WI:America takes a Japan first policy in WW2?

What if the American government were to listen to the majority of the public and many non-interventionists and used the preponderance of their resources to subdue Japan in the Pacific first. Whilst focusing on the defense of the Britain and aiding the Soviet Union until Japan was defeated?
 

CalBear

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Actually not all that much difference. The USN had to get a degree of parity on the high seas before anything could really happen in the Pacific. That happened at Midway. Two months later the Allies were in the Solomons. The Solomons were the place that the USN and USMC learned their trade for the rest of the Pacific War and where the IJN was ground down. The USN didn't get sufficient offensive power until mid-late 1943, something that was limited by the time it took to get new hulls into service, not by "Europe First", to go full out against the IJN across the vast width and breadth of the Pacific.

The Solomons would have been somewhat easier with more troops and more heavy bombers, but not a cakewalk. There is also the danger of the U.S. doing something monumentally stupid if it tried to move too quickly in the Pacific (like try a 10 division overland invasion of Burma or push the Navy to try to return to the Philippines in 1942), something that might have happened if the Army had 600,000 men sitting around waiting for an opprotunity or a mission.

In the end, the Japanese were defeated exactly when they would have been defeated in a "Pacific First" strategy, if not sooner than in the case of a Japan 1st war plan. The last straw for the Emperor was the combination of the two Atomic bombs AND the entry of the massive Red Army into the War. The Soviet Far East Front doesn't move if the Soviets are still hip deep in Nazis.
 

Markus

Banned
What CalBear said unless the decision had been made before the outbreak of the war. Say a few month after the Japanese moved into northern Indo-China. Had the reinforcement of the Philipines begun half a year sooner the Japanese would have faced app. 250 heavy bombers, 50 dive-bombers and 250 modern fighters by December 1941. The state of the ground forces would have improved too:

"Reinforcements and equipment already approved," he(General Marshall)said, "require over 1,000,000 ship tons." Fifty-five ships had already been obtained and approximately 100,000 ship tons of supplies were en route, with twice this amount ready for immediate shipment to ports of embarkation. Requests for equipment for the Philippine Army, except those for the M1 rifle, had been approved, and uncontrolled items of supply were being shipped as rapidly as they could be assembled and loaded on ships. "Not only will you receive soon all your supporting light artillery [130 75-mm. guns]," Marshall told MacArthur, "but 48 155-mm. howitzers and 24 155-mm. guns for corps and army artillery." Except for certain types of ammunition, the defense reserve for the U.S. Army forces in the Philippines would be completed in April 1942, and for the Philippine Army by July of that year.

That would have been a very big monkey wrench. :D
 
As CalBear has pointed out, the Pacific options were ship-limited. So there isnt much more the USA can do in the Pacific than they did in OTL (at least until 1943).

The one possible change would have been to put the army into Burma, but again there is the issue of logistics, all the support would have to be built up in India first. Thats a much longer trip than the UK, especially as the Med is still hostile.
Indeed, a land approach would be far simpler after freeing the Med, so you might even get pressure to speed up Torch!
 

Bearcat

Banned
I think New Guinea on steroids is far more likely. MacArthur gets 3-4 extra divisions - and struggles to support and deploy them in that theater.

The air battle is more intense, as more planes go to the Pacific as well. Again, the logistical demands of building the base infrastructure prevent an overwhelming change.

The US may lose more planes and men early, during the Japanese heyday.

Later, when things go south for Japan, the whirlwind is even harsher.

The war ends only 3-6 months sooner, as Calbear and Marcus posted, and agree with Marcus that a POD in 1940 or at latest early 41 is needed to alter that a lot.
 
I cant see it ending much earlier with a PoD than the British hold Malaysia, or at least Burma..then there would be demand to send the troops there, where the Japanese are fighting.

You REALLY want to give McA even more troops to missuse? :p
 

Markus

Banned
Holding Luzon might work too. Someone(CalBear??) said the Japanese normally advanced step-by-step and did not bypass undefeated enemy garrisons. If the landings in the DEI can be delayed and weakened, a portion might remain under allied control.

If things start like in OTL the best course of action would be to have the Australians reinforce New Guinea and stop the IJA on the northern slopes of the Owen Stanleys. From there you can retake the Lae/Buna area, threaten Rabaul and advance in the direction of the PI and DEI.
 
I just don't see the US sending a major army to CBI- one of the central premises of almost all US strategic planning against Japan was that a major land war against the Japanese, especially on the Asian mainland, would be a pointless waste of American lives for little strategic gain, and thus a major no-no.

In all the assorted Orange plans from about 1900 until they were superceded by the Rainbow plans in 1940-41, the Army & Marine Corps side of planning was limited to the defense of the Phillipines and other US territories, providing landing forces to capture whatever islands were deemed necessary to take, either to eliminate Japanese bases and establish US bases, and providing an army to retake/relieve the Phillipines depending on the circumstances. The main focus was always the naval offensive to neutralize Japanese bases, deliver the relief army to the Phillipines, eliminate the IJN as a threat, and if necessary, starve Japan into submission through blockade.

Considering that it really took the better part of a year to get a substantial, deployable field army into action OTL, if we assume that with a Japan-first focus, an army comprable to the US forces in Operation Torch can be deployed to the Pacific between July-September 1942 along with the associated air assets, what can these troops be used for? Assuming that this @ is roughly comprable to OTL, probably a bit more favorable to the Allies (not that much was sent to Europe for use by US forces before then, and although stocks of equipment were heavily used to resupply the British, and being to better equip PTO forces would have been really helpful, there's still only so many people to use them), it would seem that reinforcing New Guinea and Guadalcanal, and perhaps a more agressive tack in the Upper Solomons and subsequent campaigns would be appropriate, but still, not a major bump.

Although extra long-range bombers and fighters would be useful, the P-38 & P-47 didn't become operational in any significant numbers until mid-late 1942 and took longer to reach the front, and a PTO-focus might actually delay development of the Merlin-engined P-51 somewhat. The real bottleneck would, as has been said earlier, be naval strength. The naval assets in the ETO, a few battleships (a couple new, a couple really old), a couple carriers (Wasp goes to the Pacific a couple months earlier than OTL, which could have some effects, Ranger was considered to slow and fragile to be of any use in the PTO, and some CVEs of rather limited value in a fleet action), a few cruisers, and a bunch of destroyers probably aren't going to be enough to be strategic game-changers, so it will likely have to wait until mid-1943 for the necessary shipping to enter service. (Perhaps not building so many DEs and smaller ASW craft might speed that along a bit.)

So, unless as a result of butterflies from a pre-war POD that resulted in a PTO-first decision, there are significant trained & equipped reinforcments that can be deployed to key points such as the Phillipines, New Guinea, Australia, and the Upper Solomons right at the start of things, or prevent the blundering of MacArthur, Short, and Kimmel that led to US forces getting caught with their pants down on Dec. 7, a PTO-focus is going to result in Japan going down a bit harder, a few months earlier than usual. The real difference is in Europe, where the Soviets are going to be in a better position for the @ Cold War, because they'd likely end up with more of Europe to occupy and oppress for the next 50+ years of this TL.
 
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