WI: An escalated Vietnam War

So even if theres further escalation in Vietnam it can backfire even worse?
I wonder what kinda impact it'll have on hawks in US politics.
 
So even if theres further escalation in Vietnam it can backfire even worse?
I wonder what kinda impact it'll have on hawks in US politics.

One widely accepted analysis puts the United States as having gone through a dolchstoßlegende, or "stab in the back myth," where the Military Industrial complex and right wing nationalists/imperialists claimed that their military failure was in fact a failure of the civilian authorities. This is obviously a comparative reasoning with the much greater dolchstoßlegende that post-Imperial Germany went through.

One obvious way to take this forward, is that if the historical situation resulted in a lesser dolchstoßlegende and "crisis" in the culture of the right— then a 750000 / million men Vietnam with mobilisation, activation of reserves, Soviet panic, US investment until 1976 and the 1980 DRVN offensive uniting Vietnam, more bodies, a concerted and large bombing and riot campaign at home, a serious economic collapse ala the Soviet Union in the early 1980s that makes malaise look like the 1953 recession, open multi-divisional mutiny in Germany, open operational mutinies in Vietnam—then the crisis for the right will be that much greater.

A charismatic "uniter" like Reagan may not be available to recohere the right democratically. I would note that it took the German right 15 years to cohere a ruling coalition that recognised popular right wing discontent AND that the American political landscape with a million man Vietnam ending 1980 (US commitment 1976) is very different to Germany in 1917. For one, even in the dark days of 1973-1978, the US "left" had far more system supporting liberals than even the middle class geographic membership branches of the German SPD: the revolutionary threat which produced much of German extra-parliamentary right wing culture would not be the same.

If you want me to hazard a guess on the US "revolutionary" right, think of a more immediately "nationally" political charismatic religious revival, a revanchevist (for US Vietnam) "Returned Soldiers League," and better business council that wants PATCO and Detroit crushed with the National Guard.

What does the left look like? The blood in the gutters and hundreds of dead policemen at the 1972 Democratic "convention" combined with the Republican "southern" strategy have probably started a reconfiguration of the US Party system by 1976. While everyone thinks of the Weathermen's bar bombings, or the Coldfront splinter groups' execution campaigns into the early 1990s (largely to free RAF, BR and WeatherU/CF prisoners… failed), the day to day feminist and trade unionist work by groups like the US Maoist movements, or Radical Amerika, or the more social democratic sections of the US left had the greater lasting impact. With the 1968 mobilisation suddenly increasing the strength of organised labour, the next 14 years were a good time to organise for the Industrial left: labour shortage due to war, cultural radicalisation, hyperinflation causing "catch up" wage militant strikes, a state apparatus that was willing to put martyrs on the floor regularly, but no suspension of "normal democracy" like in the Civil War or even WWII's voluntary no strike pledges.

The guts, however, fell out of the left in 1976 when US "draw down" to "European priorities" became a reality, stripping much of the more conservative anti-war movement away from alliance with the left generally. This was exacerbated by the racial tensions in the left which exploded as the difficult to maintain links between working class black nationalists and organisations of predominantly white children of professional ex-University students broke down. Even for the Industrially oriented sections of the left, the gulf between the living world of unskilled black marginal workers, and "lifer" white rank and file activists stretched alliances to breaking point as white returned soldiers received (illegal) preference in industry leading to large scale lay offs in Detroit and Aerospace of black workers. Things only got worse in 1980 when for half of the "left" the job was finished, whereas for the rest of the left the job had only just begun. The internecine assassinations that had begun in 1974 by the armed sections of the movement had not helped left unity any either.

The US economy is a basket case, compared to the United Kingdom whose Unions were crushed during the late 1970s during the "red winter" of the West. With a broken backed Democratic party, and a Republican Party composed of hostile fights between revanchevists, faith healers, and "Thatcherites" over what course for the right it is only the deep pockets of the rich, and the depth of suffering of the poor, that keeps America from the edge of collapse situation that its wrestling partner, the Soviet Union is in. For those unconcerned with domestic society, but only concerned with international politics, the question is which wrestler shall strangle himself first? Most seem to think the United States [but as we in OTL know, they'd be wrong].

yours,
Sam R.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Okay, but given the inability of the USAF to

Hell, even earlier than that - like 1961/1962 - the USAF brass was saying that the United States should figure out what it wanted to achieve in Vietnam, and what they were willing to do to achieve it. If they wanted to win, they should do it quickly and comprehensively - if they weren't willing to do that, they'd get drawn into a quagmire.

The US never did figure out what the objective was, never committed enough force at the times when it was winnable, and got well and truly entangled.

Essentially, the problem was that in the early days, the North Vietnamese were directly supporting the Viet Cong. Air strikes against North Vietnam and normal counterinsurgency in South Vietnam could have won the war quite quickly. Doing so was, however, diplomatically and politically impossible.

That era was over by about 1964. From 1964-1967 or so, the Viet Cong became gradually more self-sufficient. The war remained winnable by the US & RVN, but at increasing cost - cutting the Viet Cong off from the North wouldn't do it, they had to be defeated in the field.

By 1967, 1968 at the absolute latest, the government of South Vietnam had lost control of the country to the Viet Cong. The United States was in a similar situation to, oh, Germany in 1942 - they'd lost the war, but hadn't got the memo yet.

If you really, really want the US to win in Vietnam, let the USAF off their leash in 1961 or so. At that date, there were half a dozen targets that would leave the North incapable of supporting the insurgency in the South. Hit them, and the South can wrap it up with minimal US ground troops. As an added bonus, the continuing show of force against Communism means no perceived US weakness, so no Operation ANADYR and resultant Cuban Missile Crisis.

Okay, but given the inability of the USAF to achieve the same in 1950-53 agianst a comparable enemy in even more open country, one can presume the USAF's ability to deliver a victory in a light infantry-centered insurgency would be rather suspect.

Gavin and Shoup, both being infantry specialists, seem rather more on point.

Best,
 
So even if theres further escalation in Vietnam it can backfire even worse?
I wonder what kinda impact it'll have on hawks in US politics.

How can it backfire worse? It turned a major U.S. party that owned Congress until 1994 into a for the most part anti-war party, with only short term changes from that status quo after a group or country really pisses off the US.

Honestly there is nothing that JFK and Johnson could have done stupider then what they did OTL other then spark WW3 which would have been harder then they thought it would be at least over Vietnam.
 
the inability of the USAF to achieve the same in 1950-53 agianst a comparable enemy in even more open country

One thing the 1950-3 campaign did manage to do was deindustrialise the DPRK. I can see three problems: 1) Soviet anti-air capacity has improved and will only continue to improve during the period. 2) The DRVN isn't industrialised. 3) The early period of the war is exactly the period when the DRVN has excess manpower capacity to respond to the social crises that a horrific man made famine caused by aerial bombardment would cause (consider the landlord campaign here, discontent swayed the party, armed resistance didn't change the state).

yours,
Sam R.
 

Some very interesting ideas here. And I'd never seen the "stab in the back" parallels before.

Both the US and the USSR collapsing in the 80s would be hilarious, though I must say, I doubt a full political collapse is a likely outcome of losing Vietnam even worse.

fasquardon
 
Some very interesting ideas here. And I'd never seen the "stab in the back" parallels before.

Both the US and the USSR collapsing in the 80s would be hilarious, though I must say, I doubt a full political collapse is a likely outcome of losing Vietnam even worse.

Thanks for that. I tend to think with a 20-30 year rule in mind, but I'm willing to stretch for a conclusion of Million man Viet nam America:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989/90 the 1992 election cycle is suspended by General C— P—*, supported by revanchist soldiers, unemployed white munitions workers, part of the Radical Christian movement who think he'll ban abortion, feminism and homosexuality, and most importantly very upset capitalists who want an end to the radicals, the unions, and the New Democratic Labour-Farmer party countrywide before it solidifies into a party system pole of attraction. C— P— calls his coup "Operation Homeland Storm," an extension of his organisational work (Homeland Shield, a preparedness exercise) in the 1980s through-out REFORGER and US forces Germany (the core of the coup's forces, fearing unemployment). Homeland Storm is relatively, relatively, restrained. P— jokes affably on tv, "You won't need Weathermen any more, the drought is over, America, Our Republic will be great again." There is little strange fruit, and C— P— seems to earnestly want to restore The Republic, if not democracy. Less of a fascist, more of a silver plated tinpot dictator.

* I've chosen these initials because the historical Colin Powell appears to have been a soft-rightist with a deep insight into Vietnam and an aching pain over it. If Million man Viet nam is the same pains amplified, then we can imagine an amplification of the tendencies that gave us Colin Powell into a C— P—.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Put it this way

One thing the 1950-3 campaign did manage to do was deindustrialise the DPRK. I can see three problems: 1) Soviet anti-air capacity has improved and will only continue to improve during the period. 2) The DRVN isn't industrialised. 3) The early period of the war is exactly the period when the DRVN has excess manpower capacity to respond to the social crises that a horrific man made famine caused by aerial bombardment would cause (consider the landlord campaign here, discontent swayed the party, armed resistance didn't change the state).

yours,
Sam R.

Put it this way; after umpteen years of victory through air power bilge, the idea that an insurgency in mixed triple canopy mountains and coastal plain was going to be defeated absent an infantry battalion in every ville seems unlikely.

Best,
 
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In theory, if the US wanted, she could have defeated Vietnam easily. An answer sprung to my mind: nuke. There is at least 2 (two) occasions where nukes (not the biggie-type like in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, but nuke is still nuke) were almost deployed. The first was in 1954 in Dien Bien Phu, USA wanted to lift off the surrounding Viet Minh troops. The second time was in 1968 in order to relief the besieged Khe Sanh base.

But, as history sees it, no nuke was used.

Hence, what else can American do? Step up the bombing, probably indiscriminately, they had already done it anyway. Send B-52 in like a hail storm - rumors say that Operation Linebacker II with massive attack of B-52 happened due to "silent agreement" (?) between China and USA (that China won't intervene - citation unconfirmed). Note that the then-leader of (North) Vietnam was Le Duan, a real nationalist. He was hawkish enough to say "no" to Chinese aids when he smelled something shitty. In other word, the chance for China to intervene (in 60s) is fairly - unless you completely wipe out the entire effing VPA in the North.

Follow up a massive attack (probably non-stop), an amphibious landing should take place at 3 locations: Hai Phong (the main harbor of then-(North) Vietnam), Vinh (the "thinnest" width of Vietnam land) and Thanh Hoa (between these 2 locations). These areas are on flat ground, hence armored forced can be deployed in great number.

The catch is that you must overwhelm (and prepare to kill) the entire region. The Vietnamese simply desired unification (and drive out the American) enough to fight to the last. In other word, you must deployed at least 3 combat divisions to stand some chances on the ground (3-to-1 ration of attack-to-defence), 5 or 6 (equivalent to 2 army corps) in order to fully secure the land against any guerilla-type operation of local citizen and the remain of VPA.

And that assumes that China had not interest (and/or unable) to intervene. Not sure about USSR, but it's highly likely that a lot of Spetnaz can be deployed

 
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