WI: American Effort Solely Focused On Europe in World War II

Historically only 15% of the US war effort went to the Pacific; 85% went to Europe. Even if the US isn't fighting Japan, yet somehow declares war on Germany in December 1941, there really isn't any way to majorly accelerate the war. 1943 is probably still too early for a cross-channel invasion, which means alt-Overlord still takes place in 1944, which means the war only ends (at best) in February-March 1945.

The only real changes I can see is a larger force committed to the Mediterranean. Something like an additional Army in Italy - which still doesn't change much.
 
Historically only 15% of the US war effort went to the Pacific; 85% went to Europe. Even if the US isn't fighting Japan, yet somehow declares war on Germany in December 1941, there really isn't any way to majorly accelerate the war. 1943 is probably still too early for a cross-channel invasion, which means alt-Overlord still takes place in 1944, which means the war only ends (at best) in February-March 1945.

The only real changes I can see is a larger force committed to the Mediterranean. Something like an additional Army in Italy - which still doesn't change much.

Can pretty much agree with this EXCEPT With no need for landing craft in the Pacific there would be enough to have both Overlord and Dragoon happen at the same time like was originally planned (probably on the original May schedule or possibly April)
 
Historically only 15% of the US war effort went to the Pacific; 85% went to Europe. Even if the US isn't fighting Japan, yet somehow declares war on Germany in December 1941, there really isn't any way to majorly accelerate the war. 1943 is probably still too early for a cross-channel invasion, which means alt-Overlord still takes place in 1944, which means the war only ends (at best) in February-March 1945.

The only real changes I can see is a larger force committed to the Mediterranean. Something like an additional Army in Italy - which still doesn't change much.

Actually even as of December 1943 the US had roughly 50% of its military in the Pacific. Compared to Europe, the Pacific had more warships (713 vs 515) and men (1,873,023 vs 1,810,367), while the ETO had more aircraft (8,807 vs 7,857). The "15 percent" figure was just King et. al. clamoring for more attention to be brought against Japan and had no basis in reality.
 
Sorry about that, I had a brain fart combined with a poorly worded paragraph. By 'talking about 1943,' it should have been 'talking about the situation circa early 1943 in which the hypothetical D-Day landings occur while the Soviets were historically slugging it with the Germans on a temporarily stabilized front,' that is, before they got the ball rolling again after the failure of Zitadelle.

Regarding German redeployments, had the WAllies tried invading a year earlier I'm not entirely convinced the German response would have (or could have been) much greater than it was. Sending over several corps' worth over the course of weeks or months is one thing, but most German forces in the East were heavily engaged as it was and extricating large quantities of them simultaneously would compromise the front.

Even operating under the assumption that Hitler would abandon the Ostfront (an uncharacteristic decision knowing Hitler) in the event of a meltdown in France and send west, say, 50 divisions, if OKW wanted to have any chance at all of forming a coherent defense they would pretty much have to acknowledge surrendering everything west of the Rhine. Not sure if Hitler would go that far, more likely he would order another Falaise-style counterattack and get himself outmaneuvered again throwing men piecemeal into the grinder where they would be hopelessly outclassed by Allied mobility and firepower. Even allowing a German strength of over 100 divisions on the Rhine it would have been much more of a problem than it was in OTL, but even then once those fixed defenses are breached there would be literally nothing between the Allies and Berlin but a lot of flat, dry "tank country."

Oh, I don't dispute any of that: the Germans can only hope to slow the WAllies down to the same degree they did IOTL at best. My point is that even accelerating the OTL transfer of German forces from East-to-West by a year accelerates the Soviet advance in the East. There were a number of battles in 1943 which came awfully close to being Bagration-esque disasters for the Germans that they only managed to blunt and escape from by the intervention of forces that ITTL 1943 (and IOTL 1944) would no longer be available. The Das Reich example I gave above is one of many. Plus the advantages the Soviets get from being able to launch their '43 summer offensives in May-June rather then July-August.

Plus, if WAllied tank forces are cruising through Central Germany to Berlin (which will probably be the last big stumbling block for the WAllies before they reach the Oder) when the Soviets are reaching the Vistula, pretty much every German soldier in Poland is going to book it westward. Very few Germans want to be the one who dies trying to defend Polish soil. They'll put up more of a fight once they withdraw into Germany proper in Silesia and East Prussia, but with Poland in Soviet hands the defense of those regions are fatally undermined.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Medicus
Historically only 15% of the US war effort went to the Pacific; 85% went to Europe. Even if the US isn't fighting Japan, yet somehow declares war on Germany in December 1941, there really isn't any way to majorly accelerate the war. 1943 is probably still too early for a cross-channel invasion, which means alt-Overlord still takes place in 1944, which means the war only ends (at best) in February-March 1945.

The only real changes I can see is a larger force committed to the Mediterranean. Something like an additional Army in Italy - which still doesn't change much.


Actually even as of December 1943 the US had roughly 50% of its military in the Pacific. Compared to Europe, the Pacific had more warships (713 vs 515) and men (1,873,023 vs 1,810,367), while the ETO had more aircraft (8,807 vs 7,857). The "15 percent" figure was just King et. al. clamoring for more attention to be brought against Japan and had no basis in reality.

That 15% is more accurate for the last 18 months, & applies to the US only.

Add in the Brit effort in the Burma front 1942-43, the commitment to defend India, the support to China 1942-43 & the savings start adding up. Total Allied combat effort to the Asia/Pacific theatres in 42-43 was closer to 35%.

As I have pointed out before the largest & perhaps most important savings are in cargo shipping. Transit times to the S Pacific or Far East were nearly triple that to the ETO or MTO. Cargo ships used instead on the North or Central Atlantic runs vs the Pacific/Asian runs would deliver over twice the cargo per ship. This makes huge difference in what the Allies can do between mid 1942 & mid 1943 or later.
 
What if during World War II, the United States was solely at war with Nazi Germany and Italy and how no conflict against Japan at all during it?

Looking back at the OP there is a implication Japans industrial output may be available to the Allies. Even if Japan has only a cash purchase policy it still adds a few percent points to the overall allied effort. & again that contribution will be magnified in the early & mid war years before the US mobilization is fully spun up.
 
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