WI: Alternate German Chief of the General Staff?

NoMommsen

Donor
I went ahead and did a rather clumsy translation of the Wiki article.

...

First of all, the load arm booms are an unnecessary and over-complicated engineering solution to ditch crossing. The British used fascines and the French used a ditching horn, both simpler and far more effective.

Second of all, the machine is underpowered. Twice the wattage per tonne might have been ideal.

Third of all, 4 mm of plate over the engine? Against the 6.5 Navy Lee of 1892, this machine would have been swiss cheesed. Not even 8 mm was enough. 12 mm minimum front and 8 mm sides.

Fourth of all, there is nothing in the patent drawings that suggests any thought was given to machine guns.

Fifth of all: the rearward facing driver is a bolo.

Sixth of all the track laying suspension is too short in length and appears too narrow in track width. Burstyn appears to not have considered ground floatation at all. Bog-tank it is, I think.

Is it better than the German A-7? Not by much; but it is a good start point for an eventual tank.
... a bit of 'nit-picking' on a very first prototype-proposal as if it would have been a finalized production type ...

... but as you said : something to start with ... earlier than the others :)

Truly an ... interesting read this source.

Though ... it lacks - unfortunatly - some references for its statements I would love - at some points - being able to confirm on some other sources - preferable primary or at leat contemporary - as well.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
...
To the op:
...
Goltz had some interesting ideas but implementing g them would be obvious and countermeasures taken.

It's easy to say spend more but you have to do without the neighbors noticing
What ideas are you talking of ? ... and where do you got them from ?

... and what kind of countermeasures ?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I'm tagging @Riain, @BooNZ, @MichaelWest, @XLII, and @NoMommsen, do you guys have any input on this?

How much did Moltke's actions really impact German performance, and would a different person filling his spot really change anything?
Well, as been said already :
Every other CGGS (Ciefs of the great General Staff)) might rather likely have kept an Aufmarsch II, Ost-Aufmarsch or however you might call it ready at hand in August 1914.

Thereby facilitating any last-minute-changes as happened IOTL without as much 'opposition' it actually met ITOL.

With such a plan at hands the 'switch of course' peformed on 1st August 1914 at around 17:30 by Kaiser Bill (" ... turn our whole army to the east ...") would have most likelly ben met instead of an "Impossibls, your majesty !" as IOTL by a "As you wish, your majesty." and been executed accordingly from 18:00 onwards.
ITTL, if after receiving King 'Georgies' reply about some 'misunderstanding' any change to mobilization/deployment would have been most likely heavily opposed as rendered impossible after 5-6 hours into it.
IOTL the mobilization orders were put on 'pause' after about 1/2 to an hour into it. They were started to be transmitted from the war ministry (at least) around 17:30 to 18:00 only to be 'put on halt/pause/stop at around 18:30/40. ... and be restarted at around 23:00 again.

Also at least some (all ?) candidates would probably have seen and handled the Schlieffen-Memorandum as what it was : an academic study, nothing more.
Whereby every iteration Schlieffen contemplatetd after his retirement had a kinda common headline:
IF ONLY we had forces larger than we have ...​
(But his pupil Moltke the Minor, lacking a lot if not any inspiration actually took this study and made it the bases of actal operational plans ... )


What if Moltke the Minor might have been replaced at the last minute ? ... or shortly afterwards ? ... sometimes before let's say 8th to 10th August with the deployment as he had planned it in full swing nearing completion ?
First thing comming to my mind :
the ill-fated mission of Richard Hentsch with his unclear objective and seemingly unclear or 'interpretable' orders.
-> different conduct of the 1st Battle of the Marne - for good or ill for whoever, but different in every case IMHO.​
 

NoMommsen

Donor
For the Imperial German Army there were to roles of importance. Chief of the Great General Staff and Minister of War.

While the General Staff drew up the war plans and lead the army in war it was the Minister of War that saw to the outfitting of the army in peace time and its budget. Schlieffen was always looking for more divisions to make his plans work but as Chief of the General Staff he had no ability to get more 1). Now Von der Goltz was noted military theorist and writer in particular he advocated for a much larger peace time army, economic general staff and preparation for a long drawn out war. He used phrases like war of nations / peoples.

...

Michael
Well, ... War Minister/Ministry and General Staff ... kinda ... in parts problematic relation.
The partition of tasks as you describe them I can fully agree upon. But their respective ... 'importance' in formpng military as well as policy in general was much dependent on :
the personal relation between Cief of the General Staff and the Minister of War
the relation of each of them with the Kaiser (in terms of influence)​

A position within the War Ministry was seen by many officers - esp. since the 'academic-of-war' Schlieffen took office - as a set back. Now they should/had to deal with ... administrational matters wich come inevitably with bureaucracy and - even worse - politicians (SHUDDER).
With the focussing or IMHO rather narrowing-of-view towards the purely operational under Schlieffen the reputation of the tasks of the War Ministry and with it the Minister of War himself dwindled within the military community ever more.

The at times congenial relation between Moltke the ElDer and Roon - though not without ... 'bumps' - was an exception. Who came after Roon were rather ... pale personalities also regarding their influence (though it wouldn't be easy for anybody to deal with a chancellor like Bismarck as your boss).
It were only some not only better to the Kaiser (v.Einem) related but also strong enough personalities like Karl v.Einem and Josias v.Heeringen to move things. The former reorganised the structure of the artillery branch and introduced the MG as standard part of the infantry, the latter was able to substantially cut down the demands of the then General Staff under Moltke the Minor and Luddendorff - regardless if for the better or worse he had the position and stamina to do so.

1)
Well ... yeah. He never really cared to climb down from his 'ivory tower' and engage with the necessary political and administrative matters this would have requested.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
...

Goltz as Minister of War might be interesting if he could push through a large increase in the size of the army and reserves.

Goltz as Chief of the General Staff would at least keep an East First option open as he advocated large forts vs France and mass concentration in the east.

Michael
Here I can only agree.

Some bits to add perhaps :

He was a FAN of logistics. ... especially the danger of overstretching them as he mentioned on numerous places not at least his 'lecture book' 'Conduct of War and Army' (2nd and heavily widened edition of 'Conduct of War' of 1901. Haven't found an english version of yet ... unfortunatly.). The parts of his 'lectures' dedicated to were not unique. They should be/were/had to be part of every lecture books on the matter of staff works. But his was exceptionally elaborated and in part also detailed (i.e. on several occasions he specifically mentions not to fortget about waterways and river-transportation as part of a logistical concept ... on army and corps level).
On several occasions he lamented about and minutely accounted the losses of fighting strengh the german army had in 1870/71 only due to marches, the so-called 'foot-ills'. ... and was in part 'attacked' for thereby diminuishing the german/prussian armies heroic efforts by too trivial details.

Given his performance of leadership he showed in WW1 with the ottomans he seems to have been IMHO rather capable, leading mainly by general, startegic advice, letting the men and officers at-place do their work rather unharrassed by too minute orders.
He was also able to see and advice what the troops were actually capable of : digging trenches one and the other time instead of 'glorious attacks'. Therefore he also seems to have understood the 'superiority of the defense' given the means of the time.

He also had already learned at his appointments to the Porte to deal with such folks as politicians, trained on a rather ... problematic branch off : the oriantal branch of politicians.
He might have had the ability to ... 'influence' politicians in Germany with a wee talk here and there ... and would most likely have lesser fear of contact with them.

With Karl v.Einem he might have found easily a common 'base' to work together. The then War Minister was supporting v.d.Goltz in the 'race' for a successor of v.Schlieffen. Both were keenly looking into technologies to improve performance, as v.d.Goltz proved during his time as Chief of Inspectorate for the Pioneers and fortifications between 1898 and 1902.
Unfortunatly I have no dea About Josias v.Heeringen. But ... who knows ... maybe with v.d.Goltz sitting at the Königsplatz (adress of the GGS) ... giving the one or other advice ... someone else might have followed.

Becoming Chief of the GGS (Great General Staff) he very likely would have had and had found ways to ... 'influence' military policy. He saw this - the team- or co-work with the civilian administration already in peacetime for wartime - as a necessity for further success of Germany (most notable source for this maybe his book 'Nation in Arms').



(have I ever mentioned to be a v.d.Goltz fanboy ? :biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:)
 
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The RN in peacetime had 1st, 2nd and 3rd fleets, 1st was fully manned with active crews, 2nd was partially manned and would go to full complement upon mobilisation and 3rd was in full reserve and received reserve crews upon mobilisation. Upon mobilisation 1st fleet was padded out with a few 2nd fleet ships and become the Grand Fleet and deployed to Scapa Flow. 2nd and 3rd fleets became the Channel fleet with 2 battle squadrons on Aug 8, but in Aug 14 one of these battle squadrons made up of 3rd fleet ships was disbanded and the ships dispersed to various stations worldwide. After mobilisation the RN found itself with more men than were needed for ships so created 2 naval brigades to add to the Marine RMLI brigade to form the RN division.

From what I can gather the Germans had something similar. The 8th naval law had a strength of 3 active battle squadrons and 2 reserve battle squadrons, but I don't know what reserve means in the German context. Upon mobilisation the KM mobilised 4, 5, 6 battle squadrons from reserve, the 6th BS had the oldest ships, Odin had a single 9.4" gun. They also mobilised 2 TB flotilla from reserve and from schools for a total of 6. They also had Seewehr reserves to beef up the Seebattalions and Matrosen naval troops, presumably to beef up coastal defences, these were formed into the Marine Division in late August but a bit like the RND don't appear to be part of a mobilisation plan.

Prince Henry was named supreme commander of the Baltic, although again I don't know if this was a prewar plan. I assume the disposition of the fleets was part of the prewar plan, they didn't seem to make a move like the RN to Scapa, but they wouldn't need to.

As for operations, they didn't seem to have some sort of seagoing series of sorties planned although U9 was in place to sink the 3 RN cruisers on Sept 9.
 
Egon Friedell, "Cultural History of the Modern Age". Note that he actually witnessed these times. He was an extremely well-read man, and he might have known about diplomatic notes. Yes, an Anglo-German alliance might seem ASBish, but the same would have applied to an Anglo-French or Anglo-Russian one.

I would look to Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents for the period 1895-96. While Salisbury made some tentative suggestions to partition of the Ottoman Empire, which Germany was opposed to, he never made any alliance offers

https://archive.org/details/germandiplomatic02etsd/page/n25

For Salisbury's rejection of any treaty that would commit him to war, see Document 200 Salisbury's memorandum May 29, 1901


This is a proposal for including England within the bounds of the Triple Alliance. I understand its practical effect to be:—
i. If England were attacked by two Powers—say France and Russia— Germany, Austria, and Italy would come to her assistance.
2. Conversely, if either Austria, Germany, or Italy were attacked by France and Russia, or, if Italy were attacked by France and Spain, England must come to the rescue.

Even assuming that the Powers concerned were all despotic, and could promise anything they pleased, with a full confidence that they would be able to perform the promise, I think it is open to much question whether the bargain would be for our advantage. The liability of having to defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend the British Isles against France. Even, therefore, in its most naked aspect the bargain would be a bad one for this country. Count Hatzfeldt speaks of our "isolation" as constituting a serious danger for us. Have we ever felt that danger practically? If we had succumbed in the revolutionary war, our fall would not have been due to our isolation. We had many allies, but they would not have saved us if the French Emperor had been able to command the Channel. Except during his reign we have never even been in danger; and, therefore, it is impossible for us to judge whether the "isolation" under which we are supposed to suffer, does or does not contain in it any elements of peril. It would hardly be wise to incur novel and most onerous obligations, in order to guard against a danger in whose existence we have no historical reason for believing.

But though the proposed arrangement, even from this point of view, does not seem to me admissible, these are not by any means the weightiest objections that can be urged against it. The fatal circumstance is that neither we nor the Germans are competent to make the suggested promises. The British Government cannot undertake to declare war, for any purpose, unless it is a purpose of which the electors of this country would approve. If the Government promised to declare war for an object which did not commend itself to public opinion, the promise would be repudiated, and the Government would be turned out. I do not see how, in common honesty, we could invite other nations to rely upon our aids in a struggle, which must be formidable and probably supreme, when we have no means whatever of knowing what may be the humour of our people in circumstances which cannot be foreseen. We might, to some extent, divest ourselves of the full responsibility of such a step, by laying our Agreement with the Triple Alliance before Parliament as soon as it is concluded. But there are very grave objections to such a course, and I do not understand it to be recommended by the German Ambassador.

The impropriety of attempting to determine by a secret contract the future conduct of a Representative Assembly upon an issue of peace or war would apply to German policy as much as to English, only that the German Parliament would probably pay more deference to the opinion of their Executive than would be done by the English Parliament. But a promise of defensive alliance with England would excite bitter murmurs in every rank of German society—if we may trust the indications of German sentiment, which we have had an opportunity of witnessing during the last two years.

It would not be safe to stake any important national interest upon the fidelity with which, in case of national exigency if either country could be trusted to fulfil the obligations of the Agreement had been concluded without the assent of its Parliament.

Several times during the last sixteen years Count Hatzfeldt has tried to elicit from me, in conversation, some opinion as to the probable conduct of England, if Germany or Italy were involved in war with France. I have always replied that no English Minister could venture on such a forecast. The course of the English Government in such a crisis must depend on the view taken by public opinion in this country, and public opinion would be largely, if not exclusively, governed by the nature of the casus belli.


Lord Salisbury would never enter a treaty such as the Triple Alliance and he was right to think so. After all, treaties were scraps of paper and Italy and Romania weren't bound by their commitments to the triple alliance
 
On the sour note of German naval planning...

During the time period when Mister McKinley was about to remove Spain from the list of major colonial powers with an outrageous (and in my opinion, immoral, YMMV) demonstration of American imperialism...

This happened.

What makes it interesting is that as far back as 1898, we have examples that show Kaiser Wilhelm II interfered with German governmental operations and promoted idiosyncratic and rather bizarre side projects that risked wars with various nations.

There was the gentleman Otto von Diederichs, a German admiral, who did this deed called the Kiautschou Bay concession.

Kaiser Wilhelm Ii sent the gentleman after that success to take a look at Manila Bay. The situation von Diederichs was to investigate and see if something could be done to further Germany's interests, like set up a concession or at least divvy up the spoils with the other nations present (US, UK, Japan).

Revolutionaries and Admirals: The German East Asia …

I'm not going to debate whose version of events was correct, but the previous event at Tsingtao indicates that the lunatic in the area, was not Dewey. (YMMV).

Going by these examples and this tidbit;

New Zealand to be attacked by guess who?

Now to be fair, the Great White Fleet not only circumnavigated the Earth but also performed recon and site surveys (which were used in WW II) and USN staff officers drew up contingency plans. This is normal. A nation's military, if it is competent, draws up a plan for anything conceivable, which is what the USN New Zealand staff study was about. Seen in that light, the "Plans" drawn up to attack Norfolk and invade Long Island are just paper studies, but it is the German navy's airy cloud cuckoo land basis of the planning which strikes me when I read those plans. That is not planning or a staff study. That is insanity.

And that I conclude might explain the strange "absence" of detailed COMPETENT preparations or planning to support the notional guerre de course the German navy declared in its own private messages to the Kaiser that they intended to wage should war with England come. They either knew it was not possible, so why waste the effort, or they knew they were the Kaiser's bathtub navy and never really expected they would have to make good on their promises if war came. War came, and it was ad hockery, first with Kohl, then Ingersoll, then Scheer. I bet that there was not even a competent plan for offensive mine warfare in the channel, come July 28, 1914.
 
Schlieffen, and the follow war plans called for far more troops than Germany had

In an interesting scenario to ponder would be if; Germany raised their conscription targets in response to France's 1911-1912 changes to conscription... France at that time enacted a program of conscripting 80 percent of draft age men... Germany hovered around 50 percent (with the rest into Ersatz reserve due to lack of funds) and Austria; 30 percent

France's decision to do this was one of mixed blessings, in that two years they did create a far larger pool of available trained-ish manpower which gave them something useful to to draw from when the pre war active divisions were destroyed in 1914-1915

However many have argued that conscription money would have been far better spent on modern heavy howitzers, modern field uniforms, modern field kitchens, machine guns etc; France in response suffered a drastic shortage of junior officers to lead the fresh recruits (being short 800 company commanders in 1913)


Had Germany decided to increase their conscription rate in response it would have given them at least 2 more field armies at the start of 1914; perhaps leaving the move through Holland still on the table or a variety of other options
 
Edit: About the German merchants being totally unprepared - but what could they do? Germany standing against Britain AND France AND Russia - where were they supposed to go?

They also forgot to fortify these ports and transmission stations excluding Tsingtao. Forgot to stockpile items need to make AMCs. Forgot to stockpile small arms for AMC and locals. Forgot to give orders to the Merchants on where to go. Forgot to track the merchants. Forgot well over half the stuff needed to be done.

Now who knows, maybe given a couple more years, someone gets around to handling these details.

Reminds me of the story when a French politician said after the Franco-German War that France being totally unprepared for this war demonstrated that France didn't really want the war (despite declaring it). This was even quoted by German Socialists.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Reminds me of the story when a French politician said after the Franco-German War that France being totally unprepared for this war demonstrated that France didn't really want the war (despite declaring it). This was even quoted by German Socialists.

Or how the Tsar did not stockpile enough ammo. It is my understanding that 60 days or so into the war, lack of ammo was costing the Russian battles. I have also read that they had more men than rifles by wide margin in WW1. Not sure that is true, but in any case it is clear the Tsar also lacked a good planning department.

Or how the UK switched to Germany as it main enemy about 1905, but spent its base defense funds on Portsmouth, not Scapa Flow or some other location in the northern North Sea.
 
I would look to Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents for the period 1895-96. While Salisbury made some tentative suggestions to partition of the Ottoman Empire, which Germany was opposed to, he never made any alliance offers

https://archive.org/details/germandiplomatic02etsd/page/n25

For Salisbury's rejection of any treaty that would commit him to war, see Document 200 Salisbury's memorandum May 29, 1901

Thanks for the info.

Lord Salisbury would never enter a treaty such as the Triple Alliance and he was right to think so. After all, treaties were scraps of paper and Italy and Romania weren't bound by their commitments to the triple alliance

However, only after 1905 they did in fact move away from the alliance with Germany and A-H.
 
Schlieffen, and the follow war plans called for far more troops than Germany had

In an interesting scenario to ponder would be if; Germany raised their conscription targets in response to France's 1911-1912 changes to conscription... France at that time enacted a program of conscripting 80 percent of draft age men... Germany hovered around 50 percent (with the rest into Ersatz reserve due to lack of funds) and Austria; 30 percent

France's decision to do this was one of mixed blessings, in that two years they did create a far larger pool of available trained-ish manpower which gave them something useful to to draw from when the pre war active divisions were destroyed in 1914-1915

However many have argued that conscription money would have been far better spent on modern heavy howitzers, modern field uniforms, modern field kitchens, machine guns etc; France in response suffered a drastic shortage of junior officers to lead the fresh recruits (being short 800 company commanders in 1913)


Had Germany decided to increase their conscription rate in response it would have given them at least 2 more field armies at the start of 1914; perhaps leaving the move through Holland still on the table or a variety of other options

The Germans did increase the size of their army by 135,000 from 1913, the first increase in decades.

There is more than one way to skin a cat; by avoiding the maastricht appendix Moltke dispensed with the 2 corps of ~80,000 men needed to mask the Dutch army. Similarly he planned to mask Antwerp with 2 corps rather than 5, saving another 120,000. Adding these savings to the 135,000 increase in army size gets the missing 300,000.

However again reality must intrude on Schleiffens memo as Moltke gets criticism for deploying 'too many' troops on the French frontier. Molke had to guard East Prussia and against the possibility that a French offensive against a virtually unguarded frontier would create more damage and loss than the theoretical advantages of a 'pure' Schlieffen offensive. In any case the logistics couldn't support more troops at the start, there was no room to deploy them and the marching distance was right on the limit of the possible.

The real loss of the plan was in its execution, which a different general may have made better, or worse.
 
Or how the Tsar did not stockpile enough ammo. It is my understanding that 60 days or so into the war, lack of ammo was costing the Russian battles.

I can't recall the exact numbers but IIRC the Russians laid in stocks of shells that were far in excess of usage rates in the 1904-05 war with Japan. It was something like each gun fired 500-600 rounds in that war and the Russians had some 1500 rounds per gun, thinking this would be sufficient.

I think the French also had 1500 rpg and the Germans 2000 rpg.

Apparently it was a surprise to all that artillery fired so much that guns wore out. Nobody had plans to refit and repair guns on a large scale and ongoing basis.
 
The Germans did increase the size of their army by 135,000 from 1913, the first increase in decades.

There is more than one way to skin a cat; by avoiding the maastricht appendix Moltke dispensed with the 2 corps of ~80,000 men needed to mask the Dutch army. Similarly he planned to mask Antwerp with 2 corps rather than 5, saving another 120,000. Adding these savings to the 135,000 increase in army size gets the missing 300,000.

However again reality must intrude on Schleiffens memo as Moltke gets criticism for deploying 'too many' troops on the French frontier. Molke had to guard East Prussia and against the possibility that a French offensive against a virtually unguarded frontier would create more damage and loss than the theoretical advantages of a 'pure' Schlieffen offensive. In any case the logistics couldn't support more troops at the start, there was no room to deploy them and the marching distance was right on the limit of the possible.

The real loss of the plan was in its execution, which a different general may have made better, or worse.

I am familiar with the additional authorization bill of 1913 which is why I used the term "hover" at 50 percent of draft age... still significantly less than the French the previous two years

The economy of force decisions Moltke made where forced by the lack of numbers of immediately available to be mobilized divisions; and the decision to keep strong forces on the common frontier proved wise; because even though the German fortifications were well served, constructed and laid out; the French sent the cream of their army including the alpine formations (which had combat experience from Madagascar and other colonial conflicts) into the Plan 14 frontal attacks. Only the Germans having adequate force to space ratios, and better stockpiles of artillery ammo allowed them to repel those attacks with such heavy losses (the stunningly high losses in the battle of the frontiers all but wiped out the advantage France had at the start of the conflict of having a larger prewar active army)

It would be interesting if a war plan developed that poured increased resources into fortifying the frontier; such that it could be held by primarily landwehr formations (perhaps with a few active or elite formations in reserve for counter/spoiler attacks like the Prussian footguards) and devoted the striking power of the army to the east; someone like Max Hoffman being in the position of Hensch or quartermaster who had seen the Russians in action and the pervasive weakness of the upper echelons of their army could have been a strong voice for a strategy like this
 
would be interesting if a war plan developed that poured increased resources into fortifying the frontier; such that it could be held by primarily landwehr formations (perhaps with a few active or elite formations in reserve for counter/spoiler attacks like the Prussian footguards) and devoted the striking power of the army to the east; someone like Max Hoffman being in the position of Hensch or quartermaster who had seen the Russians in action and the pervasive weakness of the upper echelons of their army could have been a strong voice for a strategy like this

It is interesting and has been discussed at length on regular occasions. A lot of people are big fans of a German offensive in the east, but I'm not.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I can't recall the exact numbers but IIRC the Russians laid in stocks of shells that were far in excess of usage rates in the 1904-05 war with Japan. It was something like each gun fired 500-600 rounds in that war and the Russians had some 1500 rounds per gun, thinking this would be sufficient.

I think the French also had 1500 rpg and the Germans 2000 rpg.

Apparently it was a surprise to all that artillery fired so much that guns wore out. Nobody had plans to refit and repair guns on a large scale and ongoing basis.

Any idea how many rgp in either the ACW or Napoleonic Wars?
 

BlondieBC

Banned
It is interesting and has been discussed at length on regular occasions. A lot of people are big fans of a German offensive in the east, but I'm not.

You can also fortify in the west and put another army into the wheel portion in Belgium. Or do OTL but have this army in strategic reserve.
 
It is interesting and has been discussed at length on regular occasions. A lot of people are big fans of a German offensive in the east, but I'm not.

I see it (with hindsight) as a far more effective strategy. The Germans had their military attache observations; which while remarking on the rapid growth of the Russian army where also stinging in their appreciation of the Russian ability to command that force. Via their industrial investments in Russia, they also had detailed knowledge about Russia's lack of industrial war making potential. So the markers where there for the Germans to appreciate Russia as a large but beatable enemy

Russian soldiers where sent to the front often with no boots or field kitchens in 1914 because their mobilization plans where so poorly organized and commanded; a well developed assault with the striking power of the German and Austrian army at the outset would likely have given the Russians a very rough handling

The follow on question is can Russia's political collapse occur sooner than 1917 if the primary effort is made against them from the outset
 
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