WI an Allied attack on Soviet Union in 1940?

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Unlike many people seem to believe, I think the USSR would try to avoid an escalation of war with the Western Allies if at all possible. Stalin would condemn the Allied attacks in harsh tones, but work behind the scenes to de-escalate. Stalin's OTL reaction to the possibility of Allied intervention in the Winter War supports this idea: in the event, he chose to wrap up the war with the Finns early (and with very small gains) just to avoid war with the British and the French. So Stalin's OTL reaction to the threat of Allied attacks against the USSR show that he was far less gung-ho about allying with Hitler against the Anglo-French than gets argued also on this forum. In fact it seems that the prospect did not appeal to him at all. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a marriage of convenience, a cynical, temporary arrangement by two geopolitical gamblers, not a long-term alliance in the making. Both sides knew that the other is not to be trusted.

There is also very little the USSR can do to the Allies directly in 1940 and 1941 - there is no real way to hit back. And then being at the receiving end of an attack by a "grand alliance" of capitalist states was the biggest nightmare Stalin had. War against the Western Allies was not in his interest. Especially when (not if) the Nazis attack the USSR in 1941, Stalin would end all lingering hostilities with the West to try to find common ground against Germany.
 
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Unlike many people seem to believe, I think the USSR would try to avoid an escalation of war with the Western Allies if at all possible. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a marriage of convenience, a cynical, temporary arrangement by two geopolitical gamblers, not a long-term alliance in the making.

There is also very little the USSR can do to the Allies directly in 1940 and 1941 - there is no real way to hit back.

agree with you on Soviet (Stalin) intentions but if Baku was struck (leaving aside how effective that would be) do not think they would let that lie?

too much of a sign of weakness, even if just to the Germans? the Abadan Refinery was considered British Achilles' Heal (if a bit hyperbole, but it was important) doubt that was lost on Stalin?
 

raharris1973

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agree with you on Soviet (Stalin) intentions but if Baku was struck (leaving aside how effective that would be) do not think they would let that lie?

too much of a sign of weakness, even if just to the Germans? the Abadan Refinery was considered British Achilles' Heal (if a bit hyperbole, but it was important) doubt that was lost on Stalin?

Could this whole Allied-Soviet fight be a farce of attempted bombings of each other's oilfields, without actually doing much damage? Or would clashes between ground forces in the Middle East become likely?
 
Could this whole Allied-Soviet fight be a farce of attempted bombings of each other's oilfields, without actually doing much damage? Or would clashes between ground forces in the Middle East become likely?
The British were unlikely to make any move on Baku or any ground attack. They were stretched out as it was. The only thing that changes this is if the Soviets make noises towards India or Iraq. And the Red Army of 1940 (outside the far less impacted Far Eastern and TransBaikal Fronts) was in no condition for offensive warfare against anyone with a real army. They would not motorize until 1943 (with US aid) and the command structure was a mess.
 
agree with you on Soviet (Stalin) intentions but if Baku was struck (leaving aside how effective that would be) do not think they would let that lie?

too much of a sign of weakness, even if just to the Germans? the Abadan Refinery was considered British Achilles' Heal (if a bit hyperbole, but it was important) doubt that was lost on Stalin?

IOTL Stalin was ready to look weak vis-a-vis Finland to avoid a war with the British and the French. That should tell us something.

But let's say that Stalin would want to do a tit-for-tat attack against the Abadan refinery to avenge an Allied bombing against Baku. Would the USSR have the assets in mid-1940 to pull off such an attack, and be successful in it? According to a pre-Winter War OOB, it appears that the units that would have to carry out this attack would have been the 3rd Aviation Brigade in Rostov-on-Don/Novocherkassk and the 7th Aviation Brigade in Zaporozhia, together with four bomber regiments. The planes to be used would likely be DB-3 bombers. Are there suitable "forward air fields" to be used in the Transcaucasus Military District to help shorten the distance to the target?

The Soviet long-range aviation was in a state of organizational limbo after the Winter War IOTL due to the poor performance against Finland, though. Their accuracy and success against Finnish targets in 1939-40 left something to be desired. And this was the Soviet bombers operating at lot shorter ranges than an attack against Abadan would mean. How ready and capable would the Soviets here be for long-range bombing attacks against Allied targets? IOTL in August 1941 the Soviets would prove they can bomb Berlin by flying out of the Estonian SSR with DB-3 bombers. The success of these raids was very limited, though. The distance from the Azerbaijan SSR to Abadan would be roughly in the same ballpark, I believe.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
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IOTL Stalin was ready to look weak vis-a-vis Finland to avoid a war with the British and the French. That should tell us something.

But let's say that Stalin would want to do a tit-for-tat attack against the Abadan refinery to avenge an Allied bombing against Baku. Would the USSR have the assets in mid-1940 to pull off such an attack, and be successful in it? According to a pre-Winter War OOB, it appears that the units that would have to carry out this attack would have been the 3rd Aviation Brigade in Rostov-on-Don/Novocherkassk and the 7th Aviation Brigade in Zaporozhia, together with four bomber regiments. The planes to be used would likely be DB-3 bombers. Are there suitable "forward air fields" to be used in the Transcaucasus Military District to help shorten the distance to the target?

The Soviet long-range aviation was in a state of organizational limbo after the Winter War IOTL due to the poor performance against Finland, though. Their accuracy and success against Finnish targets in 1939-40 left something to be desired. And this was the Soviet bombers operating at lot shorter ranges than an attack against Abadan would mean. How ready and capable would the Soviets here be for long-range bombing attacks against Allied targets? IOTL in August 1941 the Soviets would prove they can bomb Berlin by flying out of the Estonian SSR with DB-3 bombers. The success of these raids was very limited, though. The distance from the Azerbaijan SSR to Abadan would be roughly in the same ballpark, I believe.

Maybe Kirkuk in Iraq as target - much shorter flight?
 
The British were unlikely to make any move on Baku or any ground attack. They were stretched out as it was. The only thing that changes this is if the Soviets make noises towards India or Iraq. And the Red Army of 1940 (outside the far less impacted Far Eastern and TransBaikal Fronts) was in no condition for offensive warfare against anyone with a real army. They would not motorize until 1943 (with US aid) and the command structure was a mess.

Well, in 1936 they had 4 mechanized corps, 6 separate mechanized brigades, 6 separate tank regiments, 15 mechanized regiments within cavalry divisions and numerous tank battalions and companies. In 1940 they had 9 mechanized corps units with 20 more being formed. As for “motorization”, if you are talking strictly about the trucks, 1st, even in 1941 German army was not highly “motorized” and widely used a horse power (which did nor prevent it from being quite successful) and 2nd, even in 1937 the SU produced more than 200,000 trucks which made it the world’s 2nd truck producer. What you are seemingly confused with is an ability to produce the big numbers of trucks during the war simultaneously with the massive tank production: by 1943 the SU was running out of the pre-war trucks and those supplied by the US allowed to continue concentration on the tank production.

As for the command structure, yes, in July of 1940 the Soviets went back to restoring the old system of the mechanized corps units so there were few messy months but it seems that the first 9 corps (each with 900 - 1000 tanks) had been assembled reasonably fast. Not sure if this would be of any serious importance on the Middle Eastern theater where the Brits did not have any big mechanized units in 1940. Not that at that time the Allies demonstrated any miracles with their armor (or in general) so I would be careful about the “real army” thingy. :)

What is important is that at this time the Middle East was a powder keg and the Brits had limited forces there so even a limited intervention of a foreign force could ignite something much more serious than Anglo-Iraq war of 1941.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Well, in 1936 they had 4 mechanized corps, 6 separate mechanized brigades, 6 separate tank regiments, 15 mechanized regiments within cavalry divisions and numerous tank battalions and companies. In 1940 they had 9 mechanized corps units with 20 more being formed.
They had gone through a massive reorganization that was still ongoing after the official position that 'Deep Battle' doctrine wasn't in political favor anymore in 1939 and in the wake of experience gained in Poland, then they reorganized right after the lessons learned from the German victory in France, which mean the MC only showed up again on paper in late 1940. They were only starting to get close to TOE by June 1941, but weren't really even ready to fight then, while even at TOE they were woefully short of truck support to make them function well in combat, a lesson the Germans learned the hard way in 1940, which in part was the reason for the 1941 Panzer division remodel that halved the number of tanks per division while maintaining the same number of trucks. The Soviets too learned the hard way in 1941 and remodeled their tank divisions/corps later in a very similar way to what the Germans did after 1940.

As for “motorization”, if you are talking strictly about the trucks, 1st, even in 1941 German army was not highly “motorized” and widely used a horse power (which did nor prevent it from being quite successful)
You are conflating quite a few things there. Horse supply was a small fraction of what the overall lift capacity of the German army in 1941, because it took a lot of horses to equal the capacity of one truck, while having a bunch more limitations on how much rest, food, and medical care they needed. So horses were limited to very specific roles within the 1941 invasion force, namely supply/weapon haulage for foot infantry divisions. The fully motorized infantry and panzer divisions did not have horses and were much more mobile, which of course led to a lot of problems of them outrunning the foot infantry divisions in 1941, while horse die off during the campaign caused quite a few other problems.

and 2nd, even in 1937 the SU produced more than 200,000 trucks which made it the world’s 2nd truck producer.
Source on that. I think that number was entirely for all automobiles of all types, not just trucks. Plus a lot of them were required for industry/commercial use.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_Soviet_Union#Early_Soviet_period
Yeah looks like 1938 was the year and it referred to all motor vehicle production that year, not just trucks. Plus there was a major downturn in motor vehicle production after that, so production in 1940 was lower than in 1937.

What you are seemingly confused with is an ability to produce the big numbers of trucks during the war simultaneously with the massive tank production: by 1943 the SU was running out of the pre-war trucks and those supplied by the US allowed to continue concentration on the tank production.
This is true, the question is what could the Soviet industry actually produce, especially if the British effectively do put Baku out of commission, as by 1940 it alone accounted for about 60-70% of Soviet oil production.

As for the command structure, yes, in July of 1940 the Soviets went back to restoring the old system of the mechanized corps units so there were few messy months but it seems that the first 9 corps (each with 900 - 1000 tanks) had been assembled reasonably fast. Not sure if this would be of any serious importance on the Middle Eastern theater where the Brits did not have any big mechanized units in 1940. Not that at that time the Allies demonstrated any miracles with their armor (or in general) so I would be careful about the “real army” thingy.
That structure wasn't even ready in 1941. They only just started after France fell and they realized their mistake of disbanding the mechanized divisions of 1939. Quickly assembly of units on paper doesn't tell us anything about their ability to operate. They won't really be operational to use in the Middle East for quite some time. They could of course focus on getting 1-2 ready ASAP and forget the rest, but honestly given the terrain and Soviet affinity for cavalry, they'd just use cavalry as their fast exploitation units as in WW1 in the region. It seems based on WW1 history of the Caucasus/Persian/East Turkey campaigns that cavalry were extremely useful and effective in the area and probably would be more so especially early on until supply routes are secured to flatter terrain and mechanized units could actually operate in terrain that was more conducive to their operation. Frankly I think the British and French would have a LOT more to worry about from masses of Soviet cavalry, which they could and did use effectively IOTL. An early version of the cavalry-mechanized group seems quite likely and would probably be very effective in the region. The Allies IMHO would have been foolish to poke the Russian bear in 1940, as they'd likely lose the resulting ground confrontation in the region.
 
They had gone through a massive reorganization that was still ongoing after the official position that 'Deep Battle' doctrine wasn't in political favor anymore in 1939 and in the wake of experience gained in Poland, then they reorganized right after the lessons learned from the German victory in France, which mean the MC only showed up again on paper in late 1940. They were only starting to get close to TOE by June 1941, but weren't really even ready to fight then, while even at TOE they were woefully short of truck support to make them function well in combat, a lesson the Germans learned the hard way in 1940, which in part was the reason for the 1941 Panzer division remodel that halved the number of tanks per division while maintaining the same number of trucks. The Soviets too learned the hard way in 1941 and remodeled their tank divisions/corps later in a very similar way to what the Germans did after 1940.


You are conflating quite a few things there. Horse supply was a small fraction of what the overall lift capacity of the German army in 1941, because it took a lot of horses to equal the capacity of one truck, while having a bunch more limitations on how much rest, food, and medical care they needed. So horses were limited to very specific roles within the 1941 invasion force, namely supply/weapon haulage for foot infantry divisions. The fully motorized infantry and panzer divisions did not have horses and were much more mobile, which of course led to a lot of problems of them outrunning the foot infantry divisions in 1941, while horse die off during the campaign caused quite a few other problems.


Source on that. I think that number was entirely for all automobiles of all types, not just trucks. Plus a lot of them were required for industry/commercial use.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_Soviet_Union#Early_Soviet_period
Yeah looks like 1938 was the year and it referred to all motor vehicle production that year, not just trucks. Plus there was a major downturn in motor vehicle production after that, so production in 1940 was lower than in 1937.


This is true, the question is what could the Soviet industry actually produce, especially if the British effectively do put Baku out of commission, as by 1940 it alone accounted for about 60-70% of Soviet oil production.


That structure wasn't even ready in 1941. They only just started after France fell and they realized their mistake of disbanding the mechanized divisions of 1939. Quickly assembly of units on paper doesn't tell us anything about their ability to operate. They won't really be operational to use in the Middle East for quite some time. They could of course focus on getting 1-2 ready ASAP and forget the rest, but honestly given the terrain and Soviet affinity for cavalry, they'd just use cavalry as their fast exploitation units as in WW1 in the region. It seems based on WW1 history of the Caucasus/Persian/East Turkey campaigns that cavalry were extremely useful and effective in the area and probably would be more so especially early on until supply routes are secured to flatter terrain and mechanized units could actually operate in terrain that was more conducive to their operation. Frankly I think the British and French would have a LOT more to worry about from masses of Soviet cavalry, which they could and did use effectively IOTL. An early version of the cavalry-mechanized group seems quite likely and would probably be very effective in the region. The Allies IMHO would have been foolish to poke the Russian bear in 1940, as they'd likely lose the resulting ground confrontation in the region.

Well, it seems that we agree upon the final conclusion so there are just a couple things to make clear:

The Soviet car production of the 1930s almost exclusively amounted to the trucks.

Within Soviet system it was quite easy to mobilize a disproportionally big percentage of vehicles for the military needs, if it was necessary.

While the Red Army circa 1940 was in a messy state, it was not messy enough to make it inoperational, especially taking into an account that at this time the Brits and French did not have big forces in the Middle East. In 1941 “war” in Iraq was a shoestring operation with the Brits having, IIRC, one division and two brigades with a very few planes (judging by the photos, some of them biplanes).

Of course, the Soviets would have some logistical problems but in OTL they occupied a big part of Iran quite effectively.

Putting Baku oil production out of commission sounds reasonable but this could be easier to say than to do, especially if the Soviets has a decent AA defenses (they started developments in that area almost immediately after the RCW). You need a lot of bombers to destroy a reasonably big area and, IIRC, later experience of Ploeshty with a bigger force that could be available in 1940 was not quite encouraging in that regard.

By 1940 Franco-British situation was hardly encouraging creation of one more powerful enemy, especially over the issue which was not of a critical importance for the allies.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, it seems that we agree upon the final conclusion so there are just a couple things to make clear:

The Soviet car production of the 1930s almost exclusively amounted to the trucks.
No, though mostly trucks, car production was increasing by huge amounts:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_Soviet_Union#Early_Soviet_period
Between 1932 and 1939 the amount of car production in the Soviet Union increased up to 844,6%.[10]

It also seems the source for the 1937 production number claim and claim about truck production came from a CIA report, which were generally not considered that accurate until they could be cross checked against information that came out after the USSR fell. CIA estimates of actual Soviet production were not particularly accurate it turned out.

Within Soviet system it was quite easy to mobilize a disproportionally big percentage of vehicles for the military needs, if it was necessary.
Sure, but at cost to the economy.

While the Red Army circa 1940 was in a messy state, it was not messy enough to make it inoperational, especially taking into an account that at this time the Brits and French did not have big forces in the Middle East. In 1941 “war” in Iraq was a shoestring operation with the Brits having, IIRC, one division and two brigades with a very few planes (judging by the photos, some of them biplanes).
Entirely inoperable? No of course not. But for the large mechanized units it effectively was, though they could probably be used piecemeal as in OTL 1941.
That said the Allied forces in the Middle East were probably even worse off given the focus on Europe.

Of course, the Soviets would have some logistical problems but in OTL they occupied a big part of Iran quite effectively.
Against no resistance. The Iranian army isn't going to let them waltz in per OTL and they'd have Allies support.

Putting Baku oil production out of commission sounds reasonable but this could be easier to say than to do, especially if the Soviets has a decent AA defenses (they started developments in that area almost immediately after the RCW). You need a lot of bombers to destroy a reasonably big area and, IIRC, later experience of Ploeshty with a bigger force that could be available in 1940 was not quite encouraging in that regard.
Sure, but they didn't have any AAA defense, nor fighter defense. PVO defenders only were sent in 1942 as the Germans approached the Caucasus. The thing about the vulnerability of Baku is how polluted the area was with oil run off to the point that the soil was heavily soaked with it. It was effectively a tinderbox waiting for a match. Ploesti was vastly more modern and the target wasn't the fields themselves, but rather the refineries and rail yards bringing the oil out. And again Baku was not defended by the level of forces defending Romanian oil production; the defenses in 1942 around Ploesti were some of the most dense in the world and probably only comparable to the Ruhr, Berlin, Moscow, and Leningrad. Building up that on the fly in Baku would take a long time, especially considering the Soviets were only just starting to experiment with radar and were behind even the Japanese.

By 1940 Franco-British situation was hardly encouraging creation of one more powerful enemy, especially over the issue which was not of a critical importance for the allies.
Which is why they didn't do it IOTL before the German invasion of France. Maybe in the long run they'd try it if they contained the German advance in the Lowlands and thought they could get away with sending forces to the Middle East to cut off German oil supplies. They probably could once all the US aircraft orders started to bear fruit in 1941.
 
No, though mostly trucks, car production was increasing by huge amounts:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_Soviet_Union#Early_Soviet_period

It also seems the source for the 1937 production number claim and claim about truck production came from a CIA report, which were generally not considered that accurate until they could be cross checked against information that came out after the USSR fell. CIA estimates of actual Soviet production were not particularly accurate it turned out.

To quote from that link:
"In 1937, the Soviet Union produced over 200,000 vehicles, mostly trucks, putting the country in second place worldwide by production of trucks."

CIA aside, here are the numbers from Russian Wiki: in 1940 Soviets produced the total of 145,400 vehicles out of which only 5,500 passenger cars (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Автомобильная_промышленность_СССР#История). As I said, almost exclusively trucks.

That said the Allied forces in the Middle East were probably even worse off given the focus on Europe.

That's the whole point!

Regarding AA defenses of Baku, "В 1937 году для охраны Москвы, Ленинграда и Баку были созданы корпуса ПВО в составе которых имелись зенитные артиллерийские дивизии, зенитные прожекторные полки, полки ВНОС, полки аэростатов заграждения и пулеметные полки."
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Войск...е_окончания_гражданской_войны_(1921—1940_гг.)

It says that special AA corps units had been created for defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku in 1937. These units included AA artillery divisions, searchlight regiments, regiments of the AA baloons, and regiments of the AA machine guns. Aviation was attached to these units on operational basis.

In April - May of 1940 aviation of Baku region got additional 3 fighter brigades and 9 fighter regiments, 2 middle range and 2 long range bomber brigades and then more regiments from other military districts with a number of planes raising from 243 in March to 1,023 by June 1st, 1940. Long-range bombing aviation in Azerbaijan amounted to 350 planes and there were 3 additional long-range bomber regiments stationed in Armenia.

Of course, this would not necessary prevent a successful bombardment and destruction of the city but by starting from May 1940 the allies had other problems and Ribbentrop in his letter to Stalin attributed safety of Baku to the German victories in Europe.

The funny thing is that the 1st person who proposed destruction of Baku was Lenin who ordered the head of the Oil Committee to prepare and publish plans for a complete destruction of the city in the case of disturbances. :teary:
 
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Deleted member 1487

To quote from that link:
"In 1937, the Soviet Union produced over 200,000 vehicles, mostly trucks, putting the country in second place worldwide by production of trucks."

CIA aside, here are the numbers from Russian Wiki: in 1940 Soviets produced the total of 145,400 vehicles out of which only 5,500 passenger cars (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Автомобильная_промышленность_СССР#История). As I said, almost exclusively trucks.
To be fair that second link did only say passenger cars, not other classes of vehicles like motor cycles or scout cars.
 
Sounds like a way to cripple the USSR before the war and all but force neutrality. That is, if Hitler doesn’t get the bright idea to invade them in 1941, deciding they’re totally fucked anyway and he might as well claim what’s “his.”

At that point, the USSR becomes a bloated version of France, occupied but fighting like hell. The Nazis go down to defeat, albeit later than April 1945.

This means that the US, who was doing the lion’s share of the fighting in the Pacific, can freely force a surrender from Japan, keep the CCP at bay, and likely we see a much more Americanized Asia with pockets of communism attempted (and if Vietnam is untenable, the US may decide, fuck it, the big boys are on our side and they won’t cause problems. Not having the CCP in charge of China would make a HUGE difference.)

In Europe, the rebuild will be insane. The Nazis fall later, and either Germany gets the bomb or no one does (I don’t see Truman pulling it out in Japan unless it’s to put a decisive stop to the whole war; the only possibility is that he nukes Hiroshima and waits for Japan to surrender, threatening a worse bomb on Germany. I know Japan’s considered a more acceptable place to drop a nuke, but the timing may be all wrong.) Also, the USSR will be less involved and won’t be trusted; Stalin May even be forced from power. The USSR won’t come out of this smelling like a rose, and the Cold War will probably be averted.
 
To be fair that second link did only say passenger cars, not other classes of vehicles like motor cycles or scout cars.

Well, it says "автомобилей всего" and, unless Russian language recently changed dramatically, the motorcycle never qualified as "автомобиль". AFAIK, there were no scout cars in the SU circa 1940 so nice try but no cigars. ;)
 
Taking into an account that in 1940 the SU was already neutral (aka, not at war with the UK and France), there was no need to enforce what was already there.

If there’s a strong chance Stalin joins forces with Hitler - and OTL it was a distinct possibility - there could be.
 
If there’s a strong chance Stalin joins forces with Hitler - and OTL it was a distinct possibility - there could be.

He did join the forces against Poland. Joining them against France or Britain was not a meaningful possibility (outside of the minds of allied leadership) due to a complete absence of any practical interest.
 
Given the incompetencies of 1940 Anglo-French strategic bombing forces compounded by the usual problems that these raids face, Pike likely does little, if any, actual damage so I don’t see how it will cripple the Soviets.

If the Soviets choose to respond by invading Iran, then that’ll be pretty easy for them. The Iranians resisted the Soviet invasion in ‘41 yet it still proved to be a relative walk despite the fact the whole thing was a hasty enterprise put together with secondary forces since, ya know, German invasion. Finland it would not be. If they invade Turkey, on the other hand, that’s a completely different ballgame.

Pushing on into Iraq is iffier, since their logistics would be pretty stretched.
 
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