WI: Another BoB Thread, the August Weather

[Ian Hathaway]

As most will know the Luftwaffe's Eagle Attack on Britain was initially scheduled for 10th August but due to German meteorology reports the start of the campaign did not happen until 13th August. In fact throughout this stage of the Battle of Britain, from 10th August through to 6th September the weather prevented full scale operations on 9 of the 28 days with a further 4 days where the weather prevented daylight raids during the morning/early afternoon. If you include the 2 rest days the Luftwaffe took during this period they were only able to concentrate their efforts for just under half of the time they had (13 days).

The initial plan was drawn up and allowed for 13 days in total as follows:

Phase One
First 5 days: Attacks made in a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90- to 60-mile radius of London.

Phase Two
Next 3 days: Radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles.

Phase Three
Final 5 days: Attacks concentrated within a 30-mile radius centered on London.

In addition there would have been 10 days allowed for the Luftwaffe to soften up Britain by hitting ports, naval yards, railways etc. etc.

With perfect weather conditions the whole plan would have been complete by (if everything had gone perfectly, which is very doubtful) 1st September ... at least 2 weeks before it needed to be, if you consider Sealion to be a possibility (it being launched not a success).

So what would have happened if the weather had been perfect, with less time for the RAF to recover the damage it sustained, less production time for replacement fighters and training time for pilots?

 

[King Augeas]

Losing 9 of 28 days doesn't sound too bad for a British summer!

The question is how it affects German strategy, or lack thereof. German intelligence regarding the British aircraft strength and the Dowding system isn't changed, so Germany will use basically the same plan. The question is whether the more intense fighting will cause any particular section of the British air defences to visibly collapse, after wasting weeks flip-flopping from convoys to radar stations etc., unable to understand why the RAF hadn't already collapsed. The relevant bit is the airfields, as I don't believe that the Luftwaffe can rapidly break the RAF by any other means.

Historically, the Luftwaffe attacked the airfields for a while before switching target again, to London, perceiving that the airfield strategy was ineffective, since the RAF was still able to meet raids and the airfields were never knocked out for long or many planes caught on the ground. A greater intensity of attacks because of better weather will cause more damage to the airfields, but unless the Luftwaffe sees solid evidence that it is "working" - presumably in terms of degrading the ability of the RAF to intercept raids or catching squadrons on the ground - they'll just end up flip-flopping to London again. Is the greater intensity of attacks enough to see that happen? I don't think so, judging by the historical record of airfield damage and planes caught on the ground. I think you'll get a switch to London at the end of August, and continued ineffective attrition of both sides, as OTL.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Losing 9 of 28 days doesn't sound too bad for a British summer!

The question is how it affects German strategy, or lack thereof. German intelligence regarding the British aircraft strength and the Dowding system isn't changed, so Germany will use basically the same plan. The question is whether the more intense fighting will cause any particular section of the British air defences to visibly collapse, after wasting weeks flip-flopping from convoys to radar stations etc., unable to understand why the RAF hadn't already collapsed. The relevant bit is the airfields, as I don't believe that the Luftwaffe can rapidly break the RAF by any other means.

Historically, the Luftwaffe attacked the airfields for a while before switching target again, to London, perceiving that the airfield strategy was ineffective, since the RAF was still able to meet raids and the airfields were never knocked out for long or many planes caught on the ground. A greater intensity of attacks because of better weather will cause more damage to the airfields, but unless the Luftwaffe sees solid evidence that it is "working" - presumably in terms of degrading the ability of the RAF to intercept raids or catching squadrons on the ground - they'll just end up flip-flopping to London again. Is the greater intensity of attacks enough to see that happen? I don't think so, judging by the historical record of airfield damage and planes caught on the ground. I think you'll get a switch to London at the end of August, and continued ineffective attrition of both sides, as OTL.

You are right in the fact that the conduct of the battle will be the same, the RAF command and control structure will be the same, the flawed German startegy will also be the same and I saw flawed strategy because they did have one it was just not quite right.

If you split the battle into distinct campaigns with the first month concentrating on closing the Channel or at the least restricting ship movements you could argue that the Luftwaffe won this first round. By the end of July Dover was no longer used as a Destroyer base and there were only limited numbers of Destroyers at Portsmouth. After the attacks on convoy CW9 on 8th August it was decided that it was too risky to send convoys through the straights of Dover. The second campaign is the bit I'm interested in here, Eagle Attack, with the aim of knocking out Fighter Command. The flawed strategy was down to prewar intelligence, the list of targets was just too great and it was felt that it was better to hit everything that looked like it should be hit just in case it was something vital.

As for the switch in targets to London this was done not because the Germans believed their plan wasn't working but because they were overconfident that the plan WAS working. As Goering said at the meeting of the 3rd of September when the target priority was changed "an attack on London will draw up the last 50 fighters where we can smash them in the skies" (or words to that effect).

I think the most telling thing would be if the weather had been better in August fighter command would have had fewer replacement aircraft. Just one week extra of fine weather would have reduced this number by over 100, I'm not saying that would have been enough but it may have had some kind of effect.

 

[King Augeas]

As for the switch in targets to London this was done not because the Germans believed their plan wasn't working but because they were overconfident that the plan WAS working. As Goering said at the meeting of the 3rd of September when the target priority was changed "an attack on London will draw up the last 50 fighters where we can smash them in the skies" (or words to that effect).

I wonder about that comment. If it's taken at face value, as an accurate insight into strategy, then it's bad news for the Luftwaffe, because it dictates that a successful onslaught against the airfields, capable of degrading FC performance, would inevitably be abandoned in favour of attacking London, giving FC time to recover.

But the logic behind it is a bit dodgy. If there are only fifty fighters left, and you believe that the current strategy is working - hence the fifty fighters! - why not continue it? If you don't believe that that strategy was working and hence that a changes was needed, then would you believe that FC was down to 50 fighters? No - but you might say so in order to cover your own arse...

Or is it just typical Goering bluster, just ~words~ being spoken to justify actions, as worthless as the claim to be able to supply Stalingrad? Why change target at all? Was this Hitler's influence in response to British bombing? Was it Goering's idea in response to a perceived failing strategy? Or was it simply part of the original plan occurring on schedule, in recognition of the fact that there were too many targets to hit simultaneously, with the "fifty fighters" comment reflecting the hopeless German estimates of FC strength and resilience?

I'm not sure what point I'm really trying to make here, except that it's important to understand what the German commanders were thinking at various times during the battle and I'm wary of comments like that, particularly from people like Goering.

 

[Aber]

You also need to consider the rate of attrition for the Germans, they also need to rest crews and repair aircraft.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

You also need to consider the rate of attrition for the
Germans, they also need to rest crews and repair aircraft.

True. But the Germans started with a stronger hand. Delays allowed the British to catch up a bit.

Perfect weather for the first 30 days could be fatal to the RAF. But as noted, 30 days of perfect weather is very implausible. 5 more days of good weather might be within the bounds, but probably not enough to flip the result.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I wonder about that comment. If it's taken at face value, as an accurate insight into strategy, then it's bad news for the Luftwaffe, because it dictates that a successful onslaught against the airfields, capable of degrading FC performance, would inevitably be abandoned in favour of attacking London, giving FC time to recover.

But the logic behind it is a bit dodgy. If there are only fifty fighters left, and you believe that the current strategy is working - hence the fifty fighters! - why not continue it? If you don't believe that that strategy was working and hence that a changes was needed, then would you believe that FC was down to 50 fighters? No - but you might say so in order to cover your own arse...

Or is it just typical Goering bluster, just ~words~ being spoken to justify actions, as worthless as the claim to be able to supply Stalingrad? Why change target at all? Was this Hitler's influence in response to British bombing? Was it Goering's idea in response to a perceived failing strategy? Or was it simply part of the original plan occurring on schedule, in recognition of the fact that there were too many targets to hit simultaneously, with the "fifty fighters" comment reflecting the hopeless German estimates of FC strength and resilience?

I'm not sure what point I'm really trying to make here, except that it's important to understand what the German commanders were thinking at various times during the battle and I'm wary of comments like that, particularly from people like Goering.

To be honest its sort of understandable how Goering might think that considering the intelligence he was receiving told him there were only 100 fighters left at the end of August.

On the subject of German intel. they actually got one or two things right to begin with but unfortunately they didn't adjust their assumptions throughout the battle. At the start they had estimated Fighter Commands strength at 900+ frontline fighters with 675 operational and production of new fighters set at 180-300 per month, which at the time was pretty accurate. What they didn't count on was the fact that the production figures increased considerably. The estimates for downed aircraft was overestimated by about 1.5 (which was actually a lower figure than the British overestimates of German planes shot down which were typically 2-3 times higher than reality). The Germans also carried out successful raids on airfields that were not Fighter Command stations where hundreds of aircraft were destroyed and these were also thrown into the mix, raids such as the one at Detling on 13th August where 22 aircraft were destroyed and at Brize Norton on 16th August where 42 aircraft were destroyed.

If you take just the higher estimated production figures for July and August of 600 total replacements and compare it with actual production figures then German intelligence is already over 300 front line fighters short of the true figure.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

To be honest its sort of understandable how Goering might think that considering the intelligence he was receiving told him there were only 100 fighters left at the end of August.

On the subject of German intel. they actually got one or two things right to begin with but unfortunately they didn't adjust their assumptions throughout the battle. At the start they had estimated Fighter Commands strength at 900+ frontline fighters with 675 operational and production of new fighters set at 180-300 per month, which at the time was pretty accurate. What they didn't count on was the fact that the production figures increased considerably. The estimates for downed aircraft was overestimated by about 1.5 (which was actually a lower figure than the British overestimates of German planes shot down which were typically 2-3 times higher than reality). The Germans also carried out successful raids on airfields that were not Fighter Command stations where hundreds of aircraft were destroyed and these were also thrown into the mix, raids such as the one at Detling on 13th August where 22 aircraft were destroyed and at Brize Norton on 16th August where 42 aircraft were destroyed.

If you take just the higher estimated production figures for July and August of 600 total replacements and compare it with actual production figures then German intelligence is already over 300 front line fighters short of the true figure.

The difference in fighter pilot training does not seem to have been understood either, & perhaps was even more important. SorrY I dont have numbers at hand. Perhaps someone else has this information at hand to share?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

The difference in fighter pilot training does not seem to have been understood either, & perhaps was even more important. SorrY I dont have numbers at hand. Perhaps someone else has this information at hand to share?

Actually the Germans over estimated the number of pilots available they didn't consider replacement pilots for Fighter Command to be an issue at all.

Taken from "GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF THE RAF AND COMPARISON WITH CURRENT LUFTWAFFE STRENGTH" dated 16th July 1940

B. Personnel and Training

At present there are no difficulties regarding the number of men available.

From the outset the training is concentrated on the production of good pilots, and the great majority of the officers in particular are trained solely as such. By comparison tactical training is left far in the background. For this reason the RAF has comparatively well-trained fighter pilots while the bomber crews are not up to modern tactical standards. This applies to the bomb-aimers in particular, most of whom are NCOs and men with little service experience. Although there are deficiencies in equipment, the comparatively low standard in bombing accuracy may be attributed to this factor.