WI: André-Gaston Prételat is listened to by the French Military?

[The Odyssey]

He had actually predicted that the Germans could invade through the "impenetrable" Ardennes in the year 1938. Obviously, the high command didn't listen, as they were thinking too conservative, too World War One like (in a way).

So what if they actually took his advice?

What would happen?

(Here is André-Gaston Prételat Wiki entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/André-Gaston_Prételat)

 

[Julian]

Actually the French predicted exactly what Nazi Germany was going to do, so it's really not right to decry them over not focusing on the Ardennes. Up until early 1940 German plans involved a limited invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium. Only through a bizarre bit of luck were the plans lost and new ones proposed. In any case, it's not very likely that the French are going to have any significant forces near the Ardennes; at most a couple higher class divisions along the Meuse, but that's it. No one really though it was possible to supply and move a large force through the Ardennes so rapidly; even the Germans underestimated their own capabiltiies.

 

[The Odyssey]

Ok, but lets just say that at the last minute, the French decide to send a force to guard the Ardennes. Would that be possible? And what would be the effects on the German advance?

 

[TxCoatl1970]

Him being listened to by the general staff and thus, their formulating an effective counter-strategy for blitzkrieg are two different things.

Barring Marty Macfly coming back to Paris in 1938 with objective proof
that Hitler would NOT ever stop and French mobile-warfare doctrine sucked eggs, it would be very difficult for somebody to get the French to realize sitting behind the Maginot Line wouldn't work.

A POD I've flogged a bit is that official French participation in the Spanish Civil War would have been a nice laboratory for France to learn what works and doesn't in combined arms warfare. It was politically near impossible, even with leon Blum's Popular Front government.

I must confess as an American, I'm dirt ignorant of the politics within the 1930's French Army.
From what paltry readings I've done on the spin-up to WWII featuring the French Army- the civilian political situation resembles the current American one. The right and left thumb-wrestled for power and thought compromise a bitter surrender, not a political necessity.
FWIW, they did approve a rearmament scheme from 1936 on that delivered some excellent weapons to the French Army and Armee de'l'Aire.

The major weakness was in the tactics and strategy of the French Army hoping conscription, elan, improvisation, and the Maginot Line would carry the day instead of mobile, combined-arms warfare (and a defense-in-depth strategy) against Germany.
Changing that would need butterflies back to the early 1930's where instead of refighting WW1 with more modern weapons, they bought into a more technocratic, mobile, combined-arms idea of warfare. If they had done so, organized their forces and trained appropriately, they'd have been able to confront Hitler in 1938 a lot more confidently.

 

[The Sandman]

IIRC, the French wouldn't need to send a sizable force to block the southern end of the Ardennes; they'd just need to commit a chunk of their air force to hitting the German columns transiting the forest. Narrow roads and long vulnerable columns of vehicles would turn the German panzer divisions into juicy targets.

 

[BlondieBC]

IIRC, the French wouldn't need to send a sizable force to block the southern end of the Ardennes; they'd just need to commit a chunk of their air force to hitting the German columns transiting the forest. Narrow roads and long vulnerable columns of vehicles would turn the German panzer divisions into juicy targets.

It took 3 days to cross the Meuse. The first day allied resistance was light. The second day was a max air effort by the Allies. 60% of the planes were lost. All a quicker reaction by by French Air forces does is change the day the back of the French Air Force is broken. To stop the German breakthrough really requires a tank corp, and the biggest counter attack the French could muster was battalion level. Even when they tried to attack with an armor divisions, they could not coordinate the attacks. The French lack things like radios in most of the tanks. Once April/May 1940 roles around, it is really to late for the French.

 

[BlondieBC]

Barring Marty Macfly coming back to Paris in 1938 with objective proof
that Hitler would NOT ever stop and French mobile-warfare doctrine sucked eggs, it would be very difficult for somebody to get the French to realize sitting behind the Maginot Line wouldn't work.

A POD I've flogged a bit is that official French participation in the Spanish Civil War would have been a nice laboratory for France to learn what works and doesn't in combined arms warfare. It was politically near impossible, even with leon Blum's Popular Front government.

Easier POD is Polish/Soviet war of 1919-1920. The French learned from the French front 1914-1918, where the trench warfare generally worked. De Gaulle knew it did not work because he saw the Russians break the Polish lines in the 1919-20 time frame. Move a couple of key French Generals to observers in the Polish/Soviet War, and have them learn the right lessons. Then the French can have the right combined arms tactics and counter attack the German armor thrust. I am not sure this gives you a win, but you come a lot closer, and it can be done with the right TL.

 

[Shaby]

Move a couple of key French Generals to observers in the Polish/Soviet War, and have them learn the right lessons. Then the French can have the right combined arms tactics and counter attack the German armor thrust. I am not sure this gives you a win, but you come a lot closer, and it can be done with the right TL.

Weygand was there in 1921, but he was not able to do a lot. Granted, he was put in command two weeks after the attack, but there was very little France learned. And I believe Weygand was one of the key French generals.

 

[euromellows]

Weygand was there in 1921, but he was not able to do a lot. Granted, he was put in command two weeks after the attack, but there was very little France learned. And I believe Weygand was one of the key French generals.

This is true. While Weygand was also conservative in the trench warfare style application of tactics, he is a vast improvement over Gamelin and may have made all the difference.

 

[BlondieBC]

Weygand was there in 1921, but he was not able to do a lot. Granted, he was put in command two weeks after the attack, but there was very little France learned. And I believe Weygand was one of the key French generals.

It has to be the right Generals, the ones making the decisions. And it can't be two weeks before the attack, two years would be closer to the time frame. These generals have to be high enough in rank to change French military policy and force structure. I am not familiar enough with French Generals to give you the right names, but let say the Chief of Staff believed in combined warfare and armor corps, and that De Gaulle was the commander of the 4 division French Armor corp. That may be enough, if they are in their positions by 1938.

 

[BlairWitch749]

They don't even have to have the troops standing on the meuse for a head on battle

they can just stand keep the mobile divisions were they were, and not leave for a lost advance to the Dyle

if they stay in place, they can easily launch a flank attack on the narrow german spearhead, and due to their numerical strength would have some chance of cutting them off or stopping them

 

[BlondieBC]

They don't even have to have the troops standing on the meuse for a head on battle

they can just stand keep the mobile divisions were they were, and not leave for a lost advance to the Dyle

if they stay in place, they can easily launch a flank attack on the narrow german spearhead, and due to their numerical strength would have some chance of cutting them off or stopping them

They did launch a counter attack in OTL. DeGaulle did a division size attack, but because of poor command and control, the attack was one battalion at a time in an uncoordinated manner. It was the right plan with the right type of equipment, but the units were not properly trained and Command/Control issues existed. To fix this takes POD well before April 1940. The British also launched a counter attack with Armor that failed. A lot of the failure in France in 1940 belongs on the Generals shoulders for not adequately training their men for mobile warfare. And people can say WW1 was trench warfare, not mobile warfare, and this is true in France in 1915, 1916, and 1917. But it was not true in France in 1914 or 1918 or the other fronts.

 

[Snake Featherston]

One thing that paradoxically might change this is to avoid the incident where the Anglo-French powers captured the German operational plan intended before Sickle-Slice. It gives them more flexibility in all the right ways that would be just sufficient to tilt that narrow margin of success attained IOTL assuming Sickle-Slice still appears as a concept, to ensure that 1940 sees the Nazi war machine screech to a halt.

 

[Snake Featherston]

It took 3 days to cross the Meuse. The first day allied resistance was light. The second day was a max air effort by the Allies. 60% of the planes were lost. All a quicker reaction by by French Air forces does is change the day the back of the French Air Force is broken. To stop the German breakthrough really requires a tank corp, and the biggest counter attack the French could muster was battalion level. Even when they tried to attack with an armor divisions, they could not coordinate the attacks. The French lack things like radios in most of the tanks. Once April/May 1940 roles around, it is really to late for the French.

Not really. What needs to change is for them to alter their perception of what the Germans do to create a nasty surprise for the Germans. If there's no Orders 191-style incident with the German plans, then the French may wake up 24 hours sooner to the reality of the German strike through the Ardennes. They send just a little more artillery and armor there and the margin that IOTL was extremely narrow no longer exists. Without that margin Sickle-Slice becomes "LOL Dumbasses".

 

[Snake Featherston]

It has to be the right Generals, the ones making the decisions. And it can't be two weeks before the attack, two years would be closer to the time frame. These generals have to be high enough in rank to change French military policy and force structure. I am not familiar enough with French Generals to give you the right names, but let say the Chief of Staff believed in combined warfare and armor corps, and that De Gaulle was the commander of the 4 division French Armor corp. That may be enough, if they are in their positions by 1938.

Again, not really. All that needs to change is for the French to be more uncertain about what the Germans are doing. They may, in fact, mistake Sickle-Slice for a desperate gamble to end-run them and think sending a few more ground troops doesn't have a decisive margin and unknown to them actually wind up wrecking the German offensive before it fairly gets started. The actual OTL 1940 success was touch and go with only a small number of French reinforcements required to turn it into an all-the-way defeat.

 

[Karelian]

This is true. While Weygand was also conservative in the trench warfare style application of tactics, he is a vast improvement over Gamelin and may have made all the difference.

Not only did Weygand advocate combined armored counterattack to relieve encircled Allied armies from Dunkirk Pocket, his staff also sought to devise way to counter German tactics:

"The leaders should act as an example and the chain of command had to be reorganized so that the operational commanders could be able to react to the changing situation in time and so that the common soldiers could be kept aware of the general situation in order to counter rumours and panic. The remaining tanks of the French army should be reorganized into two armored units that should be used to operational counterattacks against the flanks of the possible German armored offensives immediately after they had been able to achieve a breakthrough. Strong field fortifications and resistance centers with supply storages and well-camouflaged positions should be set up in depth along the main roads and the most likely routes of attack, and they should be protected by extensive minefields that would allow them to fight on even when encircled. "

Naturally French army lacked forces, training and equipment to do this after fall of northern France, but put Weygand in charge earlier and make him send Corps de Cavalerie against the actual German spearhead in Ardennes and I'd say you'll end up with pretty different results. I'd still say that inferiour airforces would doom France to eventual defeat unless they can hold on until Lend-Lease from US manages to ease the situation enough.

 

[merlin]

What could have been done, in the Ardenne - would be teams of 'Combat Engineers' if there such a thing at that time. Who would fell trees, to block the paths, plant mines at 'choke points', and added booby traps to sow confusion and delay.
It wouldn't need high numbers, just people who knew what they were doing and who could swing an axe!

 

[Snake Featherston]

What could have been done, in the Ardenne - would be teams of 'Combat Engineers' if there such a thing at that time. Who would fell trees, to block the paths, plant mines at 'choke points', and added booby traps to sow confusion and delay.
It wouldn't need high numbers, just people who knew what they were doing and who could swing an axe!

Or even better use some of that artillery in just the right places on just the right rivers and shell the German crossing to the point that it fails, the river runs red with German blood and the USSR gets to be the big winner of Mr. Hitler's war.

 

[Julian]

As you said I think the best plan is to have the plans simply not fall into Allied hands. If Germany goes through with its truncated plan then it'll run headfirst into the majority of Allied forces and will simply bog down in Belgijm and northern France.

 

[TxCoatl1970]

My deux centimes

To me, moving a unit or two to block the Germans in the Ardennes is nice, but not a show-stopper IMO. Some sappers that could mine and block roads would be nice, but so would artillery, and maybe better CAS from Armee de'l Aire to call the Wehrmacht's bluff.

I hear y'all bringing up Weygand as a better overall French theater commander and De Gaulle as having a tactical clue to go with their better ability to resist but IMO, the French Army's problem was that combined-arms doctrine, tactical and strategic coordination, mobile defense-in-depth thus and ability to counter-attack) was for merde b/c of piss-poor preparation for the Ardennes attack.

As mentioned before, they were prepared for Von Schlieffen Plan part II through the Low Countries.
The French had courage and ability to improvise under pressure and plenty of gear, but no good plan everyone got and executed until it was too late.