In 1951, Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh proposed a deal with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to share profits 50/50 between the company and the Iranian government, in line with existing arrangements between oil companies and the governments of Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. The AIOC refused to negotiate, leading to nationalisation of the Iranian part of the company, the Abadan crisis, and the British-inspired 1953 Iranian coup. Yes, the British government practically begged the United States to help them overthrow Mossadegh; in late 1952, the US government was supporting Mossadegh in the dispute!
In the end, the Iranian Oil Participants consortium was formed, with all seven oil supermajors plus Compagnie Française des Pétroles (the future Total S.A.) cooperating under one banner. IOP took a 50/50 split of profits with the Iranian government, exactly as had been proposed in 1951; the former AIOC, now British Petroleum, had a 40% stake in the constortium, giving it just 20% of Iranian oil profits.
Had the original offer of 1951 been accepted, the AIOC would have received two and a half times the income from Iranian oil that it did in OTL. What if the AIOC and British government had heeded American advice, recognised that revenue sharing was unavoidable, and accepted the deal Mossadegh offered?
In the end, the Iranian Oil Participants consortium was formed, with all seven oil supermajors plus Compagnie Française des Pétroles (the future Total S.A.) cooperating under one banner. IOP took a 50/50 split of profits with the Iranian government, exactly as had been proposed in 1951; the former AIOC, now British Petroleum, had a 40% stake in the constortium, giving it just 20% of Iranian oil profits.
Had the original offer of 1951 been accepted, the AIOC would have received two and a half times the income from Iranian oil that it did in OTL. What if the AIOC and British government had heeded American advice, recognised that revenue sharing was unavoidable, and accepted the deal Mossadegh offered?