WI: Ardennes attack spotted, French tanks fight back

[Tanc49]

Hello y'all,

So, if I gather correctly, the French tanks were Superior technically to the German ones, and were too armoured for the canons of the enemy. The issue was more around doctrine. The other issue in May 1940 is the lack of reactivity after the attack in the Ardennes was spotted by scouting planes
So, what if the Ardennes was attacked by the Armée de l'Air, giving enough time for some French tanks to organise a blockade? I understand they'd still be expecting the main thrust in Belgium but there IS an attack in the Ardennes that should warrant some form of response?

Let me know if I'm completely wrong or if there's something there

 

[Belisarius II]

Interesting question. The ground in question is the same that was fought over during The Battle of the Bulge. The differences between 1940 & 1944 are pretty significant. For many reasons the Americans were able to slow the German advance, hold the flanks, narrowing the penetration, and setting up the condition for a counter attack. In 1940 the German advance was made against token Belgian resistance. It was May, with long hours of daylight, with the Germans enjoying air superiority, and strategic surprise. By the time the French realized Army Group A had most of the German Mobile units they'd already reached the Meuse.

The only way the French could get large tank formations into the Ardennes in time would've been to have placed them in the Allied Center, supporting the 9th Army. They'd have to start the advance on the first day of the battle, racing to the same road junctions the American did in 1944. Even still I'd expect the French to lose the race. I think the Germans in 1940 were just too fast for the French to react in time. I thing they got to Bastogne by May 11, and the French Infantry was too slow move up in time to support the Armor, so the tanks units would have been on their own. It would've been better if the French Armor had been in reserve in the center, and used to counterattack the German XIX Panzer Korps Bridgeheads on the Meuse, rather then trying to fight in the Ardennes.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Hello y'all,

So, if I gather correctly, the French tanks were Superior technically to the German ones, and were too armoured for the canons of the enemy. The issue was more around doctrine. The other issue in May 1940 is the lack of reactivity after the attack in the Ardennes was spotted by scouting planes
So, what if the Ardennes was attacked by the Armée de l'Air, giving enough time for some French tanks to organise a blockade? I understand they'd still be expecting the main thrust in Belgium but there IS an attack in the Ardennes that should warrant some form of response?

Let me know if I'm completely wrong or if there's something there

It wasn't like the French were idle, the Luftwaffe was just quite present while the AdlA was only at 25% strength:

History of the Armée de l'Air (1909–1942) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Armée de l'Air was beset by obsolete strategy, tactics, aircraft, weapons and even in communications, and the lack of equipment owing to "technical problems." Both became apparent when the Germans advanced swiftly through France and Belgium. On 11 May, nearly 20 French bombers and over 30 British fighter escorts were shot down attacking German crossings over the Meuse river. French fighter and bomber strength was rapidly depleted in May as Luftwaffe fighters and Flak shot down aircraft, which attacked the advancing Germans. Squadrons were often out of contact with any French army units that they were supposedly supporting, partly to the poor coordination of communication between the army and the air force and partly to the outdated, unreliable army communications equipment being used.

Battle of France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

While the German columns were sitting targets, the French bomber force attacked the Germans in northern Belgium during the Battle of Maastricht and had failed with heavy losses. In two days, the bomber force had been reduced from 135 to 72.[118]

Part of the issue too was the coordination with the Belgians who were supposed to defend the Ardennes:

The advance of Army Group A was to be delayed by Belgian motorised infantry and French mechanised cavalry divisions (DLC, Divisions Légères de Cavalerie) advancing into the Ardennes. The main resistance came from the Belgian 1st Chasseurs Ardennais, the 1st Cavalry Division reinforced by engineers and the French 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie (5th DLC).[116] The Belgian troops blocked roads, held up the 1st Panzer Division at Bodange for about eight hours then retired northwards too quickly for the French who had not arrived and their barriers proved ineffective when not defended; German engineers were not disturbed as they dismantled the obstacles. They had insufficient anti-tank capacity to block the surprisingly large number of German tanks they encountered and quickly gave way, withdrawing behind the Meuse.

Then the Luftwaffe also disrupted French reserves trying to move into position to block the German push to the Meuse:

On 11 May, Gamelin had ordered reserve divisions to begin reinforcing the Meuse sector. Because of the danger the Luftwaffe posed, movement over the rail network was limited to night-time, slowing the reinforcement.

They also thought they had time to spare given the fortifications on the Meuse and traffic jams the Germans had. Plus they didn't count on the German army coordination with the Luftwaffe as an artillery replacement, which dramatically shortened the time they needed to get sufficient fire support to force a crossing of the the Meuse. The French had anticipated them waiting for artillery and supply before trying it.

Instead of slowly massing artillery as the French expected, the Germans concentrated most of their air power (as they lacked artillery), to smash a hole in a narrow sector of the French lines by carpet bombing and by dive bombing. Guderian had been promised extraordinarily heavy air support during a continual eight-hour air attack, from 08:00 am until dusk.[123]

The Luftwaffe executed the heaviest air bombardment the world had yet witnessed and the most intense by the Germans during the war.[124] Two Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wings) attacked, flying 300 sorties against French positions.[125] A total of 3,940 sorties were flown by nine Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wings).[126]

But most important of all the French realized the threat even if a bit late and tried to react, but were stopped by the Luftwaffe/FLAK:

Recognising the gravity of the defeat at Sedan, General Gaston-Henri Billotte, commander of the 1st Army Group, whose right flank pivoted on Sedan, urged that the bridges across the Meuse be destroyed by air attack, convinced that "over them will pass either victory or defeat!". That day, every available Allied light bomber was employed in an attempt to destroy the three bridges but lost about 44 percent of the Allied bomber strength for no result.[126][129]

Plus then the Germans moved at speeds not even the German high command anticipated or wanted, which was just enough to stop the French counterattack that would have changed history:

Guderian had indicated on 12 May that he wanted to enlarge the bridgehead to at least 20 km (12 mi). His superior, General Ewald von Kleist, ordered him, on behalf of Hitler, to limit his moves to a maximum of 8 km (5.0 mi) before consolidation. At 11:45 on 14 May, Rundstedt confirmed this order, which implied that the tank units should now start to dig in.[130] Guderian was able to get Kleist to agree on a form of words for a "reconnaissance in force", by threatening to resign and behind-the-scenes intrigues. Guderian continued the advance, despite the halt order.[131] In the original Manstein Plan, as Guderian had suggested, secondary attacks would be carried out to the south-east, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command and occupy ground where French counter-offensive forces would assemble. This element had been removed by Halder but Guderian sent the 10th Panzer Division and Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland south over the Stonne plateau.[132]

The commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntziger, intended to carry out a counter-attack at the same spot by the 3e Division Cuirassée (3e DCR, 3rd Armoured Division) to eliminate the bridgehead and both sides attacked and counter-attacked from 15–17 May. Huntziger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting the flank. Success in the Battle of Stonne and the recapture of Bulson would have enabled the French to defend the high ground overlooking Sedan and bombard the bridgehead with observed artillery-fire, even if they could not take it; Stonne changed hands 17 times and fell to the Germans for the last time on the evening of 17 May.[133] Guderian turned the 1st Panzer Division and the 2nd Panzer Division westwards on 14 May, which advanced swiftly down the Somme valley towards the English Channel.[134]

The French fought extremely hard once they got in gear, but it wasn't enough to stop the German offensive.

I'm not really sure the French could have done much better even with different doctrine give that they were still dealing with the problems of their air force not being able to support their army, while the Luftwaffe was already highly experienced and at a high level of readiness for the campaign. Every time the RAF and AdlA tried to bomb the Ardennes/Meuse thrust they achieved little and were shot to pieces. Meanwhile the French reserves were delayed and disrupted by repeated Luftwaffe attacks and fleeing reserve divisions that were broken by air attacks, which demoralized, misinformed, and disrupted French counterattack forces repeatedly. Once the Meuse was breached and the French counterattack failed there was little the French could really do anymore:

The 4th DCr (de Gaulle), attempted to launch an attack from the south at Montcornet, where Guderian had his Korps headquarters and the 1st Panzer Division had its rear service areas. During the Battle of Montcornet Germans hastily improvised a defence while Guderian rushed up the 10th Panzer Division to threaten de Gaulle's flank. This flank pressure and dive-bombing by Fliegerkorps VIII (General Wolfram von Richthofen) broke up the attack. French losses on 17 May amounted to 32 tanks and armoured vehicles but the French had "inflicted loss on the Germans". On 19 May, after receiving reinforcements, de Gaulle attacked again and was repulsed with the loss of 80 of 155 vehicles.[150] Fliegerkorps VIII attacked French units massing on the German flanks and prevented most counter-attacks from starting. The defeat of the 4th DCr and the disintegration of the French Ninth Army was caused mainly by the Fliegerkorps.[151] The 4th DCr had achieved a measure of success but the attacks on 17 and 19 May had only local effect.[152]

So while an interesting POD there were a number of factors that mediated against French success even if their commanders were less 'complacent'.

 

[marathag]

So, if I gather correctly, the French tanks were Superior technically to the German ones

except for radios.
Many Panzer I still had the original Receive-Only set, while many French tanks didn't have anything. They had developed a small compact set, but they hadn't been installed in very many hulls yet. Even with Radios, HQ command links to GHQ were not radio links, as the High Command didn't fully trust Radio, thinking that the signals could be intercepted. and so relied on motorcycle messengers to pass commands and receive reports.

That was retrograde for 1918, let lone 1940.

The other major problem was that they had an unhealthy attraction to one man turrets, so the TC was commander, loader and gunner, meaning couldn't really command the tank

 

[vizzer]

There was also the crews being so new to their vehicles that they did not know that the Char-1B had 2 fuel tanks not just 1 which drastically reduced their effective range.

 

[Garrison]

If the French Armour is the Ardennes that implies one of two things. Either the French didn't capture a copy of the original German attack plan and thus didn't reinforce the Dyle force at the expense of the reserve, or they've found out about Sickle Cut. if the French can dig in and fight then the Germans are in a lot of trouble, especially if they can keep the door open long enough for the British and French armies in Belgium to fall back.

 

[Tanc49]

There was also the crews being so new to their vehicles that they did not know that the Char-1B had 2 fuel tanks not just 1 which drastically reduced their effective range.

except for radios.
Many Panzer I still had the original Receive-Only set, while many French tanks didn't have anything. They had developed a small compact set, but they hadn't been installed in very many hulls yet. Even with Radios, HQ command links to GHQ were not radio links, as the High Command didn't fully trust Radio, thinking that the signals could be intercepted. and so relied on motorcycle messengers to pass commands and receive reports.

That was retrograde for 1918, let lone 1940.

The other major problem was that they had an unhealthy attraction to one man turrets, so the TC was commander, loader and gunner, meaning couldn't really command the tank

So even if there'd been a large contingent of tanks available nearby, the doctrine of lack of training would have been an issue?
I was looking quickly at the Battle of Stone where it seems 1B were vastly superior to Panzers in combat situation and could block the advance. It might have been narrative exageration though?

 

[Bougnas]

So even if there'd been a large contingent of tanks available nearby, the doctrine of lack of training would have been an issue?
I was looking quickly at the Battle of Stone where it seems 1B were vastly superior to Panzers in combat situation and could block the advance. It might have been narrative exageration though?

The ergonomics and comms limitations of French tanks limited their capability in encounter battles and usually only their almost invincible armor allowed them to cause so much damage. These limitations would probably have been less severe in the defense, so unless the overall quality of all French forces and doctrine were improved, it would probably have been better to defend instead of going straight in. Unfortunately long command chains meant that the forces weren't even where they needed to be to defend.

Now, if the French trusted their own intelligence (which saw that the Germans would attack in the Ardennes, but was notorious for overestimating the Germans so was dismissed) or took measures to defend the Ardennes (field exercises and simply common sense saw that as early as 1938) by building field defenses and putting the forces in the area on alert, while keeping the 7th Army as reserve near Sedan, then it could have turned really badly for the Germans.

 

[alspug]

French Tank distribution was terrible. Most tanks served in small groups that lacked the mass needed to hold any real frontage. The majority of the tanks had good armour but low velocity 37mm guns.
Simply put France was caught 6 months before her upgrades would have made a difference.

 

[SwampTiger]

I would posit the French overstepped their capability in advancing to the Dyle line. The French waited for the Belgians to invite them into Belgium, advanced to protect the Belgian flank, then watched as the Belgians retreated away from French forces. Even then, the forward DLM's successfully fought a successful delaying action until Dunkirk. If the Reserve Force would have remained in place, the German advance would have been at least delayed, if not completely blocked. French attacks on the long lines of vehicles backed up across the Rhine would have helped. Yes you AdA.

 

[Veiovis]

The technical capabilities were, as usual between peer powers, fairly irrelevant for the outcome of the battle. French defeat was caused by absolutly massive and terrible flaws at both the strategic and tactical level of leadership, and not by the caliber of their guns, the thickness for their tank armor or anything else the tech affine population of this board likes to passionatly argue about in long threads.

 

[BlackDragon98]

The French had a golden chance at Hannut to destroy or incapacitate 2 panzer divisions, but they failed to seize the opportunity.
However, as @wiking mentioned, the Germans had local air superiority and used it to great effect against the French, Belgians, and British.
The Ju 87 was particularly terrifying and the psychological effect it had on French soldiers even cause an entire French infantry division, the 55th to abandon their positions and heavy equipment at Sedan.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The French had a golden chance at Hannut to destroy or incapacitate 2 panzer divisions, but they failed to seize the opportunity.
However, as @wiking mentioned, the Germans had local air superiority and used it to great effect against the French, Belgians, and British.
The Ju 87 was particularly terrifying and the psychological effect it had on French soldiers even cause an entire French infantry division, the 55th to abandon their positions and heavy equipment at Sedan.

Let's not forget that the Luftwaffe was stronger in France than any campaign the Germans ever fought in WW2 and the number of aircraft to mile of front was the highest as well. The level of aircraft saturation that they achieved was not match or exceeded until Normandy.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Let's not forget that the Luftwaffe was stronger in France than any campaign the Germans ever fought in WW2 and the number of aircraft to mile of front was the highest as well. The level of aircraft saturation that they achieved was not match or exceeded until Normandy.

The number of aircraft to mile of front was the highest because the front wasn't that big to begin with, compared to the Eastern Front.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Interesting video that explains why the French failed to stop the Germans crossing the river

It took the Germans 15 hours after the Pioneers crossed the river and defeated the French defenders before the first Panzer crossed the river where the French could have nipped it in the bud and then after Guderien minced off with the first 2 Panzer Divisions to have crossed, leaving the weakly defended bridgehead under threat from 7 French Divisions.

Who did not then attack.

Many of the French units were excellent - their Generals were ditherers

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The number of aircraft to mile of front was the highest because the front wasn't that big to begin with, compared to the Eastern Front.

And because there were about ~1200-1500 (or more depending on the source) more aircraft used in France than in the USSR.

Battle of France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Luftwaffe
Army Group B had the support of 1,815 combat, 487 transport and 50 glider aircraft and another 3,286 combat aircraft supported Army Groups A and C.

Operation Barbarossa

en.wikipedia.org

2,770–4,389 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the Luftwaffe)

3297 combat aircraft per Nigel Askey's Operation Barbarossa.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Interesting video that explains why the French failed to stop the Germans crossing the river

It took the Germans 15 hours after the Pioneers crossed the river and defeated the French defenders before the first Panzer crossed the river where the French could have nipped it in the bud and then after Guderien minced off with the first 2 Panzer Divisions to have crossed, leaving the weakly defended bridgehead under threat from 7 French Divisions.

Who did not then attack.

Many of the French units were excellent - their Generals were ditherers

The French reservists were fleeing in terror and blocking the roads as well as misinforming the units forming up to counterattack, while the commanders were moving around trying to find out what was going on at the front before committing to an action.

 

[BlackDragon98]

And because there were about ~1200-1500 (or more depending on the source) more aircraft used in France than in the USSR.

Battle of France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Operation Barbarossa

en.wikipedia.org

3297 combat aircraft per Nigel Askey's Operation Barbarossa.

That's partially because of the high attrition rate the Luftwaffe sustained in France. Keeping air superiority means that losses are imminent.
And because of the high attrition rate in France, the Luftwaffe naturally had less planes for Barbarossa.
The fact that Nazi Germany's economy wasn't at total war yet is also a major problem.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

That's partially because of the high attrition rate the Luftwaffe sustained in France. Keeping air superiority means that losses are imminent.
And because of the high attrition rate in France, the Luftwaffe naturally had less planes for Barbarossa.

France, Battle of Britain, and all the subsequent air operations before Barbarossa. That and the Mediterranean and ongoing Channel fronts.
The attrition rate in France was actually lower than the BoB. And the forces for the BoB were actually larger than for Barbarossa too. People generally don't realize how much the Luftwaffe was worn down before Barbarossa even started.

The fact that Nazi Germany's economy wasn't at total war yet is also a major problem.

That's a whole other conversation

 

[SwampTiger]

The Luftwaffe lost so many planes because the RAF and AdA were fighting back. Now, the French should have sent the Luftwaffe pilots overseas before surrendering. That would have really hurt Germany. The AdA remaining in the fight longer, with better supplies and maintenance regimen would have allowed more sorties per aircraft. The Luftwaffe would have been far weaker for the BoB.

The lunge north undermined any quick response to the 'Sickle Cut' The critical period was May 13-14. The reserve was wasted going north. A stronger AdA response to stave off the Stukas and other Luftwaffe aircraft would have helped.

Dyles Plan Breda variant worked as planned until the Belgian withdrawal, which forced the French to withdraw. An ill advised but competent operation. The failure to accept the Belgian warnings and AdA reconnaissance reports at face value, and follow up on these reports led to the Breda variant based on older reports. The French First Army was wasted in central Belgium.