refer the honourable poster to the Plan B I referred to above.
 
What kind of combat experience did the average British soldier sent to the Falklands have though ? Assuming they were 18 years old at the end of WW2, they would have been 55. Assuming they where one of the 35k sent to Malaya during the last year of fighting, they would have been 40 years old at the time of the Falklands War.

So, while British officers certainly had more experience (either direct or passed on), the infantryman on the ground saw, if I'm not mistaken, as much combat action as his Argie counterpart, i.e. none.

Every soldier in the Britsh Army had been through Northern Ireland, many of them several times and the boyo's in the 80's made the Armagh countryside as well as the towns fairly "sporty".

So at soldier level the British were familar with operating against an intelligent and cunning enemy (some of them were). The other big force multiplier is the knowledge, strength and leadership of the British NCO's over virtually all other armed forces. They are given far more responsibility and accountability than their US equivalents and this makes for a far more cohesive small sub- unit fighting force

The big difference in the armed forces however was not the soldiers and NCO's but the training of the officers and in particular the British army in its primary role in BAOR in Germany in the late 70's and early 80's regularly practiced at Battle group, brigade and divisional level which gave commanders great experience in controlling and co-ordinating their forces. The amphibious nature of Op Corperate lent itself to the royal marines and their artic warfare training. Similary the terrain prevented the use of armour (other than CVRT recce) and so lent itself to air mobile light infantry role (The Para's). 5 inf Brigade were the less prepared 2nd brigade and needed some work up training prior to deployment compared with 3Cdo Bde. There were other infantry battalions in the army (GREEN HOWARDS) who had more recently completed artic warfare training who it could be argued should have been integrated into 5 inf Brigade in lieu of one of the Guards battalions.
 
Here's a question for those more knowledgeable on the subject:

Assuming that the British still try and retake the islands despite a better Argie force holding them (including lots of extra hardware, supplies, a couple of tanks, minefields galore etc), and the landing at the beach somehow, someway fails and the next day Argentina's last exocet missile sinks the British carrier. What kind of repercussions (military, political and diplomatic) does this have, short and long term ?

Admiral Woodward was under orders from the Admiralty to keep his carriers well out of Exocet range. Admiral Anaya gave orders that his Super Entendards were not to be risked. The only way the Super Entendards could get close enough to the carriers to launch was to go on a suicide mission, and thereby risk losing Anaya's only aerial Exocet platforms in one gulp. To have a successful attack, it would also require a monumental string of consecutive screwups by the air defenses of the British task force.

Once the British are on land, they win. San Carlos Bay was indefensible, with a force need far beyond Argentinian logistical capabilities. East Falkland lacked the roads necessary to supply such a trans-island campaign. Which is why they put all their eggs in and around Goose Green and Port Stanley.

Basically, you would need world class idiots running the invasion plans (invade Port Stanley directly?) with the Argentines there waiting for them. Sinking one of Britain's two carriers would have been only icing on the cake.

What would happen next? I can not say. Not that I do not know. I mean that I can not say.:(
 

celt

Banned
There were other infantry battalions in the army (GREEN HOWARDS) who had more recently completed artic warfare training who it could be argued should have been integrated into 5 inf Brigade in lieu of one of the Guards battalions.

The Welsh Guards were sent their straight after doing public duties so were in no fit condition to go which ultimately led to the disaster on the Sir Galahad,why they were sent instead of the Green Howards is a good question, its probably down to Guards bias in certain senior officers at the time.

Just a point to those who think Guards are elite units their training is no different from line infantry units ( infact they probably do less training considering the amount of drill practice they need to do)
 
The Welsh Guards were sent their straight after doing public duties so were in no fit condition to go which ultimately led to the disaster on the Sir Galahad,why they were sent instead of the Green Howards is a good question, its probably down to Guards bias in certain senior officers at the time.

Just a point to those who think Guards are elite units their training is no different from line infantry units ( infact they probably do less training considering the amount of drill practice they need to do)

This was recognized at the time. I imagine the decision to send them was tied in to the numbers of troops Argentina was sending to the Falklands and London not yet knowing of their general poor quality as draftees yet.
 

celt

Banned
This was recognized at the time. I imagine the decision to send them was tied in to the numbers of troops Argentina was sending to the Falklands and London not yet knowing of their general poor quality as draftees yet.

Somebody should have at least got a slap on the wrist for that decision, there was plenty of light infantry battalions who would have performed much better.

The Welsh Guards got quite disgraced within the army for a while afterwards,though I don't think they can be blamed for not being fit enough.
 
Somebody should have at least got a slap on the wrist for that decision, there was plenty of light infantry battalions who would have performed much better.

The Welsh Guards got quite disgraced within the army for a while afterwards,though I don't think they can be blamed for not being fit enough.

British newspapers at the time and immediately in the aftermath of the war excoriated 5 Brigade's commander (IDK his name anymore, senility creeping in) and his troops. Comparing parade battalions to the best the Commandos and Royal Marines had? Not to mention SAS and SBS!? It's like comparing a standard US light infantry division to the US 82nd Airborne, US Marines, and Navy Seals!:mad: Typical Fleet Street.:mad:
 
I was actually doing officer training at the time (Officer Cadet Training Unit, Army Reserves) and read everything I could find, including at least one covering the Argie conscripts. Reading what appeared in the local media, I couldn't work out what the Argie command were playing at; at our platoon level we could see mistakes. ( And, yes, I know it is easier if you do not have someone shooting at you:cool:.)
But then reading what the Argie conscripts described their officers doing was almost surreal. How do you allow your troops to go 6 weeks w/out a shower and clean clothes? Esp when you have a village behind you (Pt Stanley)? For that failure alone the officers deserve punishment. If they were that bad, I cannot see them treating "regular" troops any better.
This is of course leaving out the info already posted re the difference between the Brits and the Argies.
 
I was actually doing officer training at the time (Officer Cadet Training Unit, Army Reserves) and read everything I could find, including at least one covering the Argie conscripts. Reading what appeared in the local media, I couldn't work out what the Argie command were playing at; at our platoon level we could see mistakes. ( And, yes, I know it is easier if you do not have someone shooting at you:cool:.)
But then reading what the Argie conscripts described their officers doing was almost surreal. How do you allow your troops to go 6 weeks w/out a shower and clean clothes? Esp when you have a village behind you (Pt Stanley)? For that failure alone the officers deserve punishment. If they were that bad, I cannot see them treating "regular" troops any better.
This is of course leaving out the info already posted re the difference between the Brits and the Argies.

Outstanding. I had forgotten this. It was typical of a Latin American (But NOT Spaniard) junta army officer corps to see themselves as guardians of the moneyed elite, not the nation as a whole. Hence, not only their unconscionable brutality to their "class enemies"/Communistas" (Anybody to the left of Michael Savage), but the ease with which they abandoned their lowly "peon" draftee troops to face the battle alone while they, the "important elites" of their society, saved themselves.:mad:

It didn't help the politically collapsing junta when these kids were repatriated home and told the Argentinian people of the performance of their officers on the Falklands.:mad:

EDIT: The conditions of the Argentinian troops had to do with the sheer number of forces sent. As I posted earlier, 3x what they could actually support logistically. So even if they HAD done all they could for their men (they didn't), only a third of them could get what they needed, and really none at all beyond Port Stanley's immediate environs. Oh, and Port Stanley couldn't BEGIN to provide sufficient support for all those men. No roads, no rails, no ports beyond the capitol.

What were they thinking? Flood the islands with troops, and "that woman" will lose her nerve and turn around.

Suez 2.0

Machismo had a lot to do with their strategic AND tactical thinking. No thermal underwear because such things are not macho.:rolleyes: Of course, that's not a surprising attitude in a country where 50% of the population lived within 30 miles of Buenos Aires.:p
 
Last edited:
Top