Why is Chile such a bad place for guerrilla operations? The south is filled with hills and forests and places to hide.
It appears that some people on this board seem to think that before Pinochet, Chile was some kind of middle class paradise, and that after 9/11 he actively persecuted it, throwing the spoils to rich assholes of my country.
It wasn't quite like that. That industrial middle class, owners of small factories, shops and the like, was already in crisis by the wonderful years of Allende's administration, which saw workers occupying factories, widespread inflation coupled with price controls and market manipulation, and violence condoned by the Government.
Anyways, that middle class wasn't self supporting before Allende either. Guilds formed by this middle class engaged in price manipulation, fixated quotas and suffocated unaffiliated competition. When Pinochet went on with his reforms, free competition between enterprises was allowed, international markets were open and price freedom replaced the old "minimal price scheme". As a result, the competition destroyed most of these enterprises (My own family's shoe factory included. Goddamn chinese).
But prices dropped, shortages disappeared or were reduced, and the economy was made much more competitive, which laid the foundations for today's relative wealth among Latin America. In the long run, it was benefical, and if a middle class on life support had to disappear for that, so be it. It was bound to happen eventually.
Case in point: My grandfather enacted a war drill against Pinochet when they were Colonels in the early Sixties. My grandfather won (as the technically inferior bolivians, no less), and this resulted in Pinochet's career being put under serious jeopardy. Pinochet went to my Grandfather's regiment to beg for a forgiving after action report, which he got. That saved Pinochet's career.
Eventually, my Grandfather went into retirement. After the coup, he tried to pull strings with Pinochet to get his rank back. It was refused. Pulling strings in the Chilean Army doesn't work (though there is some nepotism).
Ultimately, I think the Argentinians would've won a phyrric victory at best, a stalemate at worst. The thousands of deaths for three miserable rocks in tierra del fuego would've destabilized the country to the point where the Junta was outed from power.
Why is Chile such a bad place for guerrilla operations? The south is filled with hills and forests and places to hide.
Maverick had once written a timeline about a 1978 war, it was called "Fuego en el Magallanes". I don't think an attack on Chile would be seen as a sort of replacement for the Falklands War in 1982. The Junta had seriously and wrongly believed that the UK couldn't nor wouldn't go to war for the Falklands. In their minds, they would present the world a fait accompli and get massive public support in Argentina without major bloodshed. Such assumptions were, of course, mistaken, but were the assumptions that led to war in 1982. Planning an invasion against the islands in the Beagle channel, would mean Chile could wage war and probably would. So, it wouldn't be seen as a quick and risk-less political maneuver.
Now, if war happens in 1978, and it was a close run thing, with mediators preventing the war by the time the war was about to start, Argentina was better equipped than Chile. That said, any attack across the Andes would prove an advantage to the defender. Plus, the Falklands War revealed plenty of faults within the Argentinean Armed Forces officer's corps. Faults which might as well be present in the Chilean Army as well, for all we know.
Overall, I'd say a pyrrhic victory, probably for Argentina, with tens of thousands of deaths, bombing of civilian population by both sides and that's not even considering the risk of an international escalation: Bolivia and Peru might join Argentina if Chile seems about to collapse, and Ecuador might then see an opportunity to resolve border issues with Peru by allying with Chile.
Why is Chile such a bad place for guerrilla operations? The south is filled with hills and forests and places to hide.
Low population density, relatively inaccessible and unimportant. The Argentinians have no need to occupy. They can just close off access and let the Guerillas slowly starve to death.
I was having fun reading this thread until DValdron and his interlocutors decided to make it a pissing match about Pinochet and Friedman and Allende and all that.
Give it a rest, guys, or open a thread in Chat or something.
Point taken. I'm out of here. Have a nice day.
--I still say Brazilian involvement would have been decisive for either side. US involvement more so.
Argentina vs Chile, there you have the makings of a conflict that exceed expectations, especially from the Argentine Plans. The Naval battle would have been crucial, making the victor of the naval phase more defensible and stronger in attack during later land phases.
The only way it would work is if the Argentines were counting on the Chileans to just say 'ahhhh hell with it.' ie - that the Chileans either did not have the will to fight, or could be initimidated into not fighting, or would throw in the towel as matters escalated.
Looking at the historical record, that practically never ever works.
The more I look at it, the more it seems to me that the Junta thought they were much more impressive than they really were. "They will bow before us" seems to have been a recurrent theme for their "plans." Apparently, megalomania really is characteristic of dictators and strongmen of all stripes.
I think it is rather endemic amongst toughs and strongmen style governments.
Much as I'd like to imagine a speedy takeover, given the performance of the Argentine military in '82 and the relative unknown of Chilean capabilities in modern open warfare, I think it's much more likely that we'd end up with something along the lines of Iran-Iraq War: South American Edition. The mountain passes along the northern and central fronts would probably get bogged down into trench warfare and stalemate fairly quickly since Chile would have to be monumentally stupid to not see the invasion coming and prepare accordingly. The terrain there doesn't favor large military operations and even overwhelming numbers would be nicely negated by the choke points. The decisive theater would be in the south as the respective navies duel and jockey for position. Argentina would certainly be in a much stronger position to take complete control of the Tierra del Fuego region (for all the good that'll do) especially since I can't see Chile diverting any reinforcements south during the fights at the passes. That being said, there're certainly some opportunities for the Chilean Navy to raid and harass the area, at the very least keep the Argentinean Navy stuck around Cape Horn and away from the northern coastal cities.
Internationally, there'll be the usual UN finger wagging and hand wringing, but I really can't see anyone sending an intervention force to get in the middle of a dispute no one really cares about. I mean, gawd, it's not like someone stole the Falklands from Britain, right? Besides, Galtieri's government was Reagan's South American anti-communist bulwark of choice, hence why the US was willing the look the other way most of the time when he claimed Argentina was just disappearing communists. The US isn't going to jump into the fray aside from stern warnings to Argentina to back off or face a cut in arms shipments, even when Galtieri starts putting out propaganda that his forces are fighting to liberate Chile from the oppressive Pinochet regime for the good of South Americans everywhere. Likewise, the rest of their neighbors are simply going to close down the borders, increase patrols and hope that both sides knock the stuffing out of each other.
Final verdict: Argentina succeeds in establishing shaky control over Tierra del Fuego and the Beagles, bows to international pressure and pulls back while declaring victory. Given the bloodbath in the passes for the sake of a few windswept arctic rocks, a coup brings down the Junta within a year. Pinochet hangs on and points to the mountain pass battles and the probable exploits of the Navy in declaring his own victory.