WI/AHC: Get Germany to take defensive strategy in WW1.

What are you even talking about?
Gällivare exported their ore to Germany through world war one.
They did so otl, and there is no reason they wouldn't ttl.

It seemed you were saying that there was no guarantee that Sweden would continue to export as much iron ore to Germany. But I am glad that we seem to agree that Germany would gain all of the production of Gällivare.

As I've said repeatedly, the best course of action for Germany is not to go to war at all - certainly not an elective war (which 1914 certainly was). Any strategy Wilhelmine Germany pursues in an elective war carries serious risks.

Failing that: An East first strategy which leaves Germany on the defense in the West (which was essentially the dominating approach until Moltke the Younger becomes chief) requires looking at how the general staff evaluated the risks involved with that strategy - principal of which is, arguably, the loss of the iron mines of Lorraine, from whence Germany drew over 70% of its pre-war iron ore. All of which does not factor in the additional, ample iron production Germany gained by seizing Longwy-Briey in the opening weeks of the war in OTL.

The short answer is that Germany kept in reserve some months (I'm trying to track down my source on just exactly how much that was) of iron reserves which could get it over the hump of any temporary disruption of the Lorraine iron fields, which would accord with the idea of the Großer Generalstab to keep that area of Lorraine largely unfortified as "bait" to lure Joffre into a killing sack. It was risky, however. Even recapturing the mines might require some months to get them back into full production. So obviously, Germany must be prepared to make up the difference once its iron stocks run out. Severe economies and recycling in the domestic economy can, from what I can make out, only make a modest dent in the shortfall.

And the most obvious place to do this is in Sweden. The Reich already had call on all of Gällivare's production - but not Kiruna's. In OTL, most of that production ended up being shipped up to Narvik, for sale to the allies, after heavy British political pressure. But if the UK is neutral (even with an Entente "lean") Britain is not in the same position to lean hard on the Swedes, especially against what will be even heavier German pressure to gain *all* of Sweden's iron production.

Beyond that, Germany will have to look to other iron exporters to make up any difference. There were some modest sources in Russian Poland, in the Triasic basin and Kielce district, which will quickly fall into German hands. There are also the mines of northern Italy... Beyond that, fortunately, Germany is not facing a British blockade (at least not of trade), and this opens up other possibilities for trade. If French commerce raiding becomes too grave a threat, a lot can be shifted over to neutral hulls into, say, Italian and Dutch ports.

Likewise, being awash in iron ore is no guarantee of victory to Germany, as should be plain from our own history. Having firm control of Lorraine and Longwy-Briey comes at a horrifically high cost if it brings Britain (and in its wake, Italy and the U.S.) into the war against it. A cost which, in my view, is too much to pay.
 

Redcoat

Banned
As I've said repeatedly, the best course of action for Germany is not to go to war at all - certainly not an elective war (which 1914 certainly was). Any strategy Wilhelmine Germany pursues in an elective war carries serious risks.
Well I mean if Sweden allows Germany to take its imports, they're fine even if they lose Lorraine.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
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French taking Metz is worth Germans taking Warsaw. Most of German iron mines are west of Metz. With Metz gone, most of it is gone.
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So... since OTL they sent Germans *all* of their ore, ttl they'll... sent Germans exact same about, only that Germans won't have Metz? :noexpression:
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You do know, that the Lorrain, esp. Metz region ore and coal pits as well as the local metal works were out of commission for the first 3-4 month of the war at least IOTL anyway ?

First :
Thisregion was cleared of civilians, including 65.000 italian 'guest-workers' from 31stJuly - declaration of 'imminent Danger of War' - onwards ... causing the railway-admins quite some headaches. This was done as the region were earmarked for military action, deployment as well as potential fighting right there around the metal works and pits.
Second :
Lack of labour. Beside the removed italians most of the workers were drfated for military service, causing first the smaller companies to close at all, as they could not sustain work with the few workers left, same 'fate' came only a couple of weeks later also to the bigger companies. The allocation/re-allocation of the work-force was something that beagn to be adressed in october/november 1914, being only partially settled at first in spring 1915.

So much for the 'importance' of the Metz-area metalworks and ore-pits especially during the first 4-6 months.


edit :
as an aside ... almost no military at all, neither on the german side nor the entente side cared a dime for such 'economical reasoned targets', as the Mezt-area as well as the Briey-Longwy basin actually were ... as we know from hindsight and the teachings of two World Wars.
 
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as an aside ... almost no military at all, neither on the german side nor the entente side cared a dime for such 'economical reasoned targets', as the Mezt-area as well as the Briey-Longwy basin actually were ... as we know from hindsight and the teachings of two World Wars.

That's right, they didn't even consider the railway networks they and the enemy used constantly, as a tactical target during campaigns.
 
So much for the 'importance' of the Metz-area metalworks and ore-pits especially during the first 4-6 months.
edit :
as an aside ... almost no military at all, neither on the german side nor the entente side cared a dime for such 'economical reasoned targets', as the Mezt-area as well as the Briey-Longwy basin actually were ... as we know from hindsight and the teachings of two World Wars.

And you do hit a real nail on the head with our speculative hammer. Indeed I admit that I rely upon hindsight too much to guide me in seeing the long term value of Luxembourg, Longwy, Metz, etc. Although I try to let operations unfold and the impact is collateral, or example I think the French never actually aimed to disrupt the German steel industry but its invasion of Luxembourg and battles fought over that region would have a better impact than the operations themselves. It is the balance we need to recognize and acknowledge, our understanding has the benefit of history. As we pour over these real battles and speculate on others I think we can debate the effect but should not be easily persuaded the plans care at all if some iron mines are wrecked or saved, the war after all s won on the field not the factory floor. At least not until after Christmas.
 
Germany's advantage is that 1) Alsace Lorrraine is a narrow front, with neutral countries anchoring both ends, and this makes it easy for the Heer to attain sufficient density of troops for defense while still sparing an ample force structure for the East; 2) Alsace-Lorraine is superb defensive terrain for the most part, and Germany has spent years fortifying its key points.

Could Joffre manage to take some outlying fortifications (say, of Metz)? Sure. He'll pay for every square foot of ground in blood, though. As @NoMommsen notes, the French were not nearly as well provided in heavy siege guns as Germany was.
There are several issues with a defense of A-L, though these are important points and well-noted.

The Rhine Valley, and Rhine River itself, offers a superb opportunity for the French to bypass the Vosges and push northwards along the river. OTL, Mulhouse was taken by the French, and later abandoned to move men and materiel westward to halt the German offensive. The capture (and holding) of Mulhouse offers a good avenue for the French to begin pushing northwards along the Rhine, surrounding and dislodging the Germans from the Vosges, and from there taking Strasbourg.

Metz is a different story, but this is the most probable axis of a French offensive in Alsace past the early days, and the odds of it succeeding are not bad.
 
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Further, by 1912 the German military had become aware of the offensive nature of the Franco-Russian alliance and expected the French to launch offensives, especially if significant German forces headed east

Plan 17 wasn't exactly a State Secret
 
There are several issues with a defense of A-L, though these are important points and well-noted.

The Rhine Valley, and Rhine River itself, offers a superb opportunity for the French to bypass the Vosges and push northwards along the river. OTL, Mulhouse was taken by the French, and later abandoned to move men and materiel westward to halt the German offensive. The capture (and holding) of Mulhouse offers a good avenue for the French to begin pushing northwards along the Rhine, surrounding and dislodging the Germans from the Vosges, and from there taking Strasbourg.

Metz is a different story, but this is the most probable axis of a French offensive in Alsace past the early days, and the odds of it succeeding are not bad.
That's because Germany had only Landwehr and some reserve forces there, and the French failed miserably further north against active formations of the 7th Army. Even before the French withdrew to stop the German advance in Belgium they were pushed back when elements of the XIV and XV Corps were sent down to counterattack on 9 August.
 

BooNZ

Banned
There are several issues with a defense of A-L, though these are important points and well-noted.

The Rhine Valley, and Rhine River itself, offers a superb opportunity for the French to bypass the Vosges and push northwards along the river. OTL, Mulhouse was taken by the French, and later abandoned to move men and materiel westward to halt the German offensive. The capture (and holding) of Mulhouse offers a good avenue for the French to begin pushing northwards along the Rhine, surrounding and dislodging the Germans from the Vosges, and from there taking Strasbourg.

Metz is a different story, but this is the most probable axis of a French offensive in Alsace past the early days, and the odds of it succeeding are not bad.

Your assessment does not reconcile with the German military, which cited the lack of decent offensive options available to the French as a potential advantage of deploying more forces to the east, since it might encourage the French to attack in adverse circumstances. Nor does your assessment reconcile with the French military, with Joffre himself repeatedly advocating the violation of (awful) Belgium territory to execute his offensive doctrine. OTL the performance of French offensives failed to meet even those exceedingly modest expectations.

I look forward to hearing your revised opinion after you have completed reading chapter 2...
 

NoMommsen

Donor
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The Rhine Valley, and Rhine River itself, offers a superb opportunity for the French to bypass the Vosges and push northwards along the river. OTL, Mulhouse was taken by the French, and later abandoned to move men and materiel westward to halt the German offensive. The capture (and holding) of Mulhouse offers a good avenue for the French to begin pushing northwards along the Rhine, surrounding and dislodging the Germans from the Vosges, and from there taking Strasbourg.
...
Pls see also this post.

The capture and hold of Mulhouse after the second french attack into Alsac didn't really helped the french IOTL during the rest of the war.
Somehow the great Joffre as well as his successors didn't see this ... "opportunity" in a similar light, as you seems to do.
 
Pls see also this post.

The capture and hold of Mulhouse after the second french attack into Alsac didn't really helped the french IOTL during the rest of the war.
Somehow the great Joffre as well as his successors didn't see this ... "opportunity" in a similar light, as you seems to do.

On top of all this, an attack via Mulhouse up the Upper Rhine leads to...what?

Well, strategically, it doesn't lead to much of *anything*. It *might* as you say allow French forces to get behind the Vosges for a spell, but for any larger purposes, it's the ass end of Germany. It's not close to the Main, the Ruhr, Berlin, or Silesia, or anything else.

Secondly, it leads to the high danger that any force squeezing up that direction can be cut off.

Thirdly, the Germans are going to have more troops, better troops in Alsace than in OTL.

No, far more likely is that Joffre follows the main avenues of attack dictated by Plan XVII, which are up in Lorraine (and, perhaps, SE Belgium). But we've discussed that here already.
 
On top of all this, an attack via Mulhouse up the Upper Rhine leads to...what?

Well, strategically, it doesn't lead to much of *anything*. It *might* as you say allow French forces to get behind the Vosges for a spell, but for any larger purposes, it's the ass end of Germany. It's not close to the Main, the Ruhr, Berlin, or Silesia, or anything else.

Secondly, it leads to the high danger that any force squeezing up that direction can be cut off.

Thirdly, the Germans are going to have more troops, better troops in Alsace than in OTL.

No, far more likely is that Joffre follows the main avenues of attack dictated by Plan XVII, which are up in Lorraine (and, perhaps, SE Belgium). But we've discussed that here already.

As far as my reading has gone Joffre seems to prefer attacking on his left wing rather than pursue the right wing up the Rhine, if anything he seems to be quite accepting of the German invitation to drive into the center or try a flank through the Ardennes. I would bet he avoids even success at Mulhouse to strike further North instead, and if he is failing to push even more for the left wing flank. I would not even without hindsight but this is how Joffre appears to be biased and I do respect that. In every walk through on this I leave five Armies facing France as of August 1 through the 14th. Frankly that is sufficient to insure a draw unless Joffre gets some miracles I cannot foresee. But I concede that for Moltke a draw is equal to a defeat. Once we get into September things look far different.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
It's often stated, that Joffre ordered the first attack into Alsac more as a "propaganda" stunt, than a firm militarily founded operation.
The second might have played at least some role as a deterrent from the attack into Lorrain, though I doubt this was the main reason than retaliate for the "loss"/defeat just before.

I've never seen/read, that he had any intention to cross the Upper Rhine below Straßburg, which was a formidable, modern fortified region blocking any advance further north. Moltkes - as well as Scghlieffens btw - concept even allowed for the whole of Alsac up to named Straßburg to be - at first - "lost" to the french.
 
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