WI: Alternate German Chief of the General Staff?

BlondieBC

Banned
I don't really at the top of my head.
The only thing which comes to mind was that Moltke wasn't as bad - or incompetent - as he was made out to be. His most pressing failing is that he was...unimaginative and jittery (basically, afraid of making mistakes. Understandable, standing in the shadow of 1871). But then, the Austro-Hungarian general staff rejected plans for a "WWII-Style" tank in 1911 [The imperial germans later in 1912](The Burstyn-Motorgeschütz - wiki only in german, sorry - on my recent visit to Vienna I saw the model an went "Oh god, how stupid were they?"). So, a more adventurous spirit may have had tanks in 1914.

But then again, none of the powers had particular powers of imagination and the end of Attaque á l'outrace had to be purchased in blood.

Edit: The Motorgeschütz would have been roughly comparable to the Renault FT, so late-WW1-to-early-WW2 tank. WW2-style refers to the turret, turret-mounted gun, crew config and treads.

It was the Reichstag slashing the budgets. There were proposal for a lot more trucks, and to some extent mobile warfare in the army proposals. These were greatly trimmed back. What good does it do to have the tanks if I don't have the trucks to keep them supplied? The German army could make holes in the Entente lines, it was just the entente could fill the holes before the Germans could exploit. Tanks without a logistical tail will not solve this problem.

I would like to also point out the Entente had the dominance in armored cars in Romania (via the British Navy), and it did little good. In the 1910-1920 time frame, tanks are not wonder weapons but an emerging technology with teething problem.

I know it is fun to push weapons just coming into their own, like I like to do with U-boats. But in reality, the biggest benefit of the Germans or Austrians funding a armored car program is not the armored car but the extra marks. If you are going to say spend an additional 2% increase in the Heer's budget, you would be much more effective to just add another infantry unit. Or add some extra artillery battalions. Or extra ammo stock piles. If you spend enough money to have an "armored" division ready in 1914, I guarantee you could have raised another full infantry corp for the same costs. Maybe 2-3 corp. And I think it is self evident that either Austria or Germany having an extra 2 active corps at the start of the war adds more value than a armored division that will struggle, mostly with logistics.

And I know I like to buff the Germans, but just imagine the BEF had two more corp that show up early in the war. The race to the sea looks so much different.
 
It was the Reichstag slashing the budgets. There were proposal for a lot more trucks, and to some extent mobile warfare in the army proposals. These were greatly trimmed back. What good does it do to have the tanks if I don't have the trucks to keep them supplied? The German army could make holes in the Entente lines, it was just the entente could fill the holes before the Germans could exploit. Tanks without a logistical tail will not solve this problem.

I would like to also point out the Entente had the dominance in armored cars in Romania (via the British Navy), and it did little good. In the 1910-1920 time frame, tanks are not wonder weapons but an emerging technology with teething problem.

I know it is fun to push weapons just coming into their own, like I like to do with U-boats. But in reality, the biggest benefit of the Germans or Austrians funding a armored car program is not the armored car but the extra marks. If you are going to say spend an additional 2% increase in the Heer's budget, you would be much more effective to just add another infantry unit. Or add some extra artillery battalions. Or extra ammo stock piles. If you spend enough money to have an "armored" division ready in 1914, I guarantee you could have raised another full infantry corp for the same costs. Maybe 2-3 corp. And I think it is self evident that either Austria or Germany having an extra 2 active corps at the start of the war adds more value than a armored division that will struggle, mostly with logistics.

And I know I like to buff the Germans, but just imagine the BEF had two more corp that show up early in the war. The race to the sea looks so much different.
While that is sound reasoning, and I won't dispute it, I got to read parts of the actual dismissal (i.e. the k.u.k. Heeresamt rejecting the proposal) which boiled down to "we don't like it because then we would not be able to justify to fodder for the horses any longer" - and the "money for fodder for horses" was the actual argument used. Much the same line was apparently used by the general staff.
Also, there are a few possibilities between "refuse consideration at all" and "create an entire division". At the very least, experimenting with it would have greatly reduced the shock value when the Entente first deploys tanks.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
While that is sound reasoning, and I won't dispute it, I got to read parts of the actual dismissal (i.e. the k.u.k. Heeresamt rejecting the proposal) which boiled down to "we don't like it because then we would not be able to justify to fodder for the horses any longer" - and the "money for fodder for horses" was the actual argument used. Much the same line was apparently used by the general staff.
Also, there are a few possibilities between "refuse consideration at all" and "create an entire division". At the very least, experimenting with it would have greatly reduced the shock value when the Entente first deploys tanks.

Agreed. It would be hard to argue any harm from creating the 1st Armored Car Battalion.
 
Also, the Schlieffen plan had as a necessity that Britain would NOT join the war. Theoretically German diplomats should have worked hard to make sure Britain would ally with them, or stay neutral at least.

Less competent than Joffre, or Conrad ?

Good point, but the Allies had more men and money and whatnot. They could afford some incompetence.
 
Also, the Schlieffen plan had as a necessity that Britain would NOT join the war. Theoretically German diplomats should have worked hard to make sure Britain would ally with them, or stay neutral at least.



Good point, but the Allies had more men and money and whatnot. They could afford some incompetence.

Its a chicken and egg thing.

In December 1912 the Kaiser told Moltke that Britain was assumed to be a belligerent in a future war, the war plan for 1914 began 4 months after that. Thus having a plan that bought the British is wasn't some absent minded mistake, it was a result of the government direction to plan for a war where Britain was fighting.
 
Yeah, the German diplomats started making mistakes earlier. I wrote in a different thread that during 1895-1901, Britain approached Germany four times with a suggestion of an alliance.
 
Yeah, the German diplomats started making mistakes earlier. I wrote in a different thread that during 1895-1901, Britain approached Germany four times with a suggestion of an alliance.
How about this, if we're going for the latest possible date: The Marquess of Lansdowne dies at some point before 1900, and Brummy Joe becomes Foreign Secretary, managing to achieve an Anglo-German alliance. After Salisbury's resignation, Chamberlain becomes PM rather than Balfour, and solidifies the two nations' alliance. Of course, 1900 may still be too late, the Kruger telegram would probably need to be butterflied. Then again, Tirpitz and Kaiser Bill still want their big-ass navy, and I doubt Britain will ever tolerate that.
 
Yeah, the German diplomats started making mistakes earlier. I wrote in a different thread that during 1895-1901, Britain approached Germany four times with a suggestion of an alliance.
Still waiting for a reference on that one. Britain steadfastly rejected German overtures To Britain, Germany was to be used as leverage against France and Russia. Never did the British offer to bargain away their neutrality not to Germany and not to France later

To the op:

Moltkes strategy was sound and it's hard to find anything much better. While it could be easily beaten and needed Franco- Russian mistakes to work, it put pressure on France and Russia that made those mistakes likely

Without striking hard at France, Germany risked Russia and France completing their mobilization and striking hard at the Austrian weak point

Goltz had some interesting ideas but implementing g them would be obvious and countermeasures taken.

It's easy to say spend more but you have to do without the neighbors noticing
 

BooNZ

Banned
It was the Reichstag slashing the budgets. There were proposal for a lot more trucks, and to some extent mobile warfare in the army proposals. These were greatly trimmed back. What good does it do to have the tanks if I don't have the trucks to keep them supplied? The German army could make holes in the Entente lines, it was just the entente could fill the holes before the Germans could exploit. Tanks without a logistical tail will not solve this problem.
Can you clarify what budget cutbacks are you referring to? Between 1904 and 1910 the German army budget increased only 0.5%, while between 1910 and WW1 it increased 36%.

And I know I like to buff the Germans, but just imagine the BEF had two more corp that show up early in the war. The race to the sea looks so much different.
Agreed. Further, since you probably don't have those two Corps in transit, the Eastern Front also has a couple of additional Corps during the initial battles.

While that is sound reasoning, and I won't dispute it, I got to read parts of the actual dismissal (i.e. the k.u.k. Heeresamt rejecting the proposal) which boiled down to "we don't like it because then we would not be able to justify to fodder for the horses any longer" - and the "money for fodder for horses" was the actual argument used. Much the same line was apparently used by the general staff.
Also, there are a few possibilities between "refuse consideration at all" and "create an entire division". At the very least, experimenting with it would have greatly reduced the shock value when the Entente first deploys tanks.
To put things in perspective, A-H had been neglecting military spending for decades. Between 1904 and 1911 it declined 2%. In serious subsequent increases in military expenditure before the war, A-H had to chose between prioritising modernising its army or increasing its size - it elected to initially increase its size. As a consequence, A-H entered the war lacking modern medium and heavy artillery, it lacked numbers of machine guns, it trailed in army aviation and its new recruits had not been properly/fully indoctrinated - every one of those shortfalls was recognised by the A-H military before the war. Suggesting A-H missed a trick by not spending limited budget dollars on experimental early tanks ignores the realities on the ground.

How about this, if we're going for the latest possible date: The Marquess of Lansdowne dies at some point before 1900, and Brummy Joe becomes Foreign Secretary, managing to achieve an Anglo-German alliance. After Salisbury's resignation, Chamberlain becomes PM rather than Balfour, and solidifies the two nations' alliance. Of course, 1900 may still be too late, the Kruger telegram would probably need to be butterflied. Then again, Tirpitz and Kaiser Bill still want their big-ass navy, and I doubt Britain will ever tolerate that.
I understand there were British feelers extended to Kaiser at his grandmother's funeral as late as 1901. Again, Germany does not even need an alliance, merely amicable relations and less muddled Anglo-German communications.
 
I understand there were British feelers extended to Kaiser at his grandmother's funeral as late as 1901. Again, Germany does not even need an alliance, merely amicable relations and less muddled Anglo-German communications.
How much would you say an Anglo-German alliance changes the actions of France and Russia? I think having Brummy Joe as PM, combined with no Kruger Telegram or Daily Telegraph Affair, should be enough.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Can you clarify what budget cutbacks are you referring to? Between 1904 and 1910 the German army budget increased only 0.5%, while between 1910 and WW1 it increased 36%.

Agreed. Further, since you probably don't have those two Corps in transit, the Eastern Front also has a couple of additional Corps during the initial battles.

To put things in perspective, A-H had been neglecting military spending for decades. Between 1904 and 1911 it declined 2%. In serious subsequent increases in military expenditure before the war, A-H had to chose between prioritising modernising its army or increasing its size - it elected to initially increase its size. As a consequence, A-H entered the war lacking modern medium and heavy artillery, it lacked numbers of machine guns, it trailed in army aviation and its new recruits had not been properly/fully indoctrinated - every one of those shortfalls was recognised by the A-H military before the war. Suggesting A-H missed a trick by not spending limited budget dollars on experimental early tanks ignores the realities on the ground.

I understand there were British feelers extended to Kaiser at his grandmother's funeral as late as 1901. Again, Germany does not even need an alliance, merely amicable relations and less muddled Anglo-German communications.

The information is from newspapers at the time. The budget cuts are from what the Heer asked for versus what the final appropriations were. I don't remember the exact numbers, buy you would see things like the Heer asked for two square regiments of truck, the Reichstag approved two battalion. It was like that down a series of items for additional battalion and regiments of support units, i.e not infantry. I don't specifically remember if they asked for armored cars, but it would be easy to add the request to the list.

And this get to another interesting point. If these armored cars units can be defined as 'non-combat units', once can avoid the 'Noble Prussian Officer' issue.

Also interesting is the population went up 8% in this time frame the budget went up 2%. If Germany has 6% more Heer, Germany win WW1.

Yes, the most likely place for the two extra corp would be East Prussia as the 9th Army. There most likely mission would be a attack south into Poland.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
How much would you say an Anglo-German alliance changes the actions of France and Russia? I think having Brummy Joe as PM, combined with no Kruger Telegram or Daily Telegraph Affair, should be enough.

Massively. Just imagine not only the UK being ok with the German getting Morocco, imagine the UK being willing to go to war over the issue.

Or imagine French planners having to plan for a UK blockade if WW1 breaks out.

Imagine Germany looking for excuses to have a colonial war with France so Germany could get a big chunk of French Africa. Or French Indochina.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Its a chicken and egg thing.

In December 1912 the Kaiser told Moltke that Britain was assumed to be a belligerent in a future war, the war plan for 1914 began 4 months after that. Thus having a plan that bought the British is wasn't some absent minded mistake, it was a result of the government direction to plan for a war where Britain was fighting.

If that is true, then strangely enough, the Navy did not do this type of War Plan.
 
Still waiting for a reference on that one.

Egon Friedell, "Cultural History of the Modern Age". Note that he actually witnessed these times. He was an extremely well-read man, and he might have known about diplomatic notes. Yes, an Anglo-German alliance might seem ASBish, but the same would have applied to an Anglo-French or Anglo-Russian one.
 
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I don't really at the top of my head.

The only thing which comes to mind was that Moltke wasn't as bad - or incompetent - as he was made out to be. His most pressing failing is that he was...unimaginative and jittery (basically, afraid of making mistakes. Understandable, standing in the shadow of 1871). But then, the Austro-Hungarian general staff rejected plans for a "WWII-Style" tank in 1911 [The imperial germans later in 1912](The Burstyn-Motorgeschütz - wiki only in german, sorry - on my recent visit to Vienna I saw the model an went "Oh god, how stupid were they?"). So, a more adventurous spirit may have had tanks in 1914.

But then again, none of the powers had particular powers of imagination and the end of Attaque á l'outrace had to be purchased in blood.

Edit: The Motorgeschütz would have been roughly comparable to the Renault FT, so late-WW1-to-early-WW2 tank. WW2-style refers to the turret, turret-mounted gun, crew config and treads.

There was no Road connection between the Arkan peninsula and Rangoon in 1942 or 1944 if there was Slim would have used it.

I went ahead and did a rather clumsy translation of the Wiki article.

HGM_Modell_Burstyn_Motorgeschütz.jpg


Model of the Burstyn motor gun tractor in front of the Army History Museum in Vienna (2011)

General characteristics:

Crew: 3 men (commander/loader/driver)

Length: 3.5 m (without trench crossing boom)
Width: 1.9 m
Height: 1.9 m
Mass: 7,000 kilograms

Armor:
Front; 8 mm (0.314 in)
Side: 4 mm (0.157 in)
Rear: 4 mm (0.157 in)
Fighting compartment (turret and center compartment): 3 mm (0.118) mm (additional armor laminated.

Main armament: 37 mm (1.5 in) /40 QFNR
Secondary armament: 1 or 2 coax 7 mm (0.275) machine guns planned.

Propulsion: 34 kW (45 HP) 4 cylinder gasoline engine.
Road speed: (predicted) 25 km/h (18 mph)
Cross country speed: (predicted) 8 km/h (5 mph)
Power to weight ratio 4.7 kW /tonne (6.6 hp ton)

The Burstyn engine gun was the design of a first modern tank that had been developed before the First World War. The invention of the vehicle was in 1911 by the Austrian navy Lieutenant (s.g) Günther Burstyn.

While operating a torpedo boat, Burstyn came up with the idea of designing a "land pedal powered boat" in 1903. It should be fast and armored, as well as be able to carry its own cannon. For official reasons, however, he did not pursue the idea at first.

On November 24, 1904, the first "Holt tractor" with a "moving chain" (track layer suspension) was used in California and was dubbed "Caterpillar" by its developer, Holt. A little later, large Hungarian farms used such tractors.

In the spring of 1905, Burstyn noticed Daimler's armored automobile at Vienna's first motor show, but he thought the wheels on Daimler's car unsuitable for off-road rides. Instead of the wheels, he wanted to deploy a caterpillar drive (track layer suspension) (Burstyn called it "glide band"), as was used in the Holt tractors.

However, Burstyn did not begin technical planning until 1911. At the end of the same year, he presented his design for the "motorized gun tractor," the world's first modern tank, to the Austrian military (K.u.K.) War Ministry. However, the ministry rejected the designs, pointing out that the automotive directorate could not carry out testing of the motor gun traxctor at the expense of Army management and budget. For this reason, but also out of disinterest, the construction of a prototype was rejected (The K.u.k. military administration was not only extremely conservative, but also always extremely short of funds.). Nevertheless, from 1912, the K.u.k army also experimented with Holt tractors in order to use them as tractors for fortress artillery.

Burstyn then submitted his proposal to the German War Ministry, which, however, also showed no interest in it.

Burstyn patented his "motor vehicle device for crossing obstacles," i.e. only the tractor and ditch crossing boom of the motor gun tractor, both in Austria-Hungary (e.g. patent 53248, 25 April 1912) and in the German Empire.

Description:

· The motor gun tractor already had the typical features of a modern tank: An armored structure
· Track laying drive instead of wheels
· A swiveling turret with a cannon;
· The special feature was the position of the crew:
· -The commander and the loader sit at the front right
· -The main gun sits at the front left
· -Unhappily chosen, however, is the position of the driver. He sits with his back to the direction of travel, so he can only either see forward through a periscope or only steer at the direction of the commander.

Burstyn's design had been well thought out, as well as largely calculated statically and dynamically. His design possessed some features that were unique in the time:

Mobility:

Due to its small size and maneuverability, the motor gun tractor would have been superior to most vehicles used in the First World War: On the road and off-road, it would have been faster than the types of the Allies and could even be used in confined and mountain areas. Only in parts of wooded terrain would maneuverability have been limited due to the boom. The wheel pairs and the suspension bogeys of the motor gun tractors were, however, very complicated constructions at that time. However, the design itself was extremely advanced even without a boom and wheels (ditch crosser). Another advantage was the relatively high mobility and small size of the vehicle.

Caterpillar drive (tracklaying suspension):

Burstyn did not copy the chassis of a Holt tractor, as French tank builders did later in World War I. He designed his own caterpillar drive, which he improved several times until the German patent was applied.

Lift and sink wheels: (This is confusing. Does this correspond to the drop wheels one finds on some of the worst Christie designs that were intended to provide road traction after the track was removed, or are these vertical suspension travel wheels intended for steer and motive transmission to the tracks as featured on some of the worst Vickers designs of the late 1920s? Or is it those ditch crossing boom arms? McP.)

The motor gun tractor should also have two vertically moving pairs of wheels, which would have allowed a quick journey on the road as well as in the appropriate terrain. The front pair of wheels should be controllable, while the drive should be done via the rear pair of wheels. Since these wheels do not exist on any drawing, the intended attachment – inside or outside the vehicle is unclear. When the vehicle was later implemented by Austro-Daimler and Saurer, these wheels were installed outside.

Motor vehicle device to cross obstacles:

Burstyn was protected by patent in Austria-Hungary and Germany. By means of a side arm lift powered from the engine, each of the booms with a mechanical clutch should be raised – or lowered. Thus, the motor gun tractor could have overcome trenches, as well as barbed wire entanglements, and other obstacles. At the same time, with this constantly present tractor lifter device, it would have been possible to carry out repairs to the chain or drive on an open field. Similar devices later appear on other vehicles; An almost identical concept was patented by the British company Vickers-Armstrong in 1929.

Armament:

The rapid-fire cannon in a rotating turret enabled the fight against artillery and other armored vehicles (the successes of German anti-tank guns later show that a 37mm cannon against British and French armored vehicles possessed enough penetration to kill them.). Added to this advantage was a high rate of fire. The space required for the small-caliber ammunition would have made a large supply of ammunition possible. The vehicle, while weakly armored, protected against infantry weapons and splinter effect.

The motor gun tractor was to be equipped with a 37mm rapid-fire cannon in a rotating gun tower. In addition, secondary armament in the form of two 7 mm machine guns can be assumed, although these are not present on the drawings.

Patent:

Burstyn_Motorgeschütz123.gif


"Armored cars, suitable for moving with motor traction not only on roads but also on rough terrain, characterized by suspension caterpillar tracks for getting around, by elevator and retractable wheels for driving on roads as well as by cantilever arms, which enable the armored car to cross wide trenches as well. "

– patent specification 252,815 [1]

Under number 53248, a patent was also granted in Austria-Hungary for the same system.

Conclusion:

The dimensions and performances would have roughly matched the later Renault FT, one of the best tanks of the First World War.

888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888

Comments: This is my opinion; your mileage might vary (and should, because I am not an expert on tanks.)

First of all, the load arm booms are an unnecessary and over-complicated engineering solution to ditch crossing. The British used fascines and the French used a ditching horn, both simpler and far more effective.

Second of all, the machine is underpowered. Twice the wattage per tonne might have been ideal.

Third of all, 4 mm of plate over the engine? Against the 6.5 Navy Lee of 1892, this machine would have been swiss cheesed. Not even 8 mm was enough. 12 mm minimum front and 8 mm sides.

Fourth of all, there is nothing in the patent drawings that suggests any thought was given to machine guns.

Fifth of all: the rearward facing driver is a bolo.

Sixth of all the track laying suspension is too short in length and appears too narrow in track width. Burstyn appears to not have considered ground floatation at all. Bog-tank it is, I think.

Is it better than the German A-7? Not by much; but it is a good start point for an eventual tank.
 
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If that is true, then strangely enough, the Navy did not do this type of War Plan.

The Kaiser, CinC of the KM, chaired the (8 dec 1912) meeting and Tirpitz as State Secertary of the Navy, von Muller of the Naval Cabinet and von Heeringen Chief of the Naval Staff were atendees alongside Moltke. The Navy was well across the political assumptions.

As a semi tangent, what was the German navy's mobilization plan? We know the plans of the major armies and the Royal Navy and to some extent how the RNs concept of operations (if not the mobilisation plan) changed in the few years before the war, but I don't know any specific plans for the German Navy.
 
The Kaiser, CinC of the KM, chaired the (8 dec 1912) meeting and Tirpitz as State Secertary of the Navy, von Muller of the Naval Cabinet and von Heeringen Chief of the Naval Staff were atendees alongside Moltke. The Navy was well across the political assumptions.

As a semi tangent, what was the German navy's mobilization plan? We know the plans of the major armies and the Royal Navy and to some extent how the RNs concept of operations (if not the mobilisation plan) changed in the few years before the war, but I don't know any specific plans for the German Navy.

There was planning after the Agidir crises.

Of note:

On November 5, 1912, the German Admiralty Staff submitted a revised plan, with updated assumptions, to Kaiser Wilhelm. The new document discussed the possibility that in a European war involving Germany and France, Britain would assume a waiting posture, so Germany would only have France and Russia as opponents. The staff claimed their assessment was the result of a newly arisen situation, but Germany could not be certain of British actions; they could not dismiss the possibility that Britain might ally with Germany’s opponents. Although the staff did not elaborate as to the specific situation, the timing suggests ministers in Berlin had interpreted several diplomatic initiatives as signs of a rapprochement. British overtures to Germany preceding the failed Haldane mission, and the British reaction to the Balkan wars appear to be the newly arisen situation to which the staff referred. Germany’s ministers found additional encouragement for their policies when Berlin and London resumed discussion over naval issues during 1913–14. Despite the fact that the status of the ratio between the German navy and the Royal Navy was still unresolved when war broke out in 1914, during that two-year period the pair had resolved their disagreements over the Baghdad railway, and London supported Berlin’s colonial acquisitions in southern Africa. Britain still, however, opposed German colonies in the Mediterranean and along the North African coast. Step by step, Germany and Britain came together on all of the issues discussed during the Haldane mission. This prodded the Wilhelmstrasse to believe that much progress had been made toward an accord with Great Britain. Tirpitz even claimed after the war that he had acquiesced to the fixed 6:10 shipbuilding ratio proposed by Churchill in February 1913. Historian Robert Massie disputes Tirpitz’ claim, pointing out that each nation had built the capital ships it could afford. Nevertheless, Berlin’s hopes that London would remain neutral in a Franco-German war were based on the history of their mutual relations over a decade, especially the years of improved relations beginning in 1911.

If that is true, then someone was smoking Turkish "tobacco" at the German admiralty.

As to nuts and bolts...

Beginning in 1904, Germany improved the military usefulness of its colonies. It had developed the ability to communicate with each of its colonies via submarine telegraph cables, but most of the cables were British owned. The German government exercised initiative by building modern port facilities and adding wireless telegraphy. Generous subsidies provided by Berlin helped build neat and thriving cities, such as Dar es Salaam in German East Africa, and Rabaul in German New Guinea. For access to independent and reliable communications, Berlin had wireless stations erected in these locations as well as other Pacific locations: Angaur (Caroline Islands), Apia (Samoa), Nauru, and Tsingtao (Kiao-chau). A series of relay stations—at Duala (Cameroons), Kamina (Togoland), Windhoek (German Southwest Africa), and Yap in the south Pacific—connected these more distant locations to the main transmitting station in Nauen, Germany. These stations provided global coverage with the exception of areas in the Indian Ocean and the southernmost Pacific Ocean. Germany planned major transmitting stations in Tabora (German East Africa) and Sumatra to fill in these gaps.

And of interest at least to me;

Germany’s improved port facilities in its colonies served as coaling stations and important communications links. They were not major naval bases as in Tsingtao, but in a pinch they could serve as support bases for naval operations. This increased Germany’s naval potential in geographic areas where the Royal Navy presence was weak. German naval planning leveraged this advantage.

Of course the German naval staff forgot the JAPANESE.

Germany’s plans for ships outside the North Sea became more elaborate over time. In the event of war with Great Britain, the East Asiatic Squadron was to attack Australia and to conduct cruiser warfare against British commerce along Australia’s northwestern coast, in the seas around Colombo, and in the China Sea. Cruiser warfare tactics stressed that ships were to operate in one area only for a short time and then move to another region, always evading large forces and attempting to retain the element of surprise. When Vice Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee assumed command of the East Asia squadron, his mission after April 1913 was to damage British shipping. His secondary mission was to attempt to divide British East Asiatic naval forces and defeat them in detail. In 1907, ships on the East African and West African stations were instructed to avoid being blockaded so they could conduct cruiser warfare. On the East American station, German cruisers were to intercept British food imports from Argentina. In 1909, guidance to vessels on the East American station changed to a more general task: intercept food imports to Britain coming from South America, the Caribbean Sea, and around the horn from Asia. The Admiralty Staff now considered the aging ships stationed in West Africa obsolete, so their orders directed the ships to proceed to the Brazilian coast to give up their guns to specified merchant ships that would become auxiliary cruisers.

Something to torque the Americans off, naturally;

Germany’s plans for ships outside the North Sea became more elaborate over time. In the event of war with Great Britain, the East Asiatic Squadron was to attack Australia and to conduct cruiser warfare against British commerce along Australia’s northwestern coast, in the seas around Colombo, and in the China Sea. Cruiser warfare tactics stressed that ships were to operate in one area only for a short time and then move to another region, always evading large forces and attempting to retain the element of surprise. When Vice Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee assumed command of the East Asia squadron, his mission after April 1913 was to damage British shipping. His secondary mission was to attempt to divide British East Asiatic naval forces and defeat them in detail. In 1907, ships on the East African and West African stations were instructed to avoid being blockaded so they could conduct cruiser warfare. On the East American station, German cruisers were to intercept British food imports from Argentina. In 1909, guidance to vessels on the East American station changed to a more general task: intercept food imports to Britain coming from South America, the Caribbean Sea, and around the horn from Asia. The Admiralty Staff now considered the aging ships stationed in West Africa obsolete, so their orders directed the ships to proceed to the Brazilian coast to give up their guns to specified merchant ships that would become auxiliary cruisers.

In summary, the German Navy wanted to force a concentration of British naval resources in the North Sea to expose the British global shipping network to commerce raiding. In home waters the KM planned to practice fleet in being, so they did not do any long-term planning for actual battle fleet support. This is astonishing as they did not lay in coal or lubricant, did not plan gunnery exercises or do the intensive maintenance for ship's machinery in the run-up to the war. What they did do, was attempt rather poorly to run a guerre de course as envisaged in their pre-1912 plan. The British kiboshed that by going after the fuel supply and masked colliers the Germans planned to use in their "global" war. Credit British naval intelligence for ferreting out the German plans on that one.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The Kaiser, CinC of the KM, chaired the (8 dec 1912) meeting and Tirpitz as State Secertary of the Navy, von Muller of the Naval Cabinet and von Heeringen Chief of the Naval Staff were atendees alongside Moltke. The Navy was well across the political assumptions.

As a semi tangent, what was the German navy's mobilization plan? We know the plans of the major armies and the Royal Navy and to some extent how the RNs concept of operations (if not the mobilisation plan) changed in the few years before the war, but I don't know any specific plans for the German Navy.

As far as I can tell, none. At one time, I had the UK fleet movements by for the first 3-4 weeks of the war. I looked for the unused German naval plan for an ATL, but could not find it. Might have put in in my U-boat ATL, might have done a separate one. It took them months to get the minefields right, things that should have been out in days. The usage of U-boats as scouts was timid and slow. Same for the Torpedo boats.

So the plan seemed to be sit in port, wait for UK to impose close blockade or attack Heligoland. Send out small ships at night to harass. Figure out the rest later. I guess you could call that a plan.

Shame too. If the defenses are setup quickly, some of the early UK actions might have ended badly. U-boats would have a potential to slow troop movements to Belgium. Once first Belgium anchorage is captured, smaller surface ships could be moved. Just having these ships out would cause the UK operation headaches, plus might have bagged a troop convoy. Or if want to hope UK does not enter war, there is the whole Baltic Coast of Russia to muck with. Shell harbors, shell RR bridges. Aland Islands are undefended.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Of course the German naval staff forgot the JAPANESE.
.

They also forgot to fortify these ports and transmission stations excluding Tsingtao. Forgot to stockpile items need to make AMCs. Forgot to stockpile small arms for AMC and locals. Forgot to give orders to the Merchants on where to go. Forgot to track the merchants. Forgot well over half the stuff needed to be done.

Now who knows, maybe given a couple more years, someone gets around to handling these details.
 
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