WI: Airborne Expeditionary Unit

Vehicles for airborne expeditionary unit?

  • LAV

    Votes: 3 21.4%
  • Stryker

    Votes: 7 50.0%
  • Humvee/JLTV

    Votes: 3 21.4%
  • ISV/MRZR

    Votes: 6 42.9%

  • Total voters
    14
Here's an interesting study from RAND about modernizing US airborne forces: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR309.html

Basically, their recommendation is to give some airborne units LAVs so they can operate as light armored units behind enemy lines. This gives the Airborne the ability to land farther away from the target and bypass enemy forces to strike over a much larger area. Currently, the Airborne's job is basically to drop within walking distance of the target, seize the target, and defend it until conventional units can link up.

The way I see it, there are three options for motorizing the Airborne:

1. Go with RAND's recommendation and use Strykers or LAVs. This option has the shortest range and requires the most airlift capacity. However, they provide good protection against all types of threats, and they can carry heavier weapons like the 25mm.

2. Use vehicles like the up-armored humvee or JLTV. These provide some protection against IEDs, small arms, and shrapnel. However, they require more fuel and they can't protect against accurate artillery, air attack, or anything heavier than an AK. You could also supplement this force with some LAVs or Strykers to add firepower

3. Use unarmored vehicles like the Infantry Squad Vehicle or MRZR to manuever. This would be the lightest option to airlift, and require the least amount of fuel to keep it going. However, these can only be used to ferry the unit to objectives. Anyone who tries to engage the enemy from one of there is toast. Just like option 2, this force could be supplemented with LAVs or Strykers.

A motorized or light armored airborne unit could be used for more missions than current airborne units, which can seize airfields for follow-on forces and that's about it. Giving the airborne wheels lets them take on missions that you might see a MEU doing OTL, like evacuating US nationals from hotspots or securing WMD sites.
 
Was unable to access the main article. Wanted to read on the logistics or service support structure of this sort of unit.

I recall the Army did have some light mech or armor units back in the day. Did all that go away with the Sheridan?
 
Was unable to access the main article. Wanted to read on the logistics or service support structure of this sort of unit.

I recall the Army did have some light mech or armor units back in the day. Did all that go away with the Sheridan?
The US Army as a whole had got rid of the Sheridan except for the 82nd Airborne. Sadly Air droppable tanks went away with the Sheridan.
 
All the light mech and armor went away with the Sheridan, the 82nd kept their vehicles longer than anyone else hoping for a replacement which never came.
The Army was looking at the M-8 Armored Gun System in the 1990's as a replacement for the Sheridan. It got cancelled in the late 90's, which I thought was a bad call; some strategically mobile armored vehicle made sense with the end of the Cold War. Army brass wanted to focus on the Future Combat System vehicle family, which also eventually got cancelled, too high tech and too expensive.

It looks like the Army is looking at light tanks again, they have awarded contracts to BAE and General Dynamics to build 12 prototypes each for evaluation with delivery by 2020. Of course, the Army won't call it a light tank but rather the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle.

I would have liked the Army to look at the Wiesel made by Rheinmetall AG for the German Army. Not a light tank, but more of an armored recon vehicle. The 82nd and 101st need something more than Humvee's or JTVs. If these new vehicles don't pan out; they need at least the equivalent of a Stryker or LAV.
 
I'm rather a fan of the MGS and similar wheeled tank destroyer like platforms, but in terms of supporting conventional mechanized and in the air mobile roles. Similarly, the original concept of Stryker brigades as strategically air mobils seems more sensible to me than trying to motorize the airborne as such. I voted for Stryker, but the more I think about it ISV/MRZR with a shift toward the airborne mission being seizing airfields to insert Stryker forces into less than full secure environments at least feels like a better use of resources.
 
The whole airborne concept is obsolete and relic of the 1930's and the only reason airborne units still exist is elite light infantry is still incredibly useful.
The no one is never ever going to try and do a opposed formation sized paradrop against a near peer adversary and if anyone (including the US) tried they would get slaughtered. A transport aircraft is the most vulnerable aircraft imaginable, one unsuppressed SAM system could take out the entire formation and by the time a SEAD campaign is 100% effective you don't need to do a paradrop.
For non peer adversaries a repeat of what the French did, seizing a bridgehead followed by transport aircraft flying in exploiting forces is viable but that doesn't require air dropped vehicles or a para force above company size. Outside special forces all "airborne" should be helicopter mounted air assault or wheeled vehicle equipped airmobile.
 
The only battle I could think of that involved a majority of airborne forces that resulted in a victory of the airborne side was the invasion of Crete in May 1941. Although the Germans did win it was Pyrrhic victory with the great loss of men, aircraft & equipment so much that afterwards they didn't use mass airborne attacks again in the war.
 
The US army publication Armor did have a thesis in creating such a force back in the 1970s/early 80s using the British CVR series as a basis, pretty much how the Soviets were using their BMDs. So the grunts would have had Spartans, backed up by more Spartans with TOW, Scorpion CVR with their 76mm guns, Samson ARVs pulling them out if the dirt and so on. The US also looked rather enviously at the Wiesel although I’m not so sure they’d be looking quite the same at it now (being as it’s so tiny there’s not much room for future proofing, extensive protection, etc). I’d go with something like the Supacat and the large scout vehicle they manufacture (name escapes me).
 
For non peer adversaries a repeat of what the French did, seizing a bridgehead followed by transport aircraft flying in exploiting forces is viable but that doesn't require air dropped vehicles or a para force above company size. Outside special forces all "airborne" should be helicopter mounted air assault or wheeled vehicle equipped airmobile.

That does lead me down an interesting path... How much can a helicopter air assault force realistically be mechanized? I almost wonder if quad-tiltrotors put us on the verge of making armour strategically air mobile and the next attempt at the original Stryker brigade concept being heliborne.
 
The whole airborne concept is obsolete and relic of the 1930's and the only reason airborne units still exist is elite light infantry is still incredibly useful.
The no one is never ever going to try and do a opposed formation sized paradrop against a near peer adversary and if anyone (including the US) tried they would get slaughtered. A transport aircraft is the most vulnerable aircraft imaginable, one unsuppressed SAM system could take out the entire formation and by the time a SEAD campaign is 100% effective you don't need to do a paradrop.
For non peer adversaries a repeat of what the French did, seizing a bridgehead followed by transport aircraft flying in exploiting forces is viable but that doesn't require air dropped vehicles or a para force above company size. Outside special forces all "airborne" should be helicopter mounted air assault or wheeled vehicle equipped airmobile.

I was thinking this quite loudly but wasn't brave enough to say it, so thank you.

Like most questions about military equipment, a question that should come up early on is "what are you going to do with it?". And these days, that question is quite hard to answer about airborne forces. I can't remember the last time a US unit did an actual parachute drop into a combat zone - Grenada, maybe, with dubious value - but there's precious few situations where doing that makes sense. It's utterly unnecessary for wogbashing, and utterly suicidal against an opponent who has to be taken seriously. We're talking a very specific level of utility here, where you absolutely have to land troops in strength all at once, there's no time to grab a port or airhead, the Marines aren't available, and airmobile or air assault forces just won't do, BUT the opposing force can't do anything about your transport aircraft overflying their territory OR cope with light infantry formations.

I'm not saying that para-dropped airborne forces are useless, mind you. It's just that the roles they are useful for don't seem to be those requiring motorised/mechanised/armoured forces, and I can't see why you'd want to change their TO&E if you already have these other formations anyway.

I guess my question is "what's the use case for this?". What missions would require this which are not already addressed adequately by other means?
 
That does lead me down an interesting path... How much can a helicopter air assault force realistically be mechanized? I almost wonder if quad-tiltrotors put us on the verge of making armour strategically air mobile and the next attempt at the original Stryker brigade concept being heliborne.

Tiltrotors are a massive game changer. Up until know the only niche for paradropping is if it's outside of helicopter range (e.g. Operation Serval), in every other scenario helicopters are safer and more precise. With air to air refueling, fast tiltrotors there that niche is gone. Also losing a full Osprey is a tragedy, losing a full C-17 is a catastrophe.
Once we get second gen tiltrotors with larger lift capacity then you can up armour, with first gen you're still restricted to light (JLTV class) vehicles.
 
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ut-air-droppable-usmc-lav-25-armored-vehicles
I found this article which is very relevant to this thread. The 82nd Airborne Division has reactivated it’s armored airborne unit with LAVs from the Marine Corps. The reason being that LAVs are Air droppable and are smaller than Strykers. This article dates from 2018.

I can’t help but think about the 1976 Entebbe Raid. The Israelis brought BTRs with them to Uganda. I think this is a mission for an American Airborne armored unit. The Ranger battalions are already tasked with airfield seizure. Why not augment the Rangers with a platoon of LAVs and create a heavy raiding force?
 
That does lead me down an interesting path... How much can a helicopter air assault force realistically be mechanized? I almost wonder if quad-tiltrotors put us on the verge of making armour strategically air mobile and the next attempt at the original Stryker brigade concept being heliborne.

The US Marines have done some paper analysis of this & come up with nothing they can use. In part there a deck & cube limit on the ships, in part the '2d generation' capacity tilt rotors are not in sight.
 
... I can't remember the last time a US unit did an actual parachute drop into a combat zone - Grenada, maybe, with dubious value - ...

The value on Grenada was two fold. It got several battalions of infantry on site fast, and they diverted & pinned the Cuban 'construction workers' so the single battalion of Marines nearby could overrun the rest of the island. The single marine BLT in range was not going to do the task single handed and the perceived situation did not allow bringing in more heloborne forces fast enough. In practical terms the Grenada operation was a combined arms effort, that used several capabilities, and speed, to turn a peer force into a out maneuvered and out gunned position of inferiority.

Warfare is best done by combining unlike capabilities to take advantage of their synergies & by that creating weaknesses or taking advantages of weaknesses within the enemy.
 
I'm not saying that para-dropped airborne forces are useless, mind you. It's just that the roles they are useful for don't seem to be those requiring motorised/mechanised/armoured forces, and I can't see why you'd want to change their TO&E if you already have these other formations anyway.

I guess my question is "what's the use case for this?". What missions would require this which are not already addressed adequately by other means?

While opposed para-landing is unlikely these days, suitably equipped airborne forces are still useful in opening another front for diversion or entrapment purpose. The US Army did conduct "airborne" armor operation in the 2003 Iraq War.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Airborne_Dragon

On 26 March 2003 the US Airforce flew from Aviano AB, Italy to Bashur Airbase in Northern Iraq and deployed 950 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, who then proceeded to secure the airbase. The airmobile force initially faced no resistance from the Iraqi army as it didn't have any units it could deploy to face the Americans. Once the airbase was secure US forces Two days later, American soldiers from the 501st Forward Support Company, and the 173d Airborne Brigade's, Supply Support Activity (SSA) arrived at Bashur Airfield.

On 7 April 2003 Task Force 1-63 was transported from Europe to Bashur Airbase along with 5 M1A1 tanks, 5 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and a battalion command post with satellite communications at Bashur Airbasetransported by C-17 Globemaster III as the reinforcements to the 173rd Airborne Brigade that had parachuted in earlier to secure the airbase from the Iraqi army. Once the airbase was secure the US airmobile forces and IRTF soldiers crushed organised Iraqi resistance in the north of the country by the 10th of April.

Such experience shows the potential of a motorized/ mechanized airborne force.
 
The value on Grenada was two fold. It got several battalions of infantry on site fast, and they diverted & pinned the Cuban 'construction workers' so the single battalion of Marines nearby could overrun the rest of the island. The single marine BLT in range was not going to do the task single handed and the perceived situation did not allow bringing in more heloborne forces fast enough. In practical terms the Grenada operation was a combined arms effort, that used several capabilities, and speed, to turn a peer force into a out maneuvered and out gunned position of inferiority.

Warfare is best done by combining unlike capabilities to take advantage of their synergies & by that creating weaknesses or taking advantages of weaknesses within the enemy.
Wow, nice summary...
 
Was unable to access the main article. Wanted to read on the logistics or service support structure of this sort of unit.

I recall the Army did have some light mech or armor units back in the day. Did all that go away with the Sheridan?
According to the article, it would take 35 C-17 sorties or 21 C-5 sorties to drop an LAV battalion if they dual-load paras and vehicles on the same aircraft.

A battalion task force would be 748 paras, including 388 dismounts, on 111 LAVs
  • A battalion headquarters with 2 C2 LAVs, a signals platoon, a medical platoon, a recce platoon, and 4 mortar LAVs
  • 3 rifle companies, each with 3 rifle platoons, 3 90mm assault guns, 2 mortar LAVs, a FST team, a medevac team, and 2 LAVs in the HQ section
  • A recce troop with 3 platoons, 2 mortar LAVs, and a 4-LAV HQ section
  • Engineer, anti-armor, and maintenance platoons from the brigade
Now what the article doesn't give is the resupply requirements for any sort of extended operations. Do you know how much a battalion-sized force would need?
I think this is a mission for an American Airborne armored unit. The Ranger battalions are already tasked with airfield seizure. Why not augment the Rangers with a platoon of LAVs and create a heavy raiding force?
That would've been a big help during OIF. They were spread across the country seizing three airfields, a suspected WMD site, the Haditha Dam, and rescuing Jessica Lynch for good measure. Light armor could've helped in most of those cases, but you'd need at least a platoon in every battalion. Plus, you still have the 173rd Airborne up by Erbil. Even if you just have an LAV battalion with the rest of the brigade in light-skinned vehicles, they could've raised hell as a raiding force in Saddam's northern flank
 
According to the article, it would take 35 C-17 sorties or 21 C-5 sorties to drop an LAV battalion if they dual-load paras and vehicles on the same aircraft.

A battalion task force would be 748 paras, including 388 dismounts, on 111 LAVs
  • A battalion headquarters with 2 C2 LAVs, a signals platoon, a medical platoon, a recce platoon, and 4 mortar LAVs
  • 3 rifle companies, each with 3 rifle platoons, 3 90mm assault guns, 2 mortar LAVs, a FST team, a medevac team, and 2 LAVs in the HQ section
  • A recce troop with 3 platoons, 2 mortar LAVs, and a 4-LAV HQ section
  • Engineer, anti-armor, and maintenance platoons from the brigade
That would've been a big help during OIF. They were spread across the country seizing three airfields, a suspected WMD site, the Haditha Dam, and rescuing Jessica Lynch for good measure. Light armor could've helped in most of those cases, but you'd need at least a platoon in every battalion. Plus, you still have the 173rd Airborne up near Mosul. Even if you just have an LAV battalion with the rest of the brigade in light-skinned vehicles, they could've raised hell as a raiding force in Saddam's northern flank

The most obvious problem would be the air transport capacity as C-17 has dual strategic and tactical role.
 
I was thinking this quite loudly but wasn't brave enough to say it, so thank you.

Like most questions about military equipment, a question that should come up early on is "what are you going to do with it?". And these days, that question is quite hard to answer about airborne forces. I can't remember the last time a US unit did an actual parachute drop into a combat zone - Grenada, maybe, with dubious value - but there's precious few situations where doing that makes sense. It's utterly unnecessary for wogbashing, and utterly suicidal against an opponent who has to be taken seriously. We're talking a very specific level of utility here, where you absolutely have to land troops in strength all at once, there's no time to grab a port or airhead, the Marines aren't available, and airmobile or air assault forces just won't do, BUT the opposing force can't do anything about your transport aircraft overflying their territory OR cope with light infantry formations.

I'm not saying that para-dropped airborne forces are useless, mind you. It's just that the roles they are useful for don't seem to be those requiring motorised/mechanised/armoured forces, and I can't see why you'd want to change their TO&E if you already have these other formations anyway.

I guess my question is "what's the use case for this?". What missions would require this which are not already addressed adequately by other means?

" wogbashing"?
 
According to the article, it would take 35 C-17 sorties or 21 C-5 sorties to drop an LAV battalion if they dual-load paras and vehicles on the same aircraft.

...

Now what the article doesn't give is the resupply requirements for any sort of extended operations. Do you know how much a battalion-sized force would need?

...

I don't have any docs/refrences on that from my service & am unsure if I can trust my memory. A battalion slice of a 'light' divisions US style, might be 55 tons per day. That would include artillery ammunition & other stuff for the division service group. But, what we are looking at is a battalion or brigade TF with a mission of 1-3 days. A days basic load of fuel, ammo, rations... each day. Perhaps the largest variable would be if artillery ammo must be supplied. That stuff is a weight hog. Really need someone with recent direct experience in logistics.
 
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