Wi/AHC: Serbia left alone in 1914

What would it take, and what would the effects be, of the UK, France and/or Russia refusing to defend Serbia from the Austro-Hungarian retaliation?
 
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The decision to defend the Serbs was made by the Russian government, and the French backed them up. The French President and Prime Minister were in St. Petersburg during the crisis, and at least the President was almost certainly consulted by the Russians. I don't think the British got involved until the decision to back the Serbs had been made.

There were massive strikes in St. Petersburg during that summer, and I don't think anyone but the Russian government officials themselves realized at the time (or still realizes) how much thin ice the Russians were on domestically. Had this been more widely known it would have affected decisions made in the other capitals. A lot of German strategy, both involving going to war in the first place and doing so when they did, and their strategy for prosecuting the war, was predicated on the "Russian steamroller" becoming a reality in 1916-17 as the French financed Russian military build-up, which included a large naval construction program, continued. This probably also affected the French strategy.

A lot of the Russian actions seem to have been for domestic reasons, for whatever reason the government decided that it would get into too much domestic trouble if it backed down. The POD could be that the Russian government backs down anyway, or the French don't support them. You can get this by changing some of the key personnel, for example a different French President than Poincare, substituting Calilaux for either Poincare or Viviani, or making changes to the Russian government, and you can do this as late as 1914 in some cases.

Other PODs would be quicker action by the Austro-Hungarian government, when people were still outraged by the assassination, or the alternative course of more restraint, such as they actually accept the Serbian response to the ultimatum, which would completely upset the Russian calculations. Another interesting idea is that the Austrian police get a huge break in their investigation definitely tying elements in the Serbian government to the assassination, though how involved the Serb government actually was is still controversial among historians. Or maybe the Serb moderates somehow being able to conduct their later IOTL purge of the Black Hand in July 1914 could defuse the crisis.

One thing that does not happen is either Germany or Austria-Hungary starting a general European war anyway. While Conrad was interested in a "preventive war" against Serbia or Italy, no one in Austria-Hungary wanted war with Russia, and they would accept humiliating Serbia without a war. The German military leaders did tell the government something on the lines of "if you are going to have a war with Russia (and France), make sure you have it now" However, the Germans also had domestic political opinion to worry about and couldn't start a preventive war if Serbia and Russia backed down and removed the excuse for one, as the civilians in the government starting with the Kaiser realized. Even Hitler couldn't get his war underway when the British and French backed down in 1938.

So the first interesting question is what happens domestically in Russia, and maybe we get the Revolution happening a few years earlier.
 
Its not generally noticed by historians, but every major European country was undergoing a serious domestic political crisis and facing a change of government in 1914. I already mentioned the strikes and the unrest in Russia. Here is a list of the other ones, in order of seriousness:

United Kingdom: crisis in Ulster involving an army mutiny that was taking up most of the governments time. The minority Liberal government was clearly on the way out.

France: the trial of Mme Caillaux. Without a war, you would have probably not gotten Caillaux sidelined or Jaures assassinated, with a strengthening of the French left.

Germany: big gains for the SPD in the most recent national elections, plus there was an embarrassing at least incident involving civil-military relations in Alsace. The Germans had just lost the naval arms race with the UK and were in the process of losing an arms race in Russia because of the difficulties of the federal government in getting the financing.

Austria-Hungary: not much worse than usual, but the Austrian parliament was suspended at the time.

Any of these could have led to domestic political changes, plus there was always the chance of another Russo-Turkish war breaking out.
 
The effects would be extremely unpleasant for Russia and the Entente in general. They would be making an impression of weakness and insecurity, throwing like 6 different countries into the Central Powers' sphere one way or another, and giving Germany a dangerous direct link to the Ottoman Empire.

Serbia (and, in all likelihood, Montenegro) is invaded, carved up, and violently subjugated. It is possible that Great Power interference restrains some of Austria-Hungary's excesses, but I wouldn't bet on it. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire are firmly locked down into the Central Powers' camp. Greece and Romania (and maybe even Italy) are intimidated by this display of CP strength, confidence and belligerence and Entente weakness and hesitation; they are forced to distance themselves from the Entente and drift into Berlin's orbit. The Balkan region pretty much becomes a Central Powers' playground.

Germany and Austria get a direct link to the Straits and beyond. Naturally, this places the Ottoman Empire (even more) firmly into the German camp...but that's not all.
Now Imperial Germany can easily supply and reinforce the Ottomans from Day 1 of any future war, tightening their grip on the Straits and making them more of a threat on the Anatolian-Caucasian front. (Remember that the Ottomans closing the Straits, and then successfully staying in the fight, was a key factor in the collapse of Imperial Russia in OTL. In this scenario, things would be even worse, by a whole order of magnitude.)
The new link also allows the Germans and the Ottomans to more easily proceed with their project of fomenting instability and rebellion among Russia's Muslim subjects, as well as Britain's and France's.

So yeah...the Entente is made to look weak and loses a bunch of allies, friendly neutrals, and neutrals while cementing the ties between its enemies. Germany gains considerable influence and a massive advantage. Drunk on success, the Central Powers probably become even more belligerent. If (when?) war breaks out anyway, the Entente will be in a really bad position; even if the expected improvements take place, they'll still be struggling to survive.

That would be the "WI" part. The "AHC" part - getting the Entente to allow Austria-Hungary's aggression - is very hard; because the statesmen were not unaware of the great dangers of this approach.
 
The idea the entire Balkans would fall into line behind Germany because of an Austro-Serbian war does not look like a sustainable narrative. The Balkans were filled with rivals looking to play the Powers off one another, not seeking an excuse to become the mindless vassals of one Power. As an Austro-Serbian war did not address the fundamental issues, (Entente vs. Central Powers), the Balkans would continue to play suitors as before.

Any Russian neutrality would be fragile, meaning that the further Austria embedded itself south of the Danube, the more dangerous Russia becomes. Hard terms with Belgrade meant a quagmire and a quagmire means Russian intervention with half the Austrian army out of position.

Nor were the "Austrians" some monolithic entity bent on vassalage to Germany via the provocation of the Entente. The empire valued Entente neutrality, wanted better relations with the Russians in particular, and would place that objective above the ambitions of a Conrad.

The Serbians themselves would put up a hell of a fight. No chance of victory for Austria in 1914 because their army cannot deliver and Bulgaria will be shopping around for the best offer well into 1915. How long can the Austrians possibly imagine Russian patience to last?

If the Germans can throw away their equipment and supplies in the Ottoman Empire, so much the better, as the French and British and Russians will face more poorly equipped Germans in the main fray.

What Germany "gains" is its ally in a quagmire of outrageous expense - the Central Powers emerge weaker, not stronger, the more Austria commits itself.

Any "dangers" to the Entente in a localized Austro-Serbia war being more along the lines to risking Entente internal cohesion than in any of the somewhat fanciful military repercussions listed. Serbia simply was not powerful enough militarily to matter, (which is why its defeat in 1915 did not matter in the great scheme).
 

BooNZ

Banned
What would it take, and what would the effects be, of the UK, France and/or Russia refusing to defend Serbia from the Austro-Hungarian retaliation?
...The Italian historian Luciano Magrini concluded from his interviews with key Serbian decision-makers and other witnesses to the events of those days that the Belgrade government had in effect decided to accept the ultimatum and avoid war. ‘It was thought that in the condition she was known to be in, Serbia could not be expected to do otherwise than yield to so terrible a threat.’ It was evidently in a mood of resignation that Pašić composed his telegram of 25 July to the Serbian missions declaring that Belgrade intended to send a reply that would be ‘conciliatory on all points’ and offer Vienna ‘full satisfaction’. This was unmistakably a major step back from Paču’s much firmer circular of two days before. A telegram from Crackanthorpe to Grey, dispatched just after midday on 25 July, confirms that at this point the Serbs were even willing to accept the notorious points 5 and 6 calling for a mixed commission of enquiry, ‘provided that the appointment of such commission can be proved to be in accordance with international usage’. Sleepwalkers, Christopher Clark

So A-H would be granted the mandate and tools to investigate the assassination and curb anti-empire rhetoric disseminated from the Serbian state.

Any Russian neutrality would be fragile, meaning that the further Austria embedded itself south of the Danube, the more dangerous Russia becomes. Hard terms with Belgrade meant a quagmire and a quagmire means Russian intervention with half the Austrian army out of position.
So what? If Britain has declared neutrality then the Schlieffen plan is off the table. British neutrality is likely to strengthen the pacific tendencies of the French socialists, who had won the French general election in May 1914. With a neutral Britain and France, Italy will definitely remain seated. Therefore, if Russia decides to fight, it will do so alone. How would the Russians cope against four German armies instead of one...

The Serbians themselves would put up a hell of a fight. No chance of victory for Austria in 1914...
Serbia had a tough and experienced little army, but it would be grossly mismatched in 1v1 against A-H. Serbia could decisively win every battle, but still lose the war before Christmas - even without inevitable intervention of the OTL shell crisis, Bulgaria or General Typhoid.

...because their army cannot deliver and Bulgaria will be shopping around for the best offer well into 1915. How long can the Austrians possibly imagine Russian patience to last?
In respect of Bulgaria, there is only one offer - free land, at the expense of a despised rival, at almost no risk. I would expect the Bulgarians to mobilise as soon as an accommodation has been reached with the Ottomans - OTL 19 August 1914.

What Germany "gains" is its ally in a quagmire of outrageous expense - the Central Powers emerge weaker, not stronger, the more Austria commits itself.
A-H is almost certain to win ugly, which is likely to provide the impetus to modernize its army and work more closely with German equivalents - glaring omissions OTL
 
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