WI: Alternate German Chief of the General Staff?

BlondieBC

Banned
German cav, to my knowledge had been trained for deep independent operations and encirclements; and they where equipped with carrier pigeons; and during annual maneuvers there were pioneer companies attached to them that basically did nothing but string telephone and telegraph lines behind them

Certainly a far cry from ww2 tank battalions getting to the rear of the enemy; but still more able to communicate than the ACW for sure

Falkenhayn in his post war books stated roughly that "While Cav can travel a 100% miles per day and go behind enemy lines, we can't communicated well enough with them to make it a good option.". So let me ask you this, if I have a couple of Cav Divisions 150 miles behind enemy lines, and get new information and need to change their orders, how do I issue these orders? And to give a hypothetical. Say I sent these two East Prussian Cav divisions out to cut the retreat lines before the destruction of the Russian 1st army, then I destroy the Russian 1st Army. And say the 9th Army is coming up faster than expected and I want these divisions to raid behind the 4th and 5th armies then retreat back towards SW Poland to join the newly forming Germany Army. How would one get these type of orders to these units along with maybe things like maps? And remember, these orders may well be 10s of pages long.

Or another scenario. Say I sent out all my Cav units in brigade or smaller formations to burn RR bridges, but I want to pull them back as the Russian armies arrive and I get intel on the Russian armies locations. How would I take these 10-20 task forces and reform them into division size units somewhere on Polish lands before cutting of the retreat of the Russian 1st army. A war plan not really under consideration when these soldiers go east on D+3?
 
Falkenhayn in his post war books stated roughly that "While Cav can travel a 100% miles per day and go behind enemy lines, we can't communicated well enough with them to make it a good option.". So let me ask you this, if I have a couple of Cav Divisions 150 miles behind enemy lines, and get new information and need to change their orders, how do I issue these orders? And to give a hypothetical. Say I sent these two East Prussian Cav divisions out to cut the retreat lines before the destruction of the Russian 1st army, then I destroy the Russian 1st Army. And say the 9th Army is coming up faster than expected and I want these divisions to raid behind the 4th and 5th armies then retreat back towards SW Poland to join the newly forming Germany Army. How would one get these type of orders to these units along with maybe things like maps? And remember, these orders may well be 10s of pages long.

Or another scenario. Say I sent out all my Cav units in brigade or smaller formations to burn RR bridges, but I want to pull them back as the Russian armies arrive and I get intel on the Russian armies locations. How would I take these 10-20 task forces and reform them into division size units somewhere on Polish lands before cutting of the retreat of the Russian 1st army. A war plan not really under consideration when these soldiers go east on D+3?

At something like Brigade headquarters they could certainly have radios, messengers dashing back to the infantry formations following behind them and rapidly strung (or repurposed captured) telephone and telegraph lines... telegraph/telephone lines of the period often ran along side the rail lines, so the railroad and pioneer battalions would likely have something to work with

Encircled panicked and starving Russian field divisions would likely not cut the existing lines too extensively, so they could be captured and put to use for the advanced forces... keep in mind that German foot infantry where capable of beating out 40 miles a day even if their artillery couldn't keep up; so the cav would have someone to send messages back to or relay to

I would also assume that the consideration of a primary eastern attack would see increased planning and field training for the cavalry, as the force to space ratios in Russia would always be lower allowing indirect advances, and ability to operate in the enemy's rear areas
 
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Agreed on no longer term plans. It is why we have to discuss with a good bit of analysis to determine the ATL where there is a longer run War Plan. It is also a big portion of why France, not Russia was the preferred target. It is a lot easier to imagine a quick German win around Paris, not Moscow.

Also interesting that even in a Russia First War Plan, the second year of the war may still be about knocking France out of the war.

The lasting effects and unplanned opportunities is why I'm a believer of West us Best rather than the Feast on the Beast in the East. Not only does it put 7 fast mobilising German armies against 6 A/F/B armies/army equivalents as opposed to 3 or 4 against 2 Russian armies it captures key French economic assets and provides a forward naval base for war against Britain. Unplanned it provides the closest any power had to a 'war' plan.
 
The lasting effects and unplanned opportunities is why I'm a believer of West us Best rather than the Feast on the Beast in the East. Not only does it put 7 fast mobilising German armies against 6 A/F/B armies/army equivalents as opposed to 3 or 4 against 2 Russian armies it captures key French economic assets and provides a forward naval base for war against Britain. Unplanned it provides the closest any power had to a 'war' plan.

If Belgium is not invaded and the Germans thicken the frontier fortifications; the entente formations are stuck with only 200ish miles of front of cram their divisions into (unless they are willing to violate Belgium's territory... they certainly where willing to do so in Greece)

If the Germans have 4 field armies available they can take over more of the front from the Austrians upon mobilization (which is what they did in the original timeline anyway); since moving an army through an army is the most difficult maneuver in warfare

France and Russia had war plans; its just that the sanity of those plans was... questionable
 
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If the Germans have 4 field armies available they can take over more of the front from the Austrians upon mobilization (which is what they did in the original timeline anyway); since moving an army through an army is the most difficult maneuver in warfare

None of the eastern deployment plans in the years leading up to 1913 had the Germans taking any lines from AH. They were all about mobilisation of up to 4 armies with up to 43 divisions in East Prussia. 3 or these armies would advance to engage 2 Russian armies, which they would no doubt defeat, and capture fortresses. Once this is done you have 4 armies sitting around in poland at the end of their logistical thether do little to nothing for a few weeks at least. This is not a good campaign plan.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
None of the eastern deployment plans in the years leading up to 1913 had the Germans taking any lines from AH. They were all about mobilisation of up to 4 armies with up to 43 divisions in East Prussia. 3 or these armies would advance to engage 2 Russian armies, which they would no doubt defeat, and capture fortresses. Once this is done you have 4 armies sitting around in poland at the end of their logistical thether do little to nothing for a few weeks at least. This is not a good campaign plan.

Largely agreed. A likely result is the Germans have taken the Congress of Poland and straightened the lines, and probably mauled a couple Russians Army. Then we get to the tricky part of a full Eastern Strategy, the multi-year campaign to take and hold Moscow. We are talking about a 1000 KM of ground that has to be taken, and the tendency is not to be able to take more than a 160km (100 miles) in a bite, and often less. So we are looking at say 10 or more cycles of advance, stop due to lack of logistics, fix RR and logistics, repeat. Each probably taking 2 months or so, for more than 20 months of war before we factor in Russian counter attacks or winter.

Metz to Paris is about 330 KM on much better roads and RR system. So this in theory can be finished in campaign system even against stubborn defenses.

So interestingly enough, a War Plan Russia for 1914 might well have phase II (after 60-90 days) be an attack on France. Or even a wheel through Belgium whether initiated by the Germans or responding to France taking the easy way. And this gets into what one thinks the UK will do. And France for that matter. It is not hard to see an ATL where after the initial balance allocation of forces and the presumably rapid fall of Serbia, that we see multiple armies transferred from Poland to the French/Belgium border for phase II. Or if Italy still enters the war, the Germans take a lot of the A-H lines against Russia and the main CP campaign being against Italy.
 

BooNZ

Banned
None of the eastern deployment plans in the years leading up to 1913 had the Germans taking any lines from AH. They were all about mobilisation of up to 4 armies with up to 43 divisions in East Prussia. 3 or these armies would advance to engage 2 Russian armies, which they would no doubt defeat, and capture fortresses. Once this is done you have 4 armies sitting around in poland at the end of their logistical thether do little to nothing for a few weeks at least. This is not a good campaign plan.
A late POD would see the two best Russian armies crushed substantially within the territory of East Prussia, while an earlier POD would likely see the two or three Russian armies defeated relatively close to the German border. Neither scenario would be substanitally limited by logistics. The defeat of the Russian northern armies would leave four unattended German Armies less than a couple of hundred miles away from the substantially undefended rear-echelons of the Russian southern command facing A-H. Your suggestion the German armies would then sit around doing nothing appears strangely our of character, if compared to the German OTL performances.

As an aside, the early loss of Poland with its stockpiles of war materials and munitions is every bit as crippling to the Entente war effort as the loss of northern France. Russian industry in 1914 does not have the resilience to replace early losses and its access to import substitutes is far more challenging. The head east option is not so much a campaign plan, as reliance on traditional German doctrines. This is a substanital improvemnet on OTL, since in 1914 every major campaign plan was rubbish.
 
Largely agreed. A likely result is the Germans have taken the Congress of Poland and straightened the lines, and probably mauled a couple Russians Army. Then we get to the tricky part of a full Eastern Strategy, the multi-year campaign to take and hold Moscow. We are talking about a 1000 KM of ground that has to be taken, and the tendency is not to be able to take more than a 160km (100 miles) in a bite, and often less. So we are looking at say 10 or more cycles of advance, stop due to lack of logistics, fix RR and logistics, repeat. Each probably taking 2 months or so, for more than 20 months of war before we factor in Russian counter attacks or winter.

Metz to Paris is about 330 KM on much better roads and RR system. So this in theory can be finished in campaign system even against stubborn defenses.

So interestingly enough, a War Plan Russia for 1914 might well have phase II (after 60-90 days) be an attack on France. Or even a wheel through Belgium whether initiated by the Germans or responding to France taking the easy way. And this gets into what one thinks the UK will do. And France for that matter. It is not hard to see an ATL where after the initial balance allocation of forces and the presumably rapid fall of Serbia, that we see multiple armies transferred from Poland to the French/Belgium border for phase II. Or if Italy still enters the war, the Germans take a lot of the A-H lines against Russia and the main CP campaign being against Italy.

Except France's prewar active army was HUGE, and the Germans required 2.5-3x the manpower to hold the western front that they needed to defeat Russia

We know France was going to execute plan 17; and that it would be a large scale disaster gutting their best formations; and that with the Germans further reinforcing the border fortifications that the French would do even worse than the original timeline and take months to resolve their shell shortages (even with more of their industrial depts available) and rebuild the army.

Germany (if they additionally reinforced the border as we previously described) could easily stand on the defensive against France for all of 1914... and France would probably need to fail several times before they would consider their own advance through Belgium, and by then the Germans have additional forces and have inflicted grave damage to Russia
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Except France's prewar active army was HUGE, and the Germans required 2.5-3x the manpower to hold the western front that they needed to defeat Russia

We know France was going to execute plan 17; and that it would be a large scale disaster gutting their best formations; and that with the Germans further reinforcing the border fortifications that the French would do even worse than the original timeline and take months to resolve their shell shortages (even with more of their industrial depts available) and rebuild the army.

Germany (if they additionally reinforced the border as we previously described) could easily stand on the defensive against France for all of 1914... and France would probably need to fail several times before they would consider their own advance through Belgium, and by then the Germans have additional forces and have inflicted grave damage to Russia

True, but not exactly my point. Even if it goes just like you say, come January 1915 when the Germans GHQ is thinking on the next year war plan, attacking France option can easily win over attacking Russia option. Presumably Serbia has fallen. Presumably Bulgaria and Ottomans are in the war. Probably Italy will stay out of war. Hindenburg is still in retirement. So what does OTL leaders do in this ATL?

Interesting to discuss.
 

Anderman

Donor
Colmar von der Goltz was born in 1843 so he would 71 when WW1 starts. That makes rather unlikely that he still will be the CGGS in 1914.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Largely agreed. A likely result is the Germans have taken the Congress of Poland and straightened the lines, and probably mauled a couple Russians Army. Then we get to the tricky part of a full Eastern Strategy, the multi-year campaign to take and hold Moscow. We are talking about a 1000 KM of ground that has to be taken, and the tendency is not to be able to take more than a 160km (100 miles) in a bite, and often less. So we are looking at say 10 or more cycles of advance, stop due to lack of logistics, fix RR and logistics, repeat. Each probably taking 2 months or so, for more than 20 months of war before we factor in Russian counter attacks or winter.
Are you assuming a Soviet era determination, since Imperial Russia is more likely to tap out to a more sympathetic Imperial Germany, if no Entente relief is perceived to be forthcoming. Further, are you assuming Soviet era military resilience, since if the Russians are hammered in 1914, losing more forces, supplies and munitions, their scarcely going to be less feeble against stronger CP forces than OTL 1915.

Your logistics rules-of-thumb appear reasonable for sustained advances, although IMHO in the early months of the war greater gains might be possible with closer proximity to home territory, fresher forces, no systemic scorched earth etc. Belgium had far better logistics infrastructure, but it also had a far greater concentrations of forces on both sides.

Metz to Paris is about 330 KM on much better roads and RR system. So this in theory can be finished in campaign system even against stubborn defenses.
The French were the second most powerful continental military force and could be very effective if forced onto the defensive. It makes more sense for Germany to allow the French offensives to burn themselves out, as the French rush to relief the Russians - IMHO.

So interestingly enough, a War Plan Russia for 1914 might well have phase II (after 60-90 days) be an attack on France. Or even a wheel through Belgium whether initiated by the Germans or responding to France taking the easy way. And this gets into what one thinks the UK will do. And France for that matter. It is not hard to see an ATL where after the initial balance allocation of forces and the presumably rapid fall of Serbia, that we see multiple armies transferred from Poland to the French/Belgium border for phase II. Or if Italy still enters the war, the Germans take a lot of the A-H lines against Russia and the main CP campaign being against Italy.

From my understanding the Belgium thoroughfare becomes less attractive from a German perspective after the Belgium army had been fully deployed to support its fortress line. Further, the only options available to the French would be to continue bloody offensives against entrenched German defenses or attempt an advance through the Belgium Ardennes itself - neither option attractive. I can't see the Italians joining the war against a seemingly vigorous A-H military.

Out of interest, what do you think would be the purpose of a German pivot from east, back to west? The OTL purpose of the SP was to seek decisive battle with the French armies, which is something the Germans would be already achieving in an ATL in a round-a-bout way, by bleeding the French attackers white on German defenses.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The Russians where periodically immobilized by starvation, command squabbling and sore feet which allowed German infantry to flow around them and compel their surrender or conduct panicked retreats. If the Russians do the reckless unsupplied attacks in 1914. German cav could help flow around them and set up pickets to compel larger scale surrenders or raid farther to the rear
One of the strains on Russian logistics was the preponderance of cavalry among its forces. Cavalry conjure up images of mobility, but the reality is horses eat like horses and supply requirements of cavalry impairs overall sustained mobility. Any cavalry raids would need to substantially sustain themselves off the land, which would impair both the size and operational speed of those cavalry forces. In the OTL German advance through Belgium, the weakness of German horses in scouting/screening forces was attributed to use of green feed.

Herr Felix Graf von Bothmer? We have this new invention we want you to try out. It is called a RADIO. I kid you not, the US Army was packing copies of German field radios on mules as they fought in France.
I'm looking at a picture of a WW1 mobile German radio set up and it features a small cart, along with a generator hooked up to a tandem bike and a crew of half a dozen men.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
None of the eastern deployment plans in the years leading up to 1913 had the Germans taking any lines from AH. They were all about mobilisation of up to 4 armies with up to 43 divisions in East Prussia. 3 or these armies would advance to engage 2 Russian armies, which they would no doubt defeat, and capture fortresses. Once this is done you have 4 armies sitting around in poland at the end of their logistical thether do little to nothing for a few weeks at least. This is not a good campaign plan.
... regarding the plan we know of.

Of these I would like to remind, that for the mobilization-period 1913/1914, valid from 1st April 1913 onwards having to be 'compiled' at the change 1912/1913, included only a short 'study' for an 'Aufmarsch II' or 'Great East Deployment' of its content we don't know.
The last 'elaborated' deployment plan for the East was made for the mobilization-period 1912/1913, valid from 1st April 1912 onwards having to be 'compiled' at the change 1911/1912 latest Jan/Feb 1912. ... with the knowledge of railroads availability and capacity of midth 1911 the lastest.

However, between 1911 and 1913/1914 IOTL there was already quite lot of railway construction - mostly private - going on aside improving the existing lines as 'doubling' as we know it :
- a small-gauge network from Pilkallen east and northeastwards between Schrwindt and the Njemen/Memel
- a line surrounding the Rominten-forrest from Goldap to Szittkenmen to Tolmingkennen, in 1914 the part between Goldap and Szittkenmen yet unfinished
- a small-gauge line from Marggrabowa to the russian border at Filipowo
- a rail-line from Marggrabowa to the russian border at Raczki
- a line from Lyck to the russian border at Raygrod/Raygrod-lake and Borzymimen (IOTL in 1914 partly finished)
- a line from Lyck inwards to the training range/garrison at Arys (IOTL almost finished at the outbreak of war)​
This was done in IOTL without a different CGGS, who might have had a different 'attitude' towards the East, what mioght have (rather likely) have caused an more thoroigh railroad construction as what actually happened alread IOTL.
Thereby facilitating ... different operational possibilitieas and opportunities as the ones we know off were contemplated under Moltke the Minors reign at the Königsplatz.


And such 'ideas' aren't IMHO too far flung.
According to v.Kuhl in his afterwar writing about the GGS work during the war he mentioned - regarding prewar preparations - a staff-ride by Schlieffen in 1901 in East Prussia, when he played a 'variant' for the defense of East-Prussia :
-an attack towards Byialistock, threatening the important russian rail-line leading to Warsaw
(pls note : 'defense', not thought off as a genuine and more general offense)​
During his reign of army inspector of the region from 1907 onwards - then army-district VI - Colmar v.d. Goltz exercised the same (with then I.Corps commander v.Kluck following him in command btw) (from the biography of v.d.Goltz of Herrmann Teske).
In both cases it was concluded, that for a 'sustained' success after having reached foirst objectives - rupture/capture of the railway-knot Byialistock - the forces would be too few. ... with the forces involved only of the according inspectorate-area.

Last but not least I would like to feature - once abain - good old v.Staabs. In his book(let) about an even after Kaiser Bills switch-of-mind of 1st August afternoon by him thought possible 'Deployment on two Fronts' offeres as part of 'his' proposal a german army in Silesia with a general direction of attack/operations towards Lodz and Iwangorod (what could also be 'interpreted' as a 'austrian-flnak-securing' measure).
As most of the records of the GGS are gone we can't crosscheck if there were similar ideas recorded as well, but v.Staabs didn't live in isolation. Some of his 'ideas' he most likely has drawn from a 'discussion-pool' within the officers-corps.


Therefore with another CGGS following Schlieffen I would render a more ... 'elaborate' and inspired "Aufmarsch II/Großer Ostaufmarsch" than what came from Moltke the Minor alongside a more intense at least railroad-building in East-Prussia very likely.
 
I think we could combine the point of departure as two fold; one is in selecting an Eastern oriented COS (perhaps one that has Hoffman as head of operations who impresses on him Russia's disorganization and political instability); the other perhaps could be a more impacting impression of the math vs France following France change in conscription policy in 1912; were this alternative chief of staff decides that France cannot be defeated with any appreciable forces still being in the East because of the new reality of the force to space ratios

This alternative COS then prioritizes the increased buildup of the border fortifications (which were already very well made) and designs a defensive plan for the troops there and leaves them with a small but effective reaction force to stem or cut off any french advances.

This change in posture also has them improve the military railways and telephone facilities and establish larger supply dumps in East Prussia to nourish the first stage of the offensive

If 75 German divisions were employed against Russia in 1914 and 1915 and given number 1 priority in reinforcements and supplies I can visualize Russia being comprehensively defeated by the end of 1915 and suing for peace if political turmoil doesn't emerge sooner

The big question is would France (without British support) try to invade through Belgium in 1915 after failing (likely a few times) to generate a meaningful advance across the frontier
 
If 75 German divisions were employed against Russia in 1914 and 1915

The mobilisation plan in 1913 against Russia was 4 armies of 43 divisions. 1 was mobilised within East Prussia, 1 was bought in to EP by train, the 3rd was to detrain west of the Vistula and was to march into EP which would take about a week and the 4th was to be bought into EP by train once the lines were free after the first wave.

Given that circumstance I don't think they could deploy 75 divisions against Russia in short order, although if given a 6 month period they'd get there. In particular I think the rail network in and around Silesia couldn't sustain very large numbers of troops.
 
The mobilisation plan in 1913 against Russia was 4 armies of 43 divisions. 1 was mobilised within East Prussia, 1 was bought in to EP by train, the 3rd was to detrain west of the Vistula and was to march into EP which would take about a week and the 4th was to be bought into EP by train once the lines were free after the first wave.

Given that circumstance I don't think they could deploy 75 divisions against Russia in short order, although if given a 6 month period they'd get there. In particular I think the rail network in and around Silesia couldn't sustain very large numbers of troops.

Obviously not the active army or trained reserves up front (which only generated 6.5 armies at the start of mobilization in 1914) and 2.5 armies plus a couple of the better active divisions would need to stay to defend the border with France... BUT once the Ersatz reserve and landwehr is mobilized and ready for action at the start of 1915, the active divisions will have already driven Russia far back and generated a larger front to deploy on as was done with the 9th and 10th armies in the original timeline; it's just that in this scenario they wouldn't be employing 80+ divisions on the western front and having to keep shuttling reserves to contain exposed positions in the champagne country and against the British; France (until they decide to violate Belgium) could be contained with 40-50 divisions on the frontier
 

BooNZ

Banned
I think we could combine the point of departure as two fold; one is in selecting an Eastern oriented COS (perhaps one that has Hoffman as head of operations who impresses on him Russia's disorganization and political instability); the other perhaps could be a more impacting impression of the math vs France following France change in conscription policy in 1912; were this alternative chief of staff decides that France cannot be defeated with any appreciable forces still being in the East because of the new reality of the force to space ratios
In my opinion you are over-engineering things. If the Schlieffen Plan is scratched, you merely need to have the German 1912 eastern deployment plan on the books - or anywhere between 3 days and/or 3 weeks to re-instate and put into effect the eastern deployment plan with OTL resources and/or planning.

This alternative COS then prioritizes the increased buildup of the border fortifications (which were already very well made) and designs a defensive plan for the troops there and leaves them with a small but effective reaction force to stem or cut off any french advances.
According to Zuber, one of the advantages of an eastern deployment identified by the German planners was enticing the French into ill fated offensives. In my opinion this suggests the Germans were already comfortable with their western defenses and the decision not to over-egg those defenses was by design.

This change in posture also has them improve the military railways and telephone facilities and establish larger supply dumps in East Prussia to nourish the first stage of the offensive
If the Germans send 3-4 armies east, those are going to rout/destroy anything the Russians have on German territory within the opening weeks - the balance of the war would be further east. Accordingly, the best preparation for a more eastern focus would be an even greater focus on German Railway/engineering formations to enable those to better support a long eastern advance.

If 75 German divisions were employed against Russia in 1914 and 1915 and given number 1 priority in reinforcements and supplies I can visualize Russia being comprehensively defeated by the end of 1915 and suing for peace if political turmoil doesn't emerge sooner
The 3-4 German armies under the German 1912 mobilization are more than enough to collapse both Russian fronts (North and South) in 1914, the question being if the Russians rout soon enough to save a significant portion of their pre-war armies. In any case, at the start of 1915 the Russians would have already lost Poland and the war materials and munitions therein, are facing at least 5 full strength German armies and a relatively unscathed A-H Empire. As previously noted, the Russian people would not have expected to handle the full brunt of both the German and A-H forces, so there is a more opportunity to allocate the blame for Russian losses on the lack of Elan among the western Entente forces. Further, Nicky would not have had the opportunity to assume command and blame for Russian losses, so internally he looks like less of a goose, even if Russia is crumbling...

The big question is would France (without British support) try to invade through Belgium in 1915 after failing (likely a few times) to generate a meaningful advance across the frontier
Joffre was keen on the idea, but precluded by his political masters from any formal planning on the matter, so any substantial French excursion into Belgium would come after 1914. Such a French excursion would be limited to the rugged Belgium Ardennes, since the French do not have the means to reduce the Belgium fortress line in a timely manner. It would be a bad option, but by 1915 there would be no good options for the French - in my opinion.
 
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In my opinion you are over-engineering things. If the Schlieffen Plan is scratched, you merely need to have the German 1912 eastern deployment plan on the books - or anywhere between 3 days and/or 3 weeks to re-instate and put into effect the eastern deployment plan with OTL resources and/or planning.

According to Zuber, one of the advantages of an eastern deployment identified by the German planners was enticing the French into ill fated offensives. In my opinion this suggests the Germans were already comfortable with their western defenses and the decision not to over-egg those defenses was by design.

If the Germans send 3-4 armies east, those are going to rout/destroy anything the Russians have on German territory within the opening weeks - the balance of the war would be further east. Accordingly, the best preparation for a more eastern focus would be an even greater focus on German Railway/engineering formations to enable those to better support a long eastern advance.

The 3-4 German armies under the German 1912 mobilization are more than enough to collapse both Russian fronts (North and South) in 1914, the question being if the Russians rout soon enough to save a significant portion of their pre-war armies. In any case, at the start of 1915 the Russians would have already lost Poland and the war materials and munitions therein, are facing at least 5 full strength German armies and a relatively unscathed A-H Empire. As previously noted, the Russian people would not have expected to handle the full brunt of both the German and A-H forces, so there is a more opportunity to allocate the blame for Russian losses on the lack of Elan among the western Entente forces. Further, Nicky would not have had the opportunity to assume command and blame for Russian losses, so internally he looks like less of a goose, even if Russia is crumbling...

Joffre was keen on the idea, but precluded by his political masters from any formal planning on the matter, so any substantial French excursion into Belgium would come after 1914. Such a French excursion would be limited to the rugged Belgium Ardennes, since the French do not have the means to reduce the Belgium fortress line in a timely manner. It would be a bad option, but by 1915 there would be no good options for the French - in my opinion.

It would be interesting what the British and the Ottomans do in this scenario; I could see the British 50/50 staying out; and the Ottomans 75/25 joining in to redress their claims in the caucuses

Without British support, and with Russia comprehensively defeated by the end of 1915, that leaves France with a list of very unattractive options. Italy would be far less inclined to tangle with the Austrians with Russia being largely if not completely defeated; and might even be susceptible to German/Austrian bribes to open a front against France once Germany would start shifting victorious divisions from East to West
 
The question is not whether concentrating on the East and forgoing the invasion of Belgium wasn't feasible or had been planned for. The question is whether an alternative Chief of Staff would have gone for this. I get the impression of a consensus in favor of the western approach.

Of course, since the OTL Chief of Staff went for the invasion of Belgium, just replacing him opens up a POD to not do this, but how bad was the groupthink behind this approach?
 
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