WI: Argentina goes to war with Chile instead of Britain?

It appears that some people on this board seem to think that before Pinochet, Chile was some kind of middle class paradise, and that after 9/11 he actively persecuted it, throwing the spoils to rich assholes of my country.

It wasn't quite like that. That industrial middle class, owners of small factories, shops and the like, was already in crisis by the wonderful years of Allende's administration, which saw workers occupying factories, widespread inflation coupled with price controls and market manipulation, and violence condoned by the Government.

Anyways, that middle class wasn't self supporting before Allende either. Guilds formed by this middle class engaged in price manipulation, fixated quotas and suffocated unaffiliated competition. When Pinochet went on with his reforms, free competition between enterprises was allowed, international markets were open and price freedom replaced the old "minimal price scheme". As a result, the competition destroyed most of these enterprises (My own family's shoe factory included. Goddamn chinese).

But prices dropped, shortages disappeared or were reduced, and the economy was made much more competitive, which laid the foundations for today's relative wealth among Latin America. In the long run, it was benefical, and if a middle class on life support had to disappear for that, so be it. It was bound to happen eventually.

On the other hand, if I set out to renovate my kitchen, my first act is not to set fire to the house.

If I understand Chile's economic history correctly, it started out as one of the poorer Spanish colonies, and relatively dependent on trade and transshipment of goods between Asian and European ports. They'd stop off along the way. Aboriginal populations were pretty much wiped out, but the land base, in comparison to other regions was relatively small. For a variety of reasons, a Latifundia class as such did not truly emerge, and an emerging split between coastal commercial elites and inland latifundistas that was common elsewhere never took place. Instead, we had broadly cross-affiliated elites which integrated both land and commercial interests, and thriving classes of small landholders and relatively prosperous urban proletariats. There's also a significant economic hinterland in the Auracana/Patagonia region. This is the Chile that kicks ass for most of its 19th century wars.

Then, around the 1880 period, Chile as a result of the War of the Pacific, essentially enters into a pseudo-colonial relationship with England, and gains control of the nitrate deposits of what was formerly Bolivian and Peruvian territory. These nitrate deposits were the most valuable resource on Earth until roughly the early 1920's, and even a junior partnership in that wealth sustained a remarkable thriving economy and high standard of living. That and the commercial alliance with England allowed for probably the most advanced and prosperous Latin American nation. There were flies in the ointment - the Panama Canal for instance affected many transshipment cities and nations - Chicago and Winnipeg for instance, Chile lost a lot of sea traffic. It surrendered the Auracania hinterland to Argentina, but didn't really miss it. But overall, it was good times. This also coincides, very roughly with the Parliamentary Era of Chilean politics.

The bottom drops out in the First World War as a result of disruptions in trade, and more importantly, the chemical synthesis of artificial nitrates which basically collapses the nitrate industry. The Chilean state prolongued the party by going deeper and deeper into debt, to make up for the missing components. This takes us into the depression and a lot of crazy instability, the Meat Riots, the Navy Revolt, you name it.

Economic rescue and reform came in the 1940's, as a progressive government was lifted by copper revenues and the creation of indigenous industries including steel. The 1940's was the precursor to modern chile, creating a relatively diversified economy with a strong middle class and industrial base.
Unfortunately, after 20 years, the 1940's model was showing signs of wear and needed to be refurbished.

This lead to the Allende government, which eventually verged on economic ruin and hyperinflation. Was this because Allende's policies were fundamentally flawed or bankrupt? I think we can legitimately argue that at least some of them were ill conceived and flawed. But the truth is that during this time, the largest and most powerful economy on Earth, for political reasons, set out to destroy and punish Chile and wreck its economy.

Frankly, I don't expect a fourteen year old to mow the lawn properly if Mike Tyson is giving him a thrashing at the same time. The strengths or weaknesses of Allende's policies are hard to assess because Allende is a secondary actor in Chile's economy at this time, the primary actor is the United States.

Even acknowledging the prospect that Allende's policies were fuck ups, doesn't necessarily amount to an endorsement of Pinochet's policies. He had the advantage of the favour of the United States during this period, but despite the clear lesson in how important America was to the Chilean economy, he persisted in blowing up American citizens on the streets of Washington DC and torturing American citizens in Chile. That's a hell of a lack of perspective, and about what you'd expect from an ignorant thug.

I would agree that Chile needed to go through an economic restructuring, but this could have been done in a managed and rather less painful and destructive way. Other countries in similar situations - Australia, New Zealand, Canada, countries in Europe were able to manage economic transitions more smoothly.

We can agree to disagree, but my own considered opinion is that Chile would have achieved a smoother economic transition faster and easier and would have been much more prosperous without Pinochet.

Ultimately, all Dictactors are acknowledged to be brutal, murderous thugs with blood on their hands. That's practically the job description.

But the insidious claim that all of these guys and their suporters make incessantly is that, that giant festering sore aside, they're somehow good for the country and the economy. And frankly, that's a claim that deserves to be challenged every time it comes up


Case in point: My grandfather enacted a war drill against Pinochet when they were Colonels in the early Sixties. My grandfather won (as the technically inferior bolivians, no less), and this resulted in Pinochet's career being put under serious jeopardy. Pinochet went to my Grandfather's regiment to beg for a forgiving after action report, which he got. That saved Pinochet's career.
Eventually, my Grandfather went into retirement. After the coup, he tried to pull strings with Pinochet to get his rank back. It was refused. Pulling strings in the Chilean Army doesn't work (though there is some nepotism).

Well, except that by your own account Pinochet was able to handily pull strings. In any event, my argument is that by moving into a national occupation mode, the quality and ability of the Chilean army to function for other purposes was degraded.

You remember that case during the Pinochet years where a gang of soldiers poured gasoline over a couple of indian children and set them on fire? That speaks to a serious breakdown in unit discipline and chain of command. By 1978-82 the Army was essentially becoming a player in civilian life, which was quite unusual for the Chileans. But essentially, it was going the way of Argentina and other Latin militaries.

In any event, I maintain my characterization of Pinochet as an ignorant thug. He may have been a very professional soldier, of sorts. But Dictatorships are filled with persons who have formal training and even genuine competence as lawyers, doctors, soldiers etc.

Specialized training in a narrow field does not automatically translate to competence or even adequacy in government. Duvalier of Haiti, as I've noted was a physician, and thus entirely competent within his narrow field. As a ruler of a country, he was a brutal ignorant thug.


Ultimately, I think the Argentinians would've won a phyrric victory at best, a stalemate at worst. The thousands of deaths for three miserable rocks in tierra del fuego would've destabilized the country to the point where the Junta was outed from power.

I think that we are in complete agreement there. Their expectations were entirely unrealistic. The 'return on investment' was insane. While one should never underestimate overwhelming numerical and financial superiority, there were enough competence issues that really, them screwing it up was a real possibility.
 
Why is Chile such a bad place for guerrilla operations? The south is filled with hills and forests and places to hide.

Low population density, relatively inaccessible and unimportant. The Argentinians have no need to occupy. They can just close off access and let the Guerillas slowly starve to death.
 
I was having fun reading this thread until DValdron and his interlocutors decided to make it a pissing match about Pinochet and Friedman and Allende and all that.

Give it a rest, guys, or open a thread in Chat or something.
 
Quotes:
Maverick had once written a timeline about a 1978 war, it was called "Fuego en el Magallanes". I don't think an attack on Chile would be seen as a sort of replacement for the Falklands War in 1982. The Junta had seriously and wrongly believed that the UK couldn't nor wouldn't go to war for the Falklands. In their minds, they would present the world a fait accompli and get massive public support in Argentina without major bloodshed. Such assumptions were, of course, mistaken, but were the assumptions that led to war in 1982. Planning an invasion against the islands in the Beagle channel, would mean Chile could wage war and probably would. So, it wouldn't be seen as a quick and risk-less political maneuver.

Now, if war happens in 1978, and it was a close run thing, with mediators preventing the war by the time the war was about to start, Argentina was better equipped than Chile. That said, any attack across the Andes would prove an advantage to the defender. Plus, the Falklands War revealed plenty of faults within the Argentinean Armed Forces officer's corps. Faults which might as well be present in the Chilean Army as well, for all we know.
Overall, I'd say a pyrrhic victory, probably for Argentina, with tens of thousands of deaths, bombing of civilian population by both sides and that's not even considering the risk of an international escalation: Bolivia and Peru might join Argentina if Chile seems about to collapse, and Ecuador might then see an opportunity to resolve border issues with Peru by allying with Chile.

--I agree that the Andes posed a strategic advantage for defense of Chile and that Argentina was making many basic errors in judgement (groupthink, as some have pointed out, may be the cause).

Why is Chile such a bad place for guerrilla operations? The south is filled with hills and forests and places to hide.

--I agree, and much of Chile is defensible for guerrilla operations due to the Andes.

Low population density, relatively inaccessible and unimportant. The Argentinians have no need to occupy. They can just close off access and let the Guerillas slowly starve to death.

Inaccessible and unimportant works in favor of guerrilla defense. However, small islands without much agriculture are certainly susceptible to blockades IF you have Naval superiority (and with it air superiority and access to supplies). Not sure the Argentine army could win.

I was having fun reading this thread until DValdron and his interlocutors decided to make it a pissing match about Pinochet and Friedman and Allende and all that.

Give it a rest, guys, or open a thread in Chat or something.

--I respect your perspective. However, my own perspective is that what ScorchedLight and DValdron had to say was interesting and much of it generally relevant. I too sought to apply the issue to the scenario.

Point taken. I'm out of here. Have a nice day.

--For what it's worth I agree with many of your criticisms of the crimes committed during Pinochet's military regime to be legitimate criticisms of the military rule, and I found the discussion interesting. Maybe all the details were getting a bit far from the thread's discussions for some tastes, but still interesting nonetheless. I don't see a reason to drop the thread entirely.

--I still say Brazilian involvement would have been decisive for either side. US involvement more so.

Argentina vs Chile, there you have the makings of a conflict that exceed expectations, especially from the Argentine Plans. The Naval battle would have been crucial, making the victor of the naval phase more defensible and stronger in attack during later land phases.

Despite Argentine manpower and spending, the Chileans had much British military training in their histories and used their Navy expertly back during the War of the Pacific, and in more modern times additional reforms seem to only increase the distance they placed between themselves and their neighbors in terms of quality. As defenders, the Argentines may very likely have stopped or been toppled before the Naval campaign was decided. It does not look good for any side's plan for a quick or small war should Chile be invaded. That is strictly militarily speaking.

On the human rights issues, both sides could certainly have done a lot more housecleaning at the time, but were decades away from it.
 
Last edited:
--I still say Brazilian involvement would have been decisive for either side. US involvement more so.

Agreed. Either or Both Brazil and the US would be decisive. But having acknowedged this, I'm not sure why Brazil would be motivated to intervene. It has absolutely no interests at stake.

Argentina vs Chile, there you have the makings of a conflict that exceed expectations, especially from the Argentine Plans. The Naval battle would have been crucial, making the victor of the naval phase more defensible and stronger in attack during later land phases.

From what we can tell of Plan Sob it looks very much like the Argentinians were thinking in terms of a staged, piecemeal incremental war. They'd seize the islands, and if the Chileans put up with it, then Victory. If the Chileans did not put up with it, then they'd take the next step, escalating by stages.

All I have to say is that's a road trip to disaster. It's the perfect way to minimize Argentine advantages and to return initiative to Chile.

The only way it would work is if the Argentines were counting on the Chileans to just say 'ahhhh hell with it.' ie - that the Chileans either did not have the will to fight, or could be initimidated into not fighting, or would throw in the towel as matters escalated.

Looking at the historical record, that practically never ever works. Certainly it doesn't work when two countries are as relatively close in Strength as Chile and Argentina. To have a chance to get away with that kind of stuff, you need at least 10 to 1 or better superiority.

The most effective Argentinian strategy would have been to drive straight for Santiago and Valparaiso, with a secondary objective of splitting the south. Obviously, this was apparently politically untenable.

But geez, definitely playing to lose.
 
The only way it would work is if the Argentines were counting on the Chileans to just say 'ahhhh hell with it.' ie - that the Chileans either did not have the will to fight, or could be initimidated into not fighting, or would throw in the towel as matters escalated.

Looking at the historical record, that practically never ever works.

The more I look at it, the more it seems to me that the Junta thought they were much more impressive than they really were. "They will bow before us" seems to have been a recurrent theme for their "plans." Apparently, megalomania really is characteristic of dictators and strongmen of all stripes.
 
The more I look at it, the more it seems to me that the Junta thought they were much more impressive than they really were. "They will bow before us" seems to have been a recurrent theme for their "plans." Apparently, megalomania really is characteristic of dictators and strongmen of all stripes.

I think it is rather endemic amongst toughs and strongmen style governments.
 
Much as I'd like to imagine a speedy takeover, given the performance of the Argentine military in '82 and the relative unknown of Chilean capabilities in modern open warfare, I think it's much more likely that we'd end up with something along the lines of Iran-Iraq War: South American Edition. The mountain passes along the northern and central fronts would probably get bogged down into trench warfare and stalemate fairly quickly since Chile would have to be monumentally stupid to not see the invasion coming and prepare accordingly. The terrain there doesn't favor large military operations and even overwhelming numbers would be nicely negated by the choke points. The decisive theater would be in the south as the respective navies duel and jockey for position. Argentina would certainly be in a much stronger position to take complete control of the Tierra del Fuego region (for all the good that'll do) especially since I can't see Chile diverting any reinforcements south during the fights at the passes. That being said, there're certainly some opportunities for the Chilean Navy to raid and harass the area, at the very least keep the Argentinean Navy stuck around Cape Horn and away from the northern coastal cities.
Internationally, there'll be the usual UN finger wagging and hand wringing, but I really can't see anyone sending an intervention force to get in the middle of a dispute no one really cares about. I mean, gawd, it's not like someone stole the Falklands from Britain, right? Besides, Galtieri's government was Reagan's South American anti-communist bulwark of choice, hence why the US was willing the look the other way most of the time when he claimed Argentina was just disappearing communists. The US isn't going to jump into the fray aside from stern warnings to Argentina to back off or face a cut in arms shipments, even when Galtieri starts putting out propaganda that his forces are fighting to liberate Chile from the oppressive Pinochet regime for the good of South Americans everywhere. Likewise, the rest of their neighbors are simply going to close down the borders, increase patrols and hope that both sides knock the stuffing out of each other.

Final verdict: Argentina succeeds in establishing shaky control over Tierra del Fuego and the Beagles, bows to international pressure and pulls back while declaring victory. Given the bloodbath in the passes for the sake of a few windswept arctic rocks, a coup brings down the Junta within a year. Pinochet hangs on and points to the mountain pass battles and the probable exploits of the Navy in declaring his own victory.
 
I think it is rather endemic amongst toughs and strongmen style governments.

The thing is, when you've established a policy of throwing handcuffed men out of helicopters, or wiring up testicles for 220 volts, it takes an unusually strong and courageous person to sit you down and tell you you're wrong, damned wrong, and you're pursuing a really stupid idea.

There aren't many of those. And sadly, in that situation, they're not around long enough to say it twice.

Many regimes, having eliminated any form of legitimate dissent or contradiction, become psychologically unbalanced, feeding on their own delusions, sadly out of touch with reality. Mubarak, Hussein, Amin, Marcos, etc. etc.
 
Much as I'd like to imagine a speedy takeover, given the performance of the Argentine military in '82 and the relative unknown of Chilean capabilities in modern open warfare, I think it's much more likely that we'd end up with something along the lines of Iran-Iraq War: South American Edition. The mountain passes along the northern and central fronts would probably get bogged down into trench warfare and stalemate fairly quickly since Chile would have to be monumentally stupid to not see the invasion coming and prepare accordingly. The terrain there doesn't favor large military operations and even overwhelming numbers would be nicely negated by the choke points. The decisive theater would be in the south as the respective navies duel and jockey for position. Argentina would certainly be in a much stronger position to take complete control of the Tierra del Fuego region (for all the good that'll do) especially since I can't see Chile diverting any reinforcements south during the fights at the passes. That being said, there're certainly some opportunities for the Chilean Navy to raid and harass the area, at the very least keep the Argentinean Navy stuck around Cape Horn and away from the northern coastal cities.
Internationally, there'll be the usual UN finger wagging and hand wringing, but I really can't see anyone sending an intervention force to get in the middle of a dispute no one really cares about. I mean, gawd, it's not like someone stole the Falklands from Britain, right? Besides, Galtieri's government was Reagan's South American anti-communist bulwark of choice, hence why the US was willing the look the other way most of the time when he claimed Argentina was just disappearing communists. The US isn't going to jump into the fray aside from stern warnings to Argentina to back off or face a cut in arms shipments, even when Galtieri starts putting out propaganda that his forces are fighting to liberate Chile from the oppressive Pinochet regime for the good of South Americans everywhere. Likewise, the rest of their neighbors are simply going to close down the borders, increase patrols and hope that both sides knock the stuffing out of each other.

Final verdict: Argentina succeeds in establishing shaky control over Tierra del Fuego and the Beagles, bows to international pressure and pulls back while declaring victory. Given the bloodbath in the passes for the sake of a few windswept arctic rocks, a coup brings down the Junta within a year. Pinochet hangs on and points to the mountain pass battles and the probable exploits of the Navy in declaring his own victory.

I think you've got it.
 
Top