WI America went to war in 1937

No, its an ASB level of plausability.

Think about it. The USA in the 30's, not exactly pro-Japanese .
"Citizens, we know your sons have been dying in the Pacific because of our lack of preparation. So we are going to CUT the defence budget...."
Er, exactly how is this going to work again???

"We're cutting the budget so the Democrats will stop getting your sons killed."
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
I agree with Astrodragon. Say the US declares war on Japan for the Panay. How prepared do you think the Japanese are? The Pan-Asian Offensive of December 1941 was planned and prepared to the minute with a timetable tighter then my girlfriends butt. If it's someone else but the Japanese who starts the war Japan will be nowhere near as effective in the opening stages as OTL.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
While I will agree that the UNITED STATES was unready for a major war in 1937, especially in the case of the U.S. Army's ground formations (always the neglected child of Congress come budget time) there are several things here that are just plain wrong.

In 1937-38 the U.S. had, by far, the best carrier capable dive bomber (SB2U) and torpedo bomber (TBD) yet fielded Both aircraft were revolutions, monoplanes, almost all metal, fast and with decent range. Both the Vindicator and Devastator were faster than the IJN primary carrier fighter of the era the A4N and were nearly as fast as the A5M Claude. Even the biplane SBU was an excellent aircraft for the era and the SBC, while slower and of the old bi-plane format, was nearly 20 mph faster than the A4N, and a very sturdy design (something not to be ignored when even the best IJN fighter of the Era, the A5M, carried only 2 .30 cal machine guns) was very much the equal of and attack aircraft the IJN owned.

The IJN's BEST torpedo bomber of the era, the B4Y Jean was more than 30 mph slower the the TBD and the D1A dive bomber was close to 60 mph slower than the SB2U. Both were slower than the F2F-1 & F3F fighters that would have hunted them and (although I can't believe I am typing this) the just entering service F2A Buffalo would have feasted on the pre-war IJN designs.

The belief that IJN pilots of this era were better than their USN counterparts is also terribly flawed. USN pilots in the 1930's were the equal of any in the world, while fairly few in number (as was the case in every country in 1937) they had many hundreds, if not thousands of flight hours, were experience in operating all aircraft types (it wasn't until the war started that the USN started to allow pilots to specialize in types, and even then it was because of training needs, not a change if mindset). The JNAF pilots were not yet the highly veteran combat tested professionals that would fly off the Kido Butai's decks on December 7th, they were well trained, yes, intensely dedicated, but not a cut above their U.S. counterparts.

American carriers and carrier tactics were, simply put, the best in the world in 1937. This was more a function of the American policy of putting flight trained officers into command of carriers as much as anything else (the scandal that occurred just before Midway when Halsey recommended, and Nimitz placed, Ray Spruance (a CRUISER Officer :eek::eek:) in command of TF 16 is a reminder of this policy) along with the fact that the USN had the best set of aircraft then operating off flight decks.

The USN commander in the Pacific was very much of the old school, a big gun devotee like almost every senior naval officer on Earth, but he was not Admiral Bloch (who was a much better officer than you credit him), but Admiral Japy Hepburn. He may not have understood the power the carrier represented, (no one did except the carrier officers and pilots themselves) but he was a highly experienced and respected officer with a record that included command of USS West Virginia (during which the BB was awarded several commendations and awards, including target gunnery) as well as serving as Chief of Staff for Battle Force, Pacific, Commander, U.S. Fleet Submarine Forces AND Commander, Naval Intelligence. He was, after his term as CIC, U.S. Fleet, a primary author of the eponymous Hepburn Board which laid out the expansion plan of the USN that, well, won the war. In all he was an exceptionally qualified and remarkably adaptable, highly intelligent Naval officer.

Hepburn's IJN counterpart as Commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Osami Nagano, was a less experienced officer, with only a single ship command on his record, and a very long history of staff work (interestingly, he had undoubted met Heburn as he was a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1935 London Conference before Japan walked out in disgust). He was, as all IJN officers were, a devoted believer in "The Decisive Battle" and a devout believer in the strength of the battleship as arbiter of combat success at sea. He lacked Hepburn's breadth of experience, as well as his command and combat experience.

It is easy to overlook the fact that the IJN hit the U.S. when the Japanese Fleet was at virtually its greatest point of superiority over the USN (nothing wrong with that, indeed it is exactly when you should engage an enemy) with two brand new fleet carriers having entered service in the five months prior to Pearl Harbor (with Zuikaku joining the Kido Butai just weeks before the opening of hostilities), the Zero barely having completed its introduction and integration into the Fleet (several light carriers were still equipped with the A5M and B4Y both of which served until mid 1942) and the D3A had also been in the fleet for less than a year. The USN was, by comparison, at the bottom of it's equipment cycle (fun fact: Grumman had the ribbon cutting ceremony on the brand new factory it had constructed to build the TBF Avenger, by the time the cake had been served the U.S. was at war) with numerous new designs already ordered or beginning delivery. That was the situation in December of 1941, it was NOT the situation in 1937.

Any engagement between the IJN and USN in 1937 off, say, Midway or Wake would have been a far closer thing than indicated, with the chances for a USN victory being very good.


Well after the Phillipines fall and Guam and possibly Wake being next, the 1938 midterms will probably be rolling around and the Republicans would likely make large enough gains to get a majority in both houses.

With the Pacific Fleet reduced in strength, Japan's next logical move is to go after Midway. By now, Bloch has probably been sacked, so the Pacific Fleet would likely have a new commander along with being reinforced from the Altantic Fleet. It'd likely be Kimmel taking over I should think. Remember Nimitz is still just a Captain at this point, even if his star is on the rise.

So I'd suspect you'd see a force consisting of 3 carriers on Japan's part(assume the US will get at least one, and the light carriers never can keep up) against 3 on the US part(figure the US would have 2 in the theater at the opening of hostilities which were lost, so the other two, plus I'd imagine Langley would be brought back into service at this point) plus support ships which ratios would probably favor Japan.

Even on more or less even terms, I still think you'd see a Japanese victory here. Japan's planes and pilots were superior at this point. They would then assault the island, and given the unpopularity of the war, and the state of the US army at the time, you're likely only going to have a division or so defending the island, though they'll inflict heavy casualties on the attackers, the island will fall I should think.

By the point, the Republicans will probably be slashing the war budget in an effort to force Roosevelt to negotiate a peace. Figure on a Greater East Asia Co-Propserity Sphere Phillipines, Guam to Japan, Midway and Wake demilitarized, Japan gets perfered trade status instead of repirations and the US has to pledge not to interfere in China. Though I'd see Roosevelt continuing to do so, if under the table.

In regards to the Depression, the US was already on the climb back up, and a sudden, if brief, war boom would actually help out, even if it's along with the bitter taste of defeat. Certainly Roosevelt's going to be rebuilding the fleet for the remainder of his term.

This isn't going to affect Europe all too much I don't think. Germany still starts the European war in 1939, while Japan has the time and freedom to continue digesting China.

By the time 1940 rolls around, France has still fallen and Japan's still bogged down in China. In the US, I believe Wilkie's triumphant nomination for the GOP would be butterflied away by the Panay war, and Taft would get the nomination and win the Presidency in 1940. Interesting thing is, would Roosevelt even have the pluck to run for a 3rd term after this. Or would Garner or Wallace take a shot at it?

Hmm, this is actually getting somewhat interesting.
 
Guys

Calbear has a good bit more technical knowledge of the state of the US forces at the time but as he says the Japanese forces were nothing like the same level of equipment at the time. Also with the invasion of China proper having only just started they were more heavily involved than later on.

As such, even if the Japanese had won some early victories and even sunk much of the US Pacific fleet I can't see America giving up. It will want revenge and start producing the ships and a/c to achieve it. Furthermore some will realise the economic advantages of getting industry moving by a major expansion of military construction.

This also leaves apart the question of whether the other western powers would sit on the sidelines. They might do, already being worried by Hitler's actions. However their less isolationist than the US and also worried about Japan's expansion so you might see some support from Britain especially and possibly France and the Netherlands.

Even without this Japan is in a pretty much hopeless position. Unless it attacks the south colonies, which means war with an undefeated France and Britain and which it doesn't have the forces and bases for, it suffers very rapid stravation of oil, rubber and other vital economic and military supplies.

Steve
 
One of the main reasons Hitler pushed Germany into an earlier war than the strategists had planned, was because after Munich he concluded that US president Roosevelt was the main leader of the international Jewish conspiracy and thus America was the main threat to Germany. If there is no Roosevelt, and a more deeply isolationist American as a result of fighting with Japan, what will Hitler conclude about the need to rush to war ASAP? If Britain and France are more deeply involved in a war with Japan, how will this effect his policy visa vie Stalin? Would Britain and France commit so much to Eastern European protection, if they are already bogged down fighting in the far east?
 

Wolfpaw

Banned
One of the main reasons Hitler pushed Germany into an earlier war than the strategists had planned, was because after Munich he concluded that US president Roosevelt was the main leader of the international Jewish conspiracy and thus America was the main threat to Germany.

I've never heard this before. What's your source for this?
 
"We're cutting the budget so the Democrats will stop getting your sons killed."
No, its an ASB level of plausability.

Think about it. The USA in the 30's, not exactly pro-Japanese .
"Citizens, we know your sons have been dying in the Pacific because of our lack of preparation. So we are going to CUT the defence budget...."
Er, exactly how is this going to work again???
A politician would have to be politically retarded to even think about cuts especially during war.

Democrats thus respond with the "its a Republican stab in the back, spitting in the face, betrayal etc" message and hey presto, the Republicans get slaughtered in the next election.
 
One of the main reasons Hitler pushed Germany into an earlier war than the strategists had planned, was because after Munich he concluded that US president Roosevelt was the main leader of the international Jewish conspiracy and thus America was the main threat to Germany. If there is no Roosevelt, and a more deeply isolationist American as a result of fighting with Japan, what will Hitler conclude about the need to rush to war ASAP? If Britain and France are more deeply involved in a war with Japan, how will this effect his policy visa vie Stalin? Would Britain and France commit so much to Eastern European protection, if they are already bogged down fighting in the far east?

If Japan is fighting the USA, Britain and France without a European war, there isn't going to be any 'bogging down'. Japan will get steamrollered....
 
I only partly agree with the statement the USN carrier tactics were the "best in the world in 1937". They were quite good, but tyhe claim of being "the best" is a bit overexagurating. In many ways, the USN Carrier Doctrine still was to support the oldfashioned battleline and mainly scout for it, while offering some means of CAP for it, in case of airstrikes against it.

Although the experiments in the 30's showed quite clearly how usefull an independent carrierforce could be, it still was not accepted by the Navy as such, so a disaster like Pearl Harbor had to happen first, before such a thing could be evolved.

Japan on the other hand had done a simmilar thing, combining its fast carriers into foreward attackunits, with the mission primarily to scout ahead, while striking as good as possible against the main means of defense of the opponent, in case of the USN, the US Pacific Battlefleet of both carriers and battleships. As such, the IJN tactically outsmarted the USN, as it combined its carriers together, resulting in a larger strikegroup capacity, rather than the USN's normal single carrier taskgroups. In case of a hostile encounter, the IJN force could use its superiority in both numbers and strikingrange (IJN planes normally had longer ranges, compared to their USN equivalents) and pick of the USN carriers one by one, while being itself relatively save, being protected by a larger CAP and longer range.
 
If Japan is fighting the USA, Britain and France without a European war, there isn't going to be any 'bogging down'. Japan will get steamrollered....


Initially the IJN trashed the allied fleets in surface actions in the Pacific so there should be extensive allied naval loses. And that was against an allied fleet that had two years of combat experience along with ground forces. The Japanese did alright in the intial ground actions against the allies as well. I would expect the initial stages to reflect the historical events....Its really unlikely there would be any allied steam roller at least for a couple of years, since the allies would be even less ready for war by 1937 and they would not be ready for strategic offensive for a couple of years. Until then the Japanese should prevail.French and British strategic vision was mainly towards Europe at this time.
 

MrP

Banned
Initially the IJN trashed the allied fleets in surface actions in the Pacific so there should be extensive allied naval loses. And that was against an allied fleet that had two years of combat experience along with ground forces. The Japanese did alright in the intial ground actions against the allies as well. I would expect the initial stages to reflect the historical events....Its really unlikely there would be any allied steam roller at least for a couple of years, since none of the allies would be ready before then. Until then the Japanese should prevail.

Surely this supposes a similar scenario in technological terms as that found IOTL. Calbear's post suggests this isn't the case, doesn't it?
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Initially the IJN trashed the allied fleets in surface actions in the Pacific so there should be extensive allied naval loses. And that was against an allied fleet that had two years of combat experience along with ground forces. The Japanese did alright in the intial ground actions against the allies as well. I would expect the initial stages to reflect the historical events....Its really unlikely there would be any allied steam roller at least for a couple of years, since the allies would be even less ready for war by 1937 and they would not be ready for strategic offensive for a couple of years. Until then the Japanese should prevail.French and British strategic vision was mainly towards Europe at this time.

Again, the events in December 1941-begin 1942 were for a large part the effect of the strategic initiative of the Japanese. Something they will not have in this TL
 
esl, in Mein Kampf, published almost fifteen years before Munich, Hitler had already made clear that he saw the ultimate struggle for the world to be between the US and Germany.



Minor quibbles...

1) USS Langley simply wasn't viable as a fleet carrier so it won't be used as such and it won't be taken back into service as it never left service until it was sunk in 1942.

2) The bases for destroyers deal is still plausible if only because the fifty destroyers were in such miserable shape that come 1942 the British were still trying to get some of them into service. Other than a clear tie between the US and UK the major British benefit was that they didn't have to build fifty of their own destroyers from scratch, freeing slipways for other ships.
 
esl, the IJN lost at Coral Sea, lost at Midway and their major surface victories before that were against the obsolete cruisers of the ABDA fleet and two RN capital ships off Singapore, involving major air support from occupied French colonial territory.

In this TL the IJN doesn't have French Indochina, is down two fleet carriers, is still awaiting their most modern fighters and torpedos and the RN, not at war in Europe, can also mobilize its full force.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The 1941 IJN did indeed make that change. The 1937 IJN had not yet made the change (even the IJN use of multi-carrier formations was at least in large part based on a publicity photo of the U.S. carriers in that sort of formation. Ironically, it was only a photo op, since the USN policy was to operate carriers in single ship TF configurations).

Again, we have to keep in mind that the POD is 1937. By the end of 1941, the world had changed in many ways.

I only partly agree with the statement the USN carrier tactics were the "best in the world in 1937". They were quite good, but tyhe claim of being "the best" is a bit overexagurating. In many ways, the USN Carrier Doctrine still was to support the oldfashioned battleline and mainly scout for it, while offering some means of CAP for it, in case of airstrikes against it.

Although the experiments in the 30's showed quite clearly how usefull an independent carrierforce could be, it still was not accepted by the Navy as such, so a disaster like Pearl Harbor had to happen first, before such a thing could be evolved.

Japan on the other hand had done a simmilar thing, combining its fast carriers into foreward attackunits, with the mission primarily to scout ahead, while striking as good as possible against the main means of defense of the opponent, in case of the USN, the US Pacific Battlefleet of both carriers and battleships. As such, the IJN tactically outsmarted the USN, as it combined its carriers together, resulting in a larger strikegroup capacity, rather than the USN's normal single carrier taskgroups. In case of a hostile encounter, the IJN force could use its superiority in both numbers and strikingrange (IJN planes normally had longer ranges, compared to their USN equivalents) and pick of the USN carriers one by one, while being itself relatively save, being protected by a larger CAP and longer range.
 
Initially the IJN trashed the allied fleets in surface actions in the Pacific so there should be extensive allied naval loses. And that was against an allied fleet that had two years of combat experience along with ground forces. The Japanese did alright in the intial ground actions against the allies as well. I would expect the initial stages to reflect the historical events....Its really unlikely there would be any allied steam roller at least for a couple of years, since the allies would be even less ready for war by 1937 and they would not be ready for strategic offensive for a couple of years. Until then the Japanese should prevail.French and British strategic vision was mainly towards Europe at this time.


So what? This is a completely differebt scenario, with a Japanese flet that hasnt yet developed the air doctrine that worked so well for the first 6 months OTL.
They are using a similar doctrine to the USN and the RN, and they are heavily outnumbered. And with FIC in French hands, Singapore is pretty safe for a while (allowing reinforcement). You cany hve a completely different start point and expect everything to go the way it did 5 years (and a lot of changes!) later!

French and Britisg strategic vision is irrelevant, the suppositin was the US, Britain and France fighting Japan.
 
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